A THOUSAND TEACHINGS:
The *Upadesahasri* of Śaṅkara

Translated with Introduction and Notes
by

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Śaṅkara (700–750) has usually been regarded as the greatest philosopher of India since P. Deussen praised his philosophy and compared it with those of Parmenides and Kant. It has also been pointed out that, like Meister Eckhart, he was not so much a philosopher as a theologian. Śaṅkara was indeed a metaphysician or theologian, but, like Gotama Buddha and other great religious teachers, he was primarily concerned with the salvation of people suffering in transmigratory existence here in this present world and not with the establishment of a complete system of philosophy or theology.


As already stated in the Preface there, it is not my purpose to point out yet again the importance of the Upadesāsahasrī in the history of the Advaita Vedānta, which has been the main current of thought in India for many centuries. But it is perhaps necessary to describe briefly the character of the Upadesāsahasrī.

The Upadesāsahasrī consists of two parts, one in verse and the other in prose. The verse or Metrical Part (Padyabandha) comprises nineteen chapters (prakaraṇa). Manuscripts indicate that the two parts were regarded as independent works, as it were, and studied or commented upon separately. They also suggest the possibility that any single chapter could be selected, copied, and studied
apart from the rest. This means that reading of the text may begin anywhere.

In the Metrical Part, perforce translated here into prose, three kinds of meter are used, but the prevailing one is anusṭubh, which consists of 8 syllables to a quarter. Chapters 8, 10, and 19 are entirely composed in the sṛṣṭiṣṭhāṇa meter with 12 syllables to a quarter. This meter is also used in verses 41–50 of Chapter 14, verse 54 of Chapter 15, and verses 68–74 of Chapter 16. The only use of the vamsastha meter, which has 21 syllables to a quarter, is found in verse 81 of Chapter 17.

In the Metrical Part, the author discusses and repeatedly explains many basic problems of Advaita or “non-dualism” from different points of view, sometimes in the form of a dialogue. He first denies the validity of all kinds of action caused by ignorance (ajñāna). At the same time he asserts that knowledge (vidyā) is the remover of ignorance which is the cause of transmigratory existence (samsāra). He states that Ātman (Self) cannot be negated and explains the identity of Ātman with the Lord (īśvara). Again making clear the nature of actions, he points out the cause of delusion, sharply distinguishes Ātman from the intellect (buddhi) and declares that, from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramārtha), I (= Ātman) am the supreme Brahma, or absolute. The main topic is the great sentence (mahāāukṣyā) “tattvaṃ asī” (Thou art That), to which the longest chapter, the eighteenth, consisting of 230 verses, is devoted. All these subjects are not systematically expounded. The entire exposition is pervaded by the author’s firm faith in Ātman. He passionately refutes the teachings of other philosophical schools—Lokāyata, Buddhist, Jain, Śaṅkha, Vaiśeṣika, and so forth. This vigor of his polemic is easily seen in verse I, 16, 65: “As [their assumptions] contradict the scriptures and reasoning, they should never be respected. Their faults can be pointed out hundreds and thousands of times.”

The Prose Part opens, in a simple style, with the declaration that the author will explain how to teach the means of final release (mokṣa) for the benefit of the seekers after final release; the means is knowledge of the identity of Ātman with Brahma. He describes the qualifications of a pupil who is to receive an invitation to knowledge, and also the qualifications of a teacher: a pupil should be a seeker after final release (mumukṣu) while a teacher should already be released (muktā).

In the Vedānta school there are three stages in the attainment of final release: (a) hearing (śravaṇa), (b) thinking (manana), and (c) meditation (nididhyāṣṭana). They appear to correspond to the first, second, and third chapters, respectively, of the Prose Part. In the first chapter the teacher expounds to a pupil the purport of the scriptures using numerous citations from both the revealed texts (ātruti) and the traditional texts (āpruti). In the second chapter the pupil reflects on the the purport of the scriptures over and over again by means of his own reasoning and by discussing with the teacher such fundamental themes as nescience (avidyā) and superimposition (adhyātma). The third chapter describes the parināma meditation.

The Prose Part must have been written on the basis of Śaṅkara’s practical and pedagogical experiences. The question and answer exchanges between a teacher and his pupil in the Prose Part probably were based upon such interchanges between the author and his disciples. The Prose Part is a handy guide for teachers, while the Metrical Part is, as it were, a textbook for the pupils.

Four years have already passed since the publication of my edition of the text, though I had intended to publish the translation without delay. One of the reasons for this delay was the fact that there was nobody who could look over my English, which is not my mother tongue. Fortunately Mr. Trevor Leggett, who is not only a specialist in Japanese Buddhism and culture but also versed in Śaṅkara’s philosophy, kindly read the manuscript of this translation and suggested changes in English expression. Without his warmhearted cooperation this translation could not have been completed. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to him.

Thanks are also due to Dr. Marie G. Wanek, my former student in Indian philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, who also helped me improve my English translation.

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March 26, 1977

Sengaku Mayeda
Notes to the Preface


The Upad has been translated into modern Indian languages such as Marathi, Bengali, Kanarese, and Hindi:

(a) Śaṅkaraḥ-kti-Upadesāsahārī, Marāṭhāḥkértā, ed. by Sītārāma Mahādeva Phadake. Poona: Bhāratabhūṣāna Prāsa, 1911.


(c) Prakranaṇaḥ, Ṣaṅṣāṭi I. (Upadesāśāhārī, Gopāl, Pāḍa; Aparakṣāṇukūṭī; Advait-tīkā), by Śrī Saccidānandaśārasvātī. Hōlenāraṇaṭā, 1949.


There is an English translation of the whole text of the Upad:


This is based upon Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s commentary, Padayojana, than to the original, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Philosophy East and West, vol. 12, no. 3, 1962, pp. 261–263).

There is a German translation of the Prose Part of the text:


This is based upon the text contained in the Minor Works of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1952). It is a very reliable translation and its footnotes are useful.

The eighteenth chapter of the Metrical Part has been translated into English and French:


This is based on D. V. Gokhale’s edition: Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Upadeśaḥāraḥ with the Gloss Padayejojanaḥ by Śrī Śrīma Rāmānuja (Bombay: The Gujarati Printing Press, 1917).

(h) Guy Maximilien, Tatwaṇaṇa de Śāṅkara: Texte avec introduction, traduction et notes (Thése de troisième cycle en Sorbonne, 1974, unpublished).


In preparing my English translation I have taken the above listed translations in European languages into consideration. In addition, I consulted the following three commentaries on the text:

(i) Ṭanajaṇana’s Upadeśaḥāraḥ (alias Upadeśaḥāraḥtriṃśī)—this is unpublished. The manuscript 2552 (Eggeling 2279) in the India Office Library (London) has been utilized.

(ii) Bodhindu’s Upadeśaḥāraḥ-granthadiśanā—this is unpublished and comments on the Metrical Part alone. The manuscript 776 (TR 164) in the Adyar Library (Madras) has been utilized.

(iii) Ṛāmatirha’s Padayejojanaḥ—this has been published several times in India (see Mayeda Upad, pp. 19–21).

For descriptions of the printed editions of the text, see Mayeda Upad, pp. 19–21.

The full title of the text is Sakalavedopaniṣatopadesasahasri or “A Thousand Verses of Teachings, which is the Essence of all the Upaniṣads of the Veda”; this title appears in colophons of manuscripts and printed editions of the text. Cf. Mayeda Upad, p. 68, note 11.

The formation of the text is described in Mayeda Upad, pp. 65–68.

This is based upon Brḥ.UP. II,4,5 (= IV,5,6): ātmā vā are draśtyāṁ śrotamya man-tayō nīdaśyaśtanayō (Ātman should be seen, heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon). In his Vedāntaśāstra [XXX] 196 Sadananda adds one more stage called “concentration” (samādhi).

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<td>Ait. Up.</td>
<td>Aitareya Upanisad</td>
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<td>BhG</td>
<td>Bhagavadgītā</td>
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<td>Brh. Up.</td>
<td>Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad</td>
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<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Brahma-sūtra</td>
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<td>BSBh</td>
<td>Śaṅkara, Brahmatārthabhaṣya (Bombay: Nīrṇaya-Sāgar Press, 1934)</td>
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<td>BUBh</td>
<td>Śaṅkara, Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣadabhaṣya (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, vol. 15, 1939)</td>
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<td>Chānd. Up.</td>
<td>Chāndogya Upanisad</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBh</td>
<td>Śaṅkara, Bhagavadgītābhāṣya (Bombay: Nīrṇaya-Sāgar Press, 1936)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GK</td>
<td>Gauḍapādā, Gauḍapādiyakārikā (see GKBh)</td>
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<td>GKBh</td>
<td>Śaṅkara, Gauḍapādiyabhāṣya (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, vol. 10, 1900)</td>
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<td>Kāṭh. Up.</td>
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<td>Kauṣ. Up.</td>
<td>Kauṣṭikā Upanisad</td>
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<td>Māṇḍ. Up.</td>
<td>Māṇḍūkya Upanisad</td>
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<td>Manu</td>
<td>Manusmṛti</td>
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<tr>
<td>M.N. Up.</td>
<td>Mahānārāyaṇa Upanisad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nais</td>
<td>Śureśvara, Naiṣkarmyasiddhi (The Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi of Sureśvara, with the Candrikā of Jñānottama, edited with notes and index by the late Colonel G.A. Jacob and revised with introductory and explanatory notes by M. Hiriyanna. Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. XXXVIII, 1925)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBh</td>
<td>Śaṅkara, Padabhāṣya (The Kena Upanishad with Śrī Shankara’s Commentaries, ed. by Śrī Swami Saccidanandendra Sarasvatī. Holenarasipur: Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, 1959)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Praś. Up.</td>
<td>Praśna Upanisad</td>
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<tr>
<td>SŚ</td>
<td>Sarvajñātman, Śaṅkṣepaśārtaka (The Śaṅkṣepaśārtaka of Sarvajñātman, Critically edited with English Translation, Notes and Indexes by N. Veezhinathan. Madras: University of Madras, 1972)</td>
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<td>Śvet. Up.</td>
<td>Śvētāsvatara Upanisad</td>
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<td>Taitt. A.</td>
<td>Taittirīya Aranyaka</td>
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<td>Taitt. Up.</td>
<td>Taittirīya Upanisad</td>
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<td>Unters</td>
<td>P. Hacker, Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaitavāda, I. Die Schüler Śaṅkaras. Mainz: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, 1950)</td>
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<td>Up.</td>
<td>Upaniṣad</td>
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<td>Upad</td>
<td>Śaṅkara, Upadeśasāhasrī (see Mayeda Upad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Dharmarāja Adhvarin, Vedāntaparibhaṣā (Vedāntaparibhaṣā by Dharmarāja Adhvarin, ed. with an English Translation by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri. The Adyar Library Series, No. 34, 1942)</td>
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<td>WZKSO</td>
<td>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens</td>
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I. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ŚAṆKARA

There are many works which profess to be biographies of Śaṅkara.¹ The most famous of all is the Śaṅkaradigvijaya, written by Vidyāranya in the fourteenth century.² All these biographies were composed hundreds of years after Śaṅkara’s death and are filled with legendary stories and incredible anecdotes, some of which are mutually contradictory. Today there are no extant materials from which to reconstruct his life with certainty.

Setting the date of Śaṅkara’s birth is probably one of the most controversial problems in the history of Indian philosophy, not only because he is one of the greatest Indian philosophers but also because a solution is inseparable from the correct understanding of one of the most important and critical periods of the history of Indian thought. It has been customary to adopt the birth and death dates asserted by K. B. Pathak in 1882,³ 788 and 820, but these dates have no firm basis. After reviewing and criticizing all the conflicting opinions, Hajime Nakamura proposed in 1950 that the dates should be shifted to 700–750.⁴ This view has been accepted by such scholars as L. Renou⁵ and D. H. H. Ingalls.⁶

During the fifth and sixth centuries the Huns invaded India from the central Asian steppes, and the political system of the Gupta empire, under which India had enjoyed her golden age of classical culture, was completely broken up in the sixth century. In the seventh century King Harṣa restored peace in North India, but after his death India fell into chaos again. Thus Śaṅkara was active in composing his works and propagating his teachings dur-
ing an era of political division and social unrest in India; Bud-
dhism was on the wane and Hinduism on the rise.

Tradition says that Śāṅkara was born into a pious Nambūdīri Brahmin family in a quiet village called Kālāḍi on the banks of the Čaṇḍa (or Čanda, Periyaru) River in Kerala, South India. He is said to have lost his father, Śivaguru, early in his life. Śāṅkara renounced the world and became a saṃnyāsin (ascetic) against his mother’s will, and went to Govinda (670–720) to receive instruction. No reliable information about Govinda is available, but he is traditionally said to have been a pupil of Gaudapāda (640–690). Gaudapāda is notable as the author of an important Vedanta work, Gaudapad ātyakārikā, in which the influence of Mahāyāna Buddhism is evident and, especially in its last chapter, even dominant.

It is said that Śiva, one of the principal gods in Hinduism, was Śāṅkara’s family deity and also that he was, by birth, a Śākta, or worshipper of Śakti, the consort of Śiva and female personification of divine energy. Later he came to be regarded as a worshipper of Śiva and even as an incarnation of Śiva himself. But his doctrine is very far removed from Śaivism and Śāktism. It can be ascer-
tained from his works that he had some faith in, or was favorable to, Vaiṣṇavism. It is likely that he was familiar with Yoga, since he is the author of the Yogasūtrabhasyavivarana, the exposition of Vyāsa’s commentary on the Yogasūtra, a basic text of the Yoga school. A recent study, though not fully acceptable, has suggested that he was first an adherent of Yoga and later became an Advaitin.

Biographers narrate that Śāṅkara first went to Kāśi (Vārānasi), a city celebrated for learning and spirituality, and then travelled all over India, holding discussions with philosophers of different creeds. His heated debate with Maṇḍanamīśra, a philosopher of the Mīmāṃsā school, whose wife served as an arbiter, is perhaps the most interesting of the episodes reported in his biography and may reflect a historical fact: keen conflict between Śāṅkara, who regarded the knowledge of Brahman as the only means to final release, and the Mīmāṃsā school, which emphasized the performance of ordained duty and the Vedic rituals, and to which belonged eminent philosophers such as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Prabhākara, and Maṇḍanamīśra. It is traditionally believed that Kumārila was Śāṅkara’s senior contemporary and that Prabhākara was Kumārila’s pupil, though he later established the Prabhākara school in opposition to his teacher. Maṇḍanamīśra was another contemporary who held Advaitic views different from Śāṅkara’s. It has been remarked that “during the age of Śāṅkara and for some centuries following it, Maṇḍana’s authority on questions relating to Advaita was recognized to be at least as high and important as that of Śāṅkara himself.”

Śāṅkara would not teach his doctrine to city dwellers. In cities the power of Buddhism was still strong, though already declining, and Jainism prevailed among the merchants and manufacturers. Popular Hinduism occupied the minds of ordinary people while city dwellers pursued ease and pleasure. There were also hedonists in cities, and it was difficult for Śāṅkara to communicate Vedanta philosophy to these people. Consequently he propagated his teachings chiefly among saṃnyāsins, who had renounced the world, and intellectuals in the villages, and he gradually won the respect of Brahmins and feudal lords. He made enthusiastic efforts to restore the orthodox Brahmancial tradition, without paying attention to the bhakti (devotional) movement, which had made a deep impression on ordinary Hindus in his age.

It is very likely that Śāṅkara had many pupils, but we know only four from their writings: Padmapāda, Suresvara, Toṭaka (or Troṭaka), and Hastāmalaka. Padmapāda wrote a commentary on Śāṅkara’s commentary on the first four sūtras (aphorisms) of the Brahma-sūtra, called Paṅcaśādikī, on which in the middle of the tenth century A.D. Prakāśatman composed a commentary entitled Paṅcaśādikāvivarana. The Vivarana school which Padmapāda started was the most influential among the later Advaitins until it was overshadowed by the Bhamatī school. Suresvara is known as the commentator on Śāṅkara’s commentaries on the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and the Taittiriya Upaniṣad. His independent work Naśkarmyasiddhi is “intended to reiterate the views embodied in the Upadesāhasīrī” of Śāṅkara. Toṭaka and Hastāmalaka are the authors of the Śrutisārasamdṛśāhana and the Hastāmalakaślokaḥ, respectively, but their influence upon the development of the Advaita Vedānta seems to be negligible.

It is also traditionally believed that Śāṅkara founded four monasteries (matha), at Śrīgeri (Śrīgerimatha, South), Puri...
(Govardhana-maṭha, East), Dvārakā (Śaradā-maṭha, West), and Badarinātha (Jyotirmāṭha, North). The most important of the four is the one at Śrīgeri in Mysore Province. In founding monasteries he was probably inspired by the Buddhist vihāra (monastery) system.²⁴ In any case, the monasteries must have played a significant role in the development of his teachings into the leading philosophy of India.

More than three hundred works—commentaries, expositions, and poetry—are attributed to him.²⁵ Most of them are not accepted as authentic.²⁶ His masterpiece is the Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya, the commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, which is the fundamental text of the Vedānta school. In fact, we should define Śaṅkara as the author of the Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya, and use it as the yardstick against which to measure the authenticity of other works ascribed to him.²⁷ Śaṅkara also wrote commentaries on the Bhādhāranyaka, Chāndogya, Aitareya, Taittirīya, Kena,²⁸ Iśā, Kaṇṭha, Maṇḍaka, Praśna, and Maṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.²⁹ Those commentaries are probably all genuine, but the commentary on the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, which is traditionally ascribed to him, may be spurious.³⁰ The commentaries on the Gaṇḍapādyakārika and the Adhyātyamapajala of Āpiṣṭamakhaṇa Dharmaśūtra seem to have been written by Śaṅkara himself.³¹ As I have already mentioned, he is probably the author of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya nāvanarāṇa.³² These works are all commentaries on one or another text. The Upadeśasāhasri, which is translated here, is the only non-commentarial work whose authenticity has been conclusively demonstrated.³³

Penetrating insight, analytical skill, and lucid style characterize Śaṅkara’s works. He cannot be called a particularly original philosopher,³⁴ but it has to be remembered that in India it is not originality but fidelity to tradition which is the great virtue. He was an excellent exegete, with an approach to truth which was psychological and religious rather than philosophical.³⁵ He was really not so much a philosopher as a pre-eminent religious leader and a most successful religious teacher. His works show him to have been not only versed in the orthodox Brahmanical traditions but also well acquainted with Mahāyāna Buddhism, so much so that he was often criticized as a “crypto-Buddhist” (pratibhannabuddha) by his opponents because of the similarity between his doctrine and Buddhism. Against this criticism, it should be noted that he made full use of his knowledge of Buddhism to attack Buddhist doctrines vigorously, or to assimilate them into his own Vedāntic nondualism, and he made great exertions to “revedantize” the Vedānta philosophy, which had been made extremely Buddhistic by his predecessors. The basic structure of his philosophy is nearer to Saṅkhya, a philosophic system of nontheistic dualism, and to the Yoga school, than to Buddhism.

It is said that Śaṅkara died at Kedārānātha in the Himalayas. The Advaita Vedānta school he founded has always been pre-eminent in the learned circles of India. His doctrine has been the source from which the main currents of modern Indian thought are derived.

Notes to Introduction, I


² Editions: (1) Bombay: Gaṇpat Kṛṣṇajī’s Press, 1864; (2) Anadasrama Sanskrit Series, vol. 22 (Poona), 1891; (3) Hardwar: Śrī Śrāvaṅga Śiśupalīmāndar, 1943—this edition contains a Hindi translation by P. Baladeva Upadhyaya; and (4) Śringeri: The Śringeri Matha, 1956. The first chapter of the Saṅkararājaśīrṣṭi was translated into German by P. Deussen in his Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, 1, 3 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1906), pp. 181-189.

³ Indian Antiquary, XI (1882), pp. 174-175.


⁷ The Nambūḍiris are the only original Brahmins of Kerala, whose origins cannot be traced back outside Kerala. Even today they form a unique community among the many kinds of Brahmins in India, preserving some of the ancient Vedic and early
post-Vedic traditions and rites which are extinct elsewhere. It is of interest to note that insofar as they adhered to any philosophical system at all, it was to the Brāhma school of Pūrva Mimamsā, which Śaṅkara severely attacked in his works. It was said that Advaita was adopted by many Nambūdiris only after having become quite popular in other parts of India. See J. F. Staal, “Notes on Some Brahmin Communities of South India,” Art and Letters, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, vol. XXXII (1958), no. 1, pp. 1–7.

At present there is a walled enclosure overlooking the ghat in Kālīghat which contains sites known traditionally as Śaṅkara’s birthplace, the place where his house stood, and the place on which the remains of his mother were cremated. This compound also contains two shrines, the Śrāddhā and the Śaṅkara, and a pāthāśālā which offers instruction in Veda and Vedānta in a traditional way.

Nakamura III, p. 244.

Tradition has it that Govinda was the author of the commentaries on the Chānd. Up., Deśasthātyā, and BS, though they are not extant. He is also reported to have written the Yogasthātyā, which is unpublished. See M. Ranjgāryā, The Sāraa-Siddhdte-to-Sātrashe of Śaṅkara-Śrīryā (Madras: Government Press, 1909), p. viii; Nakamura III, pp. 244–247.

In his paper (Adyar Library Bulletin, vol. XXIV, pts. 3–4, pp. 125–140) K. K. Raja assigns Gauḍapāda to the fifth century A.D. and denies the tradition that makes him a parama-guru of Śaṅkara, interpreting the Sanskrit term as “supreme preceptor” instead of the more usual “teacher’s teacher.” See T. M. P. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita (Madras: University of Madras, 1960), pp. 15–16. Nakamura, on the other hand, regards him as an editor of the Kāriktā rather than its author and accepts the tradition that he was Śaṅkara’s teacher’s teacher. See Nakamura III, pp. 589–602.


See Nakamura III, p. 531; F. Hacker, “Relations of Early Advaśitas to Vaśāyanī,” WZKSO, vol. IX (1965), pp. 147–154. This may be related to the fact that Śaṅkara pays the highest regard to the BhG among the non-Vedic texts (see S. Maya-da, “The Authenticity of the Upadéśashari Ascribed to Śaṅkara,” JĀOS, vol. 85, No. 2, 1965, pp. 187–188; Mayeda Upad, p. 44). It should be noted here that a large percentage of the present Nambūdiris (see note 7) have Nārāyaṇa for their individual name, that the name Nārāyaṇa is very sacred to them, and that the most famous temple of Kerala is the Guruvāry temple where Kṛṣṇa is worshipped and whose priests are drawn only from particular Nambūdiri families. Cf. J. F. Staal, Art and Letters, India, Pakistan, vol. XXXII (1958), no. 1, p. 5.

See note 32, below, and Introduction, III, B, note 63, pp. 64–65.


See Upad I, II, and its notes 3 and 6.

P. Hacker, Unters.


M. Hiriyanna, The Śaṅkara-Siddha of Sureśvara-Śrīryā, p. viii.


Cf. Th. Aufrecht, Catalogus Catalogorum.

In India it has been a common practice to lend a book authenticity by attributing it to a famous author. Besides, all the heads (jagadgūtra) of the Śrīgera-maθa have had the title Śaṅkara-cārya, and any literary or philosophical work written by any of these heads could legitimately be called a work of Śaṅkara-cārya. Cf. K. K. Raja, Adyar Library Bulletin (vol. XXIV, pts. 3–4, pp. 127–128. It is thus not easy to decide which works were really written by our Śaṅkara. P. Hacker pointed out that Śaṅkara’s contemporaries had styled him Bhagavat, Bhagavatpada, and Bhagavatpājyapada and that the BS this is invariably ascribed to Śaṅkara-Bhagavat, Bhagavatpada, or Bhagavatpājyapada in the colophons. From this fact he concluded that “we are entitled to regard provisionally as genuine those works that are actually attributed to Śaṅkara in the colophons, whereas all the works that are usually attributed to Śaṅkara in the colophons are suspicious of being spurious” (P. Hacker, “Śaṅkara-cārya and Śaṅkara-bhagavatpājyapadā,” New Indian Antiquary, vol. IX, 1947, pp. 182–183). He applied this method and concluded that all the commentaries on the Prasthānakarṣṭa are genuine. But he denied the authenticity of the Śvadīśvāra-pājyapada in its present form. Cf. P. Hacker, WZKSO, vol. XII–XIII (1968/1969), p. 147.

Cf. Mayeda Upad, p. 22.

There are two commentaries on the Kenopaniṣad which are ascribed to one and the same author, Śaṅkara; one is entitled Paśadābhāsya, and the other Paśadābhāsya. Both of them seem to be genuine. See S. Maya-da, “On Śaṅkara’s Authorship of the Kenopaniṣad,” Indo-Iranian Journal, vol. X (1967), no. 1, pp. 33–55.
II. ŚAṆKARA’S CENTRAL DOCTRINE  
AND  
HIS POSITION IN THE HISTORY  
OF THE VEDĀNTA

All the systems of Indian philosophy, including materialism (Lokāyata), Jainism, and Buddhism, have as their ultimate objective the attainment of final release (mokṣa) from transmigratory existence (samsāra), a fact which Western philosophers have not always appreciated. In India philosophic speculation is simply a practical means to the goal. It is pursued out of a deep craving for the realization of the religious purpose of life, though, of course, there are considerable differences of degree in earnestness and enthusiasm among Indian philosophers and thinkers.

It was the knowledge of Brahman, the absolute, that Śaṅkara taught to his followers over and over again. The teaching that Atman, one’s inner Self (pratyagātman), is wholly identical with Brahman is not only the starting point of his philosophy but also its goal. Śaṅkara’s central doctrine is Atman’s identity with Brahman; this truth arrived at by Upaniṣadic thinkers was the culmination of the serious quest for universal truth which Rgvedic poet-thinkers had first begun probably before 1000 B.C. In Śaṅkara’s view the knowledge of this truth is the means (sādhana) to final release. He says:

When the knowledge (vidyā) [of Brahman] is firmly grasped, it is conducive to one’s own beatitude and to the continuity [of the knowledge of Brahman]. And the continuity of knowledge [of Brahman] is helpful to people as a boat is helpful to one wishing to get across a river. (ādhyātmaḥ hi vidyātmanāḥ sātvate  satyāt ca bhavati | vidyāsantatitā ca pṛthvyanugrahāya bhavati navāvāvā nam raśita naddī tīrīṣhōḥ—Upad II,1,3)

Philosophy is not his aim but is rather a vital weapon with which
to fulfil his aim, which is to rescue people out of transmigratory existence. Logic and theory are subordinate to this end.

Śaṅkara is an epoch-making reformer of the Vedānta school of philosophy, the founder of which is traditionally said to be Bādarāyaṇa (100–1 B.C.). Bādarāyaṇa is regarded as the author of the Brahmaśītra which, together with the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā, constitute the threefold canon (prasthānatraya) of the Vedānta school.

Though the Brahmaśītra is attributed to Bādarāyaṇa, it cannot be considered a work composed by a single author; it was based upon about 700 years’ activities by many scholars, and was given its present form probably around 400–450 a.d. Before the composition of the Brahmaśītra there must have been different interpretations of the Upaniṣads and various theories on metaphysical problems related to the Upaniṣads, which latter contain diverse, even mutually contradictory, and unsystematized teachings. The Brahmaśītra summarized, arranged, criticized, unified, and systematized these different or conflicting interpretations and theories.

In consolidating the Vedāntic position, the Brahmaśītra made a special point of refuting the dualism of the then prevailing Śaṅkhya school which posited Puruṣa (Spirit) and Prakṛti (Matter) as the independent ultimate causes of the Universe. The Brahmaśītra maintained instead that Brahma alone is the absolute ultimate cause of the Universe. Thus the Brahmaśītra characterized Vedānta as a monistic system devoted to inquiry into Brahma (brahmaśīṣṭa, BS I,1,1). This characterization distinguished the Vedānta not only from the Śaṅkhya, which is of all the Indian philosophic systems doctrinally most akin to it, but also from the sister system, Mimāṃsā, which has dharma as the object of its inquiry.

The most crucial problem among the Vedāntins is the relationship between Brahma, or absolute, and the individual Self, Ātman. Controversy concerning this problem led to the splitting up of the Vedānta school into many minor schools. The Brahmaśītra indicates that at the time of its composition this was already a significant problem. Today it is generally accepted that the central doctrine of the Upaniṣads is the identity of Brahma and Ātman. The Brahmaśītra, however, declares that the individual Ātman is a portion (aprīta) of Brahma (BS II,3,43). According to Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja, the three commentators on the text, this theory is based upon Bhagavadgītā XV,7. The individual Ātman is different from Brahma (nāma, BS II,1,3,43; vaiśeṣya, BS I,2,8; bheda, BS II,1,22) but it is also described as non-different (vaiveśeṣya, BS III,2,25). This fact indicates that the Brahmaśītra stands in the line of difference-and-non-difference (bheda-abheda), although this technical expression is not used in the text. As the Brahmaśītra itself suggests (BS III,2,27), it is probable that the above view reflects an intention to synthesize two contradictory teachings in the Upaniṣads, one being the teaching that the individual Ātman is different from Brahma and the other that of their non-difference.

During the period between the Brahmaśītra and Śaṅkara the Vedānta experienced a significant transformation. There was a buddhification of the Vedānta tradition. In this period the Gaudapādiyakārikā, which is traditionally ascribed to Gaudapāda, was composed, comprising four chapters (prakaṇa), ostensibly to explain the Māndukyopaniṣad. Modern scholarship has revealed that the Māndukyopaniṣad already shows Buddhist influence and that the Gaudapādyakārikā is a work greatly influenced by Buddhism; each succeeding chapter of the Gaudapādyakārikā is more Buddhistic than that preceding it. It seems to me that the Māndukyopaniṣad and the four chapters of the Gaudapādyakārikā represent five stages of increasing Buddhist influence upon the Vedānta tradition. The fourth chapter, which constitutes nearly half of the whole text, has hardly anything to do either with the Upaniṣads or with the Brahmaśītra and may well be regarded as a Buddhist text.

Śaṅkara’s composition of the commentary on the Gaudapādyakārikā is an epochal event in the history of the Vedānta, since it may be said that this commentary represents a turning point in the Vedānta tradition, which until then had been becoming more and more Buddhistic. It was in consonance with the general tendency of Śaṅkara’s time, for the age of the happy coexistence of Buddhism and Hinduism had already passed when he was born, and his age was marked by a Hindu revival. Although he tried to Vedānticize the Gaudapādyakārikā, an extremely Buddhistic text, he did not ignore the Buddhistic elements in the work; as I have shown elsewhere, he skillfully gave them a Vedāntic character and
adopted them into his own system. Thus the Vedānta in the Brahmasūtra, which may be characterized as realistic monism, was transformed into illusionistic monism, which regards everything but Brahmān as unreal. At the same time the difference between the individual Ātman and Brahmān is looked upon as due to nescience (avidyā) and therefore unreal. Śāṅkara asserted that, although the individual Ātman appears to be different from Brahmān in the sphere of nescience, they are wholly identical from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramārtha). This view of the relationship between Ātman and Brahmān is called “non-dualism” (advaitavāda), in contrast with the theory of difference-and-non-difference (bhedābheda-vāda) which was overshadowed by it, in spite of the vain efforts by Bhāskara, probably soon after the death of Śāṅkara, to revive it by writing another commentary on the Brahmasūtra from the standpoint of that older tradition.

The Advaitic tradition started long before Śāṅkara; it has its origin in the Upaniṣads. The Gaudapādiya-kārikā is the earliest extant text that advocated illusionistic Advaita. It was, however, Śāṅkara who established the illusionistic Advaita tradition based on the concept of nescience and the Sāṁkhya dualism, and made it the main current of the Vedānta.

Śāṅkara’s Upadesāsāhasrī is dedicated to explaining the identity of Ātman and Brahmān and repeatedly teaches that the knowledge of that identity is the means to final release. In the following pages we shall see his demonstration of the Brahmān-Ātman identity, and his view of final release.

Notes to Introduction, II

1 In his Mysticism East and West (pp. 28-29), R. Otto points out the similarity between Śāṅkara and Meister Eckhart on this point.

2 Nakamura II, p. 55.

3 In his BS Bh Śāṅkara does not clearly say that the author of the BS is Bādarāyaṇa. When he comments, however, on the last stūtra he says, “śat traṃ bhagyadun śāmāraka śāmyāpataḥ” (p. 905), so it is likely that he regards Bādarāyaṇa as the author of the whole text. It seems that the identification of Veda-Vyāsa with Bādarāyaṇa begins with Vācaspatīmiśra (Maṇḍūkakāraṇa of his Bhāṣṭṭi). Later it became usual to identify Bādarāyaṇa with Veda-Vyāsa and with Vyāsa, who is regarded as the author of the Mahābhārata and other Śṛutis. Cf. Nakamura II, pp. 52-58; P. V. Kane, History of Dharmakṣetra, vol. V, pt. II (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962), pp. 1160-1173. It should be noted here that Sureśvara, one of Śāṅkara’s pupils, may be attributing the BS to Jaimini when he says: “yād hi yam abhir prayāṇa bhavayati atmaḥ bhava-śāmyātkāthā jīvātmyāt disya evam dharmasastu aṣṭaujñānamāṇya-prakāśitaḥ” (BS Bh, p. 658).

4 The term dharma in the Mimāṃsā has a particular meaning. The Mimāṃsākāra I,1,2 defines it as “that which is indicated by the Vedic injunction as conducive to welfare.” Cf. Ganganatha Jha, Pārasa-Mimāṃsā in Its Sources (Benares: Benares Hindu University, 1942), pp. 172-174.

5 Cf. BS I,4,19-22. It has been pointed out that Kāṇḍakāṇa stood in the line of bhedābheda, regarding the individual Ātman as a portion (ānta) of Brahmān (Nakamura II, pp. 7-12. Cf. BS II,3,48). Auḍulomī held the opinion that they are different in the state of transmigration which is real and non-different in the state of final release (Nakamura II, pp. 22-23. Cf. Ānandaśastra on BS I,4,21). Āśmaratya was of the opinion that they are in the relationship of the material cause and its modification (prakṛti-vāda-kārikā). Bhāskara on BS I,4,21. Cf. Nakamura II, pp. 25-26.


7 See ibid., pp. 446-451.

8 In his BS Bh (II,1,27, p. 658), Śāṅkara quotes Māṇḍūkya Up. III,1,8; 2,8 and Bhṛ. Up. III,7,15 as examples of texts on the difference between Ātman and Brahmān.

9 In his BS Bh (II,1,27, p. 658), Śāṅkara quotes Chāṇḍ. Up. VI,6,7; Bhṛ. Up. I,4,10; III,4,1; 7,3 as examples of texts on the non-difference. In his Upad 1,1,6 he says that first of all a teacher should teach his pupil the Śṛutis which are concerned primarily with the oneness of Ātman with Brahmān, and he quotes as examples Chāṇḍ. Up. III,14,1; VI,2,1; VII,24,1; VII,25,2; Ait. Up. I,1,1.

10 V. Bhattacharya rejected the tradition that the GK interprets the Māṇḍūkya Up. and asserted that the Māṇḍūkya Up. being based upon the GK, came into existence after the GK. See V. Bhattacharya, “Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Gaudapāda Kārikā,” Indian Historical Quarterly I (1925), pp. 119-125; V. Bhattacharya, The Agamasastra of Gaudapāda (University of Madras, 1952), pp. 46-52; R. D. Karmarkar, Gaudapāda-Kārikā (Government Oriental Series, Class II, no. 9, 1953), pp. xxi-xxxi; Nakamura III, pp. 557-565.


12 Nakamura III, pp. 562-569.

13 Ibid., p. 587.


15 S. Mayeda, “On the Author of the Māṇḍūkīyopaniṣad- and the Gaudapādīya-
Bhāṣya,” Professor V. Raghavan’s Felicitation Volume, Adyar Library Bulletin, vols. 31–32 (1967–68), pp. 73–94. For example, the term dharma in GK IV is no doubt used in a Buddhist sense, i.e., “a thing” or “an object of knowledge” (cf. V. Bhattacharya, “The Gaṇapati-Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad,” Proceedings of the Second All-India Oriental Conference, 1920, p. 445, and Nakamura III, pp. 507–508); but Śaṅkara explains it as Ātman in GKB IV, 1, 156; 10, p. 162; 46, p. 189; 53, p. 193; 61, p. 207; 91, p. 215; 92, p. 215; 96, p. 218; 99, p. 220. It sometimes does not interpret it (GKB IV, 6; 8; 21; 33; 98). This fact probably does not indicate ignorance of the Buddhist usage of the term, but rather an intentional misunderstanding by Śaṅkara so as to give the text an Advaitic character.

This is the reason why Śaṅkara has been censured as “crypto-Buddhist” (prachandnakadaudha) by some of his opponents. But in fact he was a genuine Vedāntin who was faithful to the orthodox Brahmanical tradition and antagonistic to Buddhism, though the traditional claims that he persecuted the Buddhists and the Jains and destroyed their books (see J. N. Farquhar, An Outline of the Religious Literature of India, p. 175) are difficult to credit. His successful absorption of Buddhism into Vedānta represents a victory over Buddhism and not a surrender to it. Hinduism is all-inclusive. Among the six systems of Indian philosophy Vedānta has been most flexible and has always had extraordinary absorptive capacity. Without losing its own basis Vedānta has continued to be revitalized by incorporating foreign elements into its own system, whereas all other systems have either died out or barely survived.

On Bhaṭṭa’s khetakahavanita and other related theories, see P. N. Srivivasachari, The Philosophy of Bhedabheda (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1950); S. Dasgupta, vol. III (1961), pp. 1–11. According to Aufrecht’s Catalogus Catalogorum (1, pp. 383–386), there are 49 different commentaries on the BS which were composed from various philologic standpoints. After Bhaṭṭa, Rāmānuja, identifying Brahma with Nārāyaṇa, attacked Śaṅkara’s system and wrote a sectarian commentary from the philosophic standpoint styled sīlādvasita (Non-dualism of the qualified One). On the meaning of this compound, see J. A. B. van Buitenen, Rāmānuja on the Bhagavadgītā (Gravenhage: H. L. Smits, 1955, p. 1, n. 1). There are supposed to be five (or ten) famous schools of Vedānta (pāñcavedāntinaspradāya) which hold characteristic and differing philosophic views concerning the relationship between Brahma and Ātman. They are: (1) Advaitavāda of Śaṅkara [non-sectarian]; (2) Viśiṣṭadvaitavāda of Rāmānuja (1017–1157) [Śrivaśya Sect]; (3) Dvaitadvaitavāda of Nimbārka (1082–1162) [Nimbārka Sect]; (4) Dvaitavāda of Madhya (1230) [Madhava Sect]; and (5) Śuddhādvaitavāda of Vallabha (sixteenth century) [Vallabhācārya Sect]. Cf. J. N. Farquhar, An Outline of the Religious Literature of India, p. 237; Nakamura II, p. 99; Roma Chaudhuri, Doctrine of Śrikantha (Prayavan Research Series no. XI, Calcutta, 1962), vol. I, p. 2.

No use of the term māyā occurs in the GK although Śaṅkara uses it in his commentary on the BK [see S. Mayeda, “On the Author of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad- and the Gaudapādiya-Bhāṣya,” pp. 75–94]. Gaudapāda’s illusionism is based upon the concept of māyā, influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is not always easy to determine the meanings in which the term māyā is used in the BK. But it is certain that the term māyā there is far removed from that in works of later Advaitins, where it means the material cause of the universe indescribable as being or non-being (adisaṃsadhyan avirasamtya). As far as I can see, the meanings of māyā in the BK are: (1) the miraculous power of god or synonyms for him such as ātman (BK II,12; 19; III,10, 24 [twice]—one of which is Indra’s māyā in the quotation from Rgveda VI,47,18 = Brh 
III. ÅTMAN’S IDENTITY WITH BRAHMAN

Sāṅkara holds that Brahman is Åtman and Åtman is Brahman, but this truth may be approached along different lines. When Sāṅkara undertakes his search for the truth—or, rather, when he explains to his pupils or readers the truth that he has already attained—he does it from two different starting points. Accordingly, in the Upadesasahasrī, two different approaches are recognizable. When in his search for the truth he sets out from Brahman as the ultimate cause of the universe, he comes, through a theological or cosmological approach, to the knowledge that Brahman is Åtman. When his investigation sets out from the inner Åtman, he arrives, through a psychological or epistemological approach, at the knowledge that Åtman is Brahman. The second line of approach is adopted much more frequently than the first in Sāṅkara’s works, including the Upadesasahasrī. However, neither of them can be complete by itself, and there is a third aspect which is that the knowledge of Brahman and Åtman is attainable only through the Śrutis, and so the conclusion arrived at by the two approaches is to be confirmed and authenticated by the Śrutis. Through an exegesis of the Śrutis, Sāṅkara determines that the Śrutis state the truth of the identity of Brahman and Åtman. In the following pages I would like to examine his doctrine in greater detail through his discussions and speculations along the three different lines of approach.

A. Theological and Cosmological Approach

1. A Cosmological Proof of the Identity

The Brahma-sūtra (1,1,2) defines Brahman as “that from which the origination, subsistence, and dissolution of this universe proceed.” Brahman as the ultimate cause of the universe is regarded as different in essence from this material universe (BS II,1,4). It is Being (sat, BS II,3,9). Although the Brahma-sūtra does not explicitly characterize Brahman as Knowledge (jñāna) or Pure Consciousness (caitanya, cit), the Brahma-sūtra seems to assume it in its presentation (BS I,1,5; I,9; I,10; II,2,3; 2,9; III,2,16). Later Vedānta writers describe the positive nature of Brahman as Being-Consciousness-Bliss (sac-cid-ānanda). Though this well-known expression is not found in the Brahma-sūtra, the description of Brahman there may well point to it. Brahman in the Brahma-sūtra seems to be conceived as the personal Being rather than impersonal principle. This is clear from the fact that the word “parah” (the Highest One in the masculine form) is used for Brahman (neuter form). The same thing is true of Śāṅkara’s work, in which (param) brahma (n), and paramātman are interchangeable with Īśvara (the Lord).

According to the dualistic Sāṃkhya, Purusa (Spirit) and Prakṛti (Matter) are respectively the efficient cause and the material cause of the universe. Against this theory the Brahma-sūtra maintains that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause (BS I,4,23–27). There is no other ultimate cause of the universe than Brahman. Thus the creation of the universe is nothing but self-creation (atmakṛtī, BS I,4,26). Brahman is the creator of all things and Brahman transforms itself into all things. The Brahma-sūtra calls this type of creation “transformation” (parināma, BS I,4,26). Thus it is certain that the Brahma-sūtra holds satkāryavāda as its theory of causation (BS II,1,7; II,1,16–20).

There are three representative types of cosmological theory in India. The first is the parināmavāda, the theory of transformation; this is based upon the theory (satkāryavāda) that the effect, though different in appearance or phenomenally, is substantially identical with the cause, and pre-exists latently in it. The second is the ārāmīvatāva, the theory of atomic agglomeration, which is based on the theory (asatkāryavāda) that the effect, being something newly produced, does not pre-exist in the cause. The third is the viśvaratvāva, the theory of false appearance, which is closely connected with the first and peculiar to the Advaita Vedānta school. Although the Brahma-sūtra sharply attacks the Sāṃkhya system, the

* Footnotes to section III, A begin on p. 58.
Vedānta of the Brahmaśūtra is very similar in its fundamental cosmological theory to the Sāmkhya, which also maintains pariṇāmavādā and satkāryavādā, and it is essentially different from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which adopts śrāmbhavādā and asatkāryavādā.

By postulating Brahmā as the only ultimate cause of the universe, the monism of Vedānta encountered theoretical difficulties which the Samkhyan dualism avoided by proposing two ultimate causes, Puruṣa and Prakṛti, and which are more or less inherent in any types of monism or monotheism:

1. If Brahmā is one Being (sat) alone without any distinction, how is the manifoldness of the universe possible?9
2. If Brahmā is Pure Consciousness (cit) and if satkāryavādā is to be assumed, how can it create this material world?20
3. If Brahmā is Bliss (ānanda), why did it create this world full of sufferings? Is it not possessed of the faults of unfairness (vaśamya) and lack of compassion (nairghṛṇya)?

The Brahmaśūtra tried to solve these problems but could not do so satisfactorily12; its replies were too crude and naive to silence the opponents. These problems remained to be solved by Śaṅkara and other later Vedānta philosophers.

In order to solve them, especially the first and second ones, Śaṅkara introduces into the Vedānta system a new principle called “Unevolved Name-and-Form” (avyākṛta nāma-rūpa), for which he depends upon the Chāndogya Upaniṣad13 and which is peculiar to Śaṅkara’s cosmology. As P. Hacker first pointed out,14 in the Brahmaśūtrasabhāṣya the term means a kind of primary material or state out of which the world evolves. In the Upadēśasāhasrī (II,1,18) also, when he says that the highest Ātman is “the evolver of that Unevolved Name-and-Form” which is the seed of the world (jagadbijabhūta), and which is different in essence from the highest Ātman, he certainly means by the term a kind of primary material of the world, which corresponds to Prakṛti in the Sāmkhya doctrine. In the Sāmkhya everything material, including the intellect (buddhi), I-consciousness (ahāmkāra), mind (manas), and the senses, evolves from the Prakṛti. Similarly, for Śaṅkara everything material evolves from Unevolved Name-and-Form, which according to the Upadēśasāhasrī (II,1,18–22) itself first evolved from Brahmā. On the authority of the Taṁśīrya Upaniṣad (II,1,1), the Brahmaśūtra (II,3,1–7) simply maintains that ether, the first of the five material elements, arose from Brahmā. But Śaṅkara says:

[Originally] unevolved, this Name-and-Form took the name-and-form of “ether” in the course of its evolution from this very Ātman (= Brahmā). And in this manner this element named “ether” arose from the highest Ātman . . . (Upad II,1,19).

In the Brahmaśūtra ether arises directly from Brahmā. According to Śaṅkara, however, the Unevolved Name-and-Form first of all evolves from Brahmā and then becomes something describable as “ether.” Therefore, ether arises from Brahmā only indirectly. From this name-and-form called ether there arose air; from air, fire; from fire, water; from water, earth, in that order. Further, ether entered into air, air into fire, fire into water, water into earth; so arose the five gross elements. From earth rice, barley, and other plants consisting of the five elements are produced. From them, when they have been eaten, blood and sperm are produced in the bodies of women and men respectively. Blood and sperm, produced by churning with the stick of sexual passion, driven by nescience and sanctified with sacred formulas, are poured into the womb at the proper time. By saturation with fluid from the womb, they become an embryo, which is delivered in the ninth or tenth month (Upad II,1,20). In this manner the body consists of nothing but name-and-form. The mind and sense organs also consist only of name-and-form (Upad II,1,22).

In this context Śaṅkara then asserts on the authority of the Śrutis15 and the Smṛtis16 that Brahmā, after creating the body, entered the name-and-form of the body as Ātman. Therefore, Brahmā is Ātman, which is different from the mind, the senses, the body, and the like, since they consist of name-and-form, although through nescience ordinary people identify Ātman with the body, the mind, or a combination of the two.

The above is an outline of Śaṅkara’s cosmological view and his cosmological demonstration of Brahmā’s identity with Ātman. The originality of his cosmology lies in introducing into his basically traditional view a new concept, Unevolved Name-and-Form. But to evaluate properly his position in the history of the Vedānta we must make a more detailed examination.
2. Characteristics of Śaṅkara’s Cosmological View

In the Brahma Sūtra (II,3,1–7) the material element ether is treated as a direct transformation of its sole cause Brahman, on the authority of the Taittirīya Up. (II,1,1). This theory, however, contradicts the Vedānta system itself, since the latter holds to satkāryavāda, which cannot admit that a material element, ether, can evolve directly from Brahman, which is Pure Consciousness.

According to Śaṅkara, originally Unevolved Name-and-Form evolves from Brahman, and in the course of its evolution becomes ether. Therefore, ether evolves indirectly from Brahman. Consequently his introduction of “Unevolved Name-and-Form” into the Vedānta system may be effective in explaining the manifoldness of the universe, the creation of this material world, and other theoretical difficulties which the monism of the Brahma Sūtra had to face. However, in doing so, Śaṅkara comes near to a dualism like that of Samkhya. The acceptance of a cause other than Brahman leads to the abandonment of monism, the basic standpoint of the Vedānta.

It is certain that Śaṅkara was well aware of this theoretical difficulty. In his conception, Unevolved Name-and-Form is the supersensible seed of the world (jagadbiṣajhāta), which is not describable as “this” or anything else (tattvanyatvabhyam anirvacanīya) and is known only to Brahman itself (svayamvēya, Upad II,1,18). But he is always careful never to define it as an independent material cause of the world. On the one hand he stresses its essential difference from Brahman (svātmavilaksana, Upad II,1,19). On the other hand he asserts that it evolves from Brahman (te nāmarupe...vyākṛtye sati vyākṛtyamāne tasmad etasmad ātmanā akāśanāmaṁ śakti svamūrtte / tac cākāśakhyam bhūtām anena prakāraṇe paramātmānaḥ saṁbhātām, prasannāt salīlām malam iva phenām / na salīlām ca salīlaṁ ayaṁ phanāṁ / salīlavat sāvatam / evam paramātmā nāmarūpabhīvān anyāt phenasthānābyāvihāṁ śuddhāṁ prasannāṁ tadāvīlaksanāḥ / ... Upad II,1,19).

This simile is a variation of the simile of the sea and its waves, foam, or other modifications. It is logically appropriate for the bhedabheda Śāktya, which asserts that the relationship between Brahman and Ātman and the phenomenal world, is both different and non-different, as the sea is different and non-different from the waves.

However, the parallel simile plays a different role in the passage quoted above. There it is stressed that foam, which is of the nature of dirt, is essentially different from clear water. Although foam is different in its nature, it is not regarded as absolutely different from water for the very weak reason that it is not seen without water; this aspect of their non-difference is only touched on. Such relationship of clear water and foam is not that of bhedabheda, since the bhedabheda relation presupposes an essential non-difference between two things.

It is more significant that Śaṅkara describes water as “clear” (prasanna, svaccha) and “pure” (śuddha), while he characterizes foam as “being of the nature of dirt” (malarūpa, Upad II,1,19). Hacker has commented: “... but here he is satisfied with a simile which indeed attributes lower value but not lower reality to the world than to Brahman.” If we set the above quotation (Upad II,1,19) apart from the whole context of the Upadesaśāstras, this comment is correct, but, looking at the whole work, I would think that the above simile also ascribes a lower reality to foam, because the term “dirt” used in contrast with “clear” and “pure” from the highest Ātman, as dirty foam from clear water. Neither is foam (identical with) water, nor absolutely different from water, since it is not seen without water. But water is clear and different from foam, which is of the nature of dirt. Likewise, the highest Ātman is different from name-and-form which corresponds to foam; Ātman is pure, clear, and different in essence from it... (te nāmarūpe...vyākṛtye sati vyākṛtyamāne tasmad etasmad ātmanā akāśanāmaṁ śakti svamūrtte / tac cākāśakhyam bhūtām anena prakāraṇe paramātmānaḥ saṁbhātām, prasannāt salīlām malam iva phenām / na salīlām ca salīlaṁ ayaṁ phanāṁ / salīlavat sāvatam / evam paramātmā nāmarūpabhīvān anyāt phenasthānābyāvihāṁ śuddhāṁ prasannāṁ tadāvīlaksanāḥ / ... Upad II,1,19).
hints not only at a judgment of value but also at the important concept of avidyā. In the first chapter of the Upadeśasāhasrī, where our present cosmological discussion appears, Śaṅkara does not use similes suitable to his illusionism, such as a snake and a rope, or silver and mother-of-pearl. This is probably because the first chapter is meant for a novice at the first stage of the Vedāntic education who has just been initiated into Śaṅkara’s Vedānta and is unfamiliar with the illusionistic way of thinking. In such a context it is possible to interpret “dirt” as standing for the term avidyā, which is first taken up for discussion in the second chapter of the Upadeśasāhasrī, intended for a pupil at the second stage of the Vedāntic education.

In the Upadeśasāhasrī the adjectives nirmala (clear) and śuddha (pure) are used only for the real Ātman. The word “dirt” is compared to something unreal, in contrast with something real. For example:

As superimposition is [made] upon Ātman, so [its] negation is [made from Ātman], just as the superimposition of dirt upon the sky and negation of it therefrom are made by the foolish (ātmantā yathābhūtānāṁ pratisetadhās tathaiva ca / malādhyāsānāṁ khe kriyate ca yathābhūtānāṁ // Upad II,18,22).

A general rule cannot be made that superimposition is made only on that which is adventitiously established and not on that which is permanently established, for dirt and other things on the surface of the earth are seen to be superimposed upon the sky [which is permanently established] (... na hi kādačaśiṣṭiddhāv evaśyāropanaḥ na nityasiddhaḥ iti niyamantam śakyaṁ, aṅgagā talatādhyāropanaṇadośasanāt—Upad II,2,61).

The analogy of dirty foam seems to be capable of expressing the same illusoriness as that of the unreal snake superimposed upon a rope (Upad II,2,109, etc.). Moreover, in the Upadeśasāhasrī this world, which originally evolved from the name-and-form and corresponds in the analogy to foam, is described as the “outcome of avidyā” (avidyāprayāhava, Upad I,17,20) and “superimposition due to avidyā” (avidyādhyāsa, Upad I,6,3). This is also ascertained from the Brahmanarāhāśya, where the name-and-form is described as “made of avidyā” (avidyākṣeta), “falsely constructed by avidyā” (avidyopātā, “falsely imagined through avidyā” (avidyākalpita), “superimposed through avidyā” (avidyādhyāta, avidyādhyātāparitā), and “consisting of avidyā” (avidyāstrāmaka).

In the Śaṅkhya system Prakṛti is a real, independent, and eternal cause of the universe together with Puruṣa. Śaṅkara has tried to save monism by characterizing name-and-form as unreal and as falsely constructed upon Brahman through avidyā. But, while doing so, he introduced another difficult problem, avidyā, for his followers. What is avidyā? This problem gave birth to very great controversy among the followers of Śaṅkara himself, just as later the problem of the relationship between Brahman and Ātman was to play a central role in the division of the whole Vedānta school.

It has been generally believed that Śaṅkara advocated vivartavāda, which is based upon satkāraṇavāda. However, Nakamura and Hacker have pointed out that Śaṅkara either was not aware of an illusionistic usage of the word vivarta or else deliberately disregarded it, and that he did not advocate the so-called vivartavāda. In fact, his cosmological view as described here cannot be labelled vivartavāda. What is it then?

Śaṅkara’s special expression, “Unevolved Name-and-Form,” was not adopted even by the pupils he taught personally. One of the reasons for this may be that historically the phrase is remote from any connotation of illusion. Consequently some qualification like avidyā (or dirt) is needed in addition in order to associate the concept of illusion with this realistic phrase, and as a result the use of the phrase “name-and-form” must have introduced a double theoretical difficulty into Vedāntic monism. Padmapāda, one of Śaṅkara’s personal pupils, used the term avidyā (or māyā) for the material cause of the world, probably because of his awareness of the difficulty. Padmapāda distinguished the usage of vivarta from that of parināma, and his commentator Prakāṣṭhan in the tenth century gave a definition to vivarta. Since then the cosmology of the Advaita Vedānta has moved from parināmanavāda to vivartavāda; according to this theory, the world is the parināma of avidyā and the vivarta of Brahman.

Hacker defines Śaṅkara’s cosmological view as “a kind of illusionistic parināmanavāda.” It seems to me that it is in its essence different from the realistic parināmanavāda of the early Vedānta, because besides Brahman Śaṅkara postulates an illusory Unevolved Name-and-Form which corresponds to avidyā (or māyā). According
to the early Vedāntic theory, the world is the pariṇāma of Brahmān. According to Śaṅkara, the world is the evolution of Unevolved Name-and-Form. The relationship between Brahmān and the world is comparable to that between pure water and foam whose nature is dirt. They are essentially different from each other; Brahmān, the cause of the universe, is real, while the world, the effect, is unreal. Śaṅkara does not use a technical term with which to express his new cosmological view, but its contents are much closer to śivartavāda than to pariṇāmavāda. It might be styled as “early śivartavāda.”

3. Śaṅkara’s View of Gross Elements

When Advaita writers explain how the subtle elements are combined to produce gross elements, they resort to the theory of tri-vṛtkarāṇa “compounding each gross element from all three subtle elements” or to that of pāṇeśkarāṇa “compounding each gross element from all five subtle elements.” Does Śaṅkara hold the former theory or the latter? This is another point to be examined in his cosmological view.

On the basis of Chandogya Up. (VI,3,2; 3) the Brahmasūtra cites the theory of tri-vṛtkarāṇa, which assumes the existence of three elements, fire, water, and food, although the Bhāmasūtra itself accepts five elements, namely earth, water, fire, air, and ether, in accordance with Taittirīya Up. (II,1). In this respect the Brahmasūtra is eclectic and theoretically inconsistent. Vācaspatismiśra (ninth century) and Amalānanda (thirteenth century) preferred tri-vṛtkarāṇa to pāṇeśkarāṇa since they did not accept that air and ether also have parts of other elements incorporated in them, and because there is no authority for pāṇeśkarāṇa in the Veda.27 Later, Sadānanda and Dharmarāja established the theory of pāṇeśkarāṇa while disregarding that of tri-vṛtkarāṇa, although they were still relying upon the Chandogya Up. (VI) for scriptural support.

In his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya Śaṅkara refers to the five gross elements and comments on tri-vṛtkarāṇa, which the Brahmasūtra mentions, but he does not refer to pāṇeśkarāṇa. In the Upadeśasāhasrī this term is not used, but the author seems to suggest pāṇeśkarāṇa when he says:

This name-and-form . . ., [originally unevolved], took the name-and-form of “ether” in the course of its evolution. Becoming grosser in the course of evolution, the name-and-form from ether becomes air; from air, fire; from fire, water; from water, earth. In this order each preceding [element] has entered each succeeding one and the five gross elements, [ether, air, fire, water, and] earth, have come into existence. Consequently earth is characterized by the qualities of the five gross elements . . . (see nāmarūpā śvākyate sati śvākyāyaṃ phenaśyaṇeyā ekāṇamānākyād samaḥ āśūryāt // 19 // tatop 'ṣṭhālabhayām āpadyāmānā nāmarūpe śvākyāyaṃ vāyubhayām āpadyete, tato 'ṣṭhā agnibhayām, agner abhāvam, ahaṃ prthobhayām iti evaṃ kramaṇā pūrṇapūrṇo [tatra] tārānu praveṣena pañcamahābhātāni prthīvyantān utpānānām// tatah pāñcamahābhātānaṃ prīgyantānām ātmanāt—Upadī I,1,19-20).

This passage may not be strong enough evidence to lead us to the conclusion that Śaṅkara supported the so-called pāṇeśkarāṇa, but at least it enables us to suppose that he held a very similar idea. Moreover, of his works which can be regarded as authentic only the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (II,4,20–2) and the Chandogyaṇopanītadvāya (VI,3,2–4) that refer to tri-vṛtkarāṇa. This reminds us that the term ānanda is referred to only when the text to be interpreted forces him to mention it.28 We may infer, after our examination above, that he held a kind of pāṇeśkarāṇa, accepting the five gross elements, and therefore disregarded tri-vṛtkarāṇa. In this sense it may be said that Śaṅkara paved the way for the later establishment of the theory of pāṇeśkarāṇa.29

In any case, it should be emphasized that Śaṅkara did not intend to establish any system of cosmology of his own, but only to make use of cosmological discussion for the purpose of leading his pupils to final release. What he really wants to say is simply that from a cosmological point of view Brahmān is identical with Ātman.

B. Psychological and Epistemological Approach

If Ātman is identical with Brahmān, Ātman must be Pure Consciousness (caitanya)—eternal, changeless, ever-free, and fearless exactly in the same manner as Brahmān is. However, what ordinary people conceive to be Ātman is far removed from Brahmān, the Absolute. How and why can Ātman be Brahmān? In order to answer
this question it is necessary to investigate the nature of Atman which is called "inner Self" (pratyātman) and to approach it through an analysis of psychological and epistemological facts which are generally regarded as associated with, or based upon, Atman or as its attributes.

1. Structure of the Individual

The Vedāntic view of the structure of the individual, which is akin to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga view, has its origin in the Upaniṣads and has already been established in the Brahmasūtra. In the Upadeśasāhasrī and his other works Śaṅkara tries neither to improve upon it nor to create a new theory; he seems to adopt the then generally accepted opinion.

According to Buddhism, which maintains non-existence of any permanent Atman, the individual consists of five aggregates (skandha): matter (rūpa), perception (vedana), mental conceptions and ideas (sajñā), volition (samskāra), and consciousness (vijnāna).

The first one is the body of the individual and the other four constitute the mind. There is therefore no room for Atman in the Buddhist system. In the Vedānta and in the other philosophical systems of India, on the other hand, it is the essence of the individual. In addition to Atman, Śaṅkara recognizes five more components of the individual, which constitute the limiting adjunct (upādhi) of Atman: the body, gross (sthūla) and subtle (suksma); the principal vital air (mukhyaprāna); the five organs of action (karmendriya); the five senses (buddhindriya); and the internal organ (antāhkarāṇa).

The gross body is the perceptible body which perishes at the time of death and consists of the five elements (Upad I, 16,1–2).

Śaṅkara refers to the subtle body (itiṣa, Upad I, 11,14; 15,10) without any explanation, but the Brahmasūtra discusses it in detail.

In the Brahmasūtraśāstra Śaṅkara describes it as "the subtle parts of the elements, which subtle parts constitute the seed of the [gross] body." The gross body is dissolved at death, but this subtle body is assumed to accompany Atman when it transmigrates. According to the Brahmasūtra (IV,2,11; BSBh IV,2,11), bodily warmth belongs to the subtle body since it is not felt in the body after death, whereas form and other bodily qualities continue to be perceived.

Nothing about the principal vital air is known from the Upadeśasāhasrī, though the Brahmasūtra refers to it. According to the Brahmasūtra (II,4,12) and Śaṅkara’s commentary on it, it has five functions (pācāyacittitā): expiration (prāṇa); inspiration (apāna); vāyā (a sort of combination of both; that which supports life when the breath is held with a great effort); udāna (the faculty which at death brings about the passing of the Atman from the body); and samāna (the principle of digestion).

The rest of the components are jointly termed in the Brahmasūtra (II,4,1) prāṇa (life organ), which is synonymous with indriya (BS II,4,17). The principal vital air, which is concerned with unconscious life, is by nature different (naikṣaṇya, BS II,4,19) from prāṇa, the organs (BS II,4,11; 17) which are related to conscious life. Among these life organs, the five organs of action which are concerned with activity (karma) are speech, hand, feet, generation, and evacuation (Upad I, 16,3).

The senses have perception (buddhi) of their objects as their purpose (Upad I,16,3). They are the cause of perception of their objects (BSBh II,4,19, p. 587). There are five senses: auditory (ātrata), cutaneous (tvac), visual (caksus), gustatory (rasana), and olfactory (ghrāṇa), since there are five different perceptions (buddhibheda), having as their respective objects sound (śabda), touch (sparśa), form-color (rūpa), taste (rasa), and smell (gandha) (BSBh II,4,6, p. 572). Cf. Upad I,3,113–116). According to Śaṅkara’s cosmology, the auditory and other senses as well as the body and things external are evolutes of the five elements (ether, air, fire, water, and earth). The five elements are in turn evolutes of the Unevolved Name-and-Form. Sound and other objects of the senses are qualities (guna) of ether and other elements respectively. As in the Nyāya system, each sense is thought to have as its object something of its own kind (Upad II,16,2); for example, the auditory sense has sound, a quality of ether, as its object. Like external objects, however, the senses are material and have no consciousness at all.

Vidyāranya, the author of the Viveka-saṃyuktasāṃyoga, rejects various views of the senses which were held by the Buddhists, the Mimāṃsakas, and others, and he defines the senses as the instru-
ments (karaṇa) of perception, their existence being no more than inferred. According to him, the senses are neither sense-orifices (golaka), nor a peculiar capacity (śakti) of the organ, nor a different substance (dravya) having its locus in the visible sense-organ.§ Such discussions concerning the nature of the senses are apparently absent from Śaṅkara’s works. It is likely that he made no attempt to investigate the nature of the senses, simply accepting what was commonly or traditionally known about them in his time. He strongly emphasized that they were different from Ātman.

Śaṅkara’s concept of the internal organ is not so clear. In his Brahmāsūrabhāṣya he says that “the internal organ which constitutes the limiting adjunct (upādhi) of Ātman is called in different places by different names, such as manas, buddhi, viññāna, and citta.”12 With regard to the manas (mind) he also makes the following comments: “... finally there is the manas which has all things for its objects and extends to the past, the present and the future; it is one only but has various modifications (anekāṅkṛiti).” We find it designated by different terms in different places, as manas or buddhi or ahamkāra or citta, according to the differences of its modifications (vyrttiḥlīkā). And the Śrutis also, after having enumerated its various modifications (vyrtti), such as desire, says at the end: “All this is manas only” (Bṛh. Up. I,5,3).13 On the basis of the above passages Deussen considers that for Śaṅkara the two expressions antahkarana and manas are completely interchangeable.14 In fact Śaṅkara sometimes interprets the word “manas” as antahkarana (GBh V,19, p. 267; PBh I,2, p. 13; I,6, p. 24, etc.).

Deussen further remarks that for Śaṅkara there is only one antahkarana, the manas; even the buddhi is for him not a distinct faculty. But Śaṅkara uses the expression “twofold antahkarana” (antahkaranaṇaṇa, Upad I,3,116), so it is possible for us to infer that Śaṅkara may recognize the existence of two antahkaranas, though it is not clear what they would be. When Śaṅkara comments on the word manas in the Kena Up. (I,2 and 6), he interprets it as antahkarana and says that the word manas in this case comprises both the manas and the buddhi. If so, the “twofold antahkarana” might indicate the buddhi and the manas. Moreover, Śaṅkara describes Ātman as “Witness of all the antahkaranas” (kṛṣṇāntahkaranekāya, Upad I,18,167). This expression might suggest that each of the modifications of the antahkarana such as manas, buddhi, viññāna, and citta is called antahkarana: these antahkaranas may be represented by the two words buddhi and manas. Śaṅkara points out a self-contradiction in the Sāṃkhya system, saying that it describes the antahkarana as three in one place and as one in another place (BSBh II,2,10, p. 425), but Śaṅkara himself does not make his own position clear with regard to whether the antahkarana is one or more.

In most of the cases in Śaṅkara’s works the manas is merely another name of the buddhi, or at least it is indistinguishable from the latter. He also indiscriminately uses the terms citta and dhī as synonyms of the manas and the buddhi without specification.15 When for some unknown reason Śaṅkara seeks to distinguish the buddhi from the manas, he, like the Sāṃkhya, attributes the function of nisēṣaya (BSBh II,3,32, p. 541; Upad I,16,4; Gbh III,42, p. 180) or adhyāvastāya (Upad I,16,21) to the buddhi, and that of nīkāla (Upad I,16,3) or saṃkāla (Upad I,16,21) or saṃkālapavikāla (GBh III,42, p. 179; X,22, p. 456) or vivekabuddhi (GBh V,13, p. 257) or saṃśaya (BSBh II,3,32, p. 541) of the five senses and five organs of action to the manas. Relying probably upon the Katha Up. (III,10) and the Bhagavadgītā (III,42), he says that the buddhi is superior to the manas since the buddhi conveys the objects of experience to Ātman (BSBh I,4,1, p. 294).16 In these instances the manas and the buddhi are distinct from each other as in the Sāṃkhya system.

According to Dharmarājādhvarinād, the antahkarana is one and has four different modifications (vyrtti), namely manas, buddhi, ahamkāra, and citta, the respective objects of which are saṃśaya, nisēṣaya, garva, and smarana (VP.I,58).17 Śaṅkara’s concept of antahkarana is still unorganized and ambiguous, but it points to the systematized Vedāntic concept of antahkarana.

It is a controversial problem for later Advaita philosophers whether or not the manas is an indriya (sense).18 The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Sāṃkhya commonly assert that the manas is an indriya. In the Brahmāsūrabhāṣya (II,4,6, p. 572) the manas is one of the life organs (prṛṣā).19 But nowhere in Śaṅkara’s writings does he explicitly affirm or deny that it is an indriya. However, he briefly refers to this problem as follows:

manuḥ manaso 'py evaṃ sati oṣjjanam indriyatoena prāṣṭavaḥ sant, “manauḥ sarvendriyāṇāca” (Maṇḍ. Up. II,1,3) iti pṛthagyapadesādarsaṁataḥ satyam etat sv ete aukāsāndriyaṁ ca eva mano 'phāntīja-tvāna śrotādi-
It is, therefore, not possible from the quoted passage to draw any conclusion concerning Śaṅkara's opinion on the problem in question. However, in his argument mentioned above Śaṅkara does not deny but rather admits the validity of that evidence from which the opponent has come to the conclusion that the manas should be excluded from the class of indriyas; the evidence is the fact that the manas is mentioned separately from the indriyas in the passage "the manas and all the indriyas" (Mund. Up. II, 1, 3). If so, he may intentionally or unintentionally be differentiating the manas from the indriyas conceptually, when he uses the expression "the manas and the indriyas" (manas eva ca, Upad I, 1, 22). But the expression is being used to maintain that both the manas and the indriyas consist of name-and-form (nāmarūpātma, Upad I, 1, 22) and that they are, therefore, by nature different from Atman. It is not important at all to Śaṅkara whether or not the manas is an indriya: what he wishes to emphasize is that neither the manas nor the indriyas are Atman.

Since Name-and-Form as the primary material of the universe in Śaṅkara's doctrine corresponds to prakṛti in the Sāṁkhya, his concept of the manas seems to be close to that of the Śaṁkhya and far removed from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, according to which the manas is an eternal substance (dvaya) distinct from the physical substances such as earth and water. Śaṅkara is in agreement with the Śaṁkhya in regarding the manas as material and unconscious.

In contrast with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, he denies that the prāṇas including the manas are of atomic size (paramāntulyatva) and maintains that they are subtle and limited in size (sauksmya-pariccheda) (BSBh II, 4, 7, p. 574).

The Brhadāraṇyaka (II, 3, 32) attempts to prove the existence of the antaḥkaraṇa on the ground of an argument similar to that of the Vaiśeṣika. Commenting on the sūtra, Śaṅkara says that if the existence of the antaḥkaraṇa were not accepted, either perpetual perception would result, whenever the three means (āntahkarana) of perception—Atman, the senses, and their objects—were in proximity; or else, if perception were not to follow on the conjunction of the three causes, there would be no perception at all. The existence of some manas, therefore, has to be accepted, by attention or non-attention of which, perception and non-perception take place. He quotes a passage from Brhadāraṇyaka Up. (I, 5, 3) as scriptural evidence.

Śaṅkara's concepts of the senses and the antaḥkaraṇa have so far been dealt with. Atman not only occupies the most important position among the means of perception (upekṣhāntahkaraṇa, BSBh II, 3, 32, p. 541) but also constitutes the whole of Śaṅkara's doctrine. Here I will focus on its role in perception.

2. Psychology of External Perception

Although there is a divergence of opinion about the definition of perception among the different schools of Indian philosophy, it is generally defined as knowledge produced by the contact of sense and object. But this definition is not acceptable to the Advaita nor to the Prabhakara Mīmāṁsā and the Jaina system. Śaṅkara...
does not make any attempt to define perception. According to Dharmarājādhvarinīdra, the defining feature (pravojaka) of perception is not the sense-object contact but the identity (abhedā) between the consciousness (Ātman) limited by an object like a jar (nityacaitanya) and the consciousness limited by the modification (vrtti) of the antahkaraṇa (pramāṇacaitanya) (VP I,16). In the case of the perception of a jar, the antahkaraṇa goes out toward it through the visual sense and is transformed so as to assume the form of the jar. Such transformation (parīṇāma) is called “modification” (vrtti) of the antahkaraṇa. The two limiting conditions of Ātman-consciousness, which are the jar and the modification, occupy the same locus, and thus do not show themselves as different. The identity of the two is the defining feature which distinguishes perception from inference, where the antahkaraṇa does not go out to the object (VP I,18–19).

Like the Nyāya and other schools of Indian philosophy, Dharmarājādhvarinīdra recognizes two classes of perception: one is savikalpa perception, which is the knowledge of a thing as qualified by an attribute (naivistvāvagāthin), and the other is nirvikalpa perception, which is the knowledge of a thing as unrelated to anything else (saṃsārgānaavagāthin) (VP I,59). According to another classification which he makes, perception is again twofold: one is the perception due to jñānasākṣin which is the consciousness having the antahkaraṇa as its limiting adjunct (antahkaraṇopahitam caityanam), and the other is that due to jñānasākṣin which is the consciousness having māyā as its limiting adjunct (māyopahitam caityanam) (VP I,66–73). No such classifications appear in Śaṅkara’s works.

Dharmarājādhvarinīdra classifies perception in yet another way. Perception is twofold, namely the knowledge arising from the senses (indriyajanya) and that not so arising (indriyājanya), as for example the perception of pleasure, etc. (sukhadipratyakṣa) (VP I,120). This classification corresponds to that of external (bhaiyapratyakṣa) and internal perception (mānasa- or antarapratyakṣa) in the Nyāya. Śaṅkara does not classify perception in any way, but he discusses problems of both external and internal perception.

How are external objects perceived? What is the mechanism of perception? According to Śaṅkara, external objects of perception such as sound and touch are material and unconscious; they do not have any knowledge of themselves nor of others (Upad I,14,41; II,2,74; 3,113). The five senses are necessary for the perception of external objects. They serve the purpose of discerning the special object of each sense, such as smell (gandhādviṣayavātapiśācarhrthataḥ, BS Bh I,3,18, p. 530). It is, however, not certain whether or not Śaṅkara, like Vidyārāṇya and other Advaitins, holds that for perception to take place, the senses have to go out, reach their objects, and have contact with them. He merely says that the senses are directed toward external objects (bahirmukha, BUBh IV,3,6, p. 551).

The antahkaraṇa plays a vital role in external perception. Sound and external objects, which are not self-established (sva-t-siddhyasambhava), are established (siddhi) through the rise of pratyayas (notions) of the buddhi or antahkaraṇa, which take the form of external objects such as blue and yellow. These pratyayas, which in Śaṅkara’s works are sometimes preceded by the adjective buddhi, are nothing but modifications (bheda) of the buddhi, caused by the forms of external objects (bhaiyakārānimittatva) and having mutually exclusive attributes (Upad II,2,74). Like later Advaitins Śaṅkara also uses the term vrtti in the sense of modification of the antahkaraṇa, a usage which is probably based upon that of vrtti in cittratvam as in the Yugaśtra. But Śaṅkara seems to prefer the term pratyaya to vrtti. In order to explain this mechanism of perception, Śaṅkara uses the similes of copper and its mold, light and its object. He says as follows:

ariosnīkṣaṁ yathā tāmraṁ tannibhaṁ jayate tathā
rūpāḥdīn vyāpavac cittam tannibhaṁ drṣyaṁ dhruvaṁ

(Just as [molten] copper appears in the form of the mold into which it was poured, so it is certainly experienced that the cittas, when pervading [the external objects] such as form-color, appears in their forms.—Upad I,14,3 [= Pāññatāśī I,428,]
vyākajāko va yathāloko vyāh yasyakaratam iyaṁ
sararāthasyaṇākatoś dhir arthākāra pradhyoṣaṁ

(Or, just as light, the illuminator, assumes the forms of what it illuminates, so the dhī is seen to have the forms of its objects, since it is the illuminator of all the objects.—Upad I,14,4 [= Pāññatāśī I,29])

It has been maintained by N. K. Devaraja that the two elements in the Vedāntic theory of perception, "the going out of the antahkaraṇa to the object" and "the antahkaraṇa assuming the form of the
clearly that the second element is contained in Śaṅkara's view of perception. The idea may not be original to Śaṅkara. Already in Vīśaṅga's Yogastutrabhāṣya (I,7) it is mentioned that the citta is colored by external things through the senses. It is to be noted here that the two stanzas under discussion are quoted in Vidyārāṇya's Pañcadasī (IV,28 and 29) as the authority for his own view of perception.

The stanzas also show that in Śaṅkara's view, the first element too is present to a considerable extent. Unlike Dharmarājādīva's, Śaṅkara does not explicitly say that the antahkarana goes out to the place of the object through the senses, but he says that the citta or antahkarana pervades (vyāpnuvat, Upad 1,14,3; tamyāpti, Upad 1,18,115) the external object such as form-color. It would be natural to take it that the antahkarana, which is located internally and is not omnipresent, would have to go out in order to pervade its object which is external.

When the antahkarana pervades its object, the object is called "the one which is seated in the buddhi" (buddhyāruḍha, Upad 1,7,1; 18,94; II,2,70). Śaṅkara explains this as follows:

ālokaśtto ghaṭo yanud buddhiyāruḍho bhavet tatāḥ |
ātithyāptih stūyā ghaṭāroho dhiya vyātptau kramo bhavet ||

(Just as a jar [when pervaded by light] becomes something situated in the light, so does it [when pervaded by the buddhi] become something seated in the buddhi. It is the buddhi's pervasion [of the jar] that is the jar's being seated [in the buddhi]. In the pervasion by the buddhi there would be sequence [of stages].—Upad 1,18,156, cf. Upad 1,18,155 and 157)

It is thus necessary for perception of external objects that the antahkarana assume the forms of those objects located in the buddhi. It is, however, not sufficient since the antahkarana and its ātīṭyas are both unconscious and material like the external objects and the senses. The antahkarana and its ātīṭya are merely objects perceptible (grāha) by a perceivers (grāhaka) different from themselves (Upad II,2,74). This perceivers, according to Śaṅkara, is Ātman. His discussion now tends to be metaphysical rather than psychological.

According to Śaṅkara, Ātman is transcendentally changeless (kāfasī) and constant (nītya). Now if Ātman, as perceivers, were taken as perceiving the ātīṭyas having the forms of the external objects, Ātman itself could not be free from change and destruction (Upad II,2,74). In other words, if Ātman's perceivership consisted in pervading the buddhi which is appearing in the forms of the external objects (Upad I,14,6), Ātman, like the buddhi, would also be subject to change, and the basis of Śaṅkara's doctrine would be destroyed. In order to get round this theoretical difficulty, which is a problem common to the Advaita and the Śaṅkhya, Śaṅkara introduces the concept of ābhāsa. As I have pointed out elsewhere, he uses this term to mean both "reflection" and "false appearance." When ābhāsa means simply reflection and no more, the terms pratibimba (Upad I,5,4), pratichāya (BUb IV,3,7, p. 561), and chāya (Upad I,12,6; 14,33) are its synonyms. When the reflection (ābhāsa) of self-effulgent Ātman-consciousness (caitanyapratibimba, Upad I,5,4) pervades the buddhi, which is by nature unconscious but endowed with action, the buddhi falsely appears (ābhāsa) as perceiver because of Ātman's consciousness (bodha, Upad I,5,4) in it, together with the fact of its own action, just as torches and other things appear to be possessed of the power of burning on account of the fire in them (Upad I,18,71). After pervading, and taking the forms of, external objects, the buddhi becomes, as it were, an illuminator on account of the reflection of Ātman in it, and thus perceives external objects (Upad I,18,155 and 157). Just as the face is different from its reflection in the mirror, Ātman is different from its reflection in the buddhi (Upad I,18,32 and 33), and the reflection is by nature unreal (Upad I,18,40-46; 18,87). The appearance (ābhāsa) and disappearance (abhasa) in the buddhi is due to the Seeing (dṛṣṭi = Ātman, Upad I,18,84). Ātman's perceivership means not that Ātman is the agent of an action of perceiving, but that the reflection of self-effulgent Ātman whose nature is perception is in the pratītayās of the buddhi. Ātman does not do anything but simply exist.36

There is no doubt that the exposition of ābhāsa in the Pañcadasī is largely indebted to Śaṅkara's view. Vidyārāṇya himself clearly admits that the difference between the Brahman-consciousness and the fruit (phala)—i.e., the reflection of consciousness (cāstäbhāsa)—is stated in Śaṅkara's Upadesasahāsī. It is worthy of note that Vidyārāṇya, like Śaṅkara, regards the reflection as wholly unreal, whereas according to the pratibimbavāda of the Vivaraṇa, it is real.
3. Semantic Analysis of Perception

There are various opinions among Indian philosophers about the essential nature of knowledge. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, knowledge is a quality of Ātmā-substance. The Buddhist and the Mīmāṃsā systems commonly characterize knowledge as an activity. Śaṅkara and other Advaitins, however, stand on the Upaniṣadic axiom that knowledge or perception is Ātmā itself. But the word “perception” (upalabdhi) is generally conceived to mean an “action” of perceiving which is indicated by the verbal root (dhyān) upa-labh; action is nothing but change (Upad II,2,76). It would thus be contradictory to assert that Ātmā is transcendentally changeless and yet that perception is Ātmā. Śaṅkara defends his position by maintaining that this ordinarily accepted sense is merely a figurative meaning (upakrt) of the word “perception.” A verbal root can directly refer only to some pratyaya of the buddhi, which does have “action” as its nature. As mentioned before, it is when the reflection of Ātmā is in it that the buddhi falsely appears as perceiver. In other words, the buddhi becomes consciousness-like (cinnibha) and is called jña (= Ātmā), when the Ātmā-consciousness (cātānya, cēt) is superimposed upon it (Upad I, 18, 65; 68). When the reflection of Ātmā is in the buddhi and the doership (kartrtvā) of the buddhi is superimposed upon Ātmā, Ātmā falsely appears as the perceiver, and it is said that the jña knows (Upad I,18,65; cf. Upad I,18,70). Therefore, the entire process of perception, including all the perceiving activities of the pratyaya of the buddhi, such as pervading its objects and assuming their forms and colors, comes down to the fact that Ātmā-perception, transcendentally changeless, falsely appears as perceiver (abhāsā) as perceiver (ātmānupalabdhyābhāsaphalvavānāh, Upad II,2,77); however, this does not entail any change in Ātmā-perception. At the end of the perceiving process taking place in the buddhi, there is Ātmā-perception falsely appearing as perceiver. In this sense the perceiver is nothing but constant perception (nityopalabdhiśvātā, Upad II,2,79). The word “perception” is, therefore, being used only figuratively when it has the sense of an “action” of perceiving. For example, the “action” of cutting (chidikriyā) results, at the end of the whole process of the cutting “action,” in the static situation where the object that was to be cut has been separated into two parts (dvādhiḥbāva); the word “cut” is figuratively used in the sense of the “action” of cutting which is signified by the verbal root, though primarily it means the static situation which has resulted from the “action” of cutting (Upad II,2,76–85). It is, therefore, reasonable to assert that Ātmā is perception.

One expresses one’s experience of perception by means of language and says, jñātī (I know) or jñātī (He knows). According to the ordinarily accepted understanding of this sentence, “I” or “he,” who is the subject of knowledge, “knows” some object of knowledge, just as, in case of the sentence devadatāk karotī, Devadatta, who is the agent of action, performs a certain action by himself. The verbal root denotes action while the verbal suffix indicates an agent. Thus the meanings of the verbal root (prakṛti) and the verbal suffix (pratyaya) are different from each other, but they have a common substratum (ātāya, Upad I,18, 51 and 52), namely Devadatta. Therefore, the two meanings belong to one and the same subject; Devadatta is the agent who actually performs an action. Likewise the verbal root jña refers to the action of perceiving while the verbal suffix -ti or -mi indicates the agent. Therefore, “I” or “he,” like Devadatta, is the agent who actually perceives the object of perception. Ordinary people consider this “I” or “he” to be Ātmā and think of themselves as different from Brahman, which is actionless (akriyā) and constant (nityā).

Rejecting this ordinary understanding, Śaṅkara asserts that the verbal suffix indicates merely the reflection (abhāsa) of Ātmā which is in the buddhi, and that the verbal root means action (kriyā) of the buddhi. People say jñātā because they fail to distinguish Ātmā from its reflection and the buddhi (Upad I,18,53). Perception (avabodha) does not belong to the buddhi and action does not belong to Ātmā. For this reason the expression jñātā is applicable neither to the buddhi nor to Ātmā (Upad I,18,54). Neither Ātmā nor the buddhi can be the subject of the sentence jñātā, which requires the subject to be possessed of both perception and action.

Then what is the subject of this sentence? When consciousness (cātānya), the nature of Ātmā, is superimposed upon the buddhi which is unconscious and of the nature of action, the buddhi becomes consciousness-like (cinnibha, Upad I,18,65; 68), assuming
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the form of Ātman. Then the notion (dhī) that “I am the Seeing (Dṛṣṭi = Ātman)” occurs to the buddhi (Upad I,18,84; 89). This notion is called ahāṃdhi (Upad I,2,2) or ahāṃpratyaya (Upad II,2,52; 2,53, etc.), i.e., “T’-notion. It is also called ahāṃkriya (Upad I,14,43), ahāṃkāra (Upad I,1,24; II,1,6, etc.), or simply ahām as neuter (Upad I,5,5; 18,203). Ātman is said to be the object of this ahāṃpratyaya (ahāṃpratyayaviṣaya, Upad II,2,52; 2,53; BSBh II,3,38, p. 545; asmatpratyayaviṣaya, BSBh, Introduction, p. 17). The buddhi as the bearer of ahāṃkāra is called ahāṃkārt (Upad I,14,24; 18,20, etc.). This ahāṃkārt is the subject of the sentence jāmi or jānī (Upad I,18,65), since the meanings both of the verbal root and of the verbal suffix belong to it. Words are applicable to the ahāṃkārt but not to Ātman, since the former has generic attributes (jāti), action (karmā), etc., which are absent in Ātman.

Thus, from a semantic and psychological analysis of perception, which seems to be unique among Advaitins, Śaṅkara rejects the ordinary concept of Ātman and, while doing so, refutes the act theory of knowledge according to which knowledge is a kind of activity or function (kriya). It may not be out of place to note here that Jayanta finds the origin of act theory in a grammatical prejudice, a confusion between knowledge as manifestation and the verb “to know” as denoting an action.66

4. Psychology of Internal Perception

With regard to so-called internal perception, Śaṅkara refers to such mental or psychological events as the feelings of pleasure and pain (sukhaduhkhavedana), passion (rāga), aversion (doṣa), desire (kāma, icchā), and fear (bhaya). All these mental events are perceived as objects of perception just as are jars and other external objects. They are, therefore, different from their perceiver, Ātman (Upad II,2,70). All these impurities (asuddhi) are in the object of perception and never in Ātman, the subject of perception (Upad II,2,36). They have the same substratum (āśraya) as the impressions (saṃskāra) of pain, of form-color, and so forth (Upad I,15,13; II,1,35). Their substratum is the antahkaraṇa. Even the discriminating notion (vivekā pratyayaḥ), “I am the knower, not the object of knowledge, pure, always free,” also belongs to the buddhi (Upad I,12,14). Śaṅkara’s view is based chiefly upon Brhadāraṇya-

yaka Up. I,5,3; “Desire, volition, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, meditation, fear . . . all this is truly mind.”67 This Śruti passage also constitutes the basis of Dharmarājādīvarindra’s theory of indriyājanya perception (VP I,120).

Śaṅkara refutes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that not only knowledge but also pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are qualities (guṇa) which inhere in Ātman-substance (Upad I,16,51–66).68 He says that if the position is accepted, then pleasure, for example, cannot be an object of knowledge, since knowledge and pleasure are qualities of one and the same Ātman-substance (Upad I,16,57). Furthermore, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, pleasure, pain, etc., as particular facts are perceived when they come in contact with the manas through their inherence (saṃavāya) in Ātman which is conjoined (saṃyukta) with the manas. However, pleasure and knowledge cannot come in contact with the manas simultaneously. Therefore, pleasure cannot be an object of knowledge (Upad I,16,52 and 53) as they assert it is.

Śaṅkara maintains that pain is an object (viṣaya) of buddhis,69 which are in turn objects of the inner Ātman (Upad I,18,201). He considers desire, aversion, and so on to be attributes (dharma) of the “kṣetra” (i.e., the object of knowledge) and not those of Ātman (Upad II,1,36). His view is based upon Bhagavadgītā XIII, 6: “Desire, hatred, pleasure, pain, the aggregate, intelligence (cetanā), and steadfastness—this is kṣetra briefly described with its modifications.”60 In his commentary on this stanza Śaṅkara interprets “kṣetra” as the antahkaraṇa which is an object of perception (jīveya). Dharmarājādīvarindra also regards desire and the others as attributes of the manas (manodharma, VP I,7). Furthermore, Śaṅkara interprets the word cetanā in the above stanza as antahkaraṇavṛtti or “a modification of the antahkaraṇa” which manifests itself in the aggregate of the body and the senses, filled with the juice of the reflection of the Ātman-consciousness (ātmacaitanyābhasarasaviddha, GBh XIII,6, p. 543): desire and so on are modifications (vṛtti) of the manas (BS Bh II,4,6, p. 572). Dharmarājādīvarindra says that desire (kāma) and other attributes of the manas are knowledge taking on the form of vṛtti (vṛtti-rājajñāna, VP I,7).

According to Śaṅkara desire and other psychological events are
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perceived as objects just as a jar and other external objects are perceived as objects (Upad II,2,70). There is no essential difference between external and internal perception, since in the process of perception objects of external perception are transformed into pratyayas or vyttis of the buddhi which are in the form of those external objects, and objects of internal perception are also transformed into pratyayas which are in the form of pleasure, pain, and other objects of internal perception:

yang ty ahan man-asat vrtti ca kaksuka rāparājanā /
niyam evātmano dṛṣṭyā nityayā dṛṣṭate hi sā //
(The modification of the manas, which is caused by the visual sense and is depicted by form-color [of its object], is certainly always seen by the constant Seeing of Atman.—Upad I,13,6)

tathāyendriyayukta ya vṛttaya vīṣayākṣanaḥ /
smṛti rāgdhirūpā ca kevalāni manasy api //
(In like manner the modifications [of the manas] which are connected with the senses other [than the visual one] and are depicted by [external] objects; also [the modification of the manas] in the form of memory and in the forms of passion and the like, which is unconnected [from the senses], located in the manas.—Upad I,13,7)

mānasas tadvad anyasya dṛṣṭya ca svapnaśrutiyaḥ /
draśṭā dṛṣṭiṃ tato nityā buddhānānta ca kevala //
(and the modifications of the manas in the dreaming state are also seen to be another's. The Seeing of the Seer is, therefore, constant, pure, infinite and alone.—Upad I,13,8)

The only difference in mechanism between external and internal perception lies in the fact that the modifications of the manas are connected with the senses in case of external perception and not in case of internal perception (Upad I,13,7). Though Śaṅkara does not try to analyze perception and though it is not clear whether or not he considers the manas to be an indriya, the above distinction easily leads one to Dharmarājādhvarindra’s division of perception into the two types, indriyajanya and indriyajanya. Pleasure and the like, which have the buddhi as their substratum, differentiate the buddhi, which, being illuminated by the constant light of Atman, appears as Atman in the aggregate of the body and the senses (Upad I,16,7). Thus it is through immovable consciousness (Upad II,2,73) that one perceives everything, external and internal, seated in the buddhi (buddhayādgha, Upad II,2,70).

Śaṅkara does not seek to go beyond this point with regard to perception. However, Dharmarājādhvarindra finds here the defining feature of perception which is common to the indriyajanya and indriyajanya perception. In both cases the consciousness limited by the vyttis of the anātkarana (prāmanacaitanya) is identical with that limited by the object (vīṣayacaitanya) such as a jar in the indriyajanya and pleasure in the indriyajanya (VP I,21-22).

Dharmarājādhvarindra seems primarily to aim at the completion of the Vedic theory of means of knowledge. On the other hand, Śaṅkara is primarily concerned not with the establishment of any epistemologically or philosophically perfect system but with the salvation of people suffering from transmigratory existence here in the present world. The only truth that Śaṅkara intends to arrive at from his analysis of perception is that of the identity of Atman and Brahman.

In his book A History of Indian Philosophy, Dasgupta considers that Padmapāda, one of Śaṅkara’s disciples, was probably the first to attempt to explain from a Vedic point of view the process of perception, which was elaborated by Prakāśatman (tenth century) and later writers, and that Padmapāda’s views were all collected and systematized in the exposition of the Vedāntaparībhāṣa of Dharmarājādhvarindra in the sixteenth century. However, my investigation has shown that Śaṅkara’s view of perception, which has so far been overlooked and seems to depend considerably upon the Śaṅkhyā and the Yoga views, already displays the essential characteristics of the later Advaita theory of perception.

5. Four States of Atman

The previous sections have been concerned with our daily mental and psychological experiences in the waking state (jagrat). But Indian thinkers were not contented with the investigation of the waking state. They also speculated on the dreaming state (svapna) and deep sleep (sūpta) and discovered metaphysical significance in those states. Their speculation even extended to a fourth state (caturtha, turya, turīya) which transcends the above three.

Philosophic speculation on the four states started with Upani-
śadic thinkers, and its most systematic exposition is seen in the Māṇḍūkya Up., on which Śaṅkara wrote a commentary. The Brahmāsūtra also discusses the four states (BS III,2,1-9) as well as the state of swooning (mugdha, BS III,2,10), which is not examined in the Upaniṣads. It is, however, to be noted here that the Brahmāsūtra, which stands in the line of bhedābheda, neglects or perhaps may not know of this fourth, which could properly fit into a non-dualistic system alone.

According to Śaṅkara, Ātman is the only one, eternal and changeless. Nevertheless, it appears in many ways because of the limiting adjunct (upādhi), just as one and the same gem appears different when blue or yellow color is put near it (Upad I,17,16; 17,26; 17,27). Ātman appears and is designated differently according to the three states. When Ātman is in the waking state and external (bāhyā)—in other words, perceiving external objects—it is called viśīṭ or vaiśīṭānara (Upad I,17,64, cf. Vedāntasūtra [XVII] 36). In the waking state both the five senses (Upad I,17,24) and the internal organ are at work and, according to the Māṇḍūkya Up. and Gaudapādiyakārikā, it is conscious of external objects (bahiṣṭprajña, Māṇḍ. Up. 3; GK I,1).

When Ātman is in the dreaming state, the five senses cease to function and only the internal organ is functioning. The Ātman in this state is called tāijāsa (Upad I,15,24, cf. Vedāntasūtra [XVII] 117) or prajñāpati (Upad I,17,64), and it is conscious of things internal (aniṣṭaprajña, Māṇḍ. Up. 4; GK I,1). In other words, the object of perception in this state is not an external object but a residual impression (vāsanā) of something grasped through the senses in the waking state (Upad I,11,10; 15,24); this is like recollection of a memory in the waking state (Upad I,14,1; 17,24). Since in the dreaming state Ātman is free from limiting adjuncts such as the body and the senses, Ātman appears in a purer form and is seen to be self-effulgent (svayamprabha), just as a sword is seen to shine when drawn from its sheath (Upad I,11,11).

In the state of deep sleep everything vanishes (Upad I,17,64); even the internal organ ceases to function. The Ātman in this state is called prajñā (Upad I,15,25; 17,64); it sees nothing else (anànapadā), Upad I,15,25). Deep sleep is usually regarded as the entire cessation of consciousness. The Vaiśeṣika thinks that consciousness is adventitious because Ātman does not have this quality in deep

sleep. In the Vedāntic theory, however, the Ātman in this state is a mass of mere consciousness (prajñānagha, Māṇḍ. Up. 5; ghanaprajña, GK I,1). Nobody sees anything in the state of deep sleep, but this does not mean that in deep sleep Pure Consciousness ceases to be (Upad I,18,97). It is only because there is no object of sight that nothing is seen in the deep sleep, and not because sight—i.e., Pure Consciousness—ceases to be. It is by Pure Consciousness that one denies the existence of the objects of sight (Upad II,2,90–93). This Ātman is free from the pain which is experienced in the waking and dreaming states (Upad II,2,45). It is in a purer form, but not yet perfect. Just as one goes from the waking state to the states of dream and deep sleep, one comes back from the state of the deep sleep to the dreaming and waking states. In this sense this state is, so to speak, the seed (bijā) of the two other states (Upad I,16,18). Therefore, the Ātman in this state is called avyakta (unmanifest, Upad I,17,64). The state of deep sleep is also called tāmas (darkness) or ajñāna (ignorance). When this seed has been burnt up by the knowledge of Ātman, it is like a seed that has been scorched, without power of germinating (Upad I,17,25).

The above three states are only adventitious and not one's own nature, since they perish like clothes and wealth (cf. Upad II,12, 86–89). The triad is a verbal handle (nācārambhāya) and consequently unreal (Upad I,17,65). Vaiśīṭānara, tāijāsa, and prajñā are all merely Ātman with limiting adjuncts (sopadhi, Upad I,15,29). “The Ātman without limiting adjuncts (anupādhika) is indescribable, without parts, attributeless and pure; neither mind nor speech reach it” (Upad I,15,29). This Ātman is turiya (Upad I,10,4). This Ātman cannot be expressed by any words.

Since this turiya (Upad I,10,4) is nothing but Brahman, it is, though indescribable, indicated by means of all the possible negative adjectives which are used to describe Brahman: “non-dual” (advaya), “free from desire” (akama), “unborn” (aja), “free from evils” (apahatajapāta), “fearless” (abhaya). Adjectives such as “absolutely changeless and constant” (kātasthaśānta), which are affirmative in form but really negative in intention, are also employed to characterize it.

This Ātman is always the same in all beings (Upad I,8,3; 10,9); though perfectly stainless and non-dual, it is covered by inverted knowledge (upaparyaya) which is avidyā (nescience, Upad I,10,8).
This last is the reason why the highest truth, that Ātman is Brahman, is not generally recognized.

C. Exegetical Approach

I. The Means of Knowledge

Early Vedānta philosophers did not pay much attention to problems concerning the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) by which valid knowledge (pramā) is attained, although to other schools of Indian philosophy these were important, even essential, topics. The Materialists (Carvāka) accepted only sense-perception (pratyakṣa) as the means of knowledge, rejecting all others. Some Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists recognized both sense-perception and inference (anumāṇa), to which the Śaṅkyas added a third: statement by an authority (śabda). The Naiyāyikas accepted comparison (upamāṇa) in addition as a fourth means.

In the Brahmasūtra (I,3,28; III,2,24; IV,4,20) “pratyakṣa” and “anumāṇa” are accepted as means of knowledge, but the words have a quite special meaning and merely stand for “Śrutis” and “Smṛtis,” respectively.1 The Brahmasūtra does not discuss problems of pramāṇa. Early Advaita writers are interested only in demonstrating the illusory nature of the world and engaged in discussing the metaphysical aspect of knowledge (jñāna) which is the nature of Brahman-Ātman, and not in examining the means of knowledge. In the tenth century, Prakāśatman employs four means of knowledge in his philosophical discussion: sense-perception, inference, postulation (arthāpatti) and verbal testimony (śabda).2 In the sixteenth century, Dharmarājadhvarināla enumerates six means of knowledge, the above four and two additional ones, comparison and non-cognition (anupalabdhi) (VP, Upadgātha 10); he devotes the first six chapters of his Vedānta-paribhāṣa to the establishment of a Vedantic theory.

Śaṅkara himself does recognize the significance of the means of knowledge, remarking that everything (sarvopadārtha) is established through verbal testimony (śabda), inference (anumāṇa), and other means of knowledge, and not otherwise (Upad I,18, 133). It is true that Śaṅkara’s doctrine is on the whole illusionistic, but his arguments are strikingly realistic and not idealistic. He maintains that knowledge (jñāna) results from the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) which have existing things as their objects (yaśāḥ śabda-citāviṣaya) and that knowledge, therefore, depends upon existing things (vastutantra) and not upon Vedic injunction (codaṇāntartra) nor upon man (purusa-ntartra) (BSbH I,1,4, p. 83).3 He rejects the Vijnānavādin’s position that there is no difference whatever between knowledge and the object of knowledge, the latter being nothing but the former, since for Vijnānavāda no external objects exist.4

In his arguments he often takes it for granted that the means of knowledge are generally accepted.5 There is no doubt that he was well acquainted with nyāya (logic). In his writings he refers to at least three means of knowledge: sense-perception, inference, and verbal testimony.6 In no place in his works, however, does he give any systematic account of them, though he is aware of the relative importance of the various means of knowledge. His disregard or deliberate avoidance of the point is largely based upon his religio-philosophical standpoint. Ātman-Brahman, the knowledge of which is the means to final release (mokṣa), is self-evident (sva-pramāṇa, Upad I,18,203) and self-established (sva-nātiṣaiddha, Upad II,2,93, etc.). Therefore, Ātman-Brahman is by nature independent of the means of knowledge; Ātman-Brahman is established neither by sense-perception nor by other means of knowledge (Upad II,2, 60). An investigation of the means of knowledge is of no use for attainment of final release.

Then how is the knowledge of Ātman-Brahman obtained? It is attained only through the Śrutis (Upad I,1,19; 18,217, etc.), which are not to be doubted (anatma-jñayatva, Upad I,17,67) and are the right means of acquiring knowledge (pramāṇa, Upad I,17,8. Cf. Upad I,18,216; BS I,1,7). Śaṅkara’s firm conviction that the Śruti is infallible is seen here and there in his works. No argument or justification is necessary for the validity of the Śruti. This is not peculiar to Śaṅkara but is the basic standpoint of the Vedānta and the Mīmāṃsā.7 His absolute reliance on the Śruti leads to the denial of the validity of the other means of knowledge (Upad I,18, 7; 18,183; 18,223). Nevertheless, use is made of the other means in order to know Ātman-Brahman (Upad I,18,134) as well as the ob-
jects of knowledge (prameya) different from Ātman (Upad II,2,93). However, it is only before the attainment of the knowledge of Ātman that sense-perception and other means of knowledge are valid (Upad I,11,5). It is to be noted here that Dharmarājā-dhvarindra, who systematized the Advaita theory of the means of knowledge, also carries on his discussion of the means of knowledge under the same condition. He says: "In your [= Advaitin’s] view, a jar etc. are sublated since they are unreal. So how can knowledge of them be valid knowledge?" We [= Advaitins] reply, ‘Because a jar etc., are sublated after the realization of Brāhman. . . . but they are not sublated in the state of transmigration.'

An investigation of the means of knowledge is after all desired by the opponent would be arrived at. This type of argument was often employed by NagSrjuna and his disciple, Ar-

2. The Sentence "Tat Tvam Asi"

An Indian syllogism begins with a proposition named pratijñā (thesis) which contains a minor (pākṣa) and a major term (sādhyā) and which is restated in the fifth and last proposition, called nīgamana (conclusion). The pratijñā shows what the subject of inference is and what is to be proved. The author of the Brāhmaṣṭṭra, Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, and other Vedānta exegetes also seem to have begun with their own philosophical or theological viewpoints, the validity of which was to be proved or justified by means of their skilful exegetical techniques. This is clear from the fact that founders and important philosophers of minor schools of the Vedānta wrote commentaries on the Brāhmaṣṭṭra from their own philosophical or theological viewpoints in order to give authoritative standing to their doctrines or theological systems by demonstrating that these could successfully and consistently be used to interpret the Brāhmaṣṭṭra.

Whatever standpoint an exegete may adopt, he has to work with the conviction that all the Śrutis and other works regarded as authoritative are coherent and consistent in every respect and do not contradict one another, though this is absolutely impossible for modern philologists to admit. From his standpoint of non-dualism, Śaṅkara states his view of the Vedas as follows:

As [the Vedas] are devoted to one object [only], i.e., the knowl-
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Thus the huge bulk of the Vedas is equated with a single sentence, "tat tvam asi" (Thou art That), which was uttered nine times by the Upanisadic philosopher Uddalaka Aruni to his son, Śvetaketu, in their famous dialogue in the Chāndogya Up. (VI,8-16). This sentence is looked upon as imparting the essence of the entire Vedas, namely the identity of Brahman and Atman. Tremendous efforts to interpret the sentence were made by Śaṅkara and his followers. One other Śruti sentence—"aham brahmāsmi" (I am Brahman) (Brh. Up. I,4,10) also was assigned great importance. These celebrated sentences came to be designated mahāvākya (great sentences) by later Advaitins such as Sadānanda. In the Upadeśasahasri the term "aham" in the aham brahmāsmi sentence is explained alongside the interpretation of "tat tvam asi" (cf. Upad 1,18,96; 18,101, etc.), but the meaning of the former sentence is not specifically analyzed, probably because an examination of "aham" is nothing but that of "tvam," and the two sentences are syntactically the same. Therefore, our attention will first be focused on the sentence "tat tvam asi."

3. An Exegetical Method: Anvaya and Vyatireka

An interpretation of an Upanisadic sentence involves a semantic analysis. How is the meaning of a sentence apprehended? When one hears the words of a sentence, one gets a unitary sense which is the meaning of the sentence. How is this possible? The Mīmāṁsakas proposed two different solutions to this problem. According to the anvītabhidhāna theory of the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṁsā, the meaning of a sentence can be known only through memory, since both the individual word-meanings and their syntactic mutual relationship, which constitute the meaning of a sentence, are conveyed by the words themselves which are remembered to possess certain meanings. This theory was severely criticized by the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā, who asserted the abhihitāvākya theory: that the meaning of a sentence can be understood indirectly through the recollection of the individual word-meanings since, although the words can convey their individual meanings, their mutual relationship cannot be conveyed by the words but by the word-meanings; the knowledge of the logical connection between the remembered individual word-meanings precedes that of the sentence-meaning.Śaṅkara does not positively take one side or the other, but in the Upadeśasahasri he expresses his idea fragmentarily:

There is no fixed rule in the Veda to the effect that in a sentence a [particular] word should be placed first and another [particular] word should be placed next. (Upad I,18,175)

And then he continues to assert in the same stanza:

The syntactical relation of words (padasanga) is based upon [their] meanings.

He further says:

There is no fixed rule in the Veda to the effect that in a sentence a [particular] word should be placed first and another [particular] word should be placed next. (Upad I,18,175)

His view is that nobody can know the sentence-meaning without recollecting the word-meanings (Upad I,18,178). These remarks are not sufficient for us to infer any definite conclusion, but it seems to me that he takes the abhihitāvākya theory as a basis, or at least that he holds a similar opinion. His followers are divided among themselves on this problem, but almost all important Advaita writers such as Vācaspatimisra support the theory of the Bhāṭṭa school.

If, in order to understand the sentence-meaning, the word-meanings have first to be recollected, the next problem is: How can word-meanings be recollected? In this connection Śaṅkara refers to the anvaya-vyatireka method. His failure to give an explanation of this method, which he seems to assume is well known, prevents us from getting a clear understanding of it. He describes it as the logical means (yukti, Upad I,18,96) by which, when hearing the words in a sentence, one can recollect (samśrty, Upad I,18,176; smarana, Upad I,18,178; smarana, Upad I,18,189), discriminate (viveka, Upad I,18,180) or ascertain (avadharana, Upad I,18,96) their meanings.

In his Naiskarmyasiddhi (II,8,9; III,31, etc.), Suresvara also applies the anvaya-vyatireka method to an interpretation of the sentence "tat tvam asi." Though the method is not defined in his work,
either, it is treated not only as an exegetical method but also as a
term ignifying logical thinking or logical method. It is used as a
synonym for nyaya and anumāna.\textsuperscript{24} However, Śaṅkara says that the
'anvayaayatireka' method is mentioned only for the purpose of discrim-
inating the meaning of the word “Thou” and for no other purpose
(Upad I, 18, 180). Therefore, the usage of the method is limited and
serves only an exegetical purpose, though it is used as a synonym
of yuktī in the Upadeshasthārī (I, 18, 96). Furthermore, it seems to
be a meditational method rather than an exegetical method. An
attempt will be made to reconstruct the method as far as possible.

In Śaṅkara’s view, in the sentence “Thou art That,” the
meanings of the two words “That” (tāt) and “art” (asi) are already
known (Upad I, 18, 193). For him, the word “That” means
Brahman, or Existent (sat, Upad I, 18, 169) or Painless One (nirduhk-
ha, Upad I, 18, 169).\textsuperscript{25} The word “art” means that the words
“That” and “Thou” have the same referent (tulanyāditya, Upad I,
18, 193).\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, the sentence “Thou art That” is
taken to be an identity judgment and not a universal positive judg-
ment. Śaṅkara compares it to the sentence, “The horse is black”
(nīlāsaṃvat, Upad I, 18, 169) since, like “horse” and “black,”
“Thou” and “That” have the same referent. Although the mean-
ings of these two words are known, the sentence-meaning is still
not understood since help is needed for the recollection of the
meaning of the word “Thou” (Upad I, 18, 179; 18, 193). Here it is
that the anvayaayatireka method is applied, to ascertain the meaning
of the word “Thou” (Upad I, 18, 180). When the meaning of the
word “Thou” has been discriminated clearly, the sentence-meaning
“I am ever-free” becomes manifest (Upad I, 18, 179; 18, 180;
18, 181; cf. Nāis II, 1).

Now in the sentence “Thou art That,” through the word “art”
indicating an identity judgment, the word “Thou” comes to be
used in connection (yoga) with the word “That” which refers to
the Painless One (nīdūkhāvacin, Upad I, 18, 169). Therefore, the
word “Thou” must also refer to that Painless One (Upad I, 18,
169; 194). The word “Thou” has various meanings. But, among
them, “the inner Ātman” (pratyagātman) is the only meaning that is
compatible with “the Painless One.” And through the word “art”
indicating an identity judgment, the word “That” comes to be
used in connection with the word “Thou.” Therefore, the word

“That” refers to the inner Ātman (Upad I, 18, 170; 18, 194). This is
the meaning which is present (anvaya) in, or compatible with, the
two words. This is the anvaya method, that of positive formulation.
On the other hand, the word “Thou” ordinarily means “a sufferer
of pain” (duḥkhin, Upad I, 18, 181; duḥkhītva, Upad I, 18, 195).
This is the meaning absent (vyatireka) in, or incompatible with, the
word “That.” Therefore, this meaning is excluded (apoha, Upad
I, 18, 181) or removed (vārayetam, Upad I, 18, 195) from the word
“Thou.” Further, the word “That” may mean here “something
other than the inner Ātman” (apratyagātman, Upad I, 18, 195),\textsuperscript{27}
but this meaning is absent (vyatireka) in, or incompatible with, the
word “Thou.” For this reason the meaning “something other
than the inner Ātman” must be removed from the word “That”
(Upad I, 18, 195). This is the vyatireka method, a negative formu-
ation used to exclude all the incompatible meanings. In this
sense the two words “Thou” and “That” are said to mutually
convey the meaning of the sentence, “Not this. Not so” (Upad
I, 18, 195). The above is a tentative outline of Śaṅkara’s anvayaay-
atireka method.

4. Later Advaitins’ Exegetical Method

In later Advaitins’ works, Śaṅkara’s anvayaayatireka method
came to be replaced by another method, jahadajahallaksanā. It is
usual to distinguish three kinds of laksanā\textsuperscript{28} (transfer or meta-
phor), according to how closely the primary meaning is retained
in the actual meaning:

1. Jaḥalaksanā (or Jaḥatsvarthā laksanā). For example, in the
sentence gahga gahgayam ghosah (the village is on the Ganges),
the primary meaning of the word gahga (Ganges) is abandoned and
the secondary meaning “the bank of the river Ganges” is
taken. In this case the primary meaning is rejected since it is con-
trary to fact that the village should be situated actually on the
Ganges. A secondary meaning, connected with the primary mean-
ing, is adopted to suit the context.

2. Ajahalaksanā (or Ajahatsvarthā laksanā). In the sentence
kunṭāḥ pranītanti (the lances enter), the word “kunṭāḥ” refers to the
lances themselves and the men who carry them. In this example
the secondary meaning includes the primary sense as well.

3. Jaḥadajahallaksanā. This is a laksanā in which a word expres-
sive of the qualified abandons part of its meaning and denotes another part. In a sentence like “so 'yaṁ devadattaḥ” (This is that Devadatta) the word “that” (sat) refers to Devadatta as qualified by the past time and space whereas the word “this” (ayam) points at the same Devadatta as qualified by the present time and space. Though this sentence is an identity judgment, it does not mean that the two incompatible qualifiers “this” and “that” are identical, nor does it signify that the person qualified by “this” is identical with the same person when qualified by “that.” The sentence should be understood to mean the identity of the substantive Devadatta by abandoning the incompatible elements. In this case only a part or an aspect of the primary meaning is retained; the rest, which is incompatible, is abandoned.

Rejecting the first two laksanās, the later Advaitins accept the third and apply it to the sentence “Thou art That” as an exegetical method. “That” is qualified by all-knowingness (sarva-jñāta), and “Thou” is qualified by the inner organ (antahkarana). But the sentence indicates the identity of “That” and “Thou” in their essence, excluding one mutually incompatible elements (VP IV, 26). “That” and “Thou” cannot be identical with each other in their meanings which are universal consciousness and an individual consciousness, respectively. The sentence means the identity of consciousness common to both only by abandoning the two incompatible qualifiers “universal” and “individual.”

5. Discontinuance of Śaṅkara’s Method
As I have mentioned, Śaṅkara’s anuvāyavaśyātā method was inherited by his disciple Śureśvara. Though Śureśvara has tried to theoretically strengthen it, his use of the method does not seem to be very much different from that of his guru. Śaṅkara compares “tat tvam asī” with “nilaśva-” (The horse is black) (Upad I,18,189), while Śureśvara employs the sentence “nilotpala-” (The lotus is blue) (Nais III, 2). Padmapāda, another of Śaṅkara’s disciples, compares the same sentence with “so 'yaṁ” (This is that) which becomes the stock-instance of jāhadajahallākṣāṇā. Sarvañātman (900 a.d.), who is traditionally regarded as a disciple of Śureśvara, refers in his Saṁkṣepalāśirāka (I,154-157) to the three-fold transfer (lakṣāṇikavṛtti) and compares the sentence with “so ‘yaṁ” instead of “nilaśva-,” abandoning the example used by his guru.

‘yaṁ pumān” (This is that person) (ŚŚ I,149;151). These facts may allow us to suppose that Śaṅkara’s method was already neglected at the time of his own pupils, or at any rate of Śureśvara’s.

Why was Śaṅkara’s method dropped by later Advaitins? One reason is that the method contains a defect in logical exactitude, and the other is that his technical terms are loanwords from Grammarians or Naiyāyikas. The logical defect occurs where he compares the sentence “tāt tvam asi” with “nilaśva-.” There are two theories, samsarga and bheda, concerning the problem of how a sentence can have a single meaning, when the words forming it have definite meanings of their own. According to the first, the meaning of a sentence is samsarga or the mutual association of the word-meanings. In an example like “gauś sukla” (The cow is white), this sentence denotes the association of cowness and whiteness, and the words constitute a syntactic unity. In the theory of bheda, on the other hand, which is mutual exclusion by the word-meanings, the word “white” excludes all colors other than “white” and the word “cow” excludes all white things other than cows. Since Kumārila refers to the latter theory, Śaṅkara might be expected to have known it. But his comparison of “tāt tvam asi” with “nilaśva-” does not deal with this problem, as it is only concerned with showing the identity of the referent. When Śureśvara, however, compares the sentence with “nilotpalā-” he definitely has the above discussion in mind and rejects an opponent’s assertion that the meaning of the sentence is the mutual association of the two word-meanings as in the case of “nilotpalā-” (Nais III, 76). Furthermore, he seems to take the second view. Through the statement “nilotpalā-” non-blueness and non-lotushood are immediately ruled out. Likewise, through the sentence “tāt tvam asi,” non-Brahmanhood and otherness are excluded from the individual Ātman and Brahman respectively. But “nilotpalā-” is not in essence comparable to the sentence “tāt tvam asi” since “tāt” and “tvam” are incompatible in parts of their meanings whereas “nila” and “utpalā” are not incompatible in their meanings. This is true of the example “nilaśva-.” Sentences such as “nilotpalā-” and “nilaśva-” are suitable for the theories of bheda and samsarga, but not for an Advaitic interpretation of “tāt tvam asi.” This may be at least one of the reasons why Padmapāda uses the example “so ‘yaṁ” instead of “nilaśva-,” abandoning the example used by his guru.
and fellow disciple. The sentence “so ‘yam” shows that the subject and its predicate have the same substratum and at the same time indicates that they are mutually incompatible in some aspect of their meanings. It has opened the way for the later stock-instance “to ‘yam devadattih.” This is one reason why the method of anvayavyatireka used in conjunction with the “nīlācba” example may have come to be dropped.

The terms anuvaya and vyatireka are used by the Naiyāyikas and the Grammarians, but in a different way from the way they are used by Śaṅkara and Śureśvara. The Naiyāyikas use the anuvayavyatireka for establishing an inviable concomitance (vyāpti) between hetu and sādhyā. The Grammarians use it “to demonstrate that certain meanings are justifiably attributed to certain linguistic items.” Śaṅkara’s usage, which is concerned with the problem of word-meanings, is closer to that of the Grammarians than to that of the Naiyāyikas, but it is not identical to it.40 His anuvayavyatireka method is not used for the sake of determining “the constant co-occurrence (sāhacarye) of a linguistic item (śābda) and a meaning (artha),”41 but only for the purpose of discriminating the meanings of words in the sentence “tattvamasi,” especially “tvam” (Upad 1, 18, 178; 180). When we examine it more closely, we find that the anuvayavyatireka method is a means of realizing the true Ātman, excluding non-Ātman and, in essence, a kind of meditation and on meditation (Upad 11, 2, 52; 2, 53). Sankara urges. He uses a well-known term nāmarūpa in a peculiar sense of his own, i.e., to mean the material cause of the world, but his usage was disregarded even by his disciples. It seems to me that his anuvayavyatireka method shared the fate of nāmarūpa.

Śaṅkara’s anuvayavyatireka method has thus been supplanted by jahadajahallaksana. Although his method was not yet well systematized, it was the first attempt at a methodological approach to the mahāsāṃkhyya sentence. He was the first to give an exegetical and logical foundation for the non-dualistic interpretation of that sentence. Moreover, when he says, “Without abandoning their own meanings (svārtha) [the words “Thou” and “That”] convey a special meaning (visisṭṭhānasamarpaṇa) and result in the apprehension of the inner Ātman” (Upad I, 18, 171), he suggests the essential characteristic of jahadajahallaksana, namely that the two words retain part of their meanings. It should be emphasized that for Śaṅkara, the part of their meanings which is retained is determined by the amarga method, and the other part, which is incompatible and to be abandoned, is determined by the vyatireka method. Therefore, Śaṅkara’s method can be said to be essentially the same as jahadajahallaksana. The fundamental principles of the exegetical method concerning the sentence “tät tvam asi” were set up by Śaṅkara and systematized by Sarvajñātman.42

6. The Sentence “Aham Brahmasmi”

As for the sentence “aham brahmasmi” (I am Brahman), Śaṅkara like Śureśvara tries to clarify only the meaning of the word “aham” (I) in the sentence alongside the clarification of “tvam,” since “aham” in the sentence is identical with “tvam.”44

Ordinary people wrongly think of “aham” as the body (deha-bhimān, Upad I, 12, 5), as an experiencer (bhoktr, Upad I, 12, 7, etc.), or as an agent (kārtr, Upad I, 12, 17), and justify themselves as follows:

The meaning of verbal root and verbal suffix, though different [from each other], are seen to have one and the same subject as in “karoti” (he does), “gacchati” (he goes), etc. according to universally accepted opinion. (Upad I, 18, 51)

This is the reason why they cannot understand the meaning of the sentence “aham brahmasmi.” Taking the example of a sentence “jñāṇā” (I know) or “jñātī” (he knows), we have already seen how such a grammatical presupposition is wrong.45 According to Śaṅkara, the subject of the sentence “jñāṇā” is merely the aham-kārtṛ which is the buddhi as the bearer of ahamkāra (“I”-notion), since the meanings of both verbal root and verbal suffix can belong to it. The words are capable of expressing the ahamkārtṛ which has generic attributes (jāti) and action (karman), but not of expressing Ātman devoid of them (Upad I, 18, 28). Ātman is said to be the object of ahampratyaya (ahampratyayaviveka, Upad II, 2, 52; 2, 53. cf. SBH II, 3, 38, p. 545; asmatpratyayavisaya, BSBh, Introduction, p. 17). Therefore, words referring to the ahamkārtṛ, in which there is the reflection of the inner Ātman, can indicate the latter indirectly but never designate it directly (Upad I, 18, 29). As the ahamkārtṛ has the reflection of Ātman and appears to be Ātman, it is expressed by words which are used in the sense of Ātman, just as words which mean fire are not directly used in the sense of, for example, a torch.
but only indirectly, since they mean something different from a torch (Upad I, 18, 30–31). Ātman cannot be either expressed by words nor cognized (Upad I, 18, 57). Therefore, the primary meaning of “I” or “Thou” is not the inner Ātman but the āhāmkārtr which ordinary people mistake for the inner Ātman through avidya. If the anvayavatīreka method is applied to the sentence “I am Brahman” here, it is determined that “I” means the inner Ātman and not the āhāmkārtr.

For this reason the sentence “aḥam brahmaṇaḥ” also shows the identity of the inner Ātman and Brahman. One of the ten boys who crossed the river, when counting the party, failed to count himself and thought that one boy was missing. When he was told, “You are the tenth,” he immediately realized that he was the tenth. Similarly, through such sentences as “Thou art That,” right knowledge concerning the inner Ātman will become clearer (Upad I, 18, 190) and one comes to know one’s own identity of the inner Ātman-Brahman.

Notes to Introduction III, A

4. Cf. Nakamura II, p. 424. Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahman is the Highest One who is above the deities. He is the supporter (ātṛti) of the world (BS I, 3, 16). He is also conceived as the cause of the fruits of action (BS III, 2, 38; 41).
5. BS II, 3, 46.
10. BS II, 1, 4 and 6.
12. Reply to the first question: Brahman Himself can create the world, just as milk spontaneously becomes curd, and just as gods create various things without any instruments (BS II, 1, 24–25). Reply to the second question: It needs no discussion. In this world, there are many cases where things material come forth from things conscious. For example, hair and nails grow from humans. There are also cases where things conscious come forth from things material. For example, worms come out from cowdung. Therefore, it is not unreasonable that things material come out from Brahman (BS II, 1, 6).
Notes to Introduction, III, B


2BS I, 4, 2; III, 3, 30; IV, 2, 9-11.

3Dehâdi jñâna bhâtyakârte, BSBH III, 1, 1, p. 594.

4BS II, 4, 8-19.


10The fully developed theory of patêkhâraṇa, the oldest reference to which may be Mbh XII, 5089 and XII, 2442 (Foona Critical ed.), asserts that the five subtle elements—ether (abhâsa), air (apya), fire (agni), water (ap), and earth (prthu)—are first divided into two halves; then one of the two halves of each subtle element is combined with one-fourth of each remaining half of all the other subtle elements. Thus one half of each gross element (e.g. earth) is made from itself and the other half of it is constituted of four equal parts of each of the other elements (ether, air, fire, and water); i.e., one-eighth of it is from each of the four other elements. The Upadharma seems to be based upon Tatt. Up. I, 1 and BS II, 3, 1-12. Cf. Pañcavad I, 27; Vedantâstra [XV] 123-126; P. Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie I, 3 (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1908), p. 446; S. Dapugata, History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 74, note 1; P. Hacker, Upadhisthâra von Meister Shankara, p. 20, note 72; H. Nakamura, The Vedantasra (Kyoto: Heirakujin Shoiten, 1962), pp. 152-153.

7BS II, 4, 8-19.

8A work entitled Pañcavad, which treats patêkhâraṇa as a way of meditation (samâdâsvâd), is traditionally ascribed to Śaṅkara, but it may not be authentic. There is the following negative evidence: (1) Brahmaṇa is described as "paramânanda-sûryana" although Śaṅkara as the author of the BS Bhagavadvâpa asad is expected if it were a genuine work (cf. P. Hacker, "Śaṅkara-cârya and Śaṅkara-bhagavadvâpa," New Indian Antiquary, vol. 9, 1947, pp. 176-178 and pp. 182-183). (2) The whole text, which is an independent and non-commentary work, is colored by Śaṅkhyâna doctrine and sets forth a pañcavadâraṇa theory different from the one mentioned above; it is said that from Brahmaṇa there arose asâyāka; from asâyāka, mañâh; from mañâh, anâkārakâra; from anâkârakâra, pañcavatmâvâra; from pañcavatmâvâra, pañcâsahâbhâka. Such a theory of evolution is not advanced in any of his works which can be regarded as genuine, except the BS Bhagavadvâpa, which has Śaṅkhyâ as one of its doctrinal bases, refers to a very similar idea of evolution (VI, 4 and XIII, 5). Consequently Śaṅkara as his commentator seems to be forced to comment on it, just as he refers to the term anâna only when the text is intended to be interpreted forces him to do so. Moreover, his idea of evolution in his BS Bhagavadvâpa is slightly different from that of the Pañcavadâraṇa: in the latter asâyāka evolves from Brahmaṇa (brahmas śyâkum), while in the former asâyāka is regarded as tiṣyaśakta (GBH XIII, 5) and as mana tiṣya mâyâlakâti (GBH VII, 4).
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36See note 33, above. This idea may be traced back to the Brh. Up. I,5,3.

37Antarkeeyamapi ca prakrtirdhatvam nitya yoga dhiraishyate dhama itat... VP I,18.

38Judging from the illustration “Istakshara gona yaatad brahmaniti bhuta bhanah” (Upad I,18,156), “sambandho” is probably synonymous with “sambandha.” Ramanartha, a commentator of the Upad, interprets the term as budhhiprakriti (Padyagyanika, 7,1; 18,94).

44Digna uses the term in a different sense; in his usage it is synonymous with kalpa or vikalpa. See Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol. II (Reprint ed. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), p. 19 and p. 143. Vaisesamiprama, the author of the Bhottay, interprets as budhhiprakritisam as the term budhprakritiva is used in the BSBH I,2,28, p. 467, when Sankara mentions a Buddhist doctrine.


46See note 33, above. This idea may be traced back to the Brh. Up. I,5,3.

47Antarkeeyamapi ca prakrtirdhatvam nitya yoga dhiraishyate dhama itat... VP I,18.

48Judging from the illustration “Istakshara gona yaatad brahmaniti bhuta bhanah” (Upad I,18,156), “sambandho” is probably synonymous with “sambandha.” Ramanartha, a commentator of the Upad, interprets the term as budhhiprakriti (Padyagyanika, 7,1; 18,94).

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The Jñāya Theory

The Indian grammarians' definition of a verb varies. The Mahābhāṣya (1.3.1) discusses whether a verb denotes action (kriyāvāca) or state (bhūtvāvaca). Cf. L. Renou, Terminologie Grammaticale du Sanskrit, p. 244; R.C. Pandeya, The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy, pp. 118-119. In Nirukta I, Yāska defines a verb as bhūtvapradhūna; bhūta as the result of action is predominant in the meaning of a verb and action is only secondary. Sāṅkara's concept of a verb seems to be close to Yāska's. It is worthy of note that in this respect Sāṅkara's position is different from that of Māṇḍanaśīrśa who is a senior contemporary of Sāṅkara. Cf. R. C. Pandeya, The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy, pp. 117-118.

According to the Nyāyaśāstra, there is first the cognition of an object, "This is a pot" which is technically called poṣṭaṃ. Then another cognition, "I know the pot," which is called apyayamātya, takes place after the second cognition cognizes the object which was so long hidden by ignorance. Cf. BSBh II,2,17 Sāṅkara refutes the Vaiśeṣika position that the six categories, namely substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence, are absolutely different from one another and have different characteristics and that quality, action and the like have the attribute of depending upon substance. According to Sāṅkara a quality is essentially of the nature of the substance (dravyatmakatva gunartha, BSBh II,1,17, p. 444). Cf. N.K. Devaraju, An Introduction to Sāṅkara's Theory of Knowledge, p. 93. The meaning of the verbal suffixes is a controversial problem. Cf. R.C. Pandeya, The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy, pp. 123-128.


Notes to Introduction, III, C


6. According to the Naiyāyikas there is first the cognition of an object, "This is a pot" which is technically called poṣṭaṃ. Then another cognition, "I know the pot," which is called apyayamātya, takes place after the second cognition cognizes the object which was so long hidden by ignorance. Cf. Upad 11,2,59; 2,90 but it is probably not a technical term.

7. Some scholars think that the three states are investigated by the Māṇḍuktayopanisad and the GKBh to establish the non-duality of Ātman. See T.M.P. Mahadevan, Gaudapāda, p. 95; R. D. Karmarkar, Gaudapāda-Kārikā (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1953), p. li.


Sāṇāṇḍa does not mention this method when he comments on the sentence "tāt tām aśi" (Chānd. Up. VI, 6–10) in his Chāndogya-apāni-bhāṣya. As far as I know, the Upad is the only work of his that refers to it.

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Theoretically strengthening Śaṅkara's method of Anuvāya-yātrikāra, Śuṅ Crawford points out a threefold relationship in the sentence "tāt tām aśi": (1) the identity of referents (śaṃśādhiṣṭhakaranaya) of the two words, tāt and tām, (2) the subject-predicate relation (nītyaśāntiṃyaya) between the two word-meanings, and (3) the relation of indirectly indicated and indirect indicator (tākṣaṃkṣapakānupānbandha) between the inner

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It may be due to his extraordinary devotion to his guru (cf. Mayeda Upad, pp. 44-49) that he did not abandon it though he knew its defect. However, Padmapada, who was a more independent thinker than Suredeva, could give it up. P. Hacker remarks about his personality: “Im ganzen kijnnen wir sagen, daß Padmapada ein schlechter Kommentator, dafür aber ein um so selbständigerer Denker ist” (Unters, p. 1933).


Dharmarājādhvārilānta introduces jahadajahallaksana as the traditional view, but denies that the sentence “tat tvam asi” is a laksana (VP IV, 27-30).


IV. TRANSMIGRATION AND FINAL RELEASE

A. Transmigration

In a dialogue in the Upadesāsāhasritī (II,1,9–12) a teacher says to his pupil who wishes to get out of the ocean of transmigratory existence:

When you are dead your body will be eaten by birds or will turn into earth right here. How then do you wish to get out of the ocean of transmigratory existence? Because if you turn into ashes on this bank of the river you cannot get across to the other side of the river. (II,1,11)

The pupil answers:

I am different from the body. The body is born, dies, is eaten by birds, turns into earth, is destroyed by weapons, fire, and so forth, and suffers from disease and so on. I have entered this body as a bird enters a nest, by force of the merit and demerit accumulated by myself. Again and again, by force of the merit and demerit, when this body perishes, I shall enter another body as a bird enters another nest when its previous one has been destroyed. Thus I am in beginningless transmigratory existence. I have been abandoning [old] bodies which have been obtained one after another in the spheres of gods, animals, men, and hells by force of my own karman and I have been getting other new bodies over and over again. I am forced by my own karman to rotate in the incessant cycle of birth and death as in a waterwheel. I have obtained this body in the course of time. I am tired of this rotation in the wheel of transmigratory existence, so I have come to you, Your Holiness, in order to end the rotation.
in the wheel of transmigratory existence. Therefore I am eternal and different from the body. The bodies come and go like a person’s garments. (II,1,12)

In another dialogue a pupil, tired of transmigratory existence characterized by birth and death and seeking after final release, asks his Brahmin teacher:

Your Holiness, how can I be released from transmigratory existence? I am aware of the body, the senses and [their] objects; I experience pain in the waking state, and I experience it in the dreaming state after getting relief again and again by entering into the state of deep sleep again and again. Is it indeed my own nature or [is it] due to some cause, my own nature being different? If [this is] my own nature, there is no hope for me to attain final release, since one cannot avoid one’s own nature. If [it is] due to some cause, final release is possible after the cause has been removed. (II,2,45)

What is transmigratory existence (samsāra)? What is its cause? This is an important problem for Śaṅkara to clear up. In the Upadesasahasri it seems that two types of transmigratory existence are distinguished. One is the transmigratory existence characteristic of birth and death (jānamaranānakālaṣaṇa, Upad II,1,45) which takes place in past, present, and future existences. It is expressed in the answer of the first pupil, who is just a novice and still at the first Vedantic stage of his training or fravāna (“hearing”).¹ It may be called “external transmigratory existence” and cannot be traced back to the Upaniṣadic concept of transmigration.

The other type is the one which is characterized by the waking and dreaming states (jāgratasaṃkalpākālaṣaṇa, Upad II,2,110; cf. I,16, 18) or by agency and experiencership (karmabhoktāṇaḥkālaṣaṇa, Upad I,18,49; karmabhoktāṇaḥkālaṣaṇa, Upad II,2,51). This type of transmigratory existence, which is shown in the answer of the second pupil, who has reached the second stage of his Vedantic training or manana (“thinking”),¹ may be called “internal transmigratory existence” which is experienced in this present world.

By the word “samsāra” is generally meant the first type of transmigration, which lays stress on the existence after death.² Of course it includes the second type, but the latter focuses attention chiefly on the present daily life. The author of the Upadesasahasri, however, is primarily concerned with the second one and pays no attention to what happens after death. He is not interested in the future life, which is anyway nothing but transmigratory existence. His immediate task is to lead a seeker after final release, who is tired of transmigratory existence, to the final goal, namely the cessation of the future life. What concerns Śaṅkara most is final release (mokṣa) from the transmigratory existence which we are experiencing every moment in this present world.

Śaṅkara analyzes the nature of transmigratory existence as follows:

Karmans [as the results of actions, good or bad, in the past existence] produce association with a body. When there is association with a body, pleasant and unpleasant things are inevitable. From these result passion and aversion [and] from them actions (kriyā). (Upad I,1,3)

[From actions] merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) result [and] from merit and demerit there results an ignorant man’s association with a body in the same manner again. Thus this transmigratory existence rolls onward powerfully forever like a wheel. (Upad I,1,4)

The term karman has various meanings in Śaṅkara’s works as in other Indian texts. The term in the first stanza quoted above means the results of actions, good or bad, in the past existence.³ The term kriyā in the same stanza seems to be used in the sense of actions, good or bad, which require verbal, physical, and mental activities,⁴ including the Vedic rituals.⁵ When Śaṅkara takes up karman to discuss its nature and value as the means to final release (mokṣa), he often uses the term synonymously with kriyā in the sense mentioned above.

It appears from what Śaṅkara says that he conceives of transmigratory existence as the following cycle: (1) karmans or works as the results of actions in the previous existence—(2) one’s connection with the body—(3) experience of pleasure and pain—(4) passion and aversion (= doṣa, Upad I,1,7)—(5) actions (kriyā)—(6) merit and demerit (= karmans). In other words, transmigratory existence is the continuously recurring process of the performance of actions (karman or kriyā) and the experience of their fruits. In this sense it is possible to replace the above cycle of transmigratory existence by another, that of doership (kartrtvā) and experiencership (bhoktṛtvā):
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Their view is that the transmigratory existence exists as a real substance characterized by doership and experiencership (Upad I,18,49).

The pupil said, “Even though I exist [eternally], still I am not the highest Atman. My nature is transmigratory existence which is characterized by doership and experiencership, since it is known by sense-perception and other means of knowledge.” (Upad II,2,51)

Transmigratory existence can also be described as the waking and dreaming states (Upad I,16,18; II,2,110) since the performance of actions and the experience of their fruits take place in the waking and dreaming states. The seed (bija) of the two states is the state of deep sleep and consists of darkness (tamas = avidyā, Upad I,17,25; GK I, 13). Similarly, the ultimate cause of this transmigratory existence is ajñāna or ignorance (Upad I,1,5; II,2,110), which is also called the controller of transmigratory existence (niyāmakā, Upad I,16,17).

In another place (Upad II,3,112) the cycle of transmigratory existence is described as: (1) nescience (avidyā)—(2) faults (dosa)—(3) verbal, physical, and mental activities—(4) accumulation of karmans the results of which are desirable, undesirable, and mixed. In this way transmigratory existence can be traced back to ignorance or nescience. This cycle reminds us of the Buddhist theory of dependent origination (pratityasamutpāda), which also has nescience as its first factor.

As knowledge is the very nature of Atman it is constantly applied figuratively to the intellect. And the absence of discriminating knowledge (aviveka) is beginningless; this and nothing else is taken to be transmigratory existence. (Upad I,16,61)

Therefore let transmigratory existence be nothing but nescience (avidyāmatra) due to the absence of discriminating knowledge. Because of the existence of the immovable Atman, transmigratory existence is always existent in Atman as it were. (Upad I,18,45)

Thus transmigratory existence is said to be nothing but the absence of discriminating knowledge (aviveka) concerning Atman and non-Atman, or to be nothing but nescience (avidyā) due to the absence of discriminating knowledge.

B. Final Release

Almost all systems of Indian philosophy have final release as their final goal; for the Hindus it is man’s fourth and final aim, the culmination of the other three, which are dharma (virtue), artha (material gain), and kāma (love). However, there is considerable variety in the way it is conceived. The author of the Upadesasahasri refers to the following various ideas of final release:

1. It is a change of state (avasthāntara).
2. It is Atman’s connection (samyoga) with Brahman.
3. It is Purusa’s disconnection (niyoga) from Prakṛti.
4. It is for Atman to go to Brahman or for Brahman to come to Atman.
5. It is the destruction of Atman.

The first view, which includes the fifth, is refuted as follows: Likewise, as the nature of Atman is changeless, It has no change of state, for if It had any change of state, Its destruction would no doubt occur. (Upad I,16,38)

To him who [asserts that] final release is a change of state, final release is artificial; therefore, it is perishable (Upad I,16,39ab). Likewise, it is also unreasonable that [final release] is a change of state [in Atman, since [It] is changeless. If there were change [in Atman], [It] would have parts; consequently [It] would perish like a jar, etc. (Upad I,16,63)

The second, third, and fourth views are criticized as follows:

It is by no means reasonable that final release is [Atman’s] connection [with Brahman] or disconnection [from Prakṛti], since [Its] connection [with Brahman] and disconnection [from Prakṛti] are not permanent. And [it is by no means reasonable that final release is for Atman] to go (gamana) [to Brahman] or for Brahman] to come (agamana) [to Atman]. (Upad I,16,39cd-40abc)

The last view is denied:

But one’s own nature is not abandoned, since one’s own nature has no cause, the others (= a change of state, etc.) indeed have their causes. One’s own nature is indeed neither accepted nor abandoned by oneself [or by any others]. As [It] is the nature of all, It cannot be abandoned nor grasped, since It is not different [from anything]. Therefore, It is eternal, since [It] is not an
Among the above five opinions the second one attracts our attention. Śaṅkara does not make clear who advocates it, but it is in line with the Brahmāsūtra, according to which final release is the connection (yoga) of the individual Self with Brahmā (BS I,1,19); when they are united, the individual Self enters into the relation of non-division (avihāga) from Brahmā (Upad I,IV,2,16).10 It is very likely that Śaṅkara is here rejecting the traditional Vedāntic concept of final release. And it may be remarked that when he comments on the term “yoga” in the Brahmāsūtra, he interprets it in the sense of identity,2 probably in order to avoid direct contradiction of the Brahmāsūtra.

There is no change of state in Ātman. There is nothing which binds Ātman. There is no bondage in Ātman (Upad I,16,57). Ātman is ever-free, ever-released, pure, transcendentally changeless, invariable, immortal, imperishable (Upad I,13,3). There is no ignorance (ajñāna) in Ātman which has eternal knowledge as its nature, just as there is no darkness in the sun which has light as its nature (Upad I,16,37). If Ātman, our true nature, is really such, then what is bondage? If there were no bondage, there would be no release from it. If so, the Śruti and other scriptures, which teach us bondage and liberation from it, would be meaningless.

According to Śaṅkara, bondage is a confused idea (bhraṃti) of the intellect and final release is the cessation thereof (Upad I,16,39). When illumined by the light of Ātman, the intellect thinks that there is knowledge in itself and that there is no other knower than itself. This is the confused idea which is in the intellect (Upad I,16,60). It is the absence of the discriminating knowledge of Ātman and non-Ātman, which absence is nothing but the transmigratory existence (Upad I,16,61; 18,45). Just as when, in the twilight, a rope is mistaken for a snake, the snake, though unreal, exists in the rope by the fact of the existence of the rope until the moment when the two are differentiated, so transmigratory existence, although not real, always exists in Ātman by virtue of the existence of the immovable Ātman, but only until the two are differentiated (Upad I,18,45; 16,46).

For this reason final release is merely the attainment of the discriminating knowledge of Ātman and non-Ātman. Or, it may

*Notes to section IV, B are on p. 95.

C. Transmigrator

The concept of transmigration presupposes the existence of the transmigrator or the subject of transmigratory existence. The author of the Upadesāsahāsrī mentions several different views of the transmigrator:

1. It is the reflection (ābhāṣa) in the bearer of the “I”-notion (Upad I,18,33).
2. It is part of the Knower (jña = Ātman) (Upad I,18,34).
3. It is a modification (vikāra) of the Knower (Upad I,18,94).
4. It is the bearer of the “I”-notion (āhāmkārtṛ) which bearer is the locus of Ātman (Upad I,18,34).
5. It is the independent (svatantra) bearer of the “I”-notion (āhāmkārtṛ) (Upad I,18,35).1(*)
6. It is the individual continuity of the “I”-notion, (āhāmkārādisaṁśānta) (Upad I,18,35).2

Among these five different opinions Śaṅkara explicitly mentions only the name of the holder of the sixth view, that is to say, the Buddhists (saṅgata). The second is the theory which is found in the Brahmāsūtra (II,3,43) and the Bhagavadgītā (XV,7) and which is also asserted by Bhaṭṭaprāpṭa, Śaṅkara’s predecessor in Vedānta.3 The third also is said to have generally been advocated by early Vedānta philosophers such as Bhaṭṭaprāpṭa.4

Śaṅkara opposed all the above theories. The reflection of Ātman cannot be a transmigrator as in the first theory, since it is unreal (avastu, Upad I,18,44). Naturally the second, third, and sixth are quite unacceptable to Śaṅkara’s Advaitism, although no verse

*Notes to section IV, C are on p. 95.
is specifically devoted to their refutation. The fourth and fifth are rejected on the ground that the bearer of ‘T’-notion is non-conscious (Upad I,18,44).

What then is his view of the transmigrator? Atman cannot be a transmigrator since It is transcendentally changeless (Upad I,18,44). Furthermore, in Śaṅkara’s philosophy, Atman is the only existent; there exists nothing else. Then Śaṅkara says:

Therefore, let transmigratory existence be nothing but nescience due to the absence of discriminating knowledge. Because of [the existence of] the immovable Atman, the transmigratory existence is always existent in Atman as it were. (Upad I,18,45) Atman is ever-released and transcendentally changeless, and It does not transmigrate. Nevertheless, It is regarded as a transmigrator, but only because of avidyā. In fact, there exists no transmigrator anywhere, as the transmigratory existence itself is unreal. Then what is avidyā? This must now be considered.

D. Avidyā*

1. Nature of Avidyā

As we have seen in the previous pages, our inner Atman is transcendentally changeless (kūṭastha), constant (nitya), eternal, pure, nondual, unborn, free from desire, fear, and evils, and not subject to transmigration; as the Upaniṣadic passages such as “tat tvam asi” say, our inner Atman is nothing but the universal Self, Brahma. However, we do in fact experience pleasure and pain, and sink into transmigratory existence in our daily life. Our actual life is just the reverse of the above-mentioned original and true state of man. The Upadesātasāhasri (II,2,45) relates the following dialogue between a teacher and his pupil, who is tired of transmigratory existence and is seeking after final release:

Your Holiness, how can I be released from transmigratory existence? I am aware of the body, the senses and [their] objects; I experience pain in the waking state, and I experience it in the dreaming state after getting relief again and again by entering into the state of deep sleep again and again. Is it indeed my own nature or [is it] due to some cause, my own nature being different? If [this is] my own nature, there is no hope for me to attain final release, since one cannot avoid one’s own nature. If [it is] due to some cause, final release is possible after the cause has been removed.

When the teacher replies to him that transmigratory existence is due to some cause, he asks his teacher what its cause is and what his own nature is (Upad II,2,47). In reply to him the teacher asserts that the cause is avidyā, which is removed by knowledge (vidya) (Upad II,2,48). Then the pupil asks his teacher again:

What is that avidyā? And what is its object? And what is knowledge, remover of avidyā, by which I can realize my own nature? (Upad II,2,49)

Śaṅkara in another work gives a similar example of questions to be put to teachers:

How does bondage come about? How does release come about? What is knowledge? What is avidyā?” (GBh IV, 34, p.232)

In reply to this question, the teacher says:

Though you are the highest Atman and not a transmigrator, you hold the inverted view, “I am a transmigrator.” Though you are neither an agent nor an experiencer, and exist [eternally], [you hold the inverted view, “I am an agent, an experiencer, and do not exist [eternally]”—this is avidyā. (Upad II,2,50)

In other words avidyā is the superimposition of the qualities of one thing upon another (Upad II,2,51). In his Brahmastraṭrabhasya Śaṅkara defines superimposition (adhyāsa) as “the appearance, in one thing, of another thing previously perceived, in the form of a memory.” In his philosophy avidyā is mutual superimposition of Atman and non-Atman such as the body, the senses, and the inner organ (antahkarana, buddhi). For example, mistaking a rope for a snake in twilight, people are frightened. Or they are delighted when they mistake mother-of-pearl for silver. In these examples, when they see a rope or mother-of-pearl, they remember in it a snake or a piece of silver which they have previously perceived. In other words, they superimpose the qualities of a snake or of silver upon a rope or a piece of mother-of-pearl. They are frightened or delighted to see a snake or silver falsely projected onto a rope or mother-of-pearl through this kind of psychological process.
Likewise, people superimpose upon Ātman qualities of non-Ātman which is merely material product of the Unevolved Name-and-Form, and they wrongly conceive of Ātman as different from Brahman. Without discriminating Ātman from non-Ātman, they continue in transmigratory existence. Ordinary people think of the bearer of “I”-notion as Ātman. But this is not right since the bearer of “I”-notion is merely the bearer of the notion that “I am Ātman” which arises by error in the inner organ, when the Pure Consciousness, i.e., the nature of Ātman, is superimposed upon the inner organ. The ātman which they conceive to be Ātman is not true Ātman but the bearer of “I”-notion—that is, the inner organ upon which the nature of Ātman is superimposed through avidyā.

As is clear from the above examination, avidyā in Śaṅkara’s view is a kind of psychological and perceptual error, or an innate psychological and epistemological defect. Avidyā is identical with the original error of all beings, and mithyājñāna (false knowledge) is a synonym of it. In the case of Śaṅkara’s followers, however, avidyā is the material from which all forms of mithyājñāna come; avidyā is not mithyājñāna but the cause of mithyājñāna. In Śaṅkara’s works, avidyā is sometimes treated, like sexual desire (kāma), as a kind of psychic affection (kleśa), as in the Yoga system. Psychic affection is regarded as a wider concept to which avidyā belongs. As is seen in such instances as avidyā-kāma-karman (avidyā, desire and action, Upad I,15,21; BSBh I,2,17, p. 181), avidyā is the first and most dangerous member of a series of psychic affections that cause the others.

However, later Advaitins materialized and raised avidyā to the status of a metaphysical and eternal substance or a cosmic power (sakti). They regarded it as the primary material cause of the universe (upādāna), abandoning Śaṅkara’s Unevolved Name-and-Form. In order to save monism, they characterized avidyā as indefinable as real or unreal (sadasādhvam anirṇāṇcayet), belonging neither to the category of being nor to that of non-being. It is given a lower reality than Brahman and a higher reality than the unreal.

The philosophy of Śaṅkara and his followers has generally been called māyāvada (illusion theory). And the term avidyā is often taken as a synonym of māyā by later Advaitins. However, in Śaṅkara’s philosophy the concept of avidyā is different from that of māyā, and moreover, māyā has little terminological significance. It is peculiar to Śaṅkara that two different historical starting points are recognized in the usage of the term māyā: one is the Māyā of the Vaiśṇavism of the Bhagavadgītā which means the miraculous and veiling power of the god Viṣṇu, and the other is the māyā of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the sense of illusion or magical illusion, to which the void or unreal appearance of things illusory is compared. The māyā of Śaṅkara’s followers loses its theistic element and is regarded as the material cause of the universe.

2. The Locus and the Object of Avidyā

When avidyā is accepted, another question arises: Whose is avidyā? What is the locus (āstaya) of avidyā? In other words, who is the transmigrator? Śaṅkara hold that everything except Brahman-Ātman is unreal and falsely constructed by avidyā. Presumably then avidyā should belong to Brahman-Ātman. If so, Brahman-Ātman itself should be in transmigratory existence, and Śaṅkara’s position becomes untenable. But he in fact declares that there is no ignorance (ajñāna) in Ātman which has eternal knowledge as its nature, just as there is no darkness in the sun which has light as its nature (Upad I,16,37). Śaṅkara is quite aware of the difficulty in finding a logical solution to the whole question. He says:

If you ask, “Whose is avidyā?” we reply, “It belongs to you who ask.” [If you ask,] “Is it not declared by the Upaniṣads, <I am Brahman>?” [we reply,] “If so, you are enlightened; avidyā does not belong to anybody.” (BSBh IV,1,3,p. 833)\(^7\)

In the Upadeśasāhasri, the same question is put to the teacher by his pupil:

Your Holiness, is the mutual superimposition of the body and Ātman made by the composite of the body and so on or by Ātman? (Upad II,2,62; cf. Upad I,18,20)

This question appears different, but is almost the same. It may be paraphrased as: “Your Holiness, which is the locus of avidyā, the composite of the body and so on, or Ātman?” To this question the teacher answers as follows:

What would happen to you, if [the mutual superimposition] is made by the composite of the body and so on, or if [it] is made by Ātman? (Upad II,2,63)

In reply to this question the pupil says:
If I am merely the composite of the body and so on, then I am non-conscious, so I exist for another's sake; consequently, the mutual superimposition of body and \textit{Atman} is not effected by me. If I am the highest \textit{Atman} different from the composite [of the body and so on], then I am conscious, so I exist for my own sake; consequently, the superimposition [of body] which is the seed of every calamity is effected upon \textit{Atman} by me who am conscious. (Upad II,2,64)

Quite unexpectedly the teacher retorts:

If you know that the false superimposition is the seed of [every] calamity, then do not make it!

In the above conversation the teacher would not make clear which of the two, the composite or \textit{Atman}, is responsible for the mutual superimposition. The questions and answers continue further with the teacher skillfully leading his pupil to the realization, through psychological and epistemological argument, that he himself is transcendentally changeless (Upad II,2,66–83). Finally, the pupil says:

If so, Your Holiness, I am of the nature of transcendentally changeless and eternal perception whereas the actions of the intellect, which have the forms of [external objects] such as sound, arise and end with the result that my own nature which is perception falsely appears [as perceiver]. Then what is my fault? (Upad II,2,84)

Then the teacher concludes:

You are right. [You] have no fault. The fault is only \textit{avidya} as I have said before. (Upad II,2,85)

\textit{Sāṅkara} knows what the questioner is really asking, but he deliberately does not give him the sort of answer that he is actually looking for. Instead of dwelling on futile arguments, he leads the questioner directly to true realization. Like Gotama Buddha who avoided metaphysical speculation because of its uselessness for \textit{nirvāṇa}, \textit{Sāṅkara} too refrains from engaging in endless and profitless speculation on \textit{avidya}. He is a religious teacher who has before him an aspirant actually suffering in transmigratory existence and seeking final release. Indulgence in profitless speculation is nothing but the result of \textit{avidya}.

Similarly, the object of \textit{avidya} also is not discussed by \textit{Sāṅkara} in his \textit{Brahmasūtrabhāṣya} partly because he avoids in general the use of purely theoretical concepts. He does however in the \textit{Upadesa-sāhasrī} pay some attention to this problem.

After the teacher gives a definition of \textit{avidya} (Upad II,2,50), his pupil raises an objection:

Even though I exist [eternally], still I am not the highest \textit{Atman}. My nature is transmigratory existence which is characterized by agency and experientership, since it is known by sense-perception and other means of knowledge. [Transmigratory existence] has not \textit{avidya} as its cause, since \textit{avidya} cannot have one's own \textit{Atman} as its object.

Then, on the basis of his idea of a general rule that mutual superimposition is possible only when two things are fully known, as in the case of silver and mother-of-pearl, the pupil denies that mutual superimposition takes place between non-\textit{Atman} and \textit{Atman}, which is not fully known. His teacher rejects the proposed general rule and explains how the mutual superimposition of body and \textit{Atman} occurs (Upad II,2,51–54). In this discussion the teacher affirms only the possibility of the mutual superimposition of \textit{Atman} and non-\textit{Atman}. It is not possible for us to judge whether \textit{Sāṅkara} affirms or rejects the pupil's statement quoted above that \textit{avidya} cannot have one's own \textit{Atman} as its object. As in the case of the locus of \textit{avidya}, \textit{Sāṅkara} refrains from giving a clear-cut reply to the problem of the object of \textit{avidya}, although he is well aware that it is theoretically important.

However, even \textit{Sāṅkara}'s personal pupils were already unwilling to shelve the question, and \textit{Suresvara}, one of them, further develops the concept of \textit{avidya} (= \textit{ajñāna}):

And that \textit{ajñāna} cannot be self-existent. Therefore, it must be admitted that it is \textit{ajñāna} of someone about some object. (Nais III, Introduction)

In other words, \textit{Suresvara} stresses the locus and the object of \textit{avidya} and logically concludes that \textit{Atman} is both the locus and the object of \textit{avidya}. His view is accepted by Sarvajñātman, and further by Prakāśātman of the Vivaraṇa school of the Avaita Vedānta.

On the other hand, \textit{Maṇḍanamiśra}, the author of the \textit{Brahmasidhānta}, asserts that the locus of \textit{avidya} is \textit{jīva}, the individual \textit{ātman}, and that the object of \textit{avidya} is \textit{Brahman}, which is concealed by it. His view is accepted by \textit{Vācaspatimiśra}, the author of the \textit{Bha-
mati, and forms the fundamental standpoint of the Bhāmati school of the Advaita Vedānta. This is one of the basic differences between the two schools.

3. A Theoretical Defect in Avidyā

Certainly the most crucial problem which Śaṅkara left for his followers is that of avidyā. If the concept of avidyā is logically analyzed, it would lead the Vedānta philosophy toward dualism or nihilism and uproot its fundamental position.

As we have seen above, avidyā is mutual superimposition (anonyādhyāsa) between Ātman and non-Ātman. If so, avidyā would come to be logically untenable. Śaṅkara himself is aware of this fact and points it out in the pupil’s question to his teacher:

Is it not experienced that the thing which is superimposed [upon something else] through avidyā does not exist [in the latter]?—for example, silver [does not exist] in a mother-of-pearl nor a person in a tree-trunk nor a snake in a rope? . . . Likewise, if the body and Ātman are always mutually superimposed in the form of constantly non-distinct notions, then they cannot exist in each other at any time. Silver, etc., which are superimposed through avidyā upon mother-of-pearl, etc., do not exist [in the latter] at any time in any way and vice versa; likewise the body and Ātman are mutually superimposed through avidyā; this being the case, it would follow as the result that neither the body nor Ātman exists. And this is not acceptable, since it is the theory of the Nihilists. . . . For this reason the body and Ātman are not superimposed upon each other through avidyā.” (Upad II,2,55)

With the above objection the pupil has put forward a cogent argument striking at the very basis of the Advaita doctrine. If mutual superimposition is accepted, not only the body but Ātman as well would come to be non-existent. The teacher well understands what the pupil wants to say but does not answer directly. Deliberately side-stepping the sharp thrust of the question, the teacher asks instead what the relationship is between the body and Ātman. The pupil answers that they are permanently connected with each other like the interconnected bamboo and pillars of the structure of a house. The teacher rejects this by means of Sāṃkhya arguments and then concludes:

Not so; because it is accepted that Ātman, like space, is by nature not composite. Although Ātman exists as connected with nothing, it does not follow that the body and other things are without Ātman, just as, although space is connected with nothing, it does not follow that nothing has space. Therefore, there would not arise the fault that [I shall] arrive at the Nihilists’ position. (Upad II,2,56)

Thus the teacher does not give any definite answer to the point raised by his pupil that a further examination of avidyā as mutual superimposition results in nihilism. As far as I know, Śaṅkara’s own pupils did not take up this problem; it was Sarvajñātman who first tried to treat it.

Sarvajñātman is traditionally said to be a pupil of Suresvara. In his Samkṣepaśārtraka he has further developed the concept of avidyā on the basis of the ideas of his teacher and of Padmapāda, and tried to tackle the problems left unsolved by Śaṅkara.

In Sarvajñātman’s opinion avidyā is beginningless (anādi, Sī I, 454); it is not simply a negative entity like the absence of knowledge but a positive entity (bhanarūpa, Sī I,320—322). He identifies it with māyā (Sī II,190; 191; III,94; 105; 108—9). Following his teacher’s opinion that Ātman is both the locus and the object of avidyā (Sī I,316; 318; 319; III,15), he rejects Maṇḍana’s view (Sī II,174). His avidyā is the cause (nimitta) of superimposition (adhyāsa, Sī I,27). He says:

The idea that by [accepting] mutual superimposition, this world would turn out to be without a basis and void, is a great confusion of thought, arising out of the obstinacy of certain “Great Men” who are [actually] in a total ignorance; thus it has nothing to support it.

. . . mahātaṃ sambhramaḥ/ keśāṃcyin mahatāṃ anunatamasāṃ nirbandhāmatrāśrayyād/ anonyādhyāsaṃ nirāspadam idam śūnyam jagat syād iti /// Sī I,31

To justify his statement, he proposes two new technical terms: one is adhiṣṭhāna and the other is adhāra.14 Adhiṣṭhāna is the object of moha (= avidyā) with its products (savālāsamohaṁjaye vasūti, Sī I,31. Cf. Sī I,32). Avidyā has two faculties: one is an obscuring faculty (āvaranaśakti) and the other is a projecting faculty (vibhramaśakti = viśeṣapaśakti, Sī I,20). Avidyā works on its object, i.e., Ātman, and projects it in various forms illusorily. It is adhiṣṭhāna that is Brahma-Ātman, the object of avidyā. On the other hand
adhāra is the locus of superimposition (adhārā 'dhyasanasya vastuni, Sś 1,31). In the case of the false knowledge of a piece of mother-of-pearl ("This is silver"), the mother-of-pearl is adhiṣṭhāṇa and the adhāra is the referent of the term "this" which is the locus of superimposition.

The adhiṣṭhāṇa is essentially different from adhāra. If they were to be the same, or if a pair of things unreal were to be mutually superimposed, this world would indeed be void without any substrate (Sś 1,32; 33), but his position is that if two things, one real and the other unreal, are mutually superimposed, the above criticism does not hold good (Sś 1,33). Thus Sarvajñātman, introducing two new concepts adhiṣṭhāṇa and adhāra into the system, has tried to demonstrate the reality of the mother-of-pearl as adhiṣṭhāṇa, i.e., Ātman, translating mutual superimposition between a mother-of-pearl or adhiṣṭhāṇa and silver into one between "this" or adhāra and silver.

However, as I have discussed elsewhere, Sarvajñātman's solution is not satisfactory, and if we examine the nature of "this" more closely, we find that his position leads into regress ad infinitum. He succeeded to some extent in making the theory of mutual superimposition look logically tenable, but he could not demonstrate any real solution. After him arguments about avidyā continued, but, as far as I know, no one attempted to solve this problem.

E. The Means to Final Release

According to Śaṅkara's concepts of transmigratory existence and final release, the means to final release must necessarily be something which leads the aspirant to the cessation of nescience, the nature of which is the mutual superimposition of Ātman and non-Ātman.

Action (karma) arises from the innate conviction "I am an agent. This is mine" (Upad I,1,13), which results from a false superimposition of non-Ātman —such as the body, senses, and inner organ—upon the actionless Ātman. As is clearly shown in the above cycle of transmigratory existence, action has as its cause ignorance (Upad I,11,15) which has to be removed in favor of final release. With regard to rituals, Śaṅkara says:

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Notes to section IV, E are on p. 96.
Thus there is no hope of attaining immortality through action, which has ignorance as its cause (Upad 1,11,5).

According to Śaṅkara, it is only knowledge of Brahmā and nothing else that by nature contradicts knowledge. Only the knowledge of the identity of Ātman with Brahmā can be the means to final release:

Only knowledge [of Brahmā] can destroy ignorance; action cannot [destroy it] since [action] is not incompatible [with ignorance]. Unless ignorance is destroyed, passion and aversion will not be destroyed. (Upad 1,1,6)

Knowledge of Brahmā is called the supreme purification (para-māṇḍāvanam, Upad 1,16,71), since it enables the aspirant to be free from every kind of evil. Śaṅkara enthusiastically advises the aspirant to be firmly established in the path of knowledge (jñānapaṭṭha):

Thus both the false assumptions based upon dualism and the views that Ātman does not exist have been rejected through reasoning; seekers after final release, being free from doubts which arise from the views of others, become firm in the path of knowledge. (Upad 1,16,68)

Knowledge of Brahmā is incompatible not only with ignorance but also with action. The realization of the nature of Ātman comes about only when there is cessation of actions (Upad 1,17,48). When actions have been renounced, the nature of Ātman is realized. The renunciation of all actions becomes the means for discriminating the meaning of the word “Thou” in the sacred sentence “Thou art That” (Upad 1,18,219). From this viewpoint Śaṅkara also vehemently refutes jñānakarmasamuccayavāda, the opinion that knowledge must be combined with the performance of actions in order to attain final release.

[Reply]: Should not [certain] action too be always performed while life lasts? For this [action], being concomitant with knowledge [of Brahmā], leads to final release. Action, like knowledge [of Brahmā, should be adhered to], since [both of them] are equally enjoined [by the Śrutis]. As the Śruti also [lays it down that] transgression [results from the neglect of action, so], action should be performed by seekers after final release. [If you say that] as knowledge [of Brahmā] has permanent fruit, and so does not depend upon anything else, [we reply:] Not so! Just as the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice, though it has permanent fruit, depends upon things other than itself, so, though knowledge [of Brahmā] has permanent fruit, it always depend upon action. Thus some people think.

[Reply]: [We say] Not so, because action is incompatible [with knowledge]. In fact action is incompatible with knowledge [of Brahmā], since [it] is associated with misconception [of Ātman]. And knowledge [of Brahmā] is declared here [in the Vedānta] to be the view that Ātman is changeless. (Upad 1,1,8-12)

Knowledge of Brahmā depends upon the real (nāstvedādhiṇa), whereas the Vedic injunction to perform actions depends upon an agent (kartradhiṇa, Upad 1,1,13) whose very existence is a result of superimposition of non-Ātman upon Ātman through nescience. Śaṅkara further says:

Because of the incompatibility [of knowledge with action], therefore, one who knows so, being possessed of this knowledge, cannot perform action. For this reason action should be renounced by a seeker after final release. (Upad 1,1,15)

Those who know, “I am Brahmā” (Brh. Up. I,4,10) and [yet think], “I am doer and experiencer” are deprived of both knowledge and action; they are materialists (nāstikā) without a doubt. (Upad I, 11,8)

Thus Śaṅkara will not allow that action has any value as a means to final release, and even jñānakarmasamuccayavāda is also rejected by him. From his philosophical standpoint even ethical or moral actions are still based upon nescience and must therefore be rejected, since their incompatibility with knowledge must hinder the aspirant in attaining knowledge of Brahmā. When Śaṅkara explains how one knows one’s own Ātman from a sentence of the Śrutis, he relies upon the well-known illustration of the ten boys who crossed a river. Counting the party after the crossing to make sure none was missing, the leader failed to count himself and thought that one boy was missing. But when he was told, “You are the tenth,” he realized immediately that he himself was the tenth.6 In like manner one attains true knowledge of Brahmā-Ātman from such sentences of the Śrutis as “Thou art That.” This is a logical conclusion from Śaṅkara’s position.
F. Śaṅkara’s View of Ethics

As we have seen in the previous section, Śaṅkara accepts the knowledge of Brahmān as the only means to final release, rejecting action in any form. In fact, however, Śaṅkara does not one-sidedly teach only the knowledge of Brahmān, but here and there in his works recommends certain ethical and moral actions. In the Upadesāsāhasri, though he says that knowledge is the realization of the identity of Brahmān and Ātman and states that this is affirmed most emphatically in the Śruti, he goes on to prescribe: (1) the observance of abstinence (yama), which consists of abstinance from injury (ahimsa), from falsehood (satya), from theft (asteya), from incontinence (brahmacharya) and from possessions (aparigraha); (2) austerities (tapas); (3) the concentration of the mind (samādhi) and (4) the emanciation of the body (dehavisosaiya); as well as (5) the performance of the regular permanent rites (nityakarman) and sacrifices (yajna) (Upad I,17,21–23). He rejects the opinion of those who assert jhānakarmasamuccayavāda that prasāmkhyaṇa meditation should be observed until Ātman is apprehended (Upad I,18,9 ff.), but in the chapter entitled “Parisamkhyāṇa” in the Upadesāsāhasri (II,3,112–116) he prescribes parisāmkhyaṇa meditation for those seekers after final release who are devoting themselves to the destruction of their acquired merits and demerits (punyatpūvya) and do not wish to accumulate more of them. And he advises the wise man to perform parisāmkhyaṇa.1* Whatever difference Śaṅkara may recognize between prasāmkhyaṇa and parisāmkhyaṇa—a difference which he does not explain in his writings—it is unquestionable that both of them are not knowledge but a kind of action. If the Upad were a commentary on some text like the Bhagavadgītā, which stresses karmayoga (performance of actions) and bhaktiyoga (loving faith),2 it might have been that Śaṅkara reluctantly had to recommend action, in order to conform to his text. But the Upadesāsāhasri is not a commentary on any text. Thus when Śaṅkara insists on a complete renunciation of action and at the same time recommends the aspirant to perform some action, this must certainly be an expression of his own view.

Thus our examination has revealed that Śaṅkara’s treatment of action is self-contradictory. Bhāskara (c. 750–c. 800) in his own Gitabhasya (III, 4) has already severely criticized Śaṅkara’s self-contradiction in this respect.3 How should we understand this self-contradiction? It is not likely that Śaṅkara contradicts himself unknowingly. It can hardly be other than intentional. For what purpose does he knowingly sacrifice logical and theoretical consistency?

One of the most influential schools of philosophy at Śaṅkara’s time was the Māmāṣa to which belonged Kumārila (c. 650–c. 700) and Prabhākara (c. 700).4 Maṇḍānamiśra in particular (c. 670–c. 720),5 who must have been a younger contemporary of Kumārila and Prabhākara and an elder contemporary of Śaṅkara, was recognized by Advaitins and Māmāṣakas both as a high authority on the Māmāṣa. As the author of the Brahmāsiddhi he played a significant role in the history of the Advaita doctrine.6 Suresvara, who was the most faithful exponent of Śaṅkara’s philosophy and seems to have attacked Maṇḍānamiśra’s position,7 traditionally said to have been converted from the Māmāṣa school to Advaita by Śaṅkara.8 Judging from Śaṅkara’s writings, the Māmāṣa was unquestionably a chief target of his severe attack. Radhakrishnan remarks: “His (= Śaṅkara’s) denial of the adequacy of works to salvation is a reaction against the exaggerated emphasis which Māmāṣakas place on Vedic ritualism.” This is of course true, and by this theory “Śaṅkara’s unnecessary emphasis on the futility of the karmamarga for the final end of perfection”9 may be explicable. However, this theory is not enough to explain why Śaṅkara dares to contradict himself with regard to the problem of action.

Eliot Deutsch explains why Indian philosophy in general, and Advaita Vedānta in particular, “turns its back on all theoretical and practical considerations of morality and, if not unethical, is at least ‘a-ethical’ in character” and points out two reasons: one is that “the entire Advaita system is permeated with value questions, and in such a way, that an independent, separate treatment of them is unnecessary”; the other is that the neglect of ethics, which is quite purposive, is “based on the belief that Brahmān transcends all moral distinctions and that man, being essentially not different from Brahmān, is likewise in his essence ‘beyond good and evil.’ ”10 Neither does this theory seem to be satisfactory for...
explaining the above-mentioned self-contradiction. We must adopt another point of view.

The Mīmāṃsā school had experienced significant development and changes in its doctrine by Śaṅkara’s time. Jaimini (200–100 b.c.) and Śabaravāmin (c. 550) did not pay attention to the problem of final release, but later writers of the school had to take it into consideration. Jaimini and Śabaravāmin pointed out only the way to life in heaven and stressed the performance of the Vedic rites. Kumārila, Prabhakara, and Maṇḍanamīśra advocated their respective jñānakarmasamuccayavāda theories about the way to final release. Though not much is known of theories concerning this problem which were proposed by Vedantins before Śaṅkara, the Brahma-sūtra itself stands in the tradition of jñānakarmasamuccayavāda. Tāṅka (Brahmānandin) and Bhartṛprapañca were jñānakarmasamuccayavādins. Bhāskara also expounded jñānakarmasamuccayavāda, probably soon after Śaṅkara’s death. It is highly probable that jñānakarmasamuccayavāda in many varieties was prevalent among Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins while Śaṅkara was active. Śaṅkara, therefore, seems to have taught his teachings to, or fought against, mostly thinkers holding various types of jñānakarmasamuccayavāda. The Śaṅkhyā had already lost their vitality and Buddhism also was on the wane.

In the Upadesasāhasrī (II,1,2), Śaṅkara sets forth the following qualifications required in a seeker before he is initiated into the knowledge of Brahmān-Ātman by his teachers:

1. He must be dispassionate toward all passing objects attainable as they are by means other than knowledge.
2. He must have abandoned the desire for sons, wealth, and worlds and reached the state of a paramahamsaparivṛjaka ascetic.
3. He must be endowed with tranquillity, self-control, and the like.
4. He must be possessed of the qualities of a student, which are well known from the scriptures.
5. He must be a Brahmin who is internally and externally pure.
6. His caste, profession, behavior, knowledge, and family must have been examined.
7. He must approach his teacher in the prescribed manner.

Judging from the above requirements, it is a prerequisite that those who come to Śaṅkara for his instruction have some knowledge about Ātman and Brahmān and have fulfilled, or are at least seriously practicing, a number of ethical and moral laws prescribed by the Dharmaśāstras for their particular castes, stages of life (āśrama), and the like. Some of the candidates must have been Mīmāṃsakas, others Vedāntins following jñānakarmasamuccayavāda, and yet others Yogins or followers of different creeds.

Thus when the aspirant started receiving Śaṅkara’s teaching of the knowledge of Brahmān-Ātman, his burning concern must previously have been with the performance of action; he might also have acquired, from the study of the Veda, some knowledge of Brahmān and Ātman different from Śaṅkara’s. His attachment to action, which is based on a conviction of Brahmān and Ātman as separate, must sometimes have been too strong for him to understand Śaṅkara’s doctrine of the complete identity of Brahmān and Ātman. In the Prose Part of the Upadesasāhasrī Śaṅkara illustrates his teaching method, using the example of a pupil and his teacher. The pupil is a Brahmin’s son who has become a paramahamsaparivṛjaka ascetic (Upad II,1,10). After he has been taught, by means of many Śruti and Smṛti passages, that he (= Ātman) is identical with Brahmān and that he himself is free from caste, family, and purificatory ceremonies, he put to his teacher the objection:

I am one [and] He is another; I am ignorant, experience pleasure and pain, am bound and a transmigrator [whereas] He is essentially different from me, the god not subject to transmigration. By worshipping Him with oblation, offerings, homage and the like through the [performance of] the actions prescribed for [my] class and stage of life, I wish to get out of the ocean of transmigratory existence. How am I He? (Upad II,1,25)

It is highly probable that this was a typical pupil of the time, and Śaṅkara’s teaching required such pupils to make a total change in their views of life. In such a case one of the most effective teaching methods was to give them a great shock by the radical negation of action, which they had been considering their most important duty and which is based on the view that Ātman is different from Brahmān. They then could be led to the realization of the oneness
of Brahman and Atman. Śaṅkara’s drastic denial of action and of jñānakarmasamuccayavāda was apparently effective in shocking his pupils into an insight into the true nature of Atman.

Śaṅkara’s view is essentially different from antinomianism in Christianity. He does not intend to nullify the moral laws through his teaching of the knowledge of Brahman and Atman. In various places he affirms, though admittedly with reservations, that the performance of actions, including the observance of the moral laws, is indispensable for final release. In the Upadesasahasrī (I,17,44) Śaṅkara says that action can take place only before acquisition of knowledge of Atman, since a firm belief that “Thou art That” removes any notions of belonging to a certain caste and so on, which are prerequisites to the performance of action. This statement is indeed negative, but it implies paradoxically the positive meaning that action should be performed before one can achieve cessation of nescience. Before the cessation of nescience, abstinence from injury (ahimsā) and other abstentions (yama), the regular rites, and even sacrifice (yajña) should be observed to purify the mind, since knowledge appears when the mind becomes pure like a mirror (Upad I,17,22). According to Śaṅkara, the cessation of nescience is nothing but final release. Practically speaking, therefore, the aspirant should perform actions until his attainment of final release.

Śaṅkara explains what teachers should do when they have begun to teach knowledge to their pupils and see signs that they do not grasp it. The causes which prevent them from attaining knowledge are demerit, worldly laxity, absence of firm preliminary learning concerning the discrimination between eternal and noneternal things, care about what other people think, pride of caste, and the like. He instructs teachers to remove those causes by means of non-anger (akrodha), abstinence from injury and other abstentions, and the observances (niyama), which consist of purity (saucha), contentment (saṃśaya), self-mortification (tapas), study (svādyāya), and devotion to the lord (tīvara-praṇidhāna). He considers these means to be compatible with knowledge, though they are unquestionably actions. And he further tells them to help their pupils properly achieve the virtues, such as modesty (amaṇītva), which are described as means to attain knowledge (Upad II,1,4–5). Moreover, he prescribes that teachers should be endowed with tranquillity (śama), self-control (dama), compassion (dayā), kindness (anugraha), and the like and that they should lead blameless lives (abhinnayytta), free from faults such as deceit (damba), pride (darpa), trickery (kuhaka), wickedness (śāṭhya), fraud (maya), jealousy (mātsarya), falsehood (anṛta), egotism (ānākarā), self-interest (mamata); their knowledge is used for the purpose of helping others (Upad II,1,6).

In his famous work Mysticism East and West, Rudolf Otto attempts to get to the heart of mysticism by comparing Eastern and Western mysticism with reference to Śaṅkara and Meister Eckhart. After showing striking similarity between the two great masters, he turns to the differences between them, and remarks:

It is because the background of Śaṅkara’s teaching is not Palestine but India that his mysticism has no ethic. It is not immoral, it is a-moral. The Mukta, the redeemed, who has attained ekāta or unity with the eternal Brahman, is removed from all works, whether good or evil. Works bind man. He leaves all activity and reposes in oneness. . . . With Eckhart it is entirely different. . . . His wonderfully liberating ethic develops with greater strength from the ground of his mysticism.

The same criticism has been made of Śaṅkara’s ethical views as well as the ethics of Indian philosophy in general and the Advaita Vedānta in particular. S. Radhakrishnan devotes a chapter of his Indian Philosophy to the defense of Śaṅkara’s position against some objections put to him by P. Deussen and other Western scholars. In his Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction, Eliot Deutsch also takes up this problem for consideration and gives a favorable interpretation of the ethics of the Advaita Vedānta.

Śaṅkara’s teaching is neither “immoral” nor “a-moral.” Moral and ethical perfection is not his chief topic, not because he denies it nor because he is indifferent to it, but because he considers it to be a matter of course. He says:

Having been awakened from the ignorance as to the meanings of the words, and seeking for the realization of the meaning of the sentence, how should one come to follow his desires, when renunciation etc. have been enjoined [on such a man]? (Upad I,18,226)

Even if suffering from hunger, one certainly does not want to
take poison. Nobody whose hunger has been appeased by sweet food knowingly wants to take poison unless he is a fool. (Upad I,18,229)

These words clearly show Śaṅkara’s view of ethics. His radical denial of actions by means of a penetrating analysis is the most effective way to lead to a higher level those who are suffering in transmigratory existence, who are already fully committed to the ethical and moral laws and other requirements for admission to Śaṅkara’s teachings. He brings about in his pupils a sudden revolutionary change of world view by uprooting the foundation of their present convictions, so that they may easily be led into a totally new vision. He says:

... when knowledge is firmly grasped, it conduces to one’s own beatitude (sreyas) and to the continuity (of knowledge).

And the continuity of knowledge is helpful to people as a boat is helpful to one wishing to get across a river. (Upad II,1,3)

As in the case of other great religious teachers like the Buddha, Śaṅkara is primarily concerned with the salvation of people who are suffering from transmigratory existence here in the present world and not with the establishment of a consistent philosophical or ethical system. Śaṅkara’s view of ethics may be vague or self-contradictory, but this is because its real aim is the highest possible effectiveness in leading his pupils to the final goal.

Notes to Introduction IV, A

1Preface, p. xi.
3Karma is said to constitute the efficient cause (nimittakarana) for the origination of a new body (BSBh III,1,2, p. 597).
4Kriyā here corresponds to sāmanādhyaprayātī (verbal, mental, and physical activities) in Upad II,3,112.
5The expression kriyā sarvā dārāgpadhānāpāvīthā in the immediately preceding stanza (Upad I,1,2).
6Cf. BSBh I,1,1, p. 41; II,3,50, p. 561; GBh XVIII,12, p. 691; F Bh, Introduction, 4, p. 4; VBh, Introduction, 1, p. 61. Ajñāna, in Śaṅkara’s usage of the term, is almost but not entirely synonymous with avidyā. His concept of avidyā is wider than that of ajñāna.
7In his Nais (I,1) and Vṛttika on Śaṅkara’s Taittiriyapānī sadbhātā (I,7 and I,125), Sureśvara also gives a similar causal cycle. See J. M. van Boezaear, Sureśvara’s Taittiriyapānī sadbhātāvṛttikā Translated into English with an Introduction and Notes (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), pp. 7–8.
Notes to Introduction IV, E

1 For example, Upad I,15,21; SBbh I,2,17, p. 181; Gbh XIV, 3, p. 589; PBh IV,9, 67, p. 60; Śaṅkara ad Maṇḍ. Up. III,1,11 Cf. Eigen, p. 249.


5 Manu XI,41-71, especially XI,44.

For this illustration, see Upad I,12,3 and note 2, p. 129.

Notes to Introduction IV, F

1 Parasmākhāya is mentioned as something which Śaṅkara recommends in PBh I,3, 29, p. 24, as well.

2 Rudolf Otto remarks about Śaṅkara’s Gbh as follows: “With an almost appalling persistency and obstinacy Śaṅkara uses all the powers of his dialectic and his penetrating intellect to cloud and twist the clear meaning of the Gitā which praises the deed dedicated to Īśvara, and to reduce this action to a lower level than the stage of complete cessation of all willing and doing.” (Mysticism East and West, tr. by B. L. Bracey and R. C. Payne. New York: Collier Books, 1962, p. 225.)


6 Cf. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Brahmāsiddhi, pp. lii-i.xxi. In his Brahmāsiddhi Maṇḍana-miśra attacks a view of the relation between knowledge and action which may well be Śaṅkara’s.

7 Śaṅkara repeatedly refutes prasaṃkhyānaṇa, which may have been advocated by Maṇḍana-miśra. See Naiś 1,57; III,123-126; Sambandha-varttika 818-849; S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Brahmāsiddhi, pp. xxviii-xxxx; xxxii-xxcvi.

8 The Maṇḍana-Śaṅkara equation has been denied by such able scholars as M. Hiriyan, S. Kuppuswami Sastri, and S. Dasgupta, but they do not deny that Śaṅkara was once a Mimamsa. Cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Sambandha-Varttika of Śaṅkara (Madras University Philosophical Series No. 6), pp. xi-xii; M. Biardeau, La Philosophie de Maṇḍana Miśra, p. 2.

9 S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 627-628.


13 Cf. M. Hiriyan, Maṇḍana-saṅkara of Śaṅkara, pp. xxv-xxvii; S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Brahmāsiddhi, pp. xci-xcxi; xxi-xxxi. Maṇḍana-miśra refers to seven different theories of the problem of the relation of jīvan and karman in his Brahmāsiddhi (p. 26, line 24-26, line 7). It is said that Brahmadatta was also a saṃskṛta-saṅkara and was criticized by Śaṅkara. Cf. Naiś 1,67; M. Hiriyan, The Maṇḍana-saṅkara of Śaṅkara, pp. xxv-xxvii.

14 Nakamura III, pp. 116-117.


16 Cf. Upad I,13,27; 16,7; 17,53; 17,86; 17,87; SBbh I,1,1; Vedāntaśrī (IV) 4-31.

17 Cf. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, vol. II, pt. II (Poona, 1941), pp. 988 ff. However, when Śaṅkara illustrates the teaching method in the second chapter of the Prose Part of the Upad, he gives an example of a brahmaśrī and his teacher (Upad II,2, 45). The requirement of being a paramahamśprasārṣa-jīva might not be very strict.

18 In his commentary on the Brh-Up. III,5,1 and IV,5,15 Śaṅkara affirms that only the Brahmin can be saṃsārātmā. Most of the medieval writers on Dharmaśāstras support this opinion. But Śaṅkara is against Śaṅkara’s position in this respect. Cf. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, vol. II, pt. II, pp. 943-944.


20 Among the Hindus it may be the Tengalai of the Śrīvaism Sect who hold a view similar to antinomianism.

21 In his SBbh I,1,4, p. 83) Śaṅkara refutes the opinion that jīvan itself is an activity of the mind (maṇasī kriyā).

22 Mysticism East and West, p. 225.

23 Indian Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 621-634.


27 Rudolf Otto remarks about Śaṅkara’s Gbh as follows: “With an almost appalling persistency and obstinacy Śaṅkara uses all the powers of his dialectic and his penetrating intellect to cloud and twist the clear meaning of the Gitā which praises the deed dedicated to Īśvara, and to reduce this action to a lower level than the stage of complete cessation of all willing and doing.” (Mysticism East and West, tr. by B. L. Bracey and R. C. Payne. New York: Collier Books, 1962, p. 225.)

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CHAPTER 1
PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Salutation to the all-knowing Pure Consciousness which pervades all, is all, abides in the hearts of all beings, and is beyond all objects [of knowledge].

2. Having completed all the rituals, preceded by the marriage ceremony and the ceremony of installing the sacred fire, the Veda has now begun to utter knowledge of Brahman.

3. Karmans [as the results of actions, good or bad, in the past existence] produce association with a body. When there is association with a body, pleasant and unpleasant things are inevitable. From these result passion and aversion [and] from them actions.

4. [From actions] merit and demerit result [and] from merit and demerit there results an ignorant man's association with a body in the same manner again. Thus this transmigratory existence rolls onward powerfully forever like a wheel.

5. Since the root cause of this transmigratory existence is ignorance, its destruction is desired. Knowledge of Brahman therefore is entered on. Final beatitude results from this knowledge.

6. Only knowledge [of Brahman] can destroy ignorance; action cannot [destroy it] since [action] is not incompatible [with ignorance]. Unless ignorance is destroyed, passion and aversion will not be destroyed.

7. Unless passion and aversion are destroyed, action arises inevitably from [those] faults. Therefore, for the sake of final beatitude, only knowledge [of Brahman] is set forth here [in the Vedanta].

8. [Objection:] "Should not [certain] action too always be performed while life lasts? For this [action], being concomitant with knowledge [of Brahman], leads to final release.
9. “Action, like knowledge [of Brahman, should be adhered to], since [both of them] are equally enjoined [by the Śrutis]. As the Śruti1 also [lays it down that] transgression [results from the neglect of action, so] action should be performed by seekers after final release.

10. “[If you say that] as knowledge [of Brahman] has permanent fruit, and so does not depend upon anything else, [we reply:] Not so! Just as the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice,9 though it has permanent fruit, depends upon things other than itself,

11. “so, though knowledge [of Brahman] has permanent fruit, it always depends upon action. Thus some people think.” [Reply:] Not so, because action is incompatible [with knowledge].

12. In fact action is incompatible with knowledge [of Brahman], since [it] is associated with misconception [of Atman]. And knowledge [of Brahman] is declared here [in the Vedānta] to be the view that Atman is changeless.

13. [From the notion,] “I am agent; this is mine” arises action. Knowledge [of Brahman] depends upon the real, [whereas] the Vedic injunction depends upon an agent.10

14. Knowledge destroys the factors of action11 as [it destroys] the notion that there is water in the salt desert. After accepting this true view, [how] would one decide to perform action?

15. Because of the incompatibility [of knowledge with action] a man who knows thus, being possessed of this knowledge, cannot perform action. For this reason action should be renounced by a seeker after final release.

16. It is the innate assumption of people that Atman is not distinct from the body and the like. This arises from nescience. So long [as they have it], the Vedic injunction to perform actions would be [valid].

17. [The Śruti passage,] “Not thus! Not so!” (Bṛh. Up. II,3,6), excluding the body and the like, leaves Atman unexcluded so that [one] may know Atman free from distinction. Thereby nescience is removed.

18. Once nescience has been removed through the right means of knowledge, how can it arise again, since it does not exist in the one alone, the inner Atman free from distinction?

19. If nescience cannot arise again, how can there be the notions, “[I am] an agent, [I am] an experiencer,” when there is the knowledge, “I am the Existent”? Therefore knowledge has no helper.

20. Renunciation is therefore said by the Śruti to “be superior” (M.N. Up. 21,2) to the actions [there enumerated, beginning with truth and] ending with mental activity.18 “Only this much,” says the Vājins13 Śruti,

21. “[is, verily, the means to] immortality”14 (Bṛh. Up. IV,5,15). Therefore action should be abandoned by seekers after final release. [You] said that, as with the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice, [knowledge depends upon action].16 To this the following reply is given:

22. Because action has to be accomplished through various factors of action and varies in its result, knowledge is the opposite of it. Therefore the example is not applicable.

23. Since the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice, like agriculture, etc., has as its object a result [to be accomplished through various factors of action], it requires support from other actions [than itself]. But what else does knowledge depend upon?

24. The transgression [resulting from neglect of action]16 is imputed only to one who has “I”-notion. A knower of Atman has neither “I”-notion nor desire for the result [of action].

25. Therefore, in order to destroy ignorance, end transmigratory existence, and set forth knowledge of Brahman, this Upaniṣad has been commenced.

26. And the word “Upaniṣad” may be derived from the verbal root “sad” preceded by the prefix “upa-” and “ni-” and followed by the suffix “kvip,” since it diminishes and destroys birth and the like.18

Notes

1The Sanskrit term “caitanya” translated here as “Pure Consciousness” is used as a synonym for Brahman-Atman, indicating the nature of It (see Introduction, III,A,1, p. 19).
2Agniṣṭoma, which is the same as the Agnyadheya, is a Vedic sacrifice performed by a sacrificer and his wife with the help of four priests. Cf. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, vol. II-III (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1941), pp. 986-998.
3See Upad 1,15,6 (dehayogah kriyahetuh).
4On karman and transmigration, see Introduction, IV,A, pp. 69-72.
interprets it as passion (rāga), aversion (dveṣa), and delusion (moha) in his commentary Padapajñānta.


In his English translation (see Preface, note 4) Jagadānanda seems to take "karma ... niśye karṣayati" as "niśya karma karṣayatam" and translates it as "Obligatory duties should be performed." But, from the context, it seems to me that karma here is used in a wider sense which includes nityakarma; karman probably means action as a means to final release which is in contrast with knowledge as such, and nityam is an adverb which modifies karṣayatam.

Cf. Manu XI,41-71, especially XI,44.

This is one of the Vedic sacrifices, in which soma is used as the offering. It is a one-day sacrifice and an integral part of the Jyotistoma sacrifice, which generally occupies five days. It is to be performed in spring (varaṇa) every year and on a new moon or full moon day. See W. Caland and V. Henry, L'Agricole, 2 vols. (Paris: Ernest Leroux, Éditeur, 1906-1907); P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, vol. II-III, pp. 1133-1203.

Kūṭa, which is here transliterated as "actors of action," is a case-form of a noun dependent upon a verb. This term comprises the notions of ablation (apādāna), of giving (saṁpradāna), of instrument (karaṇa), of location (adikaraṇa), of object (karman), of agent (karaṇa), but the notion expressed by the genitive case is excluded from kūṭa. It is also defined as something instrumental in bringing about the action (kṛiṣṇasīna, Sarvanītayagāhārana, 1,1,32). Cf. L. Renou, Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1957), pp. 127-128.

M. N. Up. 21 refers to truth (satya), penance (tapas), self-control (dama), tranquility (dama), giving (dāna), and so forth, and concludes that renunciation (pārāśā) is superior to all these lower austerities (etāṃ avasthitī saṣṭhitī nāśa avasthānena).

Vājīn = Vājasaneyin, a Vedic school, to which the Brīh Up. belongs.

Bṛh. Up. IV,5,15 reads: ētadvad are khala amṛtamastam. According to Śaṅkara's commentary on this passage (Ānandārama S. S. No. 15, 1936, p. 714), the complete knowledge of Atman which is obtained through "Not thus, not so" and renunciation of everything are the means to immortality. In order to sum up this meaning, the Śruti says "etad eva khala amṛtamastam," which means that the means to Immortality is this much, and only this much—i.e. this view of the non-dual Atman which is arrived at through "Not thus, not so" and which does not depend upon any other cause cooperative with it. My translation of this quotation is based upon the above-mentioned interpretation of Śaṅkara which fits here in our present context. Cf. Upad I,11,2.

See the preceding stanzas 10 and 11.

See the preceding stanza 9.

Krīp is a suffix which disappears after having been added to several verbal roots, including sad, preceded by a preverb. See Pāṇini III,2,61; 76, etc.

Śaṅkara gives similar etymological explanation of the word "upaṇiṣad" in his commentaries on Upaniṣads. He takes the verbal root sad to mean (1) destroy (viṣa-
CHAPTER 2
NEGLIGENCE

1. As [Ātman] cannot be negated, [It] is left unnegated [by the Śruti,] “Not thus! Not so!” (Bṛh. Up. II,3,6). One attains [It] in some such way as “I am not this. I am not this.”

2. The notion “[I am] this” arises from the atman [which is identified with] “this” (= non-Ātman) and is within the range of a verbal handle. As it has its origin in the negated Ātman, it could not become [accepted as] a right notion again [as before].

3. Without negating a previous notion, a following view does not arise. The Seeing (= Ātman) is one alone, self-established. As It is the result [of the right means of knowledge], It is not negated.

4. When one has traversed the forest of “this” (= non-Ātman) which is contaminated with anxiety, delusion, and so on, one arrives at one’s own Ātman, just as the man from the land of Gandhāra [arrived at Gandhāra] through the forest.

Notes

1 Commentators Ānandajīśa, Bodhanidhi, and Rāmatīrtha interpret “idamatman” as “ahamkarta” or “the bearer of ‘I’-notion” (i.e. the intellect), which ordinary people regard as their Ātman (see Introduction, III,3,3, pp. 39-40). But “this” (idam) means here the object of knowledge which should be negated as non-Ātman in some such way as, “I am not ‘this,’ I am not ‘this’” (cf. the previous stanza). Therefore, “idamatma-” is the same as “nisiddhatma-” or “the negated Ātman” in the next line. Ātman is always the subject of knowledge and not the object of knowledge. It is not indicated by any words, since Ātman has no universals (jāti), action (karman) etc. which non-Ātman like the intellect possesses. (Cf. “idamagra,” Upad I,12,11.) Sānkara also uses “yusmad-” in the sense of “the object” or “non-Ātman” in contrast to “asmad-” or “the subject” or “Ātman.” (Cf. BSBh, Introduction, p. 4.)

2Cf. Chānd. Up. VI,1,4-6.

3Cf. Upad II,2,77; 93; 103; 108 (avagatiḥ pramāṇāṇāṁ phalam).

4 This simile is used in a famous dialogue between Uddālaka and his son Śvetaketu in Chānd. Up. VI,14,1-2 so that Uddālaka may explain to his son how Ātman, though subtle and imperceptible, can be realized. A man who is led, with his eyes covered, away from the Gandhāras and left in a place where there are no human beings, will at last arrive at Gandhāra by asking his way from village to village. In the same way one who meets a teacher to instruct him obtains true knowledge.
1. If the Lord is non-Atman, one ought not to dwell upon [the knowledge] "I am He." If He is Atman, the knowledge "I am the Lord" destroys the other [knowledge].¹

2. If, being different from Atman, [He] is taken to have characteristics such as "not coarse,"² what is the use of them when He is not an object of knowledge? If He is Atman, the notion of difference³ is destroyed [by them].

3. Understand, therefore, that [that predication of qualities] such as "not coarse" are meant to negate false superimposition⁴ [upon Atman]. If [they] were meant to negate [false superimposition] upon something other [than Atman], this would indeed be a description of emptiness (śūnyātā).⁵

4. And if it is thought [that they are meant to negate false superimposition] upon something other than the inner Atman of a man who wishes to know, the words [of the Śruti], "[He is . . .] without breath, without mind, pure [, higher than the high Imperishable]" (Mund. Up. II,1,2), would also be meaningless.

Notes

¹"Anyaniṣṭhātā" may be in the sense of "anu-dā-niṣṭhātā" if the compound "anu-dāthitta" in the next stanza is taken into consideration. "Anyadi" is synonymous with "asidha" according to Upad I,17,21 (cf. anadṛṣṭa, Upad I,17,6; 56). If so, this sentence can be translated as: "... the knowledge 'I am the Lord' destroys the [notion] of difference."

²See Brh. Up. III,8,8.

³See note 1.

⁴According to Śaṅkara, "asidha" is the superimposition of the qualities of one upon the other" (asidha nāmānyasmin anvadharmadhyātmanek, Upad II,2,51). In other words, asidha is mutual superimposition of Atman and non-Atman such as the body, the senses, and the inner organ.

⁵This is an important term in Mahāyāna Buddhism, especially the Mādhyamika School founded by Nāgārjuna (150–250). The term "śūnyātā" is sometimes translated as "emptiness," "voidness," or "nothingness" and mistaken for absolute negation of existence, which Śaṅkara also seems to mean by the term here. Buddhists are called nihilists (vaiśākha) by Śaṅkara (cf. Upad II,2,55; 2,57; 2,58) and other writers of the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. śūnyātā, however, means that nothing has any intrinsic nature of its own (niḥsvabhavatā); it denotes the unreality of the foundation of the phenomenal appearance but not the unreality of the appearance as such.

CHAPTER 4

“T”-NOTION

1. When action, which has the “I”-notion as its seed and is in the bearer of the “I”-notion (= the intellect),¹ has been burnt up by the fire of the notion that “I am not [an agent or an experiencer],”¹ how can it produce a result?

2. If [you say:] “[Even after the action has been burnt up,] production of a result [of action] will take place as previously experienced,” [we reply:] No; it (= production of a result) is based upon other action. [If you say,] “When the “I”-notion [as the seed of action] has been destroyed, we ask you, How can there be that [action beyond that which has been burnt up]? Answer that,”

3. [we reply:] As [action] can fashion the body and so on, it can overpower knowledge in you concerning the Existent and produce a result. When action comes to an end, knowledge will arise.

4. As experience [of the result of action] and knowledge are both results of action which has already begun to produce a result, it is reasonable that they (= knowledge and action) are not contradictory to each other. But other [action, namely that which has not yet begun to produce a result,] is different in nature.

5. A man who has knowledge of Atman, which negates the notion that the body is Atman and is as [firm] as [ordinary people’s] notion that the body is Atman, is released even without wishing.

⁵. Therefore, all this is established. The reasoning is as stated by us.] ²

Notes

²Anandajīna and Rāmatīrtha interpret “nāhāṃ-pratīṣṭhā” as “nāhāṃ karta bhaktā na kim tu brahmaīdaṃtī (yah pamāṇajugalaḥ) pratīṣṭhā.” Bodhanidhi also interprets in the same way but with a slight difference in expression.
³This line may be a later interpolation. See Mayeda Upad, p. 221.
1. Just as the sage Udana did not accept the nectar, thinking that it was urine, so people do not accept the knowledge of Atman out of fear that action will be destroyed.

2. Atman, abiding in the intellect, is seen as it were moving and meditating [when the intellect moves and meditates]. The mistake about transmigratory existence is like that of a man in a [moving] boat who thinks that it is the trees [along the shore which are moving].

3. Just as to a man in the boat the trees [appear to] move in a direction opposite [to his movement], so does Atman [appears to] transmigrate, since the Shruti reads, "[He, remaining the same, goes along both worlds, appearing to think [, appearing to move about]" (Bṛh. Up. IV,3,7).

4. Intellect being pervaded by the reflection of Pure Consciousness, knowledge arises in it; and so sound and other [objects of the sense-organs] appear. By this people are deluded.

5. The "I"-notion appears to be as it were Pure Consciousness and exists for its sake. And it does not do so, when the "this"-portion has been destroyed. [So] this Pure Experience [which is other than "this"-portion] is the highest [Atman].

Notes

1This story appears in the Mahābhārata, Aśvamedhapi, Sec. 54, pp. 208-212. It runs as follows: When Viṣṇu allowed the sage Udana to ask him for some boon, he asked for water and Viṣṇu told him to think of him whenever he wanted water. One day, wandering over the desert, he became thirsty and thought of Viṣṇu. Then he saw, in the desert, a naked hunter of the Caṇḍāla class, all besmeared with dirt, surrounded by a pack of dogs. Extremely fierce-looking, he carried a sword and was armed with bow and arrows. Udana saw a copious stream of water issuing from the urinary organs of that hunter. The hunter offered the water repeatedly but Udana did not accept it, and finally became angry. But later Viṣṇu explained to him that the hunter was Indra and that he had appeared before him to give him nectar.

2Cf. Naiṣ I,63.

3Rāmatirtha in his commentary suggests here the two ways of reading: one is "buddheh labdādhih bāhas" and the other is "buddheh labdādādih bāhas" which I have used.

4Ānandajñāna, Bodhanidhi and Rāmatirtha take this "anubhava" (Pure Experience) as "Sākṣin."
1. *Atman* Itself is not qualified by a hand which has been cut off and thrown away. Likewise, none of the rest [of the body] qualifies [*Atman*].

2. Therefore, every qualification is the same as a hand which has been thrown away, since it is non-*Atman*. Therefore, the Knower (= *Atman*) is devoid of all qualifications.

3. This whole [universe] is qualification, like a beautiful ornament, which is superimposed [upon *Atman*] through nescience. Therefore, when *Atman* has been known, the whole [universe] becomes non-existent.

4. One should always grasp *Atman* alone as the Knower, disconnected [from all qualifications], and abandon the object of knowledge. One should grasp that what is called “I” is also the same as a part which has been abandoned.

5. As long as the “this”-portion is a qualification [of *Atman*], that [“I”-portion] is different from [*Atman*] Itself. When the qualification has been destroyed, the Knower is established [independently from it], as a man who owns a brindled cow [is established independently from it].

6. The learned should abandon the “this”-portion in what is called “I,” understanding that it is not *Atman*. [“I” in the sentence of the Śrutī] “I am Brahman” (Bṛh. Up. I,4,10) is the portion which has been left unabandoned in accordance with the above teaching.

Notes

1This stanza appears as Naiṣ IV,26.
2This stanza appears as Naiṣ IV,27.
3Cf. stanza 2.
4This stanza appears as Naiṣ IV,29.
5The Upaniṣadic sentence “aham brahmaḥsmi” (I am Brahman) is one of the Mahāvākyas (Great Sentences) which the Advaitins consider to be best indicative of the Advaita doctrine. There are said to be eleven or twelve Mahāvākyas, but among them this sentence and “tāt tvam āsi” (Thou art That) are best known.
1. Everything located in the intellect\(^1\) is always seen by Me in every case [of cognition]. Therefore, I am the highest *Brahman*; I am all-knowing and all-pervading.

2. Just as [I] am the Witness of the movements in My own intellect,\(^2\) so am I [also the Witness of the movements] in others' [intellects]. I can be neither rejected nor accepted. Therefore, I am indeed the highest [*Ātman*].

3. There is no change in the *Ātman*, nor impurity, nor materiality, and because It is the Witness of all intellects, there is no limitation of its knowledge, as there is in the case of knowledge of intellect.

4. Just as in a jewel the forms such as red color are manifested in the sunshine,\(^3\) so in my presence everything becomes visible [in the intellect]. Therefore through Me [everything becomes visible] as [the forms such as red color become visible] through sunshine.

5. The object of knowledge in the intellect exists when the intellect exists; otherwise it does not exist. Since the Seer is always seer, duality does not exist.

6. Just as the intellect, from absence of discriminating knowledge, holds that the highest [*Ātman*] does not exist, just so when there is discriminating knowledge, nothing but the highest [*Ātman*] exists, not even [the intellect] itself.

Notes

\(^1\)Pāda a of this stanza appears again as pāda a of stanza 18.94. When the intellect per-
CHAPTER 8
THE NATURE OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

1. I Myself have the nature of Pure Consciousness, O Mind; [My apparent] connection with taste, etc., is caused by your delusion. Therefore no result due to your activity would belong to Me, since I am free from all attributes.

2. Abandon here activity born of illusion and come ever to rest from search for the wrong, since I am forever the highest Brahman, released, as it were, unborn, one alone, and without duality.

3. And I am always the same to beings, one alone; [I am] the highest [Brahman] which, like the sky, is all-pervading, imperishable, auspicious, uninterrupted, undivided and devoid of action. Therefore no result from your efforts here pertains to Me.

4. I am one alone; No other than that [Brahman] is thought to be Mine. In like manner I do not belong to anything since I am free from attachment. I have by nature no attachment. Therefore I do not need you nor your work since I am non-dual.

5. Considering that people are attached to cause and effect, I have composed this dialogue, making [them] understand the meaning of the truth of their own nature, so that they may be released from their attachment to cause and effect.

6. If a man ponders on this dialogue, he will be released from ignorance, the origin of great fears. And such a man is always free from desire; being a knower of Atman, he is ever free from sorrow, the same [to beings], and happy.

Note

1. Cf. same 'ham sarvabhilaye, BhG IX,29.

CHAPTER 9
SUBTLETY

1. It is to be known that [in the series] beginning with earth and ending with the inner Atman, each succeeding one is more subtle and more pervasive than the preceding one which has been abandoned.

2. The means of knowledge show that external earth is the same as the bodily earth. [External] water and all the other elements should be known to be the same as [bodily elements].

3. Just as the [clear] sky is all-pervading before the origination of air and other elements, so am I always one alone, all, Pure Consciousness only, all-pervading and non-dual.

4. It is said that all beings from Brahma down to the plants are my body. From what else can the faults such as desire and anger arise in Me?

5. Although I am always untouched by the faults of beings, being the Lord who abides in all beings, [yet] people look upon Me as contaminated [by the faults of beings] just as an ignorant person looks upon the sky as blue.

6. As the intellects of all beings are always to be illuminated by My Pure Consciousness, all beings are the body of Me who am all-knowing and free from evils.

7. The object of knowledge [in the waking state] is looked upon as having an origin, as is [the object of] knowledge in the dreaming state. [True] knowledge is constant and without object; hence duality does not exist.

8. The Knower's Knowing is indeed said to be constant, for nothing else exists in the state of deep sleep. Knowing in the waking state results from nescience; therefore the object of knowledge should be looked upon as unreal.
9. Just as the Infinite lacks form-and-color, etc., and is not the object of sight, etc., so it is not to be taken to be an object of knowledge.

Notes

1. The text reads "gandhander" here, but Anandajñana comments on it: prthivi gandhadesabdenotpasi, and Rāmatirtha also says: gandhadasaḥ prthiśāhadbirtāh.

2. The word jñati means "relative" in the Upaniṣads (for example, Chand. Up. VI,15,1; VIII,12,3; Kaus. Up. I,4). Bodhanidhi and Rāmatirtha interpret it as jñāpti. Anandajñana's interpretation on this term is not clear but seems to take it as caitanya.

3. The word bhuman is sometimes translated as grandeur, the superlative, acme, and plenum. The bhuman in Chand. Up. VII,23 is interpreted in BS 1,3,8, which takes it as paramātman according to BSBh 1,3,8, p. 213.

CHAPTER 10
SEEING

1. The highest [Brahman]—which is of the nature of Seeing, like the sky, ever-shining,¹ unborn, one alone, imperishable, stainless, all-pervading, and non-dual—that am I and I am forever released. Om.⁵

2. I am Seeing, pure and by nature changeless. There is by nature no object for me. Being the Infinite,³ completely filled in front, across, up, down, and in every direction, I am unborn, abiding in Myself.

3. I am unborn, deathless, free from old age, immortal, self-effulgent, all-pervading, non-dual; I am neither cause nor effect, altogether stainless, always satisfied and therefore [constantly] released. Om.

4. Whether in the state of deep sleep or of waking or of dreaming, no delusive perception appears to pertain to Me in this world. As those [three states] have no existence, self-dependent or other-dependent, I am always the Fourth,⁴ the Seeing and the non-dual.

5. The continuous series of pains due to the body, the intellect and the senses is neither I nor of Me, for I am changeless. And this is because the continual series [of pain] is unreal; it is indeed unreal like an object seen by a dreaming man.

6. It is true that I have neither change nor any cause of change, since I am non-dual. I have neither good nor bad deeds, neither final release nor bondage, neither caste nor stages of life, since I am bodiless.

7. Since I am beginningless and attributeless,⁵ I have neither action nor result [of action]. Therefore I am the highest [Ātman], non-dual. Just as the ether, though all-pervading, is not stained,
so am I not either, though abiding in the body, since I am subtle. 6

8. And I am always the same to [all] beings, the Lord, for I am superior to, and higher than, the perishable and the imperishable. 8

Though I have the highest Ātman as my true nature and am non-dual, I am nevertheless covered with wrong knowledge, which is nescience. 9

9. Being perfectly stainless, Ātman is distinguished from, and broken by, nescience, residual impression, and actions. Being filled with powers such as Seeing, I am non-dual, standing [perfect] in my own nature and motionless like the sky.

10. He who sees Ātman with the firm belief "I am the highest Brahman" “is born no more” (Kaṭh. Up. I,38), says the Śruti. When there is no seed, no fruit is produced. Therefore there is no birth, for there is no delusion.

11. "This is mine, being thus," “That is yours, being of such kind,” “Likewise, I am so, not superior nor otherwise”—[such] assumptions of people concerning Brahman, which is the same [to all beings], non-dual and auspicious, are nothing but their stupidity.

12. When there is completely non-dual and stainless knowledge, then the great-souled experiences neither sorrow nor delusion. In the absence of both there is neither action nor birth. This is the firm belief of those who know the Veda.

13. He who, in the waking state, like a man in the state of deep sleep, does not see duality, though [actually] seeing, because of his non-duality, and similarly he who, though [in fact] acting, is actionless—he [only] is the knower of Ātman, and nobody else. This is the firm conclusion here [in the Vedānta].

14. This view which has been declared by me from the standpoint of the highest truth is the supreme [view] as ascertained in the Vedānta. If a man has firm belief in it, he is released and not stained by actions, as others are.

Notes

1Sakṛdibhāta. “Sakṛ” has two meanings: one is “sudden” (for example, sakṛdīyudhata, Brh. Up. II,3,8) and the other is “always” (for example, sakṛdibhāta hy evaṣa brahma-lokaḥ, Čaṇḍ. Up. VIII,4,2). Śaṅkara interprets “sakṛdibhāta” in Čaṇḍ. Up. VIII,4,2 as “sada viḥātāḥ” in his Bhāṣya on it. When he comments on the Gk, he interprets “sakrdibhāta” as “sadaśa viḥātam, sadā brahmet” (GBKh III,36) and as “sadaśa viḥāte” (GBKh IV,81). In his commentary on this stanza, Bodhanidhi interprets sakṛdibhāta as “sādābhāṣavāratam adhyayat prakāśasvaratpatu na kathāc api tamasābhāṣe bhūyate.” Rāmāntithra interprets it as “ekadatu viṣṇataram, sadaśa sāpaṣṭām bhāṣamānaṃ.”

This whole stanza is quoted in Vedāntāra (XXX) 210. Om is the sacred syllable called praṇava and sometimes compared with Amen. It is used at the opening of most Hindu works and as a sacred exclamation may be uttered at the beginning and end of Vedic recitation or before any prayer.

2See Upad I,9,9.

3The ātman in the waking state is called vaisvātmā (Upad I,17,65), that in the dreaming state tātājasa (Upad I,15,24), and that in the state of deep sleep prājñā (Upad I,15,25; I,17,65) or saṃyuktā (Upad I,17,65). These three kinds of ātman are not the true Ātman; they are the only ātman limited by adjuncts (saṇḍhi, Upad I,15,29). Free from all limiting adjuncts (anuvādika, Upad I,15,29), the true Ātman transcends all these three, and it is called Tārīja (Upad I,10,4; Brh. Up. V,14,3-7), which is also called Caturtha (Māṇḍ. Up. 7) or Turya (Maitri Up. VI,19; VII,11,7-8). See Introduction, III,8,5, pp. 43-46.

4Cf. addhāna nirguṇatā, BhG XIII,31.

5Cf. BhG IX,29; Upad I,8,3.


7Vagānātra I,8 defines “viparyaya” as “mithyajñānam atadā papratitrham.” According to Śaṅkara’s usage of the term mithyajñāna, it is a synonym of avidyā (cf. Māyeda Upad, pp. 24-25; Introduction, IV,D,1, p. 78). In GBh XIII,2, p. 529, Śaṅkara refers to three kinds of avidyā: (1) avarāgadāhaka, (2) samiśrīṣṭhāpada, and (3) agraḥanātmaka. Among those three, (1) seems to correspond to “viparyaya.” Thus, though viparyaya is not a synonym of avidyā, it is probable that avidyā is a wider concept to which viparyaya belongs. All three commentators take avidyā as the cause of viparyaya or mithyajñāna: (1) Anandajnana, anisdattvāna mithyajñānendaurtya ātmaḥ, (2) Bodhanidhi, viparītyāyena mithyajñānabhūrtya ātmaḥ, that is, (3) Rāmāntithra, asviddātāsita eva viparyaya ity arthāḥ. The term “abhīrtā” is of interest, since later Advaitins characterize avidyā as dhvāpakaḥ, though Śaṅkara does not do so in his works.

8Cf. na maṁ karmāṇi limpanti, BhG IV,14; Upad I,16,71.
CHAPTER 11
THE QUALITY OF BEING THE BEHOLDER

1. The quality of being the Beholder is self-established as belonging to beings, and their [apparent] difference from this [Beholder] arises from ignorance. Therefore, the difference is removed by the words, “You are the Existent.”

2. The scripture rejects action with the subtle body,1 saying that, since “[The means to] immortality” is “[Only] this much” (Brh. Up. IV,5,15),² nothing else accompanies knowledge.

3. I see the modification3 of the mind in all beings without exception. [But] how can I, who am changeless, have differentiation in any respect?

4. I am the Beholder of modification of the mind and also of the mind [itself], [in beings] in the waking state as in the dreaming state; since neither [the mind] nor [its modification exists] in the state of deep sleep, [I am] Pure Consciousness only, all-pervading and non-dual.

5. Just as a dream is true until awakening, so would the identity of the body with Átman be [true, as well as] the authoritiveness of sense-perception and the other [means of knowledge] and the waking state until [the attainment of] knowledge of Átman.

6. Like ether, though abiding in all beings, I am free from [all] the faults of beings; I am the Witness, the Observer, the pure, attributeless Brahman; so I am alone.⁴

7. Being different from name, form, and action⁵ and by nature constantly free, I am Átman, i.e., the highest Brahman; I am Pure Consciousness only and always non-dual.

8. Those who know “I am Brahman” (Brh. Up. I,4,10) and [yet think] “I am doer and experiencer” lose both knowledge and action; they are materialists (nástika) without a doubt.

9. Just as it is [ordinarily] assumed that Átman is connected with the results of merit and demerit,⁶ although this [connection] is invisible, so the scripture⁷ says it should be admitted that Átman is Brahman and that final release results from knowledge.

10. The residual impressions [enumerated in the Śruti,]⁸ beginning with a saffron-colored robe, are perceived here only by those who see dreams. The Seeing (= Átman) is different from those [residual impressions], alone.

11. Just as it is seen that a sword [shines] when it is drawn from its sheath,⁹ so the Knower, separated in the dreaming state from cause and effect, is seen to be self-effulgent.

12. The natural state of the Knower who was awakened by being pushed [with the hand]¹⁰ has been declared [in the Śruti] by the sentences such as “Not thus” (Brh. Up. II,3,6, etc.), which remove [everything] falsely constructed [upon Him].

13. Just as a great king and other worlds [that I become, as it were, in the dreaming state according to the Śruti]¹¹ are things falsely constructed upon Me in the dreaming state, so the double form [of Brahman] and the residual impression should be known [as falsely constructed].

14. Action is performed by Átman identified with the gross and subtle body [and] in the form of residual impression. As My own nature is “Not thus! Not so!” (Brh. Up. II,3,6, etc.), action is not performed anywhere by Me.

15. Therefore there is no hope of immortality from action which has ignorance as its cause. Since the cause of final release is knowledge, it does not depend upon anything else but knowledge.

16. The immortal is fearless and not injured. Átman [which was left unnegated by the Śruti,] “Not thus! [Not so!]” (Brh. Up. II, 3,6, etc.)¹² is dear to Me.¹³ Therefore, along with action, one should abandon anything [else] which is contrary [to Átman or] different from It.

Notes

¹Jagadánanda translates “sálíká” as “with their accessories” (i.e., the accessories of Vedic actions): the sacred tuft of hair on the head, the sacred thread, etc., according to his footnote 2, p. 116. His translation seems to be based upon Rámátrítha’s interpretation, according to which “sálíká” means “sadākā.” According to Ánandajñána,
however, “līlā” means “kota” or “saṃsārādheka,” which may be associated with the usage of līlā in the Nyāya. The term “līlā” is used three more times in the Upad (I,11,14; 15,10; II,1,4). In Upad I,11,14 and 15,10 the word means “the subtle body,” and Upad I,11,14 especially suggests that the word “līlā” here also means “subtle body.” Bodhanidhi supports this, interpreting it as “sīkṣāmaṇa.”

2See Upad I,1,20-21.

3For a fuller explanation of the modification (śrīta, śrīti or pratyaya) of the mind or the internal organ (antahkarana), see Introduction, III,B,2, pp. 35-37.

4This stanza is probably based upon the following passages of the Upaniṣād: (1) eko devas sarvaśākṣaḥ sūryāḥ . . . sūryāḥ savit vā nighat ca, Śvet. Up. VI,11, and (2) ahān brahmān, Brh. Up. I,4,10.

5This stanza is probably based upon Brh. Up. I,6,1 (cf. I,6,2 and 3): tṛpana vā idam, nāma rūpaḥ karma. According to Śaṅkara’s commentary on Brh. Up., the universe consists of these three, but all of them are non-Ātman. Therefore, one should turn away from them. Śaṅkara holds that this is the import of this section of the Upaniṣād. Cf. Upad II,1,18 ff.; Śaṅkara ad Brh. Up. II,3,6, p. 334.


8 Cf. Upad I,14,48. Brh. Up. II,3,1–5 describes two forms of Brahmā: the formed and the formless, the mortal and the immortal. In Brh. Up. II,5,6, the form of the formless is said to be like a saffron-colored robe (mahābrāhmaṇa vāsana), white wool (pāṇḍuvaśīka), the [red] Indragopā beetle (indragopa), a flame of fire (agnyaśrī), the [white] lotus flower (pundarika), a sudden flash of lightning (sakridvidyutta). According to Śaṅkara’s commentary on Brh. Up. II,3,6, p. 333, the formless is the subtle body, the particular forms of which are residual impressions (okṣāṇa); the saffron-colored robe and the like are residual impressions.

9The simile of a sword appears in Śaṅkara ad Brh. Up. IV,5,10, p. 584.

10Brh. Up. II,1 contains a dialogue on Brahmā between Gārgya Drptabalaki and Ajātaśatru, a king of Benares. Drptabalaki, though a Brahmin, had only imperfect knowledge of Brahmā, worshipping It as the Person in the sun, the Person in the moon, etc. On the other hand, Ajātaśatru, though a king, had perfect knowledge of Brahmā and knew It as Ātman. In the beginning of their dialogue Drptabalaki explained his ideas of Brahmā but the king rejected them all. So he had to request the king to receive him as a pupil. Then the king acceded to his request, saying, “It is contrary to usual practice that a Brahmin should come to a Kṣatriya, and have the same locus. But he did not awaken. Then the king woke him by pushing (or rubbing) him with his hand. After that, the king taught Drptabalaki with reference to the states of dreaming and deep sleep that all vital airs, all worlds, all gods, and all beings come forth from Ātman.

11See note 10 above). When the person consisting of consciousness (viśisṭaātmāya) (= Ātman) is in the dreaming state, he becomes, as it were, a great king (mahābrāhmaṇa), a great Brahmin (mahābrāhmaṇa), and the like. To be, as it were, a great king—to be, as it were, a great Brahmin, and so forth—are his worlds (loka) which are consequences (of his action) (karmaphala), according to Śaṅkara’s commentary.

12Cf. Upad I,2,2.


1. Just as a man thinks that a body in sunlight is [itself] bright, so he thinks that the mind1 which appears to be the Seer is indeed “I, the Seer.”

2. Whatever is seen in this world, Ātman comes to be identified with it. Consequently [a man] is deluded and so he does not recognize Ātman.

3. Just as [the lad who] was himself the tenth thought that he was among the nine [others],8 so these deluded folk [think that] Ātman is among the objects of knowledge [such as the intellect] and do not [understand] otherwise.

4. Explain reasonably how the two incompatible notions, “You should act” and “You are That,”8 can exist at the same time and have the same locus.

5. He who misconceives the body as Ātman has pain; he who has no body4 has by nature no [pain], as in the sleeping state. In order to remove pain from the Seeing, [the Śruti] says, “Thou[art]That” (Chând. Up. VI,8,7, etc.).

6. A Yogin, seeing the notion [of the intellect] on which the reflection of the Seeing (= Ātman) is mounted like the reflection of a face in a mirror, thinks that Ātman is seen.

7. Only if he knows that the various deluded notions do not belong to the Seeing, is he beyond doubt the best of Yogins. No one else can be.

8. “Understander of understanding”16 is what is meant by the word “Thou” [in the sentence, “Thou art That”] (Chând. Up. VI,8,7, etc.). Therefore this is the [right] apprehension of this word; any other apprehension is false.
9. Since I am always of the nature of the Seeing and constant, how is it possible for Me [sometimes] to see and [sometimes] not to see? Therefore any apprehension [of the word] different from that is not accepted.

10. Just as the body, the site of the sun’s heat, is an object to the Seeing, so the intellect here is the site [of pain—corresponding to heat in the example]; therefore, the intellect is the object to the Seeing.

11. The Knower whose “this”-portion has been negated is homogeneous like ether, non-dual, ever-free and pure. He is Myself; I am Brahman, alone.

12. There can never be another understander superior to the Understander; therefore, I am the highest Understander, being always released in all beings.

13. He who knows that Atman’s Seeing is undiminished and that [Atman] is not a doer, abandoning the [very] notion that he is a knower of Brahman, [he alone] is a knower of Atman and no one else.

14. The discriminating notion, “I am the Knower, not the object of knowledge, pure, always released,” also belongs to the intellect, since it is the object of cognition and perishable.

15. Since Atman’s Seeing is undiminished and not produced by factors of action, the false assumption that this Seeing can be produced is made by another seeing which is [Its] object.

16. [The notion that] Atman is a doer is false, since [it] is due to the belief that the body is Atman. The belief, “I do not do anything,” is true and arises from the right means of knowledge.

17. [The notion that Atman] is a doer is due to factors of action [whereas the notion that It] is not a doer is due to Its own nature. It has been fully ascertained that the understanding, “[I am] a doer,” “[I am] an experiencer,” is false.

18. When one’s own nature has thus been understood by means of the scripture and inference, how can this understanding, “I am to be enjoined [to act],” be true?

19. Just as ether is within all, so am I within even ether itself; I am always changeless, motionless, pure, free from old age, released, and non-dual.
CHAPTER 13
EYELESSNESS

1. As I am eyeless, I do not see. Likewise, as I am earless, how shall I hear? As I have no organ of speech, I do not speak. As I am mindless, how shall I think?

2. As I am devoid of the life principle, I do not act. Being without intellect, I am not a knower. Therefore I have neither knowledge nor nescience, having the light of Pure Consciousness only.

3. Ever-free, pure, transcendentally changeless, invariable, immortal, imperishable, and thus always bodiless.

4. [All-]pervading like ether, I have neither hunger nor thirst, neither sorrow nor delusion, neither decay nor death, since I am bodiless.

5. As I have no sense of touch, I do not touch. As I have no tongue, I do not perceive taste. As I am of the nature of constant knowledge, I never have [either] knowledge or ignorance.

6. The modification of the mind, which is caused by the eye and takes on form-and-color [of its object], is certainly always seen by the constant Seeing of Atman.

7. In like manner the modifications [of the mind] which are connected with the senses other [than the eye] and are colored by [external] objects; also [the modification of the mind] in the form of memory and in the forms of passion and the like, which is unconnected [from the senses], located in the mind;

8. and the modifications of the mind in the dreaming state are also seen to be an other's. The Seeing of the Seer is, therefore, constant, pure, infinite, and alone.

9. The Seeing is [wrongly] taken to be inconstant and impure because of the absence of discriminating knowledge with regard to It. Similarly, I experience pleasure and pain through [a seeing] which is the object and adjunct [of the Seeing].


11. If one is a seeker after final release in this world, he should always remember Atman which is ever-free, described in the scripture as eyeless, etc. [which] includes the exterior and the interior, and is unborn.

12. And as the scripture says that I am eyeless, etc., no senses at all belong to Me. And there are the words in the [Munḍ. Up. (II,1,2)] belonging to the Atharvaveda, “[He is... ] breathless, mindless, pure.”

13. As it is stated in the Kath. Up. (I,3,15) that I do not have sound, etc., and [in the Munḍ. Up. (II,1,2) that I am] “without breath, without mind,” I am indeed always changeless.

14. Therefore, mental restlessness does not belong to Me. Therefore, concentration does not belong to Me. Both mental restlessness and concentration belong [only] to the changeable mind.

15. As I am without mind and pure, how can those two (= restlessness and concentration) belong to Me? Freedom from mind and freedom from change belong to Me who am bodiless and [all]-pervading.

16. Thus, as long as I had this ignorance, I had duties to perform, though I am ever-free, pure, and always enlightened.

17. How can concentration, non-concentration, or anything else which is to be done belong to Me? For, having meditated on and known Me, they realize that they have completed [all] that had to be done.


19. In no being is there any Knower other than Myself; I am the Overseer of deeds, the Witness, the Observer, constant, attributeless, and non-dual.

20. I am neither existent nor non-existent nor both, being
alone and auspicious. To Me, the Seeing, there is neither twilight nor night nor day at any time.

21. Just as ether is free from all forms, is subtle and non-dual, so am I devoid even of this [ether], I am Brahman, non-dual.

22. My separatedness, i.e., in the form "my atman," "his atman," and "your atman," is what is falsely constructed [on Me], just as the difference of one and the same ether arises from the difference of holes [in various objects].

23. Difference and non-difference, one and many, object of knowledge and knower, movement and mover—how can these notions be falsely constructed on Me who am one alone?

24. Nothing to be rejected or accepted belongs to Me, for I am changeless, always released and pure, always enlightened, attributeless, and non-dual.

25. Thus, with concentrated mind, one should always know everything as Atman. Having known Me to be abiding in one's own body, one is a sage, released and immovable.

26. If a Togin thus knows the meaning of the truth, he is one who has completed all that was to be done, perfected one and knower of Brahman. If he knows otherwise, he is a slayer of Atman.

27. The meaning of the Veda herein determined, which has been briefly related by me, should be imparted to serene ascetics by one of disciplined intellect.

Notes

1 See Upad II,3, which is entitled "Parisamphbhyāna" and is similar to this chapter. Cf. Utnas, p. 1925, n. 2.

2 According to Śāṅkara, the individual consists of the following six components: (1) the body, gross (śūlha) and subtle (śūkṣma), (2) the five senses (buddhindriya), (3) the five organs of action (karmendriya), (4) the internal organ (antākṣara), (5) the principal vital air (mūdha prāṇa), and (6) Atman. The term prāṇa in its wider sense comprises (2)-(5), and the term is probably used here in this wider sense. In the first stanza, (2) (eye and ear), (3) (organ of speech), and (4) (mind) are referred to. See Introduction, III,B,1, pp. 28-33. Cf. P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp. 324-332; Nakamura II, pp. 451-463.

3 The term "śūkṣma," which is translated as "transcendently changeless," is unknown to the classical Upamānda but used in the BhG (VI,8; XII,3; XV,16). Though the precise interpretation of this word is not entirely clear, Śāṅkara interprets it as aprakāmya (not to be caused to tremble or shake) in his commentary on the BhG (VI,8). In another place (BhG XII,3) Śāṅkara interprets "śūkṣma" as indicating avidyā and the many other seeds of samsāra, and so "śūkṣma" means "standing on this śūkṣma" (see S. Mayeda, "The Authenticity of the Gītābhāṣya Ascribed to Śāṅkara," WZKSO, vol. IX, 1965, pp. 182-183). In Pali the word "śūkṣma" is used in the sense of "not subject to change" or "immovable" and interpreted as "jātikāyikā yama ṛjita" (see The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary, p. 53). Cf. Edgerton (tr.), The Bhagavad Gītā (Harvard Oriental Series vol. 38. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), vol. I, note 2 on BhG VI,8, p. 183. In the Upad, Śāṅkara uses "śūkṣma" as an antonym of "citrāṇava" (Upad II,7,24) and "parāgāmin" (Upad II,7,25). See note 22 of Upad II,2.

4 See note 4 of Upad I,12.

5 See Upad I,11,3.

6 According to Śāṅkara, desire and other psychological facts are perceived as objects just as a jar and other external objects are perceived as objects (see Upad II,7,20). There is no essential difference between external and internal perception, since in the process of perception objects of external perception are transformed into pratyaya (notion) or vyāti (modification) of the buddhi (or manas) which are in the form of external objects, and objects of internal perception are also transformed into those which are in the form of pleasure, pain, and other objects of internal perception. For a fuller account of perception, see Introduction, III,B,2-4, pp. 33-43.


8 Cf. Muq. Up. II,1,7; Upad I,14,18; II,1,7.

9 In later Advaita works the term sīkṣa has the technical sense of projection and avidyā (or mayā) is said to have the projective power (śīkṣapalāti) and the obscuring power (āvraṇapalāti). Cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita (Madras: Ganesa & Co., 1957), pp. 240-242. However, Śāṅkara's concept of avidyā (or mayā) does not have such attributes. The term sīkṣa here means "moving about" or "restlessness" of the mind. This usage of the term is in accordance with that in Yag. śūkṣma I,30 and 31 (citrāṇavatśekta), which Šāṅkara interprets as "citrāṇa śīkṣiptam śīkṣyeta iti citrāṇavatśekpaḥ" in his Yagasthānajñānaḥvaraṇa (Madras Government Oriental Series, XIV, p. 82). It also agrees with that in Buddhist texts. For example, Abhidharmakośābhidhāya (ed. by P. Pra-dhan, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series vol. VIII, Patna, 1967), p. 56, line 13; p. 339, line 21; p. 340, line 1. Cf. U. Wegihara: Sanskrit-Chinese-Japanese Dictionary (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1940-1974), p. 1292; Mayeda Upad, p. 29.

10 This stanza is probably based upon Śvet. Up. VI,11. See Upad I,11,6.


13 Cf. kṛtyagya, BhG XV,20; Ait. Up. IV,4.

14 Cf. śūkṣma, Iīt. Up. III.

15 As for the conditions for admission to Śāṅkara's teachings, see Upad II,1,2. Cf. Upad I,16,72; 17,55; 17,66; 17,87; BSBh I,1,1; P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp. 60-82.
CHAPTER 14
DREAM AND MEMORY

1. Since the form-and-color of a jar, etc., is seen appearing in dream and memory, it is certainly to be inferred that the intellect has previously been seen in that form.

2. Just as one oneself is not the body which is seen wandering about begging alms in the dreaming state, so is he different from the body which is seen in the waking state, since he is the seer [of the body].

3. Just as [molten] copper appears in the form of the mold into which it was poured, so it is certainly experienced that the mind, when pervading [the external objects] such as form-color, appears in their forms.¹

4. Or, just as light, the illuminator, assumes the forms of what it illuminates, so the intellect is seen to have the forms of its objects, since it is the illuminator of all the objects.²

5. And the intellect in the form of [certain] objects must have been seen by the [dreaming] man before [also]. If not, how could he see [these forms] in the dreaming state? Again, when a form is being recalled, whence would it come to him?

6. [To say] that [the intellect] is an illuminator means that it is seen in the guise of [illuminable objects such as] form-and-color. In like manner [when we say] that the power of Seeing is the Seer, it means that It pervades [the intellect] when the intellect is appearing [in the form of objects].

7. Since all intellects in all bodies are illumined by Me, who have Pure Consciousness only as [My] light, I am therefore indeed the Ātman of all.

8. The intellect becomes instrument, object, agent, action, and result in the dreaming state. Since [the intellect] is also seen in the same way in the waking state, the Seer is different from it.

9. The intellect and so on are non-Ātman since they are by nature [objects] to be rejected or accepted. Ātman is the agent which rejects or accepts; [Ātman] is neither to be abandoned nor taken.

10. Since [Ātman] includes the exterior and the interior,³ is pure and a homogeneous mass of intelligence, how can there be falsely constructed upon [It] an exterior, an interior, and anything else to be rejected?

11. When the Brahman-knower realizes that the Ātman has been left through the exclusion of [every-]thing else by saying, “Not thus! Not so!” (Bṛh. Up. II,3,6), then why should he make any further effort?

12. Being beyond hunger, etc.,⁴ I am constantly Brahman; how can I have duties to perform? Thus one should rightly consider.

13. A knower of Ātman, if he wishes to perform some other duty here, is like a man who has reached the further bank of a river and, on being there, wishes to go back to the other bank.

14. If a knower of Ātman were [an object] to be rejected or accepted, he should not be considered to be worthy of final release. He is certainly thrown out by the mouth of Brahman.

15. As the vital air⁶ is the universe including the sun, there is neither day nor night for a knower of the vital air. How can there be [day or night] for a knower of Brahman, since He is non-dual?

16. Indeed Ātman neither remembers nor forgets Itself, since [Its] Pure Consciousness is not impaired. The knowledge that it is the mind that remembers has also its origin in nescience, the cause.

17. As it is said traditionally that if the highest Ātman is the object of a knower, this [ātman] would be something falsely constructed through nescience; when [this ātman] has been excluded like a snake [falsely constructed] on a rope, [the highest Ātman] is non-dual.

18. Since there exists neither agent nor object nor result⁶ and since [Ātman] includes both the exterior and the interior and is unborn,⁷ how can anyone have the notion about It (Ātman), “This is mine” or “This is I”?

19. The notions “oneself” and “one’s own” are indeed falsely
constructed [upon Atman] through nescience. When there is [the knowledge of] the oneness of Atman, these notions certainly do not exist. If the seed does not exist, whence shall the fruit arise?

20. The Imperishable is the Seer, the Hearer, the Thinker, and the Understander. As It is not different from the Seer, etc., I, the Seer, am the Imperishable.  

21. As everything, whether stationary (inanimate) or movable (animate), is possessed of seeing or some other activity, everything is the Imperishable. Therefore I, the Imperishable, am the Atman of all.

22. Whoever sees Atman as devoid of duties remaining [undone] devoid of action itself and of the result of the action, and free from the notions “mine” and “myself,” he [really] sees [the truth].

23. If you have come to know that the notions “mine” and “myself,” efforts and desires are by nature void in Atman, continue to be self-abiding. What is the use of efforts?

24. Whoever looks upon the Atman as the bearer of the “I”-notion and as the knower is not a knower of the Atman. He who looks upon it as not so is a knower of the Atman.

25. Just as Atman, though different, is thought to be identical with the body, etc., in like manner, since Atman is not recognized as a non-agent, It [is thought to] consist of action and its result.

26. Seeing, hearing, thinking, and understanding are always experienced by people in the dreaming state. Since these are the nature of Atman, therefore Atman is directly perceptible.

27. To the knower of Atman there is no fear of the other world nor any fear of death; to him even gods like Brahma and Indra are pitiable objects.

28. If his inauspicious desire, the cause of all afflictions, has been completely destroyed, what use is it to him to be a god, to be Brahma and Indra?

29. He to whom both “I,” the notion of “oneself,” and “my,” the notion of “one’s own,” have become meaningless, becomes a knower of Atman.

30. For one who has come to know that Atman is the same, whether adjuncts such as the intellect exist or not, how can there be anything which he ought to do?

31. Once one has understood that Atman is [Brahman]—[like ether, clear, stainless, of homogeneous intelligence, and non-dual)—what else, say, should such a one do?

32. He who sees Atman abiding in all beings and [yet] also [sees] an enemy of Atman surely wants to make fire cold.

33. Atman, which acts as the intellect and the life organs, is like the reflection of the sun in the water, within the range of sense-perception, etc., since it is said, “He, remaining the same, traverses both worlds, appearing to think, appearing to move about” (Brh. Up. IV,3,7), and is itself pure and released.

34. I am devoid of the life organs and mind, unconnected [with anything], the Seeing, [all-pervading like ether, how can there be anything for Me to do?

35. I never see non-concentration, nor anything else [needing] to be purified, belonging to Me who am changeless, the pure Brahman free from evil.

36. [Nor do] I [see] anything to be pursued as belonging to [Me] who am all-pervading and motionless, nor any upward, downward, or oblique direction as belonging to [Me] who am devoid of parts on account of being attributeless.

37. Being light of Pure Consciousness only, there is no darkness in It at all. I am ever-free; how is there now anything left for Me to do?

38. Since [It] is mindless, what does [It] think? Again, since [It] is devoid of organs [of action], what does [It] do? The words of the Sruti, “[He is . . .] certainly without breath, without mind, pure” (Mund. Up.II,1,2), are true.

39. As Atman is without time, without place, without direction, and without cause, he who always meditates [on Atman] never depends upon time and the like.

40. Whoever bathes in that spiritual pilgrimage place, where gods and Vedas and every purification unite, becomes immortal.

41. Sound and the other [external objects of knowledge] are not perceived by themselves, nor are they perceived by each other. Since taste, etc., are perceived by something other than themselves, they are objects of perception, and therefore belong to the body.

42. In like manner, “I”-notion, “my”-notion, desire, effort, change, pleasures and the like are [perceived by something other
than themselves] since [they are] objects of perception in ordinary life. Moreover, since they are objects, they are not perceived by each other. It (= their perceiver = Ātman) is different from them.

43. Since every change such as the “I”-notion, etc. has its agent, it is connected with the result of actions, and is illumined, as by the sun, on all sides by [Ātman, which is] of the nature of Pure Consciousness. Ātman is therefore unfettered.

44. [Ātman,] which is of the nature of Seeing, having pervaded, like the sky, the minds of all embodied beings, abides [there]. Therefore, there is neither a knower lower than this one nor a [knower] higher than this one. Consequently there is only one Lord.

45. The body and the intellect being perceivable by something other than themselves, the doctrines that there is no Ātman have been fully rejected by me, since it has been established that [Ātman] is beyond action which causes impurity, is completely stainless, all-pervading, unfettered, and non-dual.

46. If, in your view, the mind in the form of a jar, etc., activated variously by its own modifications, is not cognized [by Ātman different from the mind], [then] it would not be possible to prevent [It] from having faults—i.e., impurity, the nature of non-consciousness and change—as the mind has.

47. Just as ether, being pure and uninterrupted, is neither attached nor stained, so is Ātman indeed always the same to all beings and always free from old age, death, and fear.

48. As the formless and the formed, actions and residual impressions are through nescience falsely constructed upon Ātman by those whose seeing is deluded; therefore, by saying, “Not thus!” Brh. Up. II,1,2, etc.), they are excluded from [Ātman], which is of the nature of Seeing, and the Seeing [alone] is left unexcluded [by the Śrutis].

49. The form of the mind in the waking state, which arises from its connection with [external] objects, is seen at the time of memory and to a man in the dreaming state, as [external] objects [are seen in the waking state]. This is also the case with regard to the residual impression of the body. The body and the mind are different from the Seeing since they are [Its] objects.

50. There are no distinctions in ether, which is by nature pure, whether there is any impurity such as a cloud, or whether [such impurity] has passed away; in like manner there is no distinction at any time in the Seeing which is like ether, whether Its duality is negated by the Śrutis or not.

Notes
1This stanza is quoted in Pañcadaśī IV,28.
2This stanza is quoted in Pañcadaśī IV,29. Stanzas 14,3, and 4 are very important, since they reveal Śaṅkara’s view of the psychology of perception. For a detailed discussion, see Introduction, III,B,2, pp. 33-37.
3Cf. Muq. Up. I,1,2; Upad I,13,11; 14,10, etc.
4The three commentators Ānandajānata, Bodhanidhi, and Rāmatīrtha, take aāntaḍda as aśānti (the six waves of existence), i.e., aśānta (hunger), pīpa (thirst), loka (grief), moha (delusion), jara (old age), and mṛtyu (death). Cf. Brh. Up. III,5,1; Upad I,18,103; 16,206; 19,4.
6Cf. stanza 8.
7Cf. Muq. Up. I,1,2; Upad I,13,11; II,1,7.
8This stanza is based upon Brh. Up. III,8,11.
10The gods Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva constitute the Hindu triad and represent the creative, preservative, and destructive principles, respectively. However, Brahmā never attained the popularity of the other two. Indra, an atmospheric god, is the most prominent divinity in the Ṛg-Veda. He is often identified with thunder and wields a weapon named “svaṃ” which means thunderbolt. In the later Hindu mythology, however, Indra has fallen into the second rank, being inferior to the triad.
11Prajñā is buddhi according to Rāmatīrtha.
12Rāmatīrtha says: chayā yā prajñā samyuktā tva jālayu.
13Cf. Upad I,3,4; 13,12.
14Cf. ney jagata . . . svatītuṣṭād api labhānaṃāyā api , SB Bh. I,1,2, p. 47.
15Cf. BS IV,1,11.
16This is probably to refute the Buddhist tenet (nirātmāna). It is of interest that Śaṅkara uses Buddhistic terms such as īṣya (void, stanza 23) and īṣṭa (thirst, stanza 29) in this chapter.
17This interpretation is supported by all three commentators. If the reading “tena” is adopted in the first line instead of “tena,” as Rāmatīrtha suggests in his commentary, the following translation is possible: “If the mind in the form of a jar, etc., activated variously by its own modifications, is perceived by this Ātman, it is not possible to prevent [It] from having the faults, i.e., impurity, the nature of non-consciousness and change.”
19See Upad I,11,10; 13.
CHAPTER 15
ONE THING CANNOT BE ANOTHER

1. As one thing cannot be another, one should consider that nothing is anything else, since if one thing could be another, it would certainly perish.

2. [The locus] where a thing which has previously been seen is seen, like a picture painted on a canvas, by him who is remembering [it] and [the agent of knowledge] by whom it is seen to him should be known to be what are termed the intellect and the Field-Knower (Atman) respectively.

3. That which was connected with factors of action, such as agent, which ended with results [such as pleasure and pain], and was perceived—that is now remembered as having been located in the object (= the intellect) of the Field-Knower. Therefore, it (= the intellect) was formerly the object (= the Field-Knower).

4. And the object is different from the Seer, since it is always the object like a jar. The Seer and the object are heterogeneous; otherwise [the Seer would be] like the intellect and not the Witness.

5. If one believes that one's own [lineage, etc.] is identical with Atman, lineage, etc., like a dead body, will prompt [one] to obey injunctions. Therefore, lineage, etc., like a dead body is not identical with Atman; otherwise [Atman] would be non-Atman.

6. As [the Sruti] says, "Pleasure and pain do not [touch one who is bodiless]" (Chând. Up. VIII,12,1), bodilessness is not the result of actions. The cause of [one's] connection with the body is actions. Therefore a man of knowledge should abandon actions.

7. If Atman is independent with regard to actions, It should also be thought to be so with regard to the cessation of actions. If bodlessness is known to be a result which cannot be attained through actions, why should one perform actions?

8. Having completely abandoned the cause of actions such as lineage, a wise man should remember from scripture his own nature, which is incompatible with the cause of actions.

9. Atman is one and the same in all beings and these beings are in It as [they are] in the ether. It is declared that like the ether It has brightly and radiantly pervaded everything.

10. On account of the absence of any wound or sinew, one should negate the gross body. As [Atman] is pure and free from evils, [one should negate] impurity, and as the Sruti says, "[He is] bodiless" (Isà Uàp. 8), [one should negate] the subtle body.

11. Just as Vásudeva (= Krśṇa) said [to Arjuna] that He himself was the same in the holy asvattha ñg-tree and in his own body, he who knows himself to be the same is the best knower of Brahman.

12. Just as “I”- and “my”-notions are not considered to arise with regard to other bodies, they do not arise with regard to this body either, since [Atman] is equally the Witness of the intellect [in both cases].

13. Passion and aversion have, and the latent impression of form-and-color, a common substratum, [the intellect], and what is perceived as fear has the intellect as its substratum; therefore, the Knower is always pure and free from fear.

14. One [comes] to consist of that upon which one fixes one's mind, if [one is] different from [it]. [But] there is no action in Atman through which to become Atman. [It] does not depend upon [anything else] for being Atman, since, if [It] depended upon [anything else], It would not Itself be Atman.

15. Consciousness is homogeneous, undivided, free from old age and devoid of impurity, like the ether. Because of adjuncts such as the eye, etc., It is regarded as contrary [to what It is].

16. In account of being an object like a jar, etc., the “I”-notion is not an attribute of Atman. Other notions and faults should be known in like manner. Atman is therefore devoid of impurity.

17. As [Atman] is the Witness of all notions, It is changeless and all-pervading. If the Seer were to change, He would be of limited knowledge like the intellect, etc.

18. The Seeing of the Seer, unlike [that] of the eye, etc., is not
interrupted, since [the Śrutis] says, “For there is no [cessation of the Seeing of] the Seer” (Brh. Up. IV,3,23). Therefore, the Seer is always experiencer.

19. One should examine thus: Am I a composite of the elements [such as earth and water]? Am I a composite of the organs [internal and external]? Or am I any single one [of them] separately? Or who am I?

20. I am neither an individual element nor all the elements; I am neither an individual sense-organ nor all the sense-organs, since they are [respectively] objects of knowledge and instruments of knowledge, as are the jar, etc. The Knower is different from these.

21. The fuel of the fire of *Ātman* is the intellect. Blazing up with nescience, desire, and action, the intellect always burns through the gates such as the ear, etc.

22. When the intellect, inflamed by the oblation of objects, functions among [the sense-organs], which have the right eye as their chief, the fire of *Ātman* becomes the experiencer of gross objects.

23. If, being devoid of passion and aversion, one remembers, at the time of perceiving form-and-color, etc., that oblations are being offered to the fire of *Ātman*, one is not stained by faults in the waking state.

24. The *Ātman*, which [in the dreaming state] sees the memory-impressions—which are caused by action due to nescience—manifested in the abode of the mind [and] illumined by the self-effulgent One, is called *Taijasa*.

25. When [in the state of deep sleep] neither [external] objects nor [their] memory-impressions are aroused by actions [to appear] in the intellect, then *Ātman* should be known to be *Prajña*, which beholds nothing else.

26. The states of the mind, the intellect, and the sense-organs, which are aroused by actions, are illumined only by Pure Consciousness as a jar, etc., are illumined by the sun.

27. Since this is so, the Knower, which illuminates the notions [of the intellect] by Its own light, and of which they are the objects, is called the agent of those notions [of the intellect] only by the deluded.

28. [Only to the deluded], therefore, is [It] also all-knowing since [It] illuminates everything by Its own light. In like manner, as [It] is the cause of all actions, *Ātman* is all-doing.

29. The *ātmān* thus described is [the *ātmān*] with adjuncts. [But] the *Ātman* without adjuncts is indescribable, without parts, attributeless and pure; neither mind nor speech reaches It.

30. [*Ātman* is conceived variously—] as intelligent or unintelligent, agent or non-agent, pervading or not pervading, bound or released, one or not one, pure or in some other way.

31. Without attaining [It], words turn back together with the notions [of the intellect], since [It] is attributeless, actionless, and devoid of distinction.

32. Just as the ether pervades everywhere and is unconnected with anything formed, so here [in the Vedānta] one should know *Ātman* to be the pure and highest state.

33. Just as the sun [drives away] the darkness, so the All-Seeing One endowed with light, having given up sense-perception [in the waking state] and its memory [in dream], drives away the all-devouring darkness [in deep sleep].

34. That *Ātman*, whose objects are the notions which have as their objects form-and-color [in the waking state], memory [in dream], and darkness [in the state of deep sleep], is the all-pervading Seer, the same in all beings.

35. From the contact of *Ātman* with intellect, mind, eye, objects, and light there arise the various notions of the intellect which are characterized by ignorance.

36. Distinguishing one's own *Ātman* from the rest, one should know It to be the pure and highest state, the Seer abiding in all beings, the same, beyond all fears,

37. the whole, all-pervading, calm, devoid of impurity, existing firm like the ether, without parts, without actions, the all, constant and free from duality.

38. Having inquired, “Is the Knower, the Witness of all notions, knowable by me [or not]?”, one should ascertain whether or not *Brahman* is known.

39. On account of teachings such as “[It is] the unseen Seer” (Brh. Up. III,7,23) and “[If you think ‘I know well,’ you know but little” (Kena Up. II,1), the highest *Brahman* is not knowable by me or others by any means.

40. [It] is my own nature, uninterrupted; [It] has the light of
knowledge as Its nature; [It] does not depend upon anything else for [Its] knowledge. Therefore [It] is always known to me.

41. The sun does not need any other light for its illumination; Knowledge does not require any other knowledge than its own knowledge for its illumination.

42. Whatever one's own nature may be, it does not depend upon anything else, since no light is to be manifested by another light.

43. Something destitute of light is manifested through its contact with something else which has light as its nature. It is, therefore, certainly false to say that light is an effect of the sun.

44. That which did not exist previously and comes into existence from something else is declared to be its effect. Because light is the nature of the sun, it is not [the case] that light which did not previously exist arises from the sun.

45. The sun and the like, which have light as their nature, though they merely exist, are thought to be agents of light (illumination), since jars, etc., are manifested [by them]. This should also be taken to be true of Ātman which is [by nature] knowledge.

46. Just as, when a snake comes out of its hole, the sun becomes [its] illuminator without any effort, so Ātman becomes a knower since It has knowledge as Its nature.

47. Thus [fire], which is [by nature] hot, becomes a burner merely by existing. This should also be taken to be true of Ātman which is [by nature] knowledge, when Its adjunct is known, as [the sun becomes an illuminator] when a snake which has come out of its hole is known.

48. Just as the Knower becomes a knower even without any effort, so It becomes a doer like a magnet. Ātman Itself, therefore, is by nature neither knowable nor not knowable.

49. As there is the teaching that It is different from the known and the unknown, bondage, final release, and other states are those which are falsely constructed upon Ātman.

50. Just as there is neither day nor night in the sun, since there is no distinction in the nature of light, so is there neither knowledge nor ignorance in Ātman, since there is no distinction in the nature of knowledge.

51. He who has come to know Brahman as described above, free from rejection and acceptance as described above, is truly never born [again].

52. He who has fallen into the rivers of births and deaths can never save himself from them by anything else but knowledge.

53. because the Śruti says, “The knot of the heart is loosened, all doubts are cut off and one’s actions are destroyed, when He is seen” (Munḍ. Up. II,2,8).

54. If a man, having completely excluded “I”- and “my”-notions, has a firm belief in that ether-like state destitute of the body, which has been declared according to well-studied scripture and inference, he is released.

Notes

1. Upad I,12,10.
2. The body is called the field (क्षेत्र) and Ātman, which knows it, is called the Field-Knower (क्षेत्रगृह). Cf. BhG XIII.
3. See a dialogue between the teacher and his pupil which starts at Upad II,1,9. Cf. BSbh I,1,1, p. 24.
4. According to the commentators Ānandaśākara, Bodhanidhi, and Rāmapārtha, this means that on account of the belief that a dead body is my mother or my father, the dead body prompts one to perform purificatory rites (सहीत्रे).
6. Cf. Iita Up. VI; BhG VI,30.
7. Cf. Iita Up. VIII.
8. The whole stanza seems to interpret Iita Up. VIII.
9. Cf. BhG X,19-42, especially X,26; 37. Vāsudeva, or son of Vāsudeva, is another name for Kṛṣṇa who is the chief speaker and expounds his philosophical doctrine to Arjuna in the BhG.
10. This stanza is quoted in Upad II,1,35.
11. In Śankara's GBh the highest Ātman is called viśiṣṭātman (III,29, p. 139), the nature of Ātman is described as viśiṣṭa-vimātra (III,17, p. 81), and Brahman is identified with viśiṣṭa-mātra (III,33, p. 141). These are technical terms characteristic of the Viśiṣṭadvait school of Buddhism. In the Upad, Śankara uses the term jñāti three times. In this stanza he uses it in the sense of cognition of Ātman. But in Upad I,16,25, where he attacks the Bāhyāsādhvānās of Buddhism, he seems to treat it as a synonym of dīt (i.e., buddhi), and in Upad I,18,55 he asserts that the term jñāti is not applicable to Ātman, since it indicates "becoming" (bhava). Cf. Nakamura III, pp. 529-530; S. Mayeda, "On the Author of the Mañjūsīkopanīṣad- and the Gaudāparādī-Bhāṣya," The Adyar Library Bulletin, vols. 31-32, 1967-68, p. 92.
12. This stanza is quoted in Naiś IV,30.
14. Cf. avidhyā-ākārama-karma, BSbh I,2,17, p. 181. Kṣetra (a psychic affection) is regarded as a wider concept to which avidhā belongs. Avidhā is the first and most dangerous mem-


19 Rāmatirtha interprets the states of the mind, the intellect, and the senses as the states of dreaming, deep sleep, and waking, respectively.


21 The last line of this stanza appears again in stanza 36b.

22 Cf. Upad I,16,19.

23 The last line of this stanza appears again in stanza 47b.

24 The same simile is seen in Upad I,17,79.


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CHAPTER 16
CONSISTING OF EARTH

1. It is said [traditionally] that the hard element in the body consists of earth and that the liquid element consists of water. Digestion, activity, and space have their origin in fire, air, and ether, respectively.

2. [The five senses, *i.e.*, olfactory, gustatory, visual, cutaneous, and auditory, consist of earth, water, fire, air, and ether] and their [five respective] objects of perception [namely, smell, taste, form-and-color, touch, and sound] are qualities1 of earth and the other [four elements], since [each] sense is taken to have as its object a thing of its [own] kind like light and color.2

3. These [five senses] are [traditionally] said to be for the purpose of perception and [the five organs or action] such as the larynx and hand are said to be concerned with action. The mind3 within, the eleventh, is for the sake of discriminating those [senses and organs of action].

4. The intellect is for the purpose of determining [objects]. As by its light, its own nature, *Ātman* is always illuminating the intellect which perceives all objects, It is called the Knower.4

5. Just as the illuminating light takes the forms of the objects to be illuminated and, though [apparently] mixed [with its object], it is not [really] mixed [with it], so the Knower, though [apparently] mixed with notions, is not [really] mixed with them5 at any time.

6. Just as a light on a stand can illumine without any effort everything that its light reaches, so the Knower sees without any effort the notions [of the intellect] in the forms of sound, etc., which It reaches.
7. Pleasure, etc., differentiate the intellect which, being illumined by the constant light of Ātman, appears as ātman in the composite of the body and the senses.

8. One with the feeling “I am suffering” does indeed regard Ātman as suffering from headache, etc. The Seer is different from its object, which is suffering pain, and as It is the Seer, It is not suffering pain.

9. One suffers pain because he mistakenly believes, “I am a sufferer of pain,” and not because he perceives any [actual] sufferer of pain. In the composite of the limbs, etc., one is the Seer of pain and never the sufferer of pain.

10. If [you object,] “Like the eye [Ātman] is both an object and an agent,” [we reply:] No, [because] eyes are many and composite. Therefore, Ātman cannot become the object, since It is the Seer.

11. If [you] think that Ātman is also many on account of knowledge, effort, etc., [we reply:] As [It] is homogeneous knowledge, It, like light, is not an object.

12. Though light is an illuminator, it does not illumine itself, [since it has in itself] no difference as between illuminator and illuminated; even if [it] had [such a] difference, it would not illumine itself, since [both parts, illuminator and illumined, would be] the same [in nature]. In like manner Ātman [which has homogeneous knowledge] never sees Itself.

13. Nothing which has something else as its nature can become an object of the latter, as fire can neither burn nor illumine itself.

14. For this very reason is refuted the idea that the intellect perceives itself by itself. In like manner it is also unreasonable to assume parts [of Ātman], since both parts, viz. the cognizer and the cognized, would be the same [in their nature and Ātman has in itself] no difference.

15. Similarly, it is also unreasonable to assume that Ātman is empty. For this reason it has been said that the intellect, like a jar, is seen by Ātman as other than [Itself], since Ātman is established before the discrimination of the intellect.

16. Whatever may exist before the discrimination of the intellect, if it is the cause [of the discrimination], it is free from discrimination, since it is the cause of the rise of the discrimination.

17. Abandoning ignorance, which is the root of false assumption and which is the impeller of transmigratory existence, one should know Ātman to be the highest Brahman, which is released and always fearless.

18. One should abandon as non-existent the triad of the states of waking, dreaming, and their seed called the state of deep sleep and consisting of darkness; for when one of them exists, the others do not.

19. From the [apparent] mixing up of Ātman with intellect, mind, eye, light, object, and so on, actions arise; therefrom results the confused idea that Ātman acts.

20. The shutting and opening of the eye in [its] place (= the eye-socket) are related to the air and not to the eye, since [the eye ever] shines [with the power of perception]. Similarly, [they] are neither in the mind nor in the intellect since [the mind and the intellect ever] shine.

21. Thinking and determination belong to the mind and the intellect respectively, neither having the attributes of the other. And everything is [falsely] constructed on Ātman.

22. The perception of the senses is limited by the places [where they are located in the body]. The intellect comes to be identical with those senses. When the Knower sees this intellect, it is felt to be, as it were, of the same size as the body.

23. [All] this is indeed the mere dharma (element of life) which indeed perishes every moment and arises without intervals. [Though all this is momentary,] there arises the recognition that this is that past one because of similarity, just as a lamp [at this moment is recognized to be the same as it was at the previous moment on account of similarity]. The cessation of [all] this is the aim of life.

24. According to some [Buddhists], there exist [the external objects] such as form-and-color, the forms of which are manifested by one other than themselves. According to other [Buddhists] nothing else exists but this [consciousness]. [Now] the improbability of the former [theory] is explained.

25. As [in their view] consciousness takes the forms of external objects and perishes every moment, it [will] never have memory. And as the intellect itself perishes every moment, it [will] have nowhere to store any impression [of the past].

26. As not even a receptacle [for the impression and memory]
exists, there will be no instrument [with which to ascertain] the similarity [of a thing at this moment to what it was at the previous moment]; therefore, [the former theory is unreasonable]. If there were a receptacle [for the impression and memory], there would be abandonment [of the theory] that [everything] is momentary. [But] that is not acceptable [to them].

27. And since cessation [of all this] is accomplished without any effort, it will be useless to teach means for achieving it. As [all this] comes to an end at every [moment], cessation does not depend upon anything else [for its accomplishment].

28. Even if they seek to say that [cessation] should depend upon another stream of existence, though different [in essence therefrom], if everything is momentary, it does not depend upon anything else.

29. Because [if] the two exist at the same time and are connected with each other, each [of them], having been established through the connection [with the other], will depend upon the other.

30. It is our opinion that where there is false superimposition there is [also] annihilation of it. Tell me to whom final release as the result belongs, if everything perishes.

31. Truly [It] exists Itself; It may be called Knowledge, Ātman, or something else. As It is the Knower of the existence and non-existence [of things], it is not accepted that It is non-existent.

32. It is Being by which the non-existence [of things] is accepted. If It were not Being, people would not become aware of the existence and non-existence [of things]. And this is not acceptable.

33. That which is taken to exist before the false assumptions of “being,” “non-being,” and “being and non-being” is non-dual, since It is the same [in all]; It is eternal and different from what is falsely assumed.

34. Duality should be taken to be unreal like the object of a dream, since it comes into being through false assumptions and does not exist before the false assumptions of “being,” “non-being,” and the like.

35. On the authority of the scripture, which says that modifications are a verbal handle, they are indeed unreal, since [the Śrutis] say, “Death after death does he attain [who thinks he sees manifoldness in this world]” (Brh. Up. IV,4,19), and the Śruti also says, “[For this is . . . ] my miraculous power [which is hard to go beyond]” (BhG VII,14).

36. So Ātman is pure, since [It] is different in nature from false assumptions. Therefore, [It] is neither to be accepted nor rejected. Ātman is not what is falsely assumed by something other than [Itself].

37. Just as darkness does not exist in the sun, since it has light as its nature, so there is no ignorance in Ātman, since It has constant knowledge as Its nature.

38. Likewise, as the nature of Ātman is changeless, It has no change of state, for if It had any change of state, Its destruction would certainly occur.

39. To him who [asserts that] final release is a change of state, final release is something produced; therefore it is perishable. It is by no means reasonable that final release is a union [of Ātman with Brahman] or disunion [from Prakṛti], since [any] union [with Brahman] or disunion [from Prakṛti] is not permanent. And [it is by no means reasonable that final release is for Ātman] to go [to Brahman, or for Brahman] to come [to Ātman]. But one's own nature is never lost,

40. since one's own nature has no cause, whereas the others (= a change of state, etc.) indeed have their causes. One's own nature is indeed neither acquired nor lost by oneself [or by any others].

41. As [It] is the nature of all, It cannot be abandoned nor grasped, since It is not different [from anything]. Therefore it is eternal, since [It] is not an object and not separated [from anything].

42. As [It] is the nature of all, It cannot be abandoned nor grasped, since It is not different [from anything]. Therefore it is eternal, since [It] is not an object and not separated [from anything].

43. As everything exists for Ātman's sake, Ātman is eternal and isolated. Therefore the knower of final release should abandon all actions along with their accessories.

44. The attainment of Ātman is the supreme attainment according to the scriptures and reasoning. But the attainment of Ātman is not attaining something other [than Ātman]. Therefore one should [simply] give up [the misconception of Ātman] as non-Ātman.

45. The loss of equilibrium of the [three] guṇas is not possible, since nescience, etc., are inactive [in this state], and no other cause is satisfactory [on the theory proposed].
46. If one of the three guṇas were the cause of another [guṇa], there would either always be activity or never activity at all. There would not be any necessity for activity either in the guṇas or in Atman (= Purusa).33

47. If [the single Prakṛti] existed for the [Puruṣas],34 the distinction between released and bound [Puruṣas] would not be reasonable. The relation of an object and its seeker [is not possible between Prakṛti and Puruṣa], since neither the Knower (= Puruṣa) nor the other (= Prakṛti) is a seeker after an object.

48. Since in the Śāmkhya system Puruṣa is changeless, even [there] it is not reasonable for Pradhāna (= Prakṛti) to exist for another’s (= Puruṣa) sake. Even if there were changes [in It], it would still not be reasonable.

49. As no mutual relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is possible and as Pradhāna (= Prakṛti) is non-intelligent, it is not reasonable for Pradhāna to exist for Puruṣa’s sake.

50. If any action took place [in Puruṣa, It] would be perishable. If [action took place] only in knowledge [of Puruṣa, It would be perishable] in the same way. If [the functioning] of Pradhāna has no cause, it follows that there is no final release.

51. Just as heat [, a quality of fire,] is not to be manifested by [light, another quality of fire], pleasure and other qualities of Atman are not to be cognized by cognition [i.e., a quality of Atman], as held by the followers of Kaṇḍā36 and others, since they have one and the same [substance (= Atman)] as their basis.

52. Pleasure and cognition cannot inhere [in Atman] at the same time, since a [single] contact of the mind [with Atman] causes one [quality only]; therefore, pleasure is not to be cognized by cognition.

53. And since the other [qualities] are different [from one another, their] simultaneous origination is not to be accepted. If [you say,] “It is the cognition of qualities that [they] are inherent [in Atman],” we reply, “No; because [cognition] distinguishes [qualities].

54. [Qualities] are to be apprehended by cognition, [for they are] to be distinguished by cognition, and there is memory, [e.g.,] “Pleasure was perceived by me”; [and,] according to you, Atman does not have cognition as its nature.

55. Pleasure and so on will not be qualities of Atman, since it is changeless according to you. [Even if atman, though changeless, could have different qualities,] as [qualities and atmans are] different [from one another], why [do not the qualities of one atman] belong to another or equally to the mind?

56. And if a cognition should become an object of cognition, a regressus ad infinitum would be inevitable. If some final [cognition] is admitted, the simultaneous origination [of all cognitions] is accepted.35

57. And as Atman has no change of state,37 there will be no bondage in It. Nor is there any impurity, for [It] has no attachment according to the Śrutī, “[It] has no attachment, for [It does not get attached]” (Brh.Up.III,9,26).

58. And [this is also] because [Atman] is subtle, one alone and imperceptible, according to the Śrutī, “[The one . . .] is not stained [by the sorrow of the world]” (Kaṭh.Up. V,11 = II,2,11). [Objection:] “If that were so, there would be no final release at all, since there would be no bondage.

59. Thus the scripture would be meaningless.” [Reply:] No; [because] bondage is taken to be a confused idea of the intellect, and final release is the cessation thereof. Bondage is what has been mentioned before38 and nothing else.

60. Being illumined by Knowledge, the light of Atman, the intellect thinks that there is Knowledge in Itself and that there is no other knower. This is indeed the confused idea which is in the intellect.

61. As Knowledge is the very nature of Atman, It is constantly applied figuratively to the intellect. And the absence of discriminating knowledge is beginningless; this and nothing else is taken to be transmigratory existence.

62. Final release is its cessation and nothing else, since [every other view] is unreasonable. But final release is thought to be the destruction [of Atman] by those according to whom final release is to become something else.

63. Similarly, it is also unreasonable that [final release] is a change of state [in Atman],39 since [It] is changeless. If there were change [in Atman], [It] would have parts; consequently [It] would perish, like a jar, etc.

64. Therefore, assumptions concerning bondage, final release, etc., [which are] other than this are indeed confused ideas. The
assumptions of the Śaṅkhayas, of the followers of Kaññā, and of the Buddhists are lacking in profound consideration.

65. As [their assumptions] contradict the scriptures and reasoning, they should not be respected. Their faults can be pointed out hundreds and thousands of times.

66. And since it might also involve being culpable [under the text] "any other [of the manifold scriptures in the world] than this [should verily be doubted by the wise who wish for correct knowledge of the law]," [they should not be respected at any time]. Therefore, having abandoned the teaching of other scriptures, a wise man should make firm his understanding.

67. of the true meaning of the Vedānta (= Upaniṣads) and also of Vyāsa's thought, with faith and devotion and without any crookedness.

68. Thus both the false assumptions based upon dualism and the views that Ātman does not exist have been rejected through reasoning; seekers after final release, being free from doubts which arise from the views of others, become firm in the path of knowledge.

69. If one has attained the absolutely pure and non-dual Knowledge, which is self-witnessed and contrary to false assumptions, and rightly holds a firm belief, he will go to eternal peace, unaccompanied [by anything].

70. Having thoroughly examined this esoteric teaching, the supreme goal, people who are free from faults and devoid of any misconception [about Ātman] should always set their minds on rectitude. Indeed, nobody who thinks himself different [from Brāhmaṇ] is a seer of the truth.

71. Having come to know this highest means of purification, a man is released from the sins caused by nescience and accumulated in many other births; like the ether, he is unstained by crookedness.

72. This [highest means of purification] should be always taught to the seeker after final release whose mind has been calmed, whose senses have been controlled, whose faults have been abandoned, who is acting as prescribed [in the scriptures], who is endowed with virtues, and who is always obedient to his teacher.

73. Just as one does not falsely think that another's body [is oneself or one's own], so having observed the highest truth and having attained this absolutely pure knowledge, he will then be released in all respects.

74. Certainly in this world there is no attainment more excellent than that of one's own nature, since it comes from nothing else than this [Vedānta]. But the attainment of one's own nature, which is superior even to the kingdom of Indra, should not be given without examining [one's pupil] carefully.

Notes

1Bodhanidhi takes "guna" as "parināmanātara" and Rāmatīrtha as "kāya." Both of them think that the five senses and their objects are special transformations or productions of the five elements. Jagadānanda follows Rāmatīrtha's interpretation. But such usage of the word "guna" is unusual. Moreover, like the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā, the Vedānta holds that the senses are constituted by earth and the other elements, to which smell, taste, etc., belong as qualities. Cf. S. Chatterjee, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1950), pp. 131-138; D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1960), pp. 39-40. Taking into consideration the above facts and the previous stanza, I have translated the word "guna" as "quality."

2The commentators explain this simile as meaning that when there is brightness or color, it is because its illuminator (such as a lamp) is also bright.

3Śaṅkara's concept of manas is not clear. In most cases in his works the manas is merely another name for the buddhi, or at least it is indistinguishable from the latter. It is a controversial problem for later Advaita philosophers whether or not the manas is a sense (indriya), but Śaṅkara does not give any answer to this problem. See Introduction, III, B, 1, pp. 30-33. Cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita, pp. 29-31; D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 55–59.

4Anandajñāna and Rāmatīrtha consider that this stanza is meant to refute Buddhism.

5Cf. BS II,3,30-31 and Śaṅkara's commentary on it.

6This probably refers to a tenet of the Viśiṣṭādibhāva. See note 10.

7This probably refers to the Vaibhāṣika system, according to which ātman has qualities such as cognition (buddhi), pleasure (niḥśā), pain (dheka), desire (īcchā), aversion (dveṣa), and effort (prayāta). According to Śaṅkara knowledge is the nature of Ātman and not its quality. Cf. Upad I,16,51–56.

8Cf. Upad I,16,14.

9Stanzas 12–14 are probably meant to refute the Viśiṣṭādibhāva. See note 10 below.

10In Upad I,18,142 Śaṅkara quotes a stanza from Dhamakīrī's Pramāṇavāsanī which refers to the theory of the threefold part of consciousness, i.e., the object (grāha), the subject (grāhaka), and consciousness (saṃvit). It is, therefore, very likely that here Śaṅkara refutes the above theory which was advocated by Viśiṣṭādibhāva, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrī. According to Śaṅkara the Mādhyamikas consider the consciousness (viśiṣṭa) to be free from the parts of subject and object (grāhagrahaḥkāryavivirnaka) and empty (śūnya) (Śaṅkara ad Brh. Up. IV,3,7, p. 567).
11 Stanzas 15-16 are probably meant to refute the Śūnyavādins.
12 The function of viññāpa is attributed to the manas in other places. (Upad I,6,3.
Cf. Upad I,16,21; Gbh V,13, p. 257) but here it is regarded as belonging to the buddha.
14 Cf. Upad I,15,35.
16 Refutation of Buddhism starts here. Stanza 24 suggests that stanza 23 may intro¬
duce doctrines which are commonly held by the Bahyaarthavadins and the Vi¬
jñāna¬
vādins. Cf. stanza 24 and notes 20 and 23. Ānandajīna, Bodhanidhi, and Rāmatirtha
interpret “this” as knowledge (jñāna) and the object of knowledge (jñeya).
17 “Dharma” here is used in a Buddhist technical sense. Ramatirtha interprets it as
vastumatra.
18 According to Ānandajīna and Bodhanidhi, these are the Bahyaarthavadins or
those who assert that there exist external objects. By this word Sankara probably means
both the Sautrantikas and Vi¬bhaṣaikas of the Theravada Buddhism in his BSBh
(II,2,31, pp. 478-479) where he points out that both the Bāhyārthavadins and the Vi¬
jñāna¬
vādins hold the tenet of general momentariness (ksanika) in common. Cf. Y.
19 According to Ānandajīna, these are the Jīnānāmārvādins; according to
Bodhanidhi, they are the Vijnānavādins.
21 Cf. stanza 23.
22 Cf. Upad I,16,59; 17,7. Sāṅkara’s concept of final release (mokṣa), which is the ces¬
sation of false superimposition (māyā), is very similar to Candrakīrti’s, according to
which nirvāṇa is of the nature of cessation of all false assumptions (arunakānakaya¬
rūpa, Prasannapada, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, p. 524, line 6 etc.). Cf. Introduction, IV,
B, pp. 73-75.
23 Ānandajīna and Rāmatirtha attribute this tenet to the Śūnyavādins. Cf. Sāṅkara
24 Cf. stanza 16.
26 Cf. BSBh II,2,20, p. 457; stanzas 57; 63.
27 See commentaries of Bodhanidhi and Rāmatirtha.
28 See Upad II,1,32.
29 See Āparantama Dharmatīrtha I,8,22,2. Cf. Upad I,16,74; 17,4.
30 Stanzas 45-50 are meant to refute the Sāṃkhya system. In contrast with the Ve¬
dānta, the Sāṃkhya advocates dualism, recognizing the two ultimate causes of the uni¬
verse, namely Puruṣa (spirit) and Prakṛti (matter). Prakṛti (= Pradhāna) is nothing but
the equilibrium of the three guṇas, namely sattva, rajas and tamas. When their equilibri¬
um is broken, the evolution of the universe takes place. Cf. Sāṃkhyaśāstra 16 and
Gaṇapāda’s commentary on it.
31 Cf. note 32.
32 Cf. Sāṃkhyaśāstra 17; 31; 56; 57.
33 Refutation of the Vaishēṣika system starts here and seems to end with stanza 56.
Kāṇḍā or Ulīka (150-50 B.C.? is the founder of the Vaishēṣika school of philosophy.
For the qualities of atman, see note 7.
CHAPTER 17

RIGHT THOUGHT

1. Since nothing else exists, it is certainly the highest Ṭātman, all-knowing, all-seeing, and pure, which is the Ṭātman to be known. Salutation to this Ṭātman which one should know.

2. I ever bow down to those who, by their knowledge of words, sentences, and means of knowledge, have like lamps illumined Brahmā, the secret doctrine of the Vedas.

3. Paying homage to those teachers whose words have reached me and destroyed my sins as the sunbeam reaching and destroying the darkness, I shall state the conclusion about the knowledge of Brahmā.4

4. There is no other attainment higher than that of Ṭātman, for the sake of which [attainment] exist the words of the Vedas and of the Smṛtis as well as actions.

5. Whatever attainment may be desired for the sake of happiness, even though it be for one’s own sake, is contrary [to happiness]. So the knowers of Brahmā have declared the attainment of Ṭātman to be the highest one on account of its eternity.4

6. And as Ṭātman is by nature self-attained, attainment of It does not depend upon anything else. But any attainment which depends upon something else arises from seeing a difference [between Ṭātman and Brahmā].

7. Seeing difference is nescience. Its cessation is called final release.6 And this cessation can arise not through action but through knowledge alone, since [that] is incompatible [with nescience].

8. A result of action is inconstant, since it has nescience and desire as its cause.6 It is said that the Vedas alone are the right means to acquire knowledge with regard to Ṭātman.7

9. As [the Vedas are devoted to one object [only], i.e., the knowledge of Brahmā], [the wise] know that they [consist of] one sentence [only]. The oneness of Ṭātman [and Brahmā] should indeed be known through the understanding of the meaning of [this one] sentence.

10. But difference between Ṭātman [and Brahmā] is falsely assumed on the ground of difference of [meaning] which is understood [in the two different words, Ṭātman and Brahmā]; even [the meaning] which is referred to is [falsely understood] on hearing [the word] Ṭātman. Therefore, this triad, viz. form, name, and action, is mentioned [as constituting the world in the Śruti].8

12. And just as the form-and-color, which is seen [located outside of the intellect], is expressed in word through the intellect, so this whole is falsely assumed by the confused intellect.

13. Therefore it is reasonable that this triad is unreal; [Ṭātman which is] nothing but Being-Pure Consciousness only is not what is falsely assumed. Ṭātman is at once the primal knowledge and the object of knowledge,9 but everything else is falsely assumed.

14. That Īśān by which one knows everything in the dreaming state is knowledge but that [knowledge] is due to its maya.10 That by which one sees and hears in the dreaming state is called the eye and the ear respectively.

15. That by which one speaks in the dreaming state [is called] speech, and likewise, [it has the names] nose, tongue, sense of touch, other organs, and the mind.

16. On account of the limiting adjuncts which are falsely constructed [on Īśān], this very knowledge is different in many ways, just as difference appears in one and the same gem on account of difference of limiting adjuncts [such as blue and yellow].11

17. In like manner the knowledge of one when in the waking state is falsely assumed to have difference. [Ṭātman in the waking state] makes manifest the object in the intellect,12 and because of this confused idea performs actions which arise from desire.

18. As in dream so in waking, something external and internal is produced by the notion of interdependence, just as a thing
written and the reading [of it come from the notion of their interdependence]:

19. His [ātman] falsely constructing the difference, desires it, and then wills [to obtain it]. Willing its desires, it obtains [the results of] what it has done.14

20. Everything comes from nescience. This world is unreal, for it is seen by one who has nescience and is not perceived in the state of deep sleep.

21. It is indeed declared to us in the Śruti that knowledge is the notion of the oneness [of Ātman and Brahma] and nescience is the notion of the difference [of Ātman from Brahma]. Therefore knowledge is affirmed [in the scripture with all vigor].

22. When the mind/becomes pure like a mirror, knowledge shines forth; therefore [the mind should be purified]. The mind is purified by abstention, the permanent rites, sacrifices, and austerities.

23. The best austerities of the body, etc., should be performed to purify the mind. The concentration of the mind, etc., and the emaciation of the body in this and that [season] [should be performed].

24. Sense-perception should be known as the waking state, memory as the dreaming state, the absence of both as the state of deep sleep, and one's own Ātman as the highest state.

25. The darkness called deep sleep is ignorance and [it is] the seed of the dreaming and waking states. If it is burned up by the knowledge of one's own Ātman, like a seed that has been scorched it has no power of germinating.

26. That single māyā seed is to be known as repeatedly and successively [changing] in [these] three ways. Ātman, though one and changeless, is as the bearer of māyā [knowable] in many ways, like the sun in the water.

27. Just as one and the same seed becomes different in accordance with [differences of] vital air, dreaming state, etc., so Ātman like the moon on the water becomes different in bodies in the dreaming and waking states.

28. Just as a magician comes and goes riding on an elephant created by his magic, so the Ātman, though motionless, is related to vital air, dreaming state, and the like.

29. Just as there is neither elephant nor rider, but there stands the magician different [from them], so there are neither vital air and the like, nor a seer of them, but the Knower, the Seeing, different [from them], always exists.

30. Neither for one whose sight is not bound, nor for the magician, is there any magical illusion. This magical illusion exists only for him whose sight is bound. Therefore in fact there is no magician at all.

31. Ātman should be directly known according to the Śruti which says that Ātman is directly present, for the Śruti say, “The knot of the heart is loosened . . . [when He is seen]” “(Mund.Up.II,2,8), “If[here he does not know It, there is great loss]” (Kena Up.II,5), and the like.

32. Because of Its being soundless, etc., It cannot be perceived by the sense-organs. Likewise, as [It] is different from pleasure, etc., how can [It be perceived] by the intellect?

33. Just as Rāhu, though he is invisible, [is perceived] in the moon [during an eclipse] and just as a reflection [of the moon, etc., is seen] in the water, so Ātman, though all-pervading, is perceived there in the intellect.

34. Just as the reflection and heat of the sun are perceived in the water but do not belong to the water, so knowledge [, though] in the intellect, is not a quality of it, since [it] differs in nature [from the intellect].

35. Ātman, whose Seeing never fails, sees a modification of the intellect [connected with the eyes, and is the Seer of seeing and] the Hearer of hearing—so says the Śruti.

36. Seeing a modification of the mind which is isolated [from the senses], [It] is the Thinker of thinking, unborn. Likewise, [It is] the Understander [of understanding] since [It] has un-failing power. Therefore the scripture says, “For there is no [cessation of the Seeing of the Seer]” (Brh.Up.IV,3,23–30).

37. [It] is changeless, [from the Śruti] “[It appears to] meditate” (Brh.Up.IV,3,7) and “[It appears to] move about” (Brh. Up.IV,3,7). [It] is pure, from the Śruti, “There a thief is [not a thief]” (Brh.Up.IV,3,22) and “[It is] not followed [by good, It is not followed by evil]” (Brh. Up.IV,3,22).

38. As [Its] power never fails, [It] is the Knower in the state of deep sleep as well as in the waking state, for it is changeless. But the distinction is supposed only as regards the object of knowledge
since the Śruti says, “Where there [seems to be another, there the one might see the other]” (Brh. Up. IV, 3, 31).

59. As mediated [by time, space, etc.], the ordinary seeing by non-Atman [such as the eye] is indeed indirect. As Seeing is the nature of Atman it has been said that Brahman is directly known.81

60. No second lamp is necessary for illuminating a lamp; similarly no knowledge other [than Atman] is required [for knowing Atman], since Knowledge is the nature of Atman.

61. It is not accepted that [Atman] is an object, or changeable, or manifold. Therefore Atman is not to be discarded or accepted by something other [than Atman].

62. [Atman] includes the exterior and the interior,82 is unscathed, and beyond birth, death, and old age. What does one fear who knows, “I am Atman”?

63. There is action (karman) only until injunction [to attain] Atman, since notions of belonging to a caste, etc., are then removed; their removal results from the conclusion “Thou art That” (Chând. Up. VI, 8, 7, etc.) based on the scriptural teaching “[It is] neither gross [nor subtle]” (Brh. Up. III, 8, 8), and the like.

64. Since in abandoning the body in the previous life one has given up lineage and the like, and the like belong to the body. Thus the body is also non-Atman.

65. Therefore the notions of “mine” and “It” which apply to the non-Atman such as the body, etc., is nescience. It (= nescience) should be abandoned by means of knowledge of Atman since the Śruti says, “[For this is the doctrine] of the demons” (Chänd. Up. VIII, 8, 5).

66. Just as the duties of observing ten-day periods of impurity come to an end at the time of entering the life of a wandering ascetic, the actions based upon lineage and the like come to an end at the time of attaining knowledge.

67. But, willing his desires, an ignorant man obtains [the results of] what he has done.84 When desires are cast off by him who sees his own Atman, he becomes immortal.85

68. The injunction [to attain] the nature of Atman results in the cessation of actions and the like. Atman is neither an object to be accomplished nor a means of accomplishment; It is held to be eternally content as the Śruti says.

49. Actions result in things being produced, obtained, changed, or purified. There are no results of action other than these. Therefore one should abandon [actions] together with [their] requisites.87

50. Concentrating upon Atman the love which is [now set] on external things—for they end in suffering, are inconstant and exist for Atman—a seeker after the truth should resort to a teacher

51. who is tranquil, wise, released, actionless, and established in Brahman, since the Śruti says, “One who has a teacher knows . . .” (Chänd. Up. VI, 14, 2) and the Śruti also says, “Learn to know this [by obeisance, by questioning, by serving]” (BhG IV, 34).

52. If a student is disciplined and properly qualified, the teacher should immediately transport him over his great interior ocean of darkness in the boat of the knowledge of Brahman.

53. Seeing, touching, hearing, smelling, thinking, knowing, and other powers, though they are of the nature of Pure Consciousness, are differentiated by limiting adjuncts.88

54. As the sun always shines, without destroying or creating [anything by its rays], so does [It] always know all, being all-pervading, all-seeing, and pure.

55. Through nescience Atman abiding in the body is regarded as the Seeing of something other [than Itself], and as being the same size as the body and possessed of the qualities of the body, by such comparisons as that of the moon in the water and the like.40

56. Having seen an external object, one shuts the eyes and remembers it [in the dreaming state] and [then] abandoning it [in the state of deep sleep], one opens up the Seeing of Atman, reaches Brahman, and does not travel along any path.

57. He who has thus given up the triad, viz. the vital air (= the state of deep sleep), goes across the great ocean of ignorance, for he is by nature abiding in his own Atman, attributeless, pure, awakened, and released.

58. When he has realized, “I am unborn, undying, deathless, free from old age, fearless, all-knowing, all-seeing, and pure,” he is not born again.

59. He who knows the oneness of Atman and Brahman concludes that the above-mentioned darkness-seed does not exist. How should he be born [again] when it does not exist?
60. Just as clarified butter, extracted from milk, does not become the same as before if thrown back into it, [so] the Knower [once discriminated] from the untrue such as the intellect never becomes the same embodied \textit{Atman} as before.

61. One becomes free from fear realizing, “I am Brahmā” (Bṛh. Up. I, 4, 10), which is ‘the real, knowledge, and the infinite’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1), which is superior to the fivefold \textit{Atman} such as [the \textit{ātman} consisting of] the essence [of food], etc., \textsuperscript{44} and which is declared in the scripture to be ‘invisible’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7).

62. A man who knows the truth, \textit{i.e.}, the bliss of that \textit{Atman}, from fear of which speech, mind, fire, and the like carry out their functions, \textsuperscript{45} does not fear anything at all. \textsuperscript{46}

63. If a knower of \textit{Atman} abides in his own infinite and non-dual kingdom, which is superior to name and the like, \textsuperscript{47} then whom should he salute? Then, there is no need for action.

64. When [\textit{Atman}] is external [It is called] \textit{Virāj} or \textit{Vaśvānara}. When [It] remembers within, [It is called] \textit{Prajāpati}. But when everything vanishes [It] is called \textit{Prajñā or Auyākṛta}. \textsuperscript{48}

65. As they are merely verbal handles, \textsuperscript{49} however, the triad, namely, the state of deep sleep, etc., are unreal. A man who thus covers himself with the truth, “I am the True and the Knower,” \textsuperscript{50} is released. \textsuperscript{51}

66. As the sun has light as its nature, it has neither day nor night. \textsuperscript{52} In like manner I have neither knowledge nor ignorance since I have Pure Consciousness as my nature, without distinctions [in It].

67. As the scripture is not to be doubted, one should remember, “I am always Brahmā; as I am Brahmā, I have nothing to reject or to accept.”

68. He is not born [again] who sees thus, “I am the One in all beings just as the ether and all beings are in Me.” \textsuperscript{53}

69. There is nothing else but one’s own [\textit{Atman}] anywhere, outside, within or inside, since the \textit{Śruti} says, “[This Brahmā is . . .] without an outside, without an inside” (Bṛh. Up. II, 5, 19); [It] is therefore pure and self-effulgent.

70. According to such scriptural passages as, “Not thus! Not so!” (Bṛh. Up. II, 3, 6, etc.), [\textit{Atman}] is “the quiescence of the pluralistic universe and non-dual” (GK II, 35). \textsuperscript{54} And according to such scriptural passages as, “[That Imperishable . . .] is the unknown [Knower]” (Bṛh. Up. III, 8, 11), [It] should not be known in any way other than that.

71. If one has come to know the supreme \textit{Brahma} realizing, “I am the \textit{Atman} of all,” one becomes the \textit{Atman} of all beings, since the \textit{Śruti} says, “[Whoever thus knows ‘I am Brahmā’ becomes this all; even the gods have no power to prevent his becoming thus,] for he is their \textit{Atman}” (Bṛh. Up. I, 4, 10).

72. If a living being clearly [knows] his \textit{Atman} as the highest \textit{Atman}, as God, \textsuperscript{55} he is to be worshipped by the gods and ceases to be [domestic] animal for the gods.\textsuperscript{56}

73. As a killer of the unreal thus covers himself with the truth, \textsuperscript{57} “I am the Real-\textit{Atman} and the Knower, but, like ether, I am empty of anything else,” he is not bound [again].

74. They are pitiable who know the supreme \textit{Brahma} differently from this. “The gods would be under the power of him” (Taitt. A. 3, 13, 2d; \textit{Vājasaneyī-Samhitā}, 31, 21d) who is a self-ruler, a seer of non-difference and abiding in himself. \textsuperscript{58}

75. Abandoning your relationship with lineage, etc., and other words along with actions and [saying,] “Om,” you attain your own \textit{Atman}, which is all, pure, \textsuperscript{59}

76. The bulwark of all that is established,\textsuperscript{60} devoid of day, night, and the like,\textsuperscript{61} and is to the sides, above, below, all, ever-shining, and free from disease.

77. One should know one’s \textit{Atman} to be the highest One which is devoid of merit and demerit, free from past and future, free from cause and effect\textsuperscript{62} and free from all bondage.

78. While being pure and not acting, [\textit{Atman}] does all; while standing, [It] goes past those who are running. \textsuperscript{63} As \textit{It} is almighty through Its \textit{māyā}, It is thought to be manifold, though [really \textit{It} is] unborn. \textsuperscript{64}

79. While causing the world to turn around,\textsuperscript{65} \textit{I}, \textit{Atman}, am actionless, non-agent and non-dual for, like a king, I am merely the Witness [of the world], and like a magnet,\textsuperscript{66} merely close [to it].

80. One should bear in mind, “I am that \textit{Brahma} which is attributeless, actionless, eternal, free from the pairs [of opposites], free from disease, pure, awakened, and released.”

81. Having properly known bondage, final release, and all [the causes] from which [all] this and both [bondage and final
delusion, who is all-knowing, all-doing, free from the fear of release] result; the one (= the state of deep sleep) and the two (= the dream and waking states) 66 which are to be rejected; and the only, pure, and highest Truth which transcends the knowable and the unknowable, which has been studied and which is spoken of by the Śūtras and sages,—[having known all this] one would become a knower of Brahman who has transcended sorrow and delusion, who is all-knowing, all-doing, free from the fear of existence, and who has completed all that has to be done.

82. Ātman Itself does not become something to be rejected nor is It to be accepted by Itself or anything else. Nothing else becomes something to be rejected or to be accepted by Itself; this is true thought as has been mentioned [above, stanza 67].

83. This true thought leads [people] to understand Ātman and has all the Upaniṣads as its field; so, having come to know this, they are released from all the bonds of transmigratory existence.

84. As it is the supreme means of purification that is the secret doctrine of all the Vedas and is the highest [secret doctrine] even for the gods, it has been expounded here.

85. This secret and supreme knowledge should not be given to [a student] who is not tranquil but should be taught to a student who is dispassionate and obedient.

86. And there is no actionless one other than [the teacher] who is offering the knowledge of Ātman. Therefore, [a student] who is seeking after knowledge should always qualify himself with the qualities of a student. 67

87. Salutation to that knowledge-Ātman which is all-knowing and almighty and besides which there is nothing else, neither knowledge, nor object of knowledge, nor knower. 68

88. Salutation to the all-knowing teachers by whom through knowledge we have been led across the great ocean of birth and death filled with ignorance.

Notes

1Cf. BhG V,16; 17.
3Cf. Upad I,1,3.
5Cf. Gk I,33; IV,1; Upad I,19,9. This idea is very similar to a tenet of the Viśnunāvādins.
6Cf. Upad I,7,16; 17,16; 16,122; BS Bh I,3,19, p. 235; III,2,11, p. 641, etc. The simile is also used in Bhartrhari's Vākyapāda III,3,41.
7See Introduction, III,8,5, p. 44. Cf. Gk II,13; 14; 15; 16.
8Cf. Upad I,17.
9Cf. stanza 47.
10Abstention (yama) consists of non-injury (ahimsa), non-lying (satya), non-theft (asteya), non-incontinence (brahmacharya), and non-possession (aparigraha). See Togasutra II,30; Vedāntāstara [XXXI] 214; Upad II,1,4.
11Rāmatiratha treats “nitya” as “njana” while Bodhanidhi interprets it as “avajaynijahan,” which suggests that he treats it as “nijakaranam” or “permanent rite.” The reading “njana” for “nitya” is not supported by manuscripts. In Vedāntāstara [IV] 7 “permanent rites” are defined as the rites which lead to disquiet (pratyavayasadhana) when they are not performed. The ultimate object of the permanent rites is the purification of the intellect (budhi,tadthi, Vedāntāstara [IV] 11) and their result is the attainment of the world of ancestors (pitrloka, Vedāntāstara [IV] 15).
12For Śāṅkara’s view of actions including sacrifice, see Introduction, IV,F, pp. 88-94.
13The BhG mentions the threefold austerity (tapas) : (1) the austerity of the body (jātra, XVII, 14), (2) of the speech (vācāyoga, XVII, 15) and (3) of the mind (mānas, XVII,16).
14According to Rāmatiratha the senses are implied by the term “etc.”
15Rāmatiratha interprets “tattaddehaaisosanam” as “teṣaṃ teṣaṃ teṣaṃ deha-āsisanam...”
16See Upad I,10,4.
17This stanza is quoted in Naṣ IV,43. Cf. Upad I,16,18.
18The word “prāpa” here may also imply the state of deep sleep. See stanza 57 below.
19With regard to stanzas 28-30, see Mayeda Upād, pp. 36-37.
20Cf. Brh. Up. III,4,1; 4,2; 5,1.
22According to an Indian tradition Rāhu is a demon who is supposed to seize the sun and the moon and swallow them, thus causing eclipses. When the gods had once produced the amṛta, water of life, by churning the ocean, he assumed a disguise and drank some of it. The sun and the moon detected him and informed Visnu, who cut off his head. Thus Rāhu wreaks vengeance on the sun and the moon by occasionally swallowing them. Cf. Upad I,18,39-40 and note 26.
23See Upad I,11,3; 4.
24See Upad I,1,4; 4,2.
25See Upad I,14,26.
26See Upad I,1,12; Upad I,13,11; 14; 18.
27It is believed that birth (janālā) and death (myātakālā) cause impurity to the members of the family or to relatives. The periods of impurity depend on many
nityatrpto niranjanah, "the source of which is not known, but Rama-

The author seems to have Brh. Up. IV,4,7 (Kath. Up. VI,14) in mind.

Ramatirtha quotes Brh. Up. IV,4,7 (etayaistannandaagyayai ... upajvaniti) and another passage, "nityatrpto niradayaḥ," the source of which is not known, but Ramatirtha says that it is a Śruti passage. Bodhanidhi quotes Brh. Up. III,9,28 (ajīñānam ānandam). It is, however, to be noted here that BhG IV,20 reads "nityatrpto nirdsayah" (vijRanam tirtha says that it is a Sruti passage. Bodhanidhi quotes Brh. Up. IV,4,15).

Another passage, "prapajyā ... trikām" in stanza 65. It is, therefore, very probable that, the question parallels "susupta-dītrikām." In the state of deep sleep, the senses are absorbed into the mind, and their functions are extinguished.

In the waking state atman is submerged in the Brahman. In the sleeping state, the senses are absorbed into the mind, and their functions are extinguished. In the dreaming state, the senses are absorbed into the mind, and their functions are extinguished.

Mind exercises its influence throughout the body by means of the senses; in the dream¬
CHAPTER 18
THOU ART THAT

1. Salutation to that Ātman, the Constant Awareness, Ātman of the notions of the intellect, through which the modifications [of the intellect] disappear and arise.

2. Salutation to an Indra among ascetics, teacher of the teacher, a man of great intellect, who defeated hundreds of enemies of the Śrutis by means of sword-like words supported by thunderbolt-like reasoning and protected the treasure meaning of the Vedas.

3. If the understanding, “I am ever-free, the existent,” could not arise, for what purpose does the Śruti teach thus zealously like a [devoted] mother?

4. From this [self-established Ātman which is indicated by the word] “I” the attribute “you” is excluded—just as the notion of a serpent [is excluded] in application to a rope by means of reasoning and such teachings as “Thou art That” (Chānd. Up. VI, I, 13, 3, etc.) and so forth.

5. Just as the existence of merit, etc., is to be known on the evidence of the scriptures, [so is the existence of Ātman]. Just as poison is counteracted through meditation, evil will be destroyed [through the scriptural sentence].

6. The two [contradictory] notions, “I am the Existent-Brahman” and “I act,” have Ātman as their Witness. It is considered more reasonable to give up only [that one] of the two [notions] which arises from ignorance.

7. The notion, “I am the Existent,” arises from right means of knowledge [while] the other notion has its origin in fallacious means of knowledge; moreover, [the notion which has its origin in fallacious knowledge] such as sense-perception is negated like a mistake in orientation.

8. When the scripture says, “[I am] a doer,” “[I am] an experiencer,” that conforms to ordinary people’s belief [concerning Ātman]. The notion, “I am the Existent,” arises from the Śruti; the former notion is negated by it.

9. [Objection:] “Even when one is told, ‘You are indeed the Existent,’ one does not attain immovable final release of Ātman. Therefore, one should take up prasāmkhyāna meditation as well as reasoning.

10. “Even one who understands the meaning of the sentence does not grasp it from a single utterance. Therefore he needs further things; they are two, [prasāmkhyāna meditation and reasoning], as we have said [above].

11. “Since [the sentence] is not understood [immediately], there has to be an injunction to perform [Vedic] actions. Likewise the injunction [to meditate by prasāmkhyāna] is not incompatible [with knowledge] as long as [that] is not firmly grasped.

12. “And [if] one did attain [Ātman] spontaneously, that activity would [it is true] be meaningless, [but as one does not] prasāmkhyāna meditation should accordingly be performed until Ātman is grasped.

13. “And the firm impression which arises from sense-perception certainly negates the knowledge, ‘I am the Existent,’ which arises from the Śruti. And on account of faults one is attracted towards things external.

14. “[This is] because [the notion] which arises from sense-perception and has particulars [visēsa] as its objects would necessarily hinder the notions which arise both from the verbal testimony and from inference, which have universals [samānaya] as their objects.

15. “Nobody, even if he knows the meaning of the sentence, is found to be free from pain. If anybody is seen to become free from pain merely by hearing the meaning of the sentence,

16. “it is inferred that he must have performed [prasāmkhyāna meditation] in past bodies. [If an injunction for prasāmkhyāna meditation were not accepted,] the scripture would not be the authority for [right] conduct. If this be so, it is not desirable.
17. “After stating an end, ‘You are the Existent,’ the means [to it] should be enjoined. So it is *prasamkhya*na meditation that is the means, and nothing else; the object of [*prasamkhya*na meditation] is taken here to be the well-established [*A* tman].

18. “Therefore, for the sake of apprehending [*A* tman] one should perform *prasamkhya*na meditation diligently, being endowed with tranquility, etc., and abandoning anything incompatible with [this] means and its object.”

19. [Reply:] That is not so, for the secret doctrines (= Upaniṣads) end with “Not thus! Not so!” (Brh. Up. II,3,6, etc.). Ends to be attained by actions should be stated in the scripture before [these Upaniṣadic doctrines] and final release is not [an end to be attained by actions], since it is ever-existing.

20. Just as the pain of a son is superimposed upon himself by a father, though himself suffering no pain, so [pain] is superimposed by the bearer of the “I”-notion (= the intellect) upon its *A* tman which is ever free from pain.

21. This superimposition is negated, as if it were a thing acquired, by the words, “Not thus! Not so!” (Brh. Up. II,3,6). Moreover no injunction based upon superimposition is reasonable.

22. As superimposition is [made] upon *A* tman, so [its] negation is [made from *A* tman], just as the superimposition of dust upon the sky and its negation therefrom are made by the unwise.

23. If a thing were [really] acquired and then negated, final release would certainly be [merely] temporary. Therefore this [negation of superimposition] is a negation of what has not been [in fact] acquired, like [the prohibition against] the building of a fire in the sky [which is in fact impossible].

24. It is possible [to apply] a word or a notion to its object but not something else. It is not possible [to apply] either word or notion [to *A* tman] since [It] is their own *A* tman as well as the *A* tman of the bearer of the “I”-notion.

25. [The *Śruti,*] “Not thus! Not so!” (Brh. Up. II,3,6, etc.) negates all things, including the notion of agency which is superimposed upon *A* tman, Pure Consciousness, by the bearer of the “I”-notion, and it negates also the bearer of the “I”-notion.

26. [*A* tman] is the self-effulgent Perception, the Seeing, inter-nally existing and actionless. [It] is the Witness which is directly cognized and in the interior of all, and the Observer which is constant, attributeless, and non-dual.19

27. The bearer of misconception [about *A* tman] (= the intellect), because it is always near to *A* tman, appears to be *A* tman. From this arise the two [notions], “oneself” and “one’s own,” which are indicated by [the words] “I” and “my.”

28. As this bearer of the “I”-notion has a universal, and is possessed of action, etc., it can be referred to by words. One’s own *A* tman cannot be referred to by any word since [It] neither has a universal nor is possessed of action, etc.

29. In the [bearer of the “I”-notion] there is the reflection of the internal Seeing, and words referring to the former could indicate the internal Seeing indirectly, but never designate It directly.

30. [This is] because that which is not a member of any genus and so on cannot be indicated by words. As the bearer of the “I”-notion has the reflection of *A* tman [in it and appears to be *A* tman], it is the intellect that is referred to by the words for *A* tman.

31. Just as [words] which mean fire are only indirectly used in the sense of a torch, etc., since they mean something different [from a torch, etc.]. Just as the reflection of a face is different from the face since it conforms to the mirror, so the face is [different] from the reflection since it does not conform to the mirror. The reflection of *A* tman in the bearer of the “I”-notion is thought to be like the reflection of a face [in a mirror].

32. *A* tman, like the face, is always different [from Its reflection]; but as in the case of the face these two [ *A* tman and its reflection] are not discriminated [from each other]. Some there are who say that the reflection in the bearer of the “I”-notion is the transmigrator24; a shadow is a real substance according to [the authority of] the *Smrti,* and there are further reasons [for taking it to be a real substance]; for example, [the reason] that [one feels] cool in a shadow.25 [Some say that the transmigrator is] a part of the Knower or a modification of It.26 Others [think that the transmi-
17. “After stating an end, ‘You are the Existent,’ the means [to it] should be enjoined. So it is prasamkhyaṇa meditation that is the means, and nothing else; the object of [prasamkhyaṇa meditation] is taken here to be the well-established [Ātman].

18. “Therefore, for the sake of apprehending [Ātman] one should perform prasamkhyaṇa meditation diligently, being endowed with tranquility, etc., and abandoning anything incompatible with [this] means and its object.”

19. [Reply:] That is not so, for the secret doctrines (= Upaniṣads) end with “Not thus! Not so!” (Brh. Up. II,3,6, etc.). Ends to be attained by actions should be stated in the scripture before [these Upaniṣadic doctrines] and final release is not [an end to be attained by actions], since it is ever-existing.

20. Just as the pain of a son is superimposed upon himself by a father, though himself suffering no pain, so [pain] is superimposed by the bearer of the “I”-notion (=the intellect) upon its Ātman which is ever free from pain.

21. This superimposition is negated, as if it were a thing acquired, by the words, “Not thus! Not so!” (Brh. Up. II,3,6). Moreover no injunction based upon superimposition is at all reasonable.

22. As superimposition is [made] upon Ātman, so [its] negation is [made from Ātman], just as the superimposition of dust upon the sky and its negation therefrom are made by the unwise.

23. If a thing were [really] acquired and then negated, final release would certainly be [merely] temporary. Therefore this [negation of superimposition] is an exception of what has not been [in fact] acquired, like [the prohibition against] the building of a fire in the sky [which is in fact impossible].

24. It is possible [to apply] a word or a notion to its object but not something else. It is not possible [to apply] either word or notion [to Ātman] since [It] is their own Ātman as well as the Ātman of the bearer of the “I”-notion.

25. [The Śrutis] “Not thus! Not so!” (Brh. Up. II,3,6, etc.) negates all things, including the notion of agency which is superimposed upon Ātman, Pure Consciousness, by the bearer of the “I”-notion, and it negates also the bearer of the “I”-notion.

26. [Ātman] is the self-effulgent Perception, the Seeing, inter-
35. Some others say it is the independent bearer of the "I"-notion alone that is the transmigrator. That transmigrator is the individual continuity of the "I"-notion and the like, and that there is no continuity apart [from that],—

36. so say the Buddhists. It must be examined whether there is any truth among these [doctrines]. But an end should be put [for the time being] to the debate on what it is that transmigrates. The topic of [the nature of the reflection] in question will now be discussed.

37. The reflection of the face in the mirror is not an attribute either of the face or of the mirror. If it were an attribute of either of the two, it would remain even if the other one were removed.

38. If it is proposed [by an objector] that [the reflection of the face is an attribute] of the face, since [it is] given the same name as the face, [we answer:] No, because [the reflection of the face] conforms to the mirror and because even when the face is there, no [reflection of it] exists [unless there is also a mirror].

39. If [you say] that [the reflection is] an attribute of both [the face and the mirror], [we answer:] That is not right since [it is] not seen even when both [are present unless they are properly placed]. If you say that Rāhu, who is real though invisible, is seen against the sun and the moon,

40. [we answer:] Even before [he is seen in the sun and the moon] it has been established from the authority of the scriptures that Rāhu is a real substance. However, if [you are of] the opinion that [he] is [merely] a shadow, then on the basis of the previous reasoning he would not be a real substance.

41. The Smṛti [referred to in stanza 34] is a prohibition against stepping on the shadow of a teacher, etc. but does not prove that [it] is a real substance, since a sentence cannot [be taken to] express any other meaning than the one which it intends.

42. It is from not using anything warm, etc., but not from the shadow that a feeling of coolness, etc. result, for [coolness] is not observed [to be a property of shadows] though it is observed to be a property of water.

43. Atman, [Its] reflection, and [Its] locus (= the intellect) are comparable to the face, [its] reflection, and [its] locus (= the mirror). And the unreality of the reflection is understood by means of the scripture and reasoning.

44. [Objection:] “As the Seeing is changeless, [It] is not [the transmigrator], nor is the reflection [the transmigrator], for the reflection is unreal. Nor is the bearer of the “I”-notion [the transmigrator], since it is not conscious. Who could be the transmigrator?”

45. [Reply:] Therefore let transmigratory existence be nothing but nescience due to the absence of discriminating knowledge. Because of [the existence of] the immovable Atman, transmigratory existence is always existent in Atman as it were.

46. Just as a snake, [although not real], exists in a rope because of [the existence of] the rope until [the two] are discriminated, so it is because of [the existence of] the immovable Atman that transmigratory existence, although not real, [exists in It, but only until the two are discriminated].

47. Some people think that Atman is the locus of a reflection of Atman which changes according to Its notions of Itself, and that It is [thus] a permanent transmigrator which experiences pleasure and pain.

48. These people, unguided by scripture, are deluded because they do not fully know Atman and [Its] reflection as they really are, and think that Atman is a bearer of the “I”-notion.

49. Their view is that transmigratory existence exists as a real substance characterized by acting and experiencing. They undergo transmigratory existence since they do not know Atman, [Its] reflection and [Its] locus, on account of their lack of discriminating knowledge.

50. If the intellect [though appearing to be Pure Consciousness], has the reflection of Pure Consciousness, while Atman has Pure Consciousness as Its nature, the Vedas are right to teach Atman by means of words like “knowledge” (jñāna).

51. [Objection:] “The meaning of verbal root and verbal suffix, though different [from each other], are seen to have one and the same subject as in ‘karoti’ (he does), ‘gacchati’ (he goes), etc., according to universally accepted opinion.

52. “Neither in ordinary life nor in the Smṛti is it seen that there are two separate subjects for these two [verbal root and verbal
Therefore the word “consciousness” (jñāpti), which is not applicable to either of them. 55. Knowledge does not belong to the intellect and Ātman has no action. Therefore “to know” (jñāti) is not applicable to either of them. 54. Knowledge does not belong to the intellect and Ātman has no action. Therefore “to know” (jñāti) is not applicable to either of them.

55. Therefore the word “consciousness” (jñāpti), which implies action, has no application [to Ātman] either. For It is not anything changing, the doctrine being that Ātman is constant. 56. It is the intellect but not [Ātman] that is expressed by [the word] “intellect” (buddhi) [which is an instrument], since [if Ātman were expressed by the word “intellect” which denotes an instrument, Ātman would itself be an instrument and there would be no agent remaining, but] there can be no instrument without an agent. Nor again is [Ātman] expressed by words denoting an object, by saying [of It] “it is known” (jñāyate).

57. Ātman is never taken to be expressible by words or cognizable, according to those who [realize that] Ātman is only one, free from pain and changeless.

58. If the bearer of the “I”-notion were Ātman, then [Ātman] would be the primary meaning of a word. 46 But as [the bearer of the “I”-notion] has hunger, etc., it is not in the Śruti taken to be Ātman.

59. [Objection:] “Unfortunately then there is no primary meaning [of the word] and neither is there any secondary meaning. 47 Nevertheless, the application of words like ‘jñāti’ has to be accounted for.

60. “If words were false, the Vedas would not be an authority either. And this is not acceptable. Therefore the application of this word has to be taken according to the generally accepted way.”

61. [Reply:] If what is generally accepted by deluded people is taken, it would entail the non-existence of Ātman, that is, the settled doctrine of the Lokāyatas, 48 and this is not acceptable.

62. If what is generally accepted by the learned [is taken], failure to discriminate [between Ātman and the intellect follows] as before. 49 This Veda which is the authority does not make any useless [word]. 50

63. The face is indeed thought by men to be the same as the face in a mirror, for the reflection of the face is seen to be of the form of the face.

64. And because they do not discriminate between this [Ātman] which becomes falsely manifest in that [intellect] and that [intellect] in which this [Ātman] becomes falsely manifest, all people naturally use the verb “jñāti.” 51

65. Superimposing the agency of the intellect [upon Ātman], [they] say that the Knower (= Ātman) “knows” (jñāti). In like manner superimposing the Pure Consciousness [of Ātman upon the intellect], [they] say in this world that the intellect is knower.

66. As Knowledge is the nature of Ātman and is eternal Light, as the Śruti says, 52 It is never produced by the intellect, by Ātman, or by anything else.

67. Just as the “I”-notion arises with regard to the body and ordinary people say that [the body, i.e., “I”] knows, so the intellect, and Ātman as well, are [regarded as] producers of knowledge.

68. Deluded thus by the notions of the intellect which are produced and appear to be Pure Consciousness, logicians say that knowledge is produced.

69. Therefore [the very existence of] a word like “jñāti,” the notion [of it], and memory of it are from the absence of the discriminating knowledge of the Knower, [Its] reflection and the intellect.

70. The nature of the reflection [of the face], viz. conformity to the mirror, is superimposed upon the face. In like manner, the nature of the reflection of the Knower, viz. conformity to the attributes of the intellect, is taken to be [superimposed upon the Knower].

71. The notions of the intellect, therefore, on being illumined by the reflection of Ātman, appear, as it were, to be perceivers, just as torches, etc., appear to be burning [though in fact it is the fire in the torches, etc., that is burning]. 53

72. Saying that [the notions of the intellect] are manifest of themselves alone, and that [they] are of themselves alone perceivers, the Buddhists 54 deny the existence of a perceiver [other than the notions themselves].
73. If thus these notions of the intellect were not to be seen by anything else, tell [me] how are those Buddhists to be refuted?\textsuperscript{66} [Even if it be said that] although their existence and non-existence are never perceived by anything else,

74. they have [among themselves] a continuous perceiver [apart from \textit{Atman}], [we reply:] It is also no more than a notion, since even if there is another perceiver, [it and the notions] are equally non-intelligent.

75. If [you] think that in the presence of the Overseer [the notions] would be established, [we answer:] No, because it would follow that even if [the notions were in the presence of] anything other [than the Overseer—for example, wood and clay—they would be established], since the Overseer, even though [they were in its presence], does nothing to help establish them.\textsuperscript{66}

76. Is the hearer who is suffering from pain and seeking after [final release] the Overseer or something else? It is not your view that it is the Overseer who is suffering from pain and seeking after [final release].

77. It can never be right to take it that I, a doer, am the Overseer and the Existent. Nor further is it proper that the statement of the \textit{Sruti}, "You are the Existent," should also be false.

78. If the \textit{Sruti} were making its statement [on the basis of] not discriminating the two ["I" (= \textit{Atman}) and "you" (= non-\textit{Atman})], it would be comprehensible.\textsuperscript{67} But if [the \textit{Sruti} were to say], "You [are the Existent]" [on the basis of] discriminating ["you"] from "I,'"

79 & 80. [and "you"] refers to the continuum of the notions, there would be the defect already mentioned.\textsuperscript{68} If [you] say that "you" refers to the Overseer, [you] should explain here how any relation between the "I"-notion and the Overseer could exist through which "you" could indicate [the Overseer] indirectly. If [you say that] there is a relation of being seer and the object seen, how can there be [such a relation between the "I"-notion and the Overseer], when the Overseer is actionless?

81. If [you say], let the Overseer, though actionless, be in essence identical [with the "I"-notion], [we answer:] Unless it is grasped that the relationship is that the Overseer is the essence of "mine" (= the "I"-notion),\textsuperscript{69} there will be no realization [of the identity of the "I"-notion and the Overseer].

82. If you think that the relationship can be grasped from the scripture, [we answer:] No, because that would entail the three-fold defects given already\textsuperscript{61}; or else it would be an understanding of [the Overseer] as "mine" and [not the understanding of their identity].

83. While the intellect, [though] non-Seeing, is always appearing in the form of the Seeing (= \textit{Atman}), then from the intellect notions too appear, as sparks from a red-hot iron.\textsuperscript{62}

84. It is [only on the assumption of] the ultimate Seeing that one can reasonably [account for the fact] that people [perceive the intellect's] false appearance [in the form of the Seeing of waking and dream, and] its disappearance [in deep sleep], and not otherwise [than on that assumption]. And as this is [in fact] the case, [the intellect] takes [itself] to be the Seeing.

85. [Objection:] "Can it not be that the Seeing enters [the intellect] as fire into a lump of iron?" [Reply:] That [contention] has been refuted by the illustration of the face and [its] reflection in a mirror.\textsuperscript{63}

86. When the black iron appears red, that is considered to be an analogy\textsuperscript{64} [of the intellect appearing to be the Seeing].\textsuperscript{65} An analogy, however, can never correspond in every detail.

87. In like manner, with the reflection of Pure Consciousness [in it], the mind appears to be Pure Consciousness. The reflection has been said to be false like the reflection of the face in a mirror.

88. It is not supported by the scriptures or reasoning that the mind is conscious. [If the mind were conscious,] it would follow that the body and the eye, etc., would also be so.

89. If [you say,] "Let them also be so," [we answer:] No, because [if it were so, you would have] become a materialist. And if there were no reflection in the mind, the notion that I am the Seeing would not arise."

90. If there were no notion, "I am the Existent," [the sentence], "Thou art That" (Chând. Up. VI,8,7, etc.) would also be meaningless. To him who knows the distinction between "you" and "I" this sentence will be meaningful.\textsuperscript{66}

91. It should be known that the two notions "my" and "this" inevitably denote "you" (= non-\textit{Atman}). [The notion] "I" is thought to denote "I" (= \textit{Atman}) and [the notion] "I am this" denotes both ["I" and "you"].

92. In regard to each other, a relation of principal and subordi-
nate is assumed, and it is reasonable that a relation of qualifying and qualified between them should be accepted.

93. These two [notions], “my” and “this,” are both qualifying attributes of the [notion “I”] which is mentioned in the middle [of Upad I,18, 91], just as [the wealth and cows are qualifying attributes of a man in the case of] “a man possessed of wealth” and “a man possessed of cows”: and similarly the body is [a qualifying attribute] of the bearer of the “I”-notion.

94. Everything seated in the intellect, as well as the bearer of the “I”-notion, is [a qualifying attribute] of the Witness. Therefore the Knower makes everything manifest, though touching nothing.

95. All this, which has been set forth according to popular conviction, is inverted [thinking], [though] for those who are not intent upon discrimination, everything exists, [yet] it does not exist for those who have discriminating knowledge.

96. The logical means by which to ascertain [the meanings of] “this” [and] “I” should indeed be the method of agreement and difference of the words and of the meanings of the words.

97. In thinking, “I did not see anything else at all in this state of deep sleep,” one does not deny his own Seeing but negates his own notions.

98. [The scripture itself declares] the existence of Consciousness and Its immovability, saying, “[Then this person becomes] self-illumined” (Bṛh. Up. IV,3,9) [and] “For there is no [cessation of the Seeing of] the Seer [because of Its imperishability]” (Bṛh. Up. IV,3,23), but [declares] the perishability of the notions. [Thus] the scripture itself separates notions from Awareness.

99. When one has thus come to know, from the Śrutī and from universally accepted usage, the meaning of the sentences, the Śrutī says, “Thou art That” (Chānd. Up. VI,8,7, etc.) in order to remove the delusion of a hearer, and the result (= final release) is assumed to be in Pure Consciousness.

100. Just as Brahmā removed the ignorance of Daśaratha’s son (= Rāma) merely by means of the declaration [“You are the God Nārāyaṇa,”] and did not mention any other effort whereby he was to know that he was Viṣṇu.

101. [The sentence] that you are the Existence expresses only the basis of the word “I,” which [rests] on the Light, i.e., the inner Ātman. Thus the result of it is final release.

102. If the result should not arise by merely hearing [the sen-

tence], then there would necessarily be some duty to be fulfilled. It is accepted that even before the verbal expression, Ātman exists by Itself.

103. Right knowledge arises at the moment of hearing, resulting in freedom from hunger, etc. There is no doubt about the meaning of the sentences like “Thou art That” (Chānd. Up. VI,8,7, etc.), in the past, present, or future.

104. As the Awareness-Ātman is by nature free from obstacles, the right knowledge of one’s own Ātman infallibly arises at the time of hearing.

105. Does one understand [at the time of hearing], “I am the Existent” or, “I am something else”? If [one understands, “I am] the Existent,” the principal meaning of the word “I” should be regarded as being “the Existent.”

106. If [one were to understand, “I am] something else,” then it [would] be wrong to attain the knowledge, “I am the Existent.” If the principal meaning is grasped, there is therefore no obstacle to the realization here.

107. The notion and its bearer (= the intellect), which have the reflection of Ātman and appear to be Ātman, exist for Its sake. And since both are non-conscious, the result (= final release) is assumed to be in Pure Consciousness.

108. The result (= final release) is proper to Ātman though [It is] immovable, just as victory, etc. are proper to a king, since that result (i.e., final release) is neither the nature nor the cause of either action or the notion.

109. Only in the sense that the mirror which has the reflection of a face and appears to be the face is the face, can the mirror of the intellect’s notion which has the reflection of Ātman [and appears to be Ātman] be what is called ātman. In that sense the “I” is indeed ātman but not in the true sense.

110. This is the way of realization that “[I] am the Existent.” And [if] it were not so (= if there were no reflection), it would not be [realized]. If there were no medium, the teaching “Thou art That” (Chānd. Up. VI,8,7, etc.) would moreover be meaningless.

111. Thus, teaching is useful [only] when it is directed to a hearer. If the Overseer is not taken as the hearer, who would be the hearer?

112. If [you] suggest that in the presence of the Overseer the
Intellect will be [a hearer], [we answer:] The Overseer does not do anything for [the intellect], any more than a piece of wood can be taken [to do anything for it].

113. If the Overseer were to do anything for the intellect, would it not be subject to transformation? And what is wrong with [accepting] the reflection [theory] since it is supported by the Śruti and other authority?

114. If [you say that to accept] a reflection entail changes [in Atman], [we answer:] No, as already said, [it is unreal] just as a snake and so forth appears to be a rope and so forth and just as a mirror [appears to be] a face.

115. If [you say that] unless the appearance of [the intellect] as Atman is established apart from the perception of Atman, there would arise the fallacy of mutual dependence, [we answer:] The face and so on are established apart from [the appearance of the mirror as the face and like].

116. [You may say that] if the Overseer is established apart from [Its reflection], the reflection belongs to It, and if the reflection does belong to It, [the reflection] is distinct from the Overseer.

117. That is not so, since the notion [of the intellect] and the Seeing are in dream established each separately; since no chariot or other [external objects] exist in the dreaming state, [it is simply that] the notion [of the intellect] is being perceived by Atman.

118. Pervaded by Awareness (= Atman), the notion [of the intellect] assumes the form of an object [of perception]. The object [of perception] is taken to be that in whose form the notion arises.

119. As [the object of perception] is most desired, it is the object of an action. One who is desirous of obtaining it is enjoined to perform the action. And that [notion of the intellect] to which the form [of the object] should be given is called an instrument.

120. That Atman is called Knower by the reflection of which [the notion of the intellect] is pervaded. He is a knower of Atman who, having examined these three, knows which is Atman among them.

121. Since they are judged to be "right," "doubtful," or "false," the notions [of the intellect] are changeable. There is only the one Awareness in them but distinctions are made [in It] by the notions.

122. Just as the distinctions [in color, etc.] of a jewel are due to the distinctions of the limiting adjuncts, so impurity and all changes of the Awareness (= Atman) are due to the notions [of the intellect].

123. The manifestation, perception, and establishment of the notions here [in this world] are due to another (= Atman), since [it is Atman that is] directly cognizable like a lamp. This is the inference which is being stated.

124. Should one let the man ignorant of It grasp Atman by some [accepted] means of knowledge, or [should it be] by negating [non-Atman] so that [only] the other (= Atman) remains, without [using] any [of the accepted] means of knowledge?

125. If it is now said that [the method is that non-Atman] is negated by verbal testimony which is a means of knowledge, it would follow that Atman would be a void, since no Overseer would have been established.

126. If [you argue,] "You are a conscious being. How [can you be] the body?", [we answer:] Not [conclusive], because [it is] not established [through the mere negation that the conscious being is different from the body]. [Only] if a conscious being different from anything else had been established, would [the Overseer] be [established] in that way by abandoning something else.

127. [Objection:] Then the understanding of a man ignorant of It ought to be the same as [that of] the one [skeptic] who positively asserts the non-existence of Atman.

128. [Objection:] By the fact that people in ordinary life have the memory 'I knew this,' we may say that the instrument, object, and agent are established simultaneously.

129. [Reply:] Even if [we admit for the sake of argument] that memory is a right means of knowledge, it [only] appears to be simultaneous on account of its swiftness. The perceptions [of instrument, object, and agent] arise originally one after another before the memory [was laid down], and [now], after the memory [has been recalled, they come up] in the same manner.

130. One certainly assumes [distinctions like] "I know this (= the object)" and "I knew me (= the agent)." Where distinctions are assumed there is no simultaneity.

131. And [a regressus ad infinitum follows] since the three [instrument, object, and agent] arise at the time of perceiving the na-
132. The object of an action is declared to be that which it is intended should be always affected by the action of some agent. 

Therefore it is accepted that the object of an action depends upon the agent [and] not upon anything else.

133. It is by verbal testimony, inference, or a means of knowledge other than these that anything becomes established for the man ignorant [of It], and not otherwise.

134. [Question:] “Is the Overseer too established by a means of knowledge, or without any?” [Reply:] One’s own [Overseer] is [in fact] established without any [means of knowledge]; but this is not sufficient for the man ignorant [of It].

135. If the Overseer be taken to be the man ignorant [of It], there ought to be some evidence other than [Itself] for [It to be] known. And if anything other [than It] is the man ignorant [of It], there ought certainly to be [evidence other than Itself] for knowing [It].

136. Does “establishment” mean “the state of being known,” “coming into existence,” or something else? If [it means] “the state of being known,” you must remember the two alternatives just mentioned [in the previous verse].

137. If “establishment” means “coming into existence,” no effort would be of any avail for that, since it is well known to everyone that a thing [comes into existence] from its own causes.

138. In the doctrine, therefore, which accepts knowledge, object of knowledge, etc., “establishment” is said to be “the state of being known.” The Overseer and the overseen are “established” [and] are “the object to be known,” but they do not “come into existence.”

139. If [you] assume that “establishment” means “distinctness” of the object, agent, etc., [we say that] “distinctness” and “indistinctness” belong only to the Overseer different from object, agent, etc. and not to them.

140. And a jar does not become “distinct” to a blind man, an agent who has no faculty of seeing. If “distinctness” be supposed to belong to the agent, etc. which have no faculty of seeing], the faculty of sight must have a bearer—the Overseer.

141. [Objection:] Tell [us] what do you gain by [postulating] the dependence of knowledge upon something else (= Atman)? [If you say,] “The dependence of knowledge upon the knower is accepted,” [we answer:] In our view the knower too is nothing but knowledge.”

142. “It is certain that the nature of knowledge is devoid of distinction but yet is seen by those of distorted vision as if it had the distinction of object, knower, and consciousness.”

143. [“In our view knowledge is declared to be action and agent.”] [Reply:] If [you admit that] knowledge is existent and perishable, [you should also] accept that it has a bearer. If [you say that] you accept no attribute of knowledge, [you] give up [your own] position that knowledge is existent and perishable.

144. [Objection:] “Surely an attribute such as existence is really simply the exclusion of non-existence, and so on?” [Reply:] Even then knowledge should not be perishable, for you hold that [it] has specific individuality.

145. Destruction goes only up to specific individuality (= Atman) in our view. But you hold that destruction is the exclusion of non-destruction. You say that sameness [perceived] as cow is the non-existence of non-cow, but that is not the specific individuality of a cow.

146. You say that the meaning denoted by the word “momentary” is also nothing but the non-existence of something else [than the momentary]. [Objection:] “Though non-existence is devoid of distinction, we take it that distinction arises because of names.”

147. [Reply:] How in your view can one become many because of differences in names? If exclusion is concerned with things other [than a cow], how does this [exclusion of them] indicate a cow?

148. Neither non-existences (negations) nor any particularities [could] ever distinguish a cow from a non-cow, any more than names, generic properties, and the like [could distinguish] consciousness, since on your view consciousness is devoid of particularities.

149. If you accept sense-perception or inference as means of knowledge in daily life, it must necessarily be admitted that it (sense-perception or inference) arises on the basis of differences between action and the agent.
150. Therefore blue and yellow or a jar and the like are qualifying attributes of consciousness; and so the [perceiver] which perceives [it] should be admitted.

151. There is the perceiver of form-color and other [external objects], which is different from them, since [they] are objects of perception. Likewise there is [the perceiver] of the notion [of the intellect] which is similarly different [from that notion], since [the perceiver] is the illuminator [of the notion], like a lamp.

152. What kind of relationship other than that of the seer and the object of seeing will be possible between the Overseer who is the seeing and the object of the Overseer, which is the object of seeing?

153. Being effected by the Overseer, seeing pervades the object of seeing, or rather, some help is given to the intellect by the permanent Overseer.

154. It has previously been said that the help is [for the intellect] to become Overseer-like [because of the reflection of the Overseer in it] and since the intellect [thus] becomes an illuminator, [it] pervades a jar and other [external objects], as light and the like pervade [their objects].

155. Just as a jar [when pervaded by light] becomes something situated in the light, so does it [when pervaded by the intellect] become something seated in the intellect. It is the intellect's pervasion [of the jar] that is the jar's being seated [in the intellect]. In the pervasion by the intellect there would be sequence [of stages].

156. First the notion [of the intellect] pervades [objects]. Then there is the help of Ātman. [However] this sequence is not applicable to the Overseer of all, any more than to time, space and the like.

157. Something which, like the mind, perceives objects with the help of some factors, leaving [some objects] unperceived, is subject to transformation.

158. The knowledge "I am the Overseer" is merely a conviction pertaining to the intellect [but] not to the Overseer, since That is free from distinction, having no other [Overseer above It].

159. Even if the bearer [of the "I"-notion] were to realize final release, thinking thus, "I am [the Overseer]," it is not reasonable that final release from pleasure and pain should take place in the bearer of the "I"-notion (= the intellect).

160. The notion "[I am] suffering pain" must arise from a misconception of Ātman as the body and so forth, like the notion that "[I am] owner of an earring." It is by the notion "[I am the inner Ātman]."

161. namely by discriminating knowledge here [in our doctrine], that [the notion] devoid of discriminating knowledge is sublated. In the inverted view, [everything] would become non-existent in the end since the valid means of knowledge would become invalid.

162. If [I, Ātman], were burnt, cut, and destroyed, [I, Ātman] would suffer pain, but otherwise not; for though one [man] may be burnt, [cut, or destroyed], a different [man] never suffers the pain.

163. Being without touch and body, I (= Ātman) can therefore never be burnt. Therefore [the notion "I suffer pain"] arises from false conception just as, when [one's] son is dead, [the notion "I am dead"] arises from false conception.

164. [The notion] "I am owner of an earring" is certainly sublated by discriminating knowledge. Likewise the notion "[I] suffer pain" is always [sublated] by the notion "I am apart."

165. If it be established that Ātman suffers pain, it should be admitted that Ātman is always capable of suffering pain [but this is not the case]. [Therefore the notion "I suffer" results from the false conception whereby the object [i.e., pain] is produced and destroyed.]

166. Just as, though Ātman is] without touch and motion, [one feels] touch and motion, etc. [to be located in Ātman], so also because of lack of discriminating knowledge one feels pain to be located in Ātman, though it belongs to the mind.

167. By discriminating knowledge, namely the [right] notion of Ātman, pain is removed like motion, etc. Since the mind is by nature devoid of discriminating knowledge, it roams without desiring [to do so].

168. Then pain is experienced; [but it is] not [experienced] when the mind has become motionless. Therefore it is not reasonable that pain is located in the inner Ātman.

169. Since [in the sentence "Thou art That" the words]
“Thou” and “The Existent” (= That) have the same referent, this [sentence] is comparable to [the sentence] “The horse is black.” Since the word “Thou” is [used] in apposition to [a word—“Existent”—which] refers to the Painless One (= Brahman), it [too] refers to that [Painless One].

170. Likewise, since the word “That” is [used] in connection with [the word which] denotes the inner Ātman, [it refers to the inner Ātman]. [Just like the sentence] “You are the tenth,” the sentence [“Thou art That”] means the inner Ātman.

171. Without abandoning their own meanings [the words “Thou” and “That”] convey a special meaning and result in the realization of the inner Ātman. Therefore there is no other meaning contradictory to this meaning.

172. Since [the tenth boy] is included in the notion [“he must be among the nine [others],” he tries to know [which is the tenth boy], not counting himself as making up the ten. Similarly people [try to know] their own Ātman.

173. Because their eyes are bound by nescience those people whose intellect is seized by desire do not clearly realize themselves to be the Seeing, just as [the tenth boy] does not realize himself to be the tenth.

174. [Just as the boy knew himself to be the tenth through the sentence] “You are the tenth,” so through such sentences as “Thou art That” one knows one’s own Ātman, the Witness of all the internal organs.

175. There is no fixed rule in the Veda to the effect that in a sentence one [word] should be placed first and another word should be placed next; the syntactical relation of words is based upon [their] meanings.

176. For when the meanings of the words in a sentence, while they are being listened to, are remembered by the method of agreement and difference, then the meaning of the sentence is understood.

177. When the meanings of words in eternal sentences are clarified in order to convey the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences [to a pupil], then the question [“How am I Brahman?”] is out of place.

178. The method of agreement and difference has been mentioned for the purpose of remembering [the meanings of words].

179. In such sentences as “Thou art That,” the meaning of sentences—[namely] “I am ever-free”—is not manifested from them because the meaning of the word “Thou” has not been analyzed.

180. The method of agreement and difference has been mentioned for the purpose of analyzing out the [meaning of the word “Thou”] and for no other purpose; for [it is only] when the meaning of the word “Thou” has been discriminated, like a vilvao fruit placed on the palm [of the hand], the meaning of the sentences becomes manifest. And thus [the meaning of the sentences] is the One Apart, since the inner Ātman is ascertained by the exclusion of the meaning “experiencer of pain” from the meanings of the word “I.”

181. Such being the case the [above-mentioned] meaning is possible; thus it is not reasonable for those versed in the meanings of words and sentences to abandon the [meaning] which is expressed in the Śrutis and to understand a meaning which is not expressed in the Śrutis.

182. [Objection:] “Sense-perception and other [means of knowledge] do sublate [knowledge arising from sentences], as [they do in the case of the sentence describing] cooking as applied to grains of gold and so on.” [Reply:] How can [knowledge arising from] sentences be sublated by that erroneous [knowledge] which arises from sense-perception and other [means of knowledge]?

183. [Objection:] “As long as there is the knowledge ‘I suffer pain’ [the knowledge] ‘[I am] free from pain’ does not arise from the sentence, although [the former] is erroneous knowledge due to perception and other [means of knowledge].” [Reply:] Not so, because there are exceptions.

184. In the dreaming state I suffered pain today on account of burning, cutting, and the like [but the pain was sublated by the sentences]. Even if [the pain] be not sublated by the sentences in the dreaming state, still it should be admitted that [pain] is sublated before [the beginning] of, and [after] the end of, the pain, since the persistence of pain or delusion is not seen anywhere.

185. If one knows that the inner Ātman is the [highest] Ātman for nobody can know the meaning of a sentence without remembering [the meanings of words].
by sublating the [knowledge] that I suffer pain, just as [the boy knew he was] the tenth by sublating the knowledge that he was among the nine [others].

188. The knowledge that one is ever-free arises from the sentence and not from anything else. The knowledge of the meaning of the sentence is also preceded by recollecting the meaning of the words.

189. By the method of agreement and contrariety the meaning of words is certainly recollected. Thus one realizes that one is oneself free from pain and actionless.

190. Through such sentences as “[Thou art] the Existent,” like the [sentence] “You are the tenth,” right knowledge concerning the inner Ātman will become clearer.

191. Just as all pain in the dreaming state ceases by awakening so [the notion] that one suffers pain oneself is always [destroyed] by the [right] notion that the inner Ātman is the highest Ātman.

192. In the case of grains of gold, etc., right knowledge does not arise since [grains of gold, etc.,] to which something other than [cooking] pertains, do not become soft. But this is not true of such sentences as “Thou art That” since there is no contradiction.

193. In the sentence “Thou art That” the meaning of the two [words] “That” and “art” are already known. Because of the absence of any assistance to recollect the meaning of [the word] “Thou,” the sentence will not produce right knowledge.

194. This word “art” means that [the words] “That” and “Thou” have the same referent. The word “That” means inner Ātman and [the word] “Thou” has the meaning of the word “That.”

195. The two [words] will remove [the notions] that [the word “Thou” (= the inner Ātman] means] a sufferer of pain and that [the word “That” (= Brahmam] means] non-inner Ātman. And thus [the two words] will mutually convey the meaning of [the sentence] “Not thus! Not so!”

196. When the result of the [sentence] “Thou art That” is understood in such a way, how is it said that this [sentence] is not the means of knowledge and that it depends upon action?

197. Therefore in the beginning, in the middle and in the end, the [injunction] “Perform action” is contradictory [to the sentence]; so [it] should not be accepted since [it is] not stated in the Śrutis. And there [would] also [be] the meaningless abandonment of that which is stated in the Śrutis.

198. [Objection:] “Satisfaction is felt from eating, but it is not experienced from the sentence. This analysis of the sentence is like [trying to] get boiled milk-rice from cow-dung.”

199. [Reply:] It is true that [only] indirect knowledge arises from sentences referring to things other than Ātman. But it cannot be doubted that [direct knowledge arises from the sentence] which refers to the inner Ātman, just as the [true] number [ten] was obtained [from the sentence, “You are the tenth”].

200. It has to be accepted that [the inner Ātman] is “self-evident,” which is synonymous with “self-knowable.” And the Awareness of one’s own Ātman is established at the time of the cessation of the “I”-notion.

201. Pain is the object to intellects. How can this inner Ātman, the Seeing, have any connection with pain, when those [intellects themselves are in turn properly] taken to be merely objects to It?

202. It is only Itself that is aware of the Seeing, for Its nature is Awareness. The Awareness of this [inner Ātman] is described as the intellect’s coming into being as a possessor of Its reflection.

203. You here and now are final release, [self-]established and free from hunger, etc.

204. If [you say] that [final release] has to be established, it might be so; then hearing and so forth would be necessary to establish final release. In that case final release would be non-eternal. Otherwise (i.e., if it were eternal), the [injunctive] sacred word would be contradictory.

205. Once having known himself as “I am the [self-]established final release, any man who desires action would be foolish and would also betray the scripture.

206. For he who is [self-]established has no duty to perform;
he who has any duty to perform is not [self-]established. One who maintains both [ideas together] deceives himself.

208. [Objection:] “Only [the bare fact of] this reality is taught by the words, ‘You are the [self-]established final release.’ [But] what is the hearer to do so as to know that he is thus?

209. “It is experienced by means of perception that I am an agent and a sufferer of pain. Therefore there would be an effort [to know] that I am neither an agent nor a sufferer of pain.

210. “The Śruti has repeatedly affirmed agency, etc., when saying that reasoning, etc., should be employed in order to know that [‘I must be neither an agent nor a sufferer of pain’] and to experience [‘I am self-]established.’ ”

211. [Reply:] Once having understood “I am final release, painless, actionless, desireless, and [self-]established,” how can one still accept such a contradictory meaning?

212. [Objection:] “You have to explain how it is that I experience that [I] have desire and action, and am not [self-]established, although I am not so.”

213. [Reply:] That [point] may indeed be questioned about [but] not the experience that [one is] in final release. It is a thing which is contradicted by means of valid knowledge which is questionable.

214. The [experience] that I am in final release results from means of knowledge other [than perception, namely the sentence] “Thou art the Existent.” It is [the experience] that [I] suffer pain which deserves to be questioned, arising as it does from fallacious perception.

215. One should be told what he asks and hopes for. The absence of pain is being asked for. How does this pain disappear from mind completely?

216. To meet this question, it must be stated what it is that removes pain. Since the Śruti are the means of knowledge there is no doubt of one’s own Ātman.

217. Therefore the sacred word of the Śruti brings about the realization that one’s Ātman is in final release. It should be accepted that [this sacred word] has this meaning, since there is no evidence to the contrary.

218. No Awareness of Ātman other than this is possible, since the Śruti says, “It is not known by those who [say they] understand It” (Kena Up. II,3) [and] “[By what, my dear, should one know] the knower?” (Brh. Up. II,4,14).

219. The renunciation of all actions becomes the means for discriminating the meaning of the word “Thou” since there is an [Upaniṣadic] teaching, “Having become calm, self-controlled, [. . . , one sees Ātman there in oneself]” (Brh. Up. IV, 4, 23).

220. In oneself should one see Ātman, the inner Ātman which is denoted by [the word] “Thou.” Thence one sees all to be Ātman—that is, the One Apart which is meant by the sentence [“Thou art That”].

221. When the meaning of the sentence, viz. that all is Ātman, has become known to one through the right means of knowledge, how can any injunction enjoin him to perform [any action], since the other means of knowledge are untrue?

222. Therefore after the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence [has been realized], there cannot be any injunction to action, since two contradictory notions, “I am Brahma” and “I am an agent,” do not [co-]exist.

223. The knowledge “I am Brahma” is not sublated by [the knowledge] “[I am] an agent” [and] “[I] have desire and am bound” which is derived from the fallacious means of knowledge.

224. When on the basis of the scripture the conviction “I am Brahma” and no other becomes firm, then the [above-mentioned erroneous] notion, like the notion that the body is Ātman, will become untenable.

225. Neither one who has come out to fearlessness from a state of fear, nor he who is still making efforts to do so, would seek, if he is independent, to go back to the state of fear.

226. Having been awakened from the ignorance as to the meanings of the words, and seeking for the realization of the meaning of the sentence, how should one come to follow his desires, when renunciation, etc., have been enjoined [on such a man]?

227. Therefore everything has been established which we have said above.

228. Certainly nobody strives towards something in which he has no interest. Why should a seeker of final release make any effort, since he has no interest in the three worlds?2140
229. Even if suffering from hunger, one certainly does not want to take poison. Nobody whose hunger has been appeased by sweet food knowingly wants to take poison unless he is a fool.141

230. Salutation to this good teacher who, like a bee, has collected for us from the flowers of the Upaniṣadic sentences the best honey of the nectar of knowledge.142

Notes

141 Cf. Upad II,2,95 f.
142 Rāmatirtha interprets “gūra gṛjyā” as “paramguru.” The epithet “paramguru” is traditionally applied to Gauḍāpatha, the author of Gūra, whom the tradition regards as the teacher of Śaṅkara’s teacher Govinda. Bodhanidhi interprets “gūra gṛjyā” as “sarvagurur api gariyase,” which does not indicate any particular person.

143 “Vajra” (thunderbolt) is a weapon of Indra who stands in the first rank among the gods in the Veda. Nearly one-fourth of the total number of hymns in the Rigveda is dedicated to him. Having drunk soma juice, he overcomes Vṛtra, the demon of darkness (see Sama Vedic Mythology, reprinted ed. Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1963), pp. 54–66. The word vajra seems to be connected with the word yatindra (an Indra of ascetics) in the present stanza (pāda 4).

144 “You” (vyām) denotes the object, viz. non-Atman, in contrast with “I” (āham, asmi), namely the subject, Atman. See note 1 to Chap. II, p. 108.

145 Cf. Upd I,14,17; 18,46; 18,114; II,2,109.

146 Rāmatirtha interprets dhyanat as gamadīrmanukṣitamsamāparatāḥ; Anandajīna, as mantrabijaksaradhyanadyatha gayatryadijapat.

147 Rāmatirtha supplies here: ekākād atmatattvahamamātreṇa; Anandajīna, okṣyākātīvīṣṭeṣāt.

148 Śaṅkara recognizes the significance of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) but stresses that the knowledge of Brahman-Atman is attained only through the Śruti (Upad I,11,9; 18,217, etc.). The Śruti is infallible, but any other means of knowledge than that is fallacious (prasamkhyājñeya, Stanza 223; prasamkhyājñeya, Stanza 216). See Introduction, III,C,1, pp. 46–49.

151 Cf. Upd I,1,12,17.
152 This objection, which ends at stanza 11, seems to be made by the Mīmāṃsākās. See the next note. Cf. Upd I,18,11–11; 18,183.

The word prasamkhyā is used as a synonym of prasamabhāya (see stanza 12). In his work Sureśvarā makes an opponent define prasamabhāya as: “Mentally going over the meaning of such Śruti sayings as ‘Thou art That’ and the reasoning based on the method of agreement and contrariety” (tattvamasyādi dīdhrthābhāvamayaśāya bhāyāntyājaya bhuddhyameśaḥ). It is also said that when properly performed, prasamabhāya generates perfect knowledge through the increase of knowledge (iśī). Like Śaṅkara Sureśvara rejects prasamabhāya. Cf. Nāsi I,67; III,88–93; 123–126; Brh. Up. Vārttika I,818–848; III,796–961; Uuters, pp. 2005–2006; T.M.P. Mahadevan, Sureśvarā-Vārttika of Sureśvarā (Madras: University of Madras, 1958), pp. xxi–xxiii. In his Brahmasiddhi I, 18) Metropolitan Part

Maṇḍanaṁiśra does not explicitly advocate the doctrine of prasamabhāya. However, he uses the expression “prasamabhāyaśāvatā karmāṇi” (Brahmasiddhi, p. 33, line 11) and seems to hold the same idea, calling it upāsāṇa (see Brahmasiddhi, p. 55, and p. 134). It is said that the doctrine of prasamabhāya is one of the instances in which Vācaspatsi, who is the author of the Bhāmati, commentary on the CBSB, is made responsible by later Advaitins for a view which was originally set forth by Maṇḍanaṁiśra, which he simply revised and read into Śaṅkara’s CBSB. See Brahmasiddhi, pp. xxv–xxvi; S.S. Suryanarayana Sastrī and C. Kunhān Rājā, The Bhāmati of Vācaspatsi (Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1933), pp. xxxix–xl and its footnote; A. J. Alston (tr.), The Nāsi Karmas Siddhi of Śrī Sureśvarā (London: Shanti Sanāti, 1959), p. 197. As is clear in the Upad, Śaṅkara rejects prasamabhāya, but he recommends puriṣamabhāya, though he says that the former is not known; and an illustration of the latter appears in Upad II,3. Cf. Phb I,5,29, p. 24.

153 Anandajīna interprets “two” (dvaya) as “labdhanuṣṭhana” and “śukṣmaṇuṣṭhana”; Bodhanidhi, as “yuktivadaśāṃthayā”; Rāmatirtha, as “yuktivadaśāṃthayā.” Cf. the previous stanza. Śaṅkara recognizes the necessity of reasoning and Vedic teachings (see stanza 4) but not of prasamabhāya.

154 Anandajīna and Rāmatirtha supply “ed,” after “pratidgatate,” but Bodhanidhi reads “jatu” for “tathā.”

155 What has been heard (śruta) may stand for “labdha” (verbal testimony, especially Śruti), which constitutes one of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa).

156 Cf. Śvet. Up. VI,11; Upd I,11,6; 13,19.

157 In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system “upadādhī” (perception) and “jñāna” (knowledge) are synonyms for “suddhi” and “prāptaja” (Nyāyaśāstra I,1,15; Viśīśṭāsaṃkhyā 8,1,1). According to them knowledge is a quality of Atman substance. The Bhūdāyat and the Mīmāṃsākās commonly characterize knowledge as an activity. Śaṅkara rejects both theories and asserts that knowledge or perception is Atman itself or the nature of Atman. See Introduction, III,B,3, pp. 38–40.


160 See stanza 71.

161 See Introduction, IV,C, pp. 75–76.

162 See Manu IV,130; Tārākāvyaprāvatī I,152. This view is refuted later at stanza 41.

163 This view is refuted at stanza 42. See Introduction, IV,C, pp. 75–76.

164 Cf. BS II,3,45; BhG XV,7. It is reported that Bhārtṛprapātica held this view. Cf. Nakamura III, p. 172. This theory is rejected in GK III,7. See Introduction, IV,C, pp. 75–76.
The idea that the individual \textit{ātman} is a modification (\textit{vikāra}) of the highest \textit{ātman} is said to have been held generally by early Vedānta philosophers such as Bhārtrhari (see Śāṅkara \textit{adh. Brh. Up.} IV, 3, 7, p. 560). See Nakamura III, pp. 632-633. See Introduction, IV,C, pp. 75-76. This theory is refuted in \textit{GK} III, 7.

This opinion is refuted at stanzas 45, 47, and 48.

\textit{Ānandajñāna} and Rāmārāthi attribute this opinion to the \textit{Bhāṭya} school of \textit{Mīmāṃsā}.

According to \textit{Ānandajñā}na and Rāmārāthi this is the theory of the \textit{Prāṇaṇīkās}.

This problem is taken up again in stanzas 44 ff.

See Upad I,17,33.

Rāhu is said to be first referred to in the \textit{Atharvaveda} (XIX,9,10). Chānd. Up. VIII,13 refers to the eclipse of the moon. This legend (see Upad I,17, 33) was developed especially in the \textit{Purāṇas}.


\textit{Mīmāṃsā}. This problem is taken up again in stanzas 44 ff.

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88See Pāṇini I,4.49. Cf. stanza 132 below.

89Cf. Upad I,15.48; 16.4; 18.65.

90The object of perception (viśeṣa, stanza 118), the instrument (karaṇa, stanza 119), and the knower (jñātā, stanza 120).

91As for this simile, see Upad I,17.16.

92See stanza 151.

93Cf. the second and sixth chapters of the Metrical Part.

94Anandajīna and Rāmatīrtha regard this as referring to the Śūnyavādins.

95V. J. Alston suggests that this is a reference to Prabhāśāra or his school in his "That Thou Art," pp. 74–75.

96Apart from the Jaina and the Vaiśēṣika, and the Advaita Vedaṇḍa system, all the schools of philosophy are definitely opposed to memory (smrti) being regarded as a distinct source of knowledge. Cf. Chatterjee, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, pp. 371–376.

97This may also be true of half a stanza Tattvavaiśarādi IV,23, p.198. How¬

98This is a quotation from Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika II,354. This stanza is so famous that it is often quoted, with slight differences in rendering, by other authors, for example, Sarasadarśanaśāstra II, lines 206–7; Prakaraṇaprakāśikā, p. 141; Sarvādhyāyasūtra II,2; Saṃkhya-pravarga II, p. 272; Goyatā p. 540; Bhāṣya U. Vārttika II,4,746; Tattvavaiśārādi IV,25, p.196. However, it seems to me that this stanza is a later interpolation or that, as Bodhanidhi's commentary suggests, copies incorrectly by mistake the māla the text the stanza which a commentator originally quoted in his commentary for the purpose of clarifying stanza 141. This may also be true of a stanza (bhūtir yēṣā karakaḥ saiva karakam saivo) which, in some manuscripts and printed editions (see variant readings of which a commentator originally quoted in his commentary for the purpose of clarifying stanza 118), the instrument (bhūta) which, in some manuscripts and printed editions (see variant readings of Mayeda Upad), constitutes the first two lines of the succeeding stanza, and which is also often quoted by other authors, for example, Bh. Up. Vārttika IV,3,494; Bhāmatī II,2,20; Tattvavaiśārādi IV,20, p.195; Bodhiścintasvatropāsādkhyāta LX,6 (cf. Louis de la Val¬

99From the time of Dignāga Buddhists have accepted two different means of knowledge, sense-perception (pratītya) and inference (anumāna).

100See stanza 123.

101Cf. stanza 80.

102See stanzas 75, 87, 112–114, 154, and 156.

103See note 106.

104See Upad I,7,1 and note 1; 18.94; Introduction, III,B,2, p. 96.


106Cf. stanza 20.

107Cf. stanza 160; BS Bh 1,4,4, pp. 94–95.

108See Upad I,12.3.

109See note 114.

110This stanza appears as Nais IV,34.

111This stanza appears as Nais IV,35.


113See stanza 96.

114Vīna or Bilva is Aegle marmelos, the wood-apple tree. Its delicious fruit when unripe is used medicinally.


116Cf. note 104.

117Cf. stanzas 9–18; 192; Nais I,5.

118Girīptaka (gulīṭ or rakīṭā) is the black berry of the plant Abrus precatorius used as a weight. It also means a piece of gold of the same weight, which corresponds to 0.122 grains or 1.875 grains. Cf. Māyā VIII, 194–196; Prakāśadharśana, IV,6–10; VI,11–12; Prāṇamāṇya I,363–365; P. V. Kane, A History of Indian Literature, I, p. 1209; III, pp. 120–121 and footnote 162; G. Bühler, The Laws of Manu (SBE vol.


120See note 101.

121According to Buddhism every element of existence (dhāraṇa). Cf. Upad
XXV, 1964), p. 277, note 134. According to Jagadānanda (p. 273, note 5) gold particles are cooked in order to sanctify them for use in certain sacrifices. If stanza 192 is taken into consideration, this simile probably means that even after cooking gold particles we do not perceive them as cooked, since they have not become soft; and so sense-perception denies the fact that they have been cooked. Cf. Minānādīṭṭhīra X, 1-3; 2,1-2; Śābara's commentary on these sūtras.

138 See Upad I, 12, 3.

139 This stanza appears as Naiṣ IV, 31. See stanza 178; Introduction, III, C, 3, p. 50-53.

140 This stanza appears as Naiṣ IV, 32.

141 This stanza appears as Naiṣ IV, 33.

142 This stanza appears as Naiṣ IV, 34.

143 This prakarana and the seventeenth open and end with benedictory stanzas. For a fuller discussion of the formation of the text, see Mayeda Upad, pp. 65-68.

CHAPTER 19

ANNIHILATION OF FEVER

1. Having taken the treatment by the medicines of knowledge and dispassion, which brings about the annihilation of the fever of desires, one does not [again] come to suffer pain from the delirium of that fever of desires and the connection with the series of hundreds of bodies.

2. You [O My Mind] seek to obtain valueless things, such as the notions of "I"- and "my"-notions. Other people realize that your effort is for the sake of one other than yourself. You indeed have no knowledge of the objects, and I [who have it] have no desire to possess them. Therefore it is proper for you to be calm, O Mind!

3. As I am none other than the supreme and eternal One I am always satisfied [and] I have no desire. And being always released, I do not wish [My] welfare. O Mind, make more efforts for your tranquilization!

4. According to the Śruti it is the Ātman of both the world and us that transcends a series of the six waves of existence; it is also known by Me from the [other] means of knowledge as well. Therefore, O Mind, you make useless efforts.

5. When you have been calmed there is indeed no notion of difference, on account of which people fall into delusion through illusion, since the perception [of difference] is the cause of the rise of illusion; at the time of release from the perception [of difference], nobody has any illusion at all.

6. I am not deluded by your activity since I am by true nature enlightened, unfettered, and changeless. There is indeed no difference in our nature at an earlier and later time. Therefore, O Mind, your effort is useless.
7. As I am constant I do not become other [than I am]; if [I were] connected with changes, [I] would indeed be inconstant. I am always shining and therefore I am non-dual. Certain it is that what is falsely assumed is unreal.

8. In essence you are non-existent in this world, O Mind, since when scrutinized through reasoning [you are] found to be non-existent. Now there is no destruction of what is existent, and there is no origination of what is non-existent. Moreover, the destruction of the world results from the false assumption that the world is non-existent. Therefore you are not accepted as the existent.

9. The subject of seeing, the object of seeing, and seeing—all this is an error, since it is what you have falsely constructed. The object of seeing is not considered to be different from the Seeing. The atman in the state of deep sleep is not different from atman in the waking state.

10. And similarly false construction is also dual, since it is not a real substance, as in the familiar case of the torch circle. If there is no difference of powers of atman such as seeing, etc. nor of atman in different bodies, non-duality of atman is ascertained to be as the Srutis say.

11. And if these conscious atmans were different from one another, their destruction would certainly come about, since they would be limited and things which have differences are seen to be destructible. Moreover, the destruction of the world results from the final release of all.

12. Nobody belongs to Me and I do not belong to anybody, for I am non-dual and nothing that is falsely constructed exists. And I am not that which is falsely constructed but am established before the false construction. It is only duality that is falsely constructed.

13. Moreover, there is no false assumption of "being" or "difference" in regard to the Unborn (= Atman); so [It] is not non-existent. Furthermore, that Atman from which your false assumption proceeds is not falsely assumed since [It] was already established.

14. Whatever duality may be seen by you is certainly non-existent. That Atman is not seen by you by no means shows [Its] non-existence. That from which the false assumption of "being" or "non-being" proceeds [must itself] exist. And just as an investigation [is accepted as the cause of a conclusion], so the Non-Dual and Existent [Atman] is to be accepted as the cause of the false assumption.

15. Since [It] is the cause of [your] investigation, the Existent is [in fact] accepted by you and supposed to exist. And if It were non-existent the investigation would be given up; so [It] would remain as such. If it is not desirable [that the investigation be given up] the Existent should by all means be accepted.

16. [Objection:] "Even if [we admit for the sake of argument] that there be the Existent I would be the same as the non-existent, since It has no practical efficiency, any more than the [fabled] donkey's horn." [Reply:] But the absence of practical efficiency does not constitute a criterion of the non-existence [of a thing]. The existence of a thing is not [established] through the fact that [it has practical efficiency]. Conversely, [if a thing has no practical efficiency], it is not [therefore established] that [it] is otherwise [than existent].

17. Moreover, [that is] because [your argument, viz. that the Existent has no practical efficiency] is not established, since [the Existent] is the [very] cause of [your] investigation, and duality is emitted from It through [Its] Maya. [The Existent] is thus established through the Srutis, the Smrtis, and reasoning. But otherwise [It] is not reasonably [established].

18. Furthermore, as the Srutis say, the Non-dual is different in Its nature from any false assumption, and [that is also] because It is established before [there is any] false assumption. And similarly what has been falsely assumed is also negated here [in this sentence], "Not thus! Not so!", in order to establish the remainder (= Atman).

19. Though [It] is thus not what is falsely assumed, [but is] unborn, non-dual, and non-perishable, people always undergo birth, old age, and death, which arise from the illusion of their own mind, falsely assuming [It] to be "being" and "non-being."

20. If the birth of a thing were not [itself] without birth, there would be regressus ad infinitum; [in other words] this brith would have another [and that one yet another . . . ]. Otherwise, there is no birth [at all], since [if the existent were to have been born] the existent would have been non-existent, and [if the non-existent
were to be born] the non-existent would be existent. And there is neither action [of birth] nor [its] agent. Therefore [everything] is unborn.\(^{17}\)

21. If the agent [of birth] is taken to be [something] devoid of action [and] no more than that, [then] there is surely no [thing] which is not an agent of [birth]. [But in fact] there is no [agent at all], because [if the agent were the existent, it would create everything] since the [merely] existent has no particularity, and [if the agent is the non-existent, then too it would create everything] since the non-existent [has no particularity] if [the non-existent is taken to be] the destruction of the existent, and because no [cause and effect relation] is determinable, as in the case of the two ends of a balance beam [moving up and down].

22. If it is unacceptable that the existent becomes the non-existent and vice versa, how could birth take place, when the existent and the non-existent are [firmly] fixed? These two are fixed in isolation [from each other]. Therefore, O Mind, nothing existent and nothing non-existent could produce any effect relation, and because no [cause and effect] is determinable, as in the case of the two ends of a balance beam [moving up and down].

23. Even if I should, at your desire, admit your birth, I still declare that your activity is of no use to Me. There is neither loss nor gain [for Me] since what is non-existent is born neither of itself nor of something else. Even if there were both [loss and gain your activity would still be of no use to Me].

24. Things constant are not connected with things inconstant; neither things constant nor things inconstant are connected with each other. Therefore it is not reasonable that there is any effect of one upon another, and so it is to be accepted that nothing belongs to anything else. And the Truth Itself is not within the range of etymological explanation of words.

25. Therefore the wise man, examining by means of reasoning and the \textit{Srūtis} [the \textit{Ātman}] which is the same [in all beings], ever radiant, and free from duality which is falsely assumed to be "being" or "non-being," goes to the perfect \textit{Nirvāṇa} \(^{18}\) (extinction) as a lamp [is extinguished].

26. A man who is not possessed by the attributes [of \textit{Brahman}], scrutinizing in the above manner the One, the Attributeless, which is not seen by those who know the identity [of \textit{Ātman} with \textit{Brahman}] but is easily seen by the bad logician, \(^{19}\) does not undergo
delusion since he is released from the fault of being possessed [by the attributes].

27. It is not acceptable that [the fault of] being possessed [by attributes] is destroyed in no other way than this. Only [the fault of] being possessed is the cause of the notion due to delusion. Just as fire with no more fuel, so also [the fault of] being possessed, which is without cause, comes to the ultimate extinction.

28. Salutation to the teachers who churned out from the ocean of the \textit{Veda} what they held to be supreme, this knowledge, as the gods, the great souls, [churned] out from the great ocean the elixir of immortality.\(^{20}\)

Notes

\(^{1}\) All the commentators consider this the view of the Sāṃkhya and interpret "\textit{para}" as \textit{purusa}. Cf. \textit{Śāṅkara}ḍaśāra 51; 36; 37; 56; 57; 58; 60.

\(^{2}\) See Upad I,14,12; 18,123; 18,203.

\(^{3}\) The \textit{Srūti} and \textit{pāṇjy} according to the three commentators.

\(^{4}\) See BkG II,15 and \textit{Śāṅkara}'s commentary on it. Cf. GK III,28.

\(^{5}\) \textit{Dharmasāra} here may mean "duality." Cf. GK III,29.

\(^{6}\) My text reads \textit{tathādhyog}, but it should be corrected to \textit{tathā duṣyak}.

\(^{7}\) See GK IV,50; \textit{dravyavāddhānyogat}, which \textit{Śāṅkara} interprets as \textit{nastutothbhāt} in his \textit{GKBh}.

\(^{8}\) This (\textit{alatāsakara}) is a circle which is seen when one whirls a torch in the air. In Buddhist texts (e.g. \textit{Lahākārā} [ed. by B. Nanjo. Bibliotheca Otaniensis, vol. I, Kyoto, 1923], p. 32 etc.) this simile is used to illustrate the unreality of the phenomenal world. The fourth chapter of the \textit{GK} is entitled "Quenching of the Torch" (\textit{Alatāsātātā}) and it is an important idea in the \textit{GK}. The simile is also used in the \textit{Maitri Up.} (VI, 24) and the \textit{Mahābhāṣya} (III,2,124; 125) but in a different sense.


\(^{10}\) \textit{Rāmatīrtha} quotes \textit{Taitt}. Ā 3,14; \textit{Īg-Veda} X,114,5; Kath. Up. V,9 in this context.

\(^{11}\) The \textit{Buddhist}.

\(^{12}\) The word \textit{anarthavattva} is interpreted as \textit{arthakriyātukata} by \textit{Ānandajīhara}, as \textit{arthakriyāpārāhāra} by \textit{Bodhanidhi}, and as \textit{arthakriyāpatīta} by \textit{Rāmatīrtha}. The \textit{Śaṅkara} and \textit{Vijñānavādin} logicians such as \textit{Dignāga} and \textit{Dharmakīrti} regard \textit{arthakriyā} (practical efficiency) as a criterion of existence. See, for example, \textit{Rāmatīrtha} I,12–15. According to the \textit{Advaita Vedānta} \textit{Ātman} is actionless (\textit{ākriya}), changeless, and eternal (\textit{kītasthānani}). Therefore \textit{Buddhist} assert that that \textit{Ātman} is not existent, since it has no practical efficiency. Cf. S. \textit{Dasgupta}, \textit{A History of Indian Philosophy}, vol. I, pp. 117–118; p. 154; note 1; Th. \textit{Schoberzky}, \textit{Buddhist Logic}, vol. II (Reprint ed. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), p. 7, note 2; pp. 120–121, note 6.

\(^{13}\) See stanzas 14 and 15.
The three commentators interpret this line quite differently. Bodhanidhi takes “oaste” viz. Atman as the subject of the sentence: prasiddhyati . . . yujyate . . . Anandajñāna takes “brahma jagaddhutuśtam” as the subject of the sentence with the verb prasiddhyati; and “brahma jagaddhutuśtam hitaś” as anyathā; and “pradhanāder jagaddhutuśtam” as the subject of the verb yujyate. Rāmatirtha takes “iṭham kṛṣṭhayapāpy artha-kṛṣṭhyādityo” as the subject of the verb prasiddhyati; “paramāṭhatoḥ” as anyathā; and “artha-kṛṣṭhyādityo hitaya kṣaṇikassyāt” as the subject of the verb yujyate.

The idea that nothing is born (ajñāti) constitutes a central theme of the third and the fourth chapters of the GK, which often depends upon arguments of the Mādhyānikas and the Viśiṣṭādhyāna. Cf. Nakamura III, pp. 613–654; T. M. P. Mahadevan, Gaudapāda (Madras: University of Madras, 1952), pp. 128–147. Stanza 20 here seems also to prove this theory by means of arguments similar to those in the GK, but they (especially stanza 21) are so brief and obscure that my translation has had to be largely based upon the commentaries, which themselves differ in the interpretation of these stanzas.

The term “nirvāṇa,” which is important in Buddhism but does not occur in the early Upaniṣads at all, is used as “sasāya” in GK III, 47.

This is a famous legend (amṛtamanthana) which is narrated, with some variations, in the Rāmāyaṇa, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas. Cf. Upad I, 17, 33 and note 27; K. Rüping, Amṛtamanthana und Kūraṇ-Assāṭa (Wiesbaden, 1970).
1. Now we shall explain how to teach the means to final release for the benefit of seekers thereafter with faith and desire.

2. The means to final release is knowledge [of Brahma]. It should be repeatedly related to the pupil until it is firmly grasped, if he is dispassionate toward all things non-eternal which are attained by means [other than knowledge]\(^1\); if he has abandoned the desire for sons, wealth, and worlds\(^8\) and reached the state of a paramahansa wandering ascetic\(^9\); if he is endowed with tranquility, self-control, compassion, and so forth\(^4\); if he is possessed of the qualities of a pupil\(^5\) which are well known from the scriptures; if he is a Brahmin\(^6\) who is [internally and externally] pure\(^7\); if he approaches his teacher in the prescribed manner\(^8\); if his caste, profession, behavior, knowledge [of the Veda],\(^9\) and family have been examined.

3. The Śruti also says:

"Having scrutinized [the worlds that are built up by action, a Brahmin should arrive at indifference. . . . For the sake of this knowledge let him go, with fuel in hand, to a spiritual teacher who is learned in the scriptures and established in Brahman. To him who has approached properly, whose thought is calm, who has reached tranquility, the man of knowledge teaches] in its very truth that knowledge of Brahman [by which he knows the Imperishable]" (Mund. Up. I,2,12-13);

for when knowledge [of Brahman] is firmly grasped, it is conducive to one's own beatitude and to the continuity [of knowledge of Brahman]. And the continuity of knowledge [of Brahman] is helpful to people, as a boat [is helpful] to one wishing to get across a river. The scripture also says:
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II, 1, 4-6

[Verily, a father may teach this Brahman to his eldest son or to a worthy pupil, but to no one else at all.] Even if one should offer him this [earth] that is encompassed by water and filled with treasure, [he should say,] 'This, truly, is more than that' (Chāṇḍ. Up. III,11,[5]-6), since knowledge of Brahman is not obtained in any other way [than from a teacher] according to passages from the Śruti and the Smṛti such as:

"One who has a teacher knows . . ." (Chāṇḍ. Up. VI,14,2);
"The knowledge which has been learned from a teacher [best helps to attain his end" (Chāṇḍ. Up. IV,9,3);
"A teacher is a boatman; his [right] knowledge is called a boat here."10

4. When [the teacher] finds from some indications that the pupil has not grasped [this] knowledge, he should remove the causes which hinder his grasping it—demerit, worldly laxity, absence of firm preliminary learning concerning the discrimination between things eternal and non-eternal, care about what other people think, pride of caste and the like—by the means contrary to those causes and enjoined by the Śruti and the Smṛti, that is to say, non-anger, etc., non-injury and other abstentions, and the observances which are not contradictory to knowledge.

5. He should also let [him] properly achieve the virtues such as modesty which are the means to attain knowledge.

6. And the teacher is able to consider the pros and cons [of an argument], is endowed with understanding, memory, tranquility, self-control, compassion, favor and the like; he is versed in the traditional doctrine; not attached to any enjoyments, visible or invisible, he has abandoned all the rituals and their requisites; a knower of Brahman, he is established in Brahman; he leads a blameless life, free from faults such as deceit, pride, trickery, wickedness, fraud, jealousy, falsehood, egotism, self-interest, and so forth; with the only purpose of helping others he wishes to make use of knowledge.20

First of all, he should teach the Śrutis which are concerned primarily with the oneness of Ātman [with Brahman], for example:

"In the beginning, my dear, this universe was the Existent only, one alone, without a second" (Chāṇḍ. Up. VI,2,1);
"Where one sees nothing else, [hears nothing else, understands nothing else—that is the Fullness]" (Chāṇḍ. Up. VII,24,1);
"Ātman, indeed, is this all" (Chāṇḍ. Up. VII,25,2);
"Brahman, indeed, is this all" (Brh. Up. II,5,1)?
"Ātman, verily, was this universe, one alone, in the beginning" (Ait. Up. I,1,1);
"Verily, this all is Brahman" (Chāṇḍ. Up. III,14,1).

7. And after teaching [these Śrutis], he should help [him] by means of the Śrutis to grasp the marks indicative of Brahman, for example:

"Ātman, which is free from evil . . ." (Chāṇḍ. Up. VIII,7,1);
"[Explain to me] what the manifest, unconcealed Brahman is" (Brh. Up. III,4,1; 5,1);
"That which transcends hunger and thirst" (Brh. Up. III,5,1);
"Not Thus! Not so!" (Brh. Up. II,3,5);
"[It is] not coarse, not fine" (Brh. Up. III,8,8);
"This Ātman is [described as] 'not, not' " (Brh. Up. III,9,26; IV,2,4; 4,22; 5,15);
"[Verily, O Gārgī, that Imperishable is] the unseen Seer" (Brh. Up. III,8,1);
"[Brahman is] knowledge, bliss" (Brh. Up. III,9,28);
"[He who knows Brahman as the real,] as knowledge, as the infinite" (Taitt. Up. II,1);
"[For truly, when one finds fearlessness as a foundation in That (= Brahman) which is invisible, bodiless, . . . then he has reached fearlessness]" (Taitt. Up. II,7);
"This, verily, is [the great, unborn Ātman]" (Brh. Up. IV,4,22);
"[This Brahman is . . .] breathless, mindless" (Mund. Up. II,1,2);
"[This Brahman is] without and within, unborn" (Mund. Up. II,1,2);
"[This great Being . . .] is just a mass of knowledge" (Brh. Up. II,4,12);
"[This Brahman is . . .] without an inside and without an outside" (Brh. Up. II,5,19);
"It is, indeed, other than the known and than the unknown" (Kena Up. I, 3);
"Verily, what is called ‘Space’ [is the accomplisher of name-and-form]"22 (Chāṇḍ. Up. VIII,14,1)

8. [He should] also [help him grasp the marks indicative of
Brahman] by means of the Smṛtis, if they are not incompatible with the marks indicative [of Brahman] described by the Śrutis and concerned primarily with teaching that the highest Atman is not subject to transmigration and that It is identical with all—for example:

“He is not born, nor does he ever die” (BhG II,20; Kaṭh. Up. II,18);
“He does not receive [the effect of] any one’s evil” (BhG V,15);
“As [the great Wind] constantly abides in space [ . . . so all beings abide in Me]” (BhG IX, 6);
“Know also that I am the Field-Knower (= Atman)” (BhG XIII,2);
“It is called neither existent nor non-existente” (BhG XIII,12);
“Because [He] is beginningless and attributeless” (BhG XIII, 31);
 “[The supreme Lord, abiding] alike in all beings” (BhG XIII, 27);
“But there is the highest Puruṣa (= Ātman)” (BhG XV,17).

9. If the pupil who has thus grasped the marks indicative of the highest Ātman according to the Śrutis and the Smṛtis wishes to get out of the ocean of transmigratory existence, [the teacher] should ask him: “Who are you, my dear?”

10. If he answers: “I am a Brahmin’s son belonging to such and such a family. I was a student—or, I was a householder—[but] now I am a paramahamsa wandering ascetic. I wish to get out of the ocean of transmigratory existence infested with great sharks of birth and death”;

11. [then] the teacher should say: “You are right. Your view is correct. [Then] why did you say incorrectly, ‘I am a Brahmin’s son belonging to such and such a family. I was a student—or, I was a householder—but] now I am a paramahamsa wandering ascetic’?”

12. If he says: “Your Holiness, how have I spoken wrongly?”

13. [then] the teacher should reply to him: “Because, through such statements as ‘I am a Brahmin’s son belonging to such and such a family,’ you have identified the Ātman, which is free from caste, family, and purifying ceremonies, with the body, which has different caste, family, and purifying ceremonies.”

14. If he asks: “How does the body have different caste, family, and purifying ceremonies?” or, “How am I (= Ātman) free from caste, family, and purifying ceremonies?”

15. [then] the teacher should reply: “Listen, my dear, [this is] how this body, different from you (= Ātman), has different caste, family, and purifying ceremonies and how you (= Ātman) are free from caste, family, and purifying ceremonies.”

16. If he asks: “How does the body have different caste, family, and purifying ceremonies?” or, “How am I (= Ātman) free from caste, family, and purifying ceremonies?”

17. [then] the teacher should reply: “Listen, my dear, [this is] how this body, different from you (= Ātman), has different caste, family, and purifying ceremonies and how you (= Ātman) are free from caste, family, and purifying ceremonies.”

Thereupon [the teacher] should remind him: “You should remember, my dear, that you have been taught that the highest Ātman, the Ātman of all, is endowed with the marks described above according to such Śruti and Smṛti passages as:

‘[In the beginning,] my dear, this universe was the Existent only, [one alone, without a second]’ (Chānd. Up. VI,2,1) and that you have also been taught the marks indicative of the highest Ātman according to Śruti and Smṛti passages.”

18. When [the pupil] has recalled to mind the marks indicative
of the highest \textit{Atman}, [the teacher] should tell him [in answer to his first question]: "This [highest \textit{Atman}] which is called `Space'\textsuperscript{38} is something different from name-and-form,\textsuperscript{34} bodiless,\textsuperscript{35} characterized as `not coarse,'\textsuperscript{36} etc., and as `free from evil,'\textsuperscript{37} etc. It is not afflicted with any attributes of transmigratory existence; 

`[Explain to me] what the manifest, unconcealed Brahman is, . . . It is your \textit{Atman}, which is within everything' (Brh. Up. III,4,1).

It is `the unseen Seer, the unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the unknown Knower' (Brh. Up. III,7,23).

It is of the nature of eternal knowledge, `without an inside and without an outside' (Brh. Up. II,5,19), `just a mass of knowledge' (Brh. Up. II,4,12).

It is all-pervading like ether, possessed of infinite power, the \textit{Atman} of all, free from hunger, etc.,\textsuperscript{38} and free from appearance and disappearance.\textsuperscript{39} This [highest \textit{Atman}] is the Evolver of the unevolved name-and-form merely by being existent since It is possessed of inconceivable power. The unevolved name-and-form\textsuperscript{40} is different in essence from this [\textit{Atman}] and it is the seed of the world, abiding in It, indescribable as this or something else,\textsuperscript{41} and known to It.

19. `[Originally] unevolved, this name-and-form took the name-and-form\textsuperscript{42} of `ether' in the course of its evolution from this very \textit{Atman}. And in this manner this element named `ether' arose from the highest \textit{Atman}\textsuperscript{43} as dirty foam from clear water.\textsuperscript{44} Foam is neither [identical with] water nor absolutely different from water since it is not seen without water. But water is clear and different from foam which is of the nature of dirt. Likewise, the highest \textit{Atman} is different from name-and-form which corresponds to foam; \textit{Atman} is pure, clear, and different in essence from it. This name-and-form, [originally] unevolved, took the name-and-form of `ether,' which corresponds to foam, in the course of its evolution.

20. `Becoming grosser in the course of evolution, the name-and-form becomes air\textsuperscript{45} from ether, fire\textsuperscript{46} from air, water\textsuperscript{47} from fire, earth\textsuperscript{48} from water. In this order each preceding [element] entered each succeeding one and the five gross elements, [ether, air, fire, water, and] earth, came into existence. Consequently earth is characterized by the qualities of the five gross elements.\textsuperscript{49} And from earth, rice, barley, and other plants consisting of the five elements are produced; from them, when they are eaten, blood and sperm are produced, related respectively to the bodies of women and men. Both blood and sperm, produced by churning with the churning stick of sexual passion driven by nescience\textsuperscript{50} and sanctified with sacred formulas,\textsuperscript{51} are poured into the womb at the proper time.\textsuperscript{52} Through the penetration of fluid from the womb, they become an embryo and it is delivered in the ninth or tenth month.\textsuperscript{53}

21. When it is born it obtains its name-and-form, sanctified with sacred formulas by means of a birth ceremony\textsuperscript{54} and other [purifying ceremonies]. Again it obtains the name of a student through the performance of the purifying ceremony for initiation.\textsuperscript{55} This same body obtains the name of a householder\textsuperscript{56} through the performance of the purifying ceremony for union with a wife.\textsuperscript{57} This same body obtains the name of an ascetic\textsuperscript{58} through the purifying ceremony of becoming a forest-dweller. This same body obtains the name of a wandering ascetic\textsuperscript{59} through the purifying ceremony which ends the ritual actions. Thus the body is different from you (= \textit{Atman}) and is possessed of different caste, family, and purifying ceremonies.

22. The mind and the sense organs consist only of name-and-form according to the \textit{Sruti} such as:

`For, my dear, the mind consists of food'\textsuperscript{60} (Chand. Up. VI,5,4; 6,5; 7,6).

23. `[The second question you asked me earlier was,] `How am I (= \textit{Atman}) free from caste, family, and purifying ceremonies?' Listen to what [I am going to say]. The Evolver (= the highest \textit{Atman}) of name-and-form, by nature different in essence from name-and-form, created this body in the course of evolving name-and-form. And [the Evolver] entered the name-and-form [of the body], itself being free from the duties of purifying ceremonies. Itself unseen by others, [the Evolver] is seeing; unheard, It is hearing; unthought, It is thinking; unknown, It is knowing.\textsuperscript{62} `The wise one who having distinguished all forms and having created [their] names, sits calling' (Taitt. A. III,12,7).

There are thousands of \textit{Sruti} passages which have this same meaning, for example:

`Having created it, It, indeed, entered into it' (Taitt. Up.II,6,1);

`The Ruler of the creatures entered into [them]' (Taitt. A. III, 11,1);
‘It entered here, [even to the fingertips]’ (Brh. Up. I,4,7);
‘It is your Atman, [which is in everything]’ (Brh. Up. III,4,1; 5,1);
‘So, cleaving asunder this very top of the skull, It entered by that door’ (Ait. Up. I,3,12);
‘Though It is hidden in all things, that Atman [does not shine forth]’ (Kath. Up. II,II,12);
‘That divinity thought, “Come! Let me [enter] these three divinities heat, water, and food) with this living Atman and evolve name-and-form” ’ (Chand. Up. VI,3,2);
‘[Atman which is] the bodiless among bodies’ (Kath. Up. II,12).

24. “There are also Smṛti passages [which have this same meaning], for example:
‘Atman is truly all gods’ (Manu XII, 119);
‘The embodied Atman in the city of nine gates’ (BhG V, 13);
‘Know also that I am the Field-Knower (= Atman)’ (BhG XIII,2);
‘[The supreme Lord abiding] alike in all beings’ (BhG XIII, 27);
‘The onlooker and consenter, [the highest Atman . . . is also declared to be the highest Puruṣa, in this body]’ (BhG XIII, 22);
‘But there is the highest Puruṣa, different [from this]’ (BhG XV, 17).

It is, therefore, established that you (= Atman) are free from caste, family, and purifying ceremonies.’

25. If he says: “I am one [and] He is another; I am ignorant, I experience pleasure and pain, am bound and a transmigrant [whereas] He is essentially different from me, the god not subject to transmigration. By worshipping Him with oblations, offerings, homage, and the like and through the [performance of] the actions prescribed for [my] class and stage of life, I wish to get out of the ocean of transmigratory existence. How am I He?”

26. [then] the teacher should reply: “My dear, you should not hold such a view since it is prohibited to understand that [Atman] is different [from Brahman].”

[The pupil may say:] “How is it prohibited to understand that [Atman] is different [from Brahman]?”

Then the teacher replies:

“‘So whoever worships another divinity [than his Atman], thinking that He is one and I another, he does not know’ (Brh. Up. I,4,10);
‘Brahmanhood has deserted him who knows Brahmanhood as different from Atman’ (Brh. Up. II,4,6);
‘He who thinks he sees manifoldness in this world attains death after death’ (Brh. Up. IV,4,19).

27. “These Śrutis passages indeed reveal that transmigratory existence results from the understanding that [Atman] is different [from Brahman].

28. “And thousands [of Śrutis passages] reveal that final release results from the realization of the identity [of Atman and Brahman]. [For example, through the statement,]
‘That is Atman, Thou art That’ (Chānd. Up. VI, 8,7, etc.), [the Śrutis] establish that [Atman] is the highest Atman (= Brahman). Then [they] state,
‘One who has a teacher knows’ (Chānd. Up. VI,14,2), and [they] show final release with the words,
‘He is delayed only until [he is freed from bondage of ignorance; then he will arrive at his final goal]’ (Chānd. Up. VI,14,2).

With the simile about the [man] who was not a thief and [therefore] not burned [in the ordeal of the heated axe, the Śrutis] teach that he who covers himself with truth does not undergo transmigratory existence since he knows that [Atman] is identical [with Brahman]; [on the other hand], with the simile about the[man] who was a thief and was [therefore] burned, [the Śrutis] teach that he who covers himself with the untruth undergoes transmigratory existence since [he holds] the view that [Atman] is different [from Brahman].”

29. “And with such [similes] as,
‘Whatever they are in this world, whether tiger or [lion . . . mosquito, they become That Existent]’ (Chānd. Up. VI,9,3), [the Śrutis] say that because of the view of the identity [of Atman with Brahman]
And with the words,
‘But they who know otherwise than this are ruled by another; theirs are perishable worlds’ (Chānd. Up. VII, 25, 2), the Śrutis [continue to] teach that on account of the contrary view,
the view that \( \text{Atman} \) is different from \( \text{Brahman} \), he undergoes transmigratory existence. This is what is taught in every school of the \( \text{Veda} \). So you were indeed wrong in saying, 'I (= \( \text{Atman} \) am) a Brahmin's son belonging to such and such a family'; I (= \( \text{Atman} \) am) a transmigrator, essentially different from the highest \( \text{Atman} \).

30. 'For the above reason it is prohibited [by the \( \text{Srutis} \)] to hold the view that \( \text{Atman} \) is different [from \( \text{Brahman} \)]; use of the rituals is [made] in the sphere of [the view] that \( \text{Atman} \) is different [from \( \text{Brahman} \)]; and the sacred thread and the like are requisites for the rituals. Therefore, it should be known that the use of rituals and their requisites is prohibited, if the identity [of \( \text{Atman} \)] with the highest \( \text{Atman} \) is realized, since [the use of] rituals and their requisites such as the sacred thread is contradictory to the realization of the identity [of \( \text{Atman} \)] with the highest \( \text{Atman} \). [The use of] rituals and their requisites such as the sacred thread is indeed enjoined upon a transmigrator [but] not upon one who holds the view of the identity [of \( \text{Atman} \)] with the highest \( \text{Atman} \); and the difference [of \( \text{Atman} \)] from It is merely due to the view that \( \text{Atman} \) is different [from \( \text{Brahman} \)].

31. 'If rituals were to be performed and it were not desirable to abandon them, [the \( \text{Srutis} \)] would not declare in such unambiguous sentence as,

'That is \( \text{Atman} \), Thou art That' (Chänd. Up. VI, 8,7, etc.), that the highest \( \text{Atman} \), unrelated to the rituals, their requisites, and such factors of the rituals as castes and stages of life, should be realized to be identical with [the inner] \( \text{Atman} \); nor would [the \( \text{Srutis} \)] condemn the realization that \( \text{Atman} \) is different [from \( \text{Brahman} \)], [in passages] such as,

'This is the constant greatness of the knower of \( \text{Brahman} \); it does not increase nor decrease by action' (Brh. Up. IV,4,23);

'He is unaffected by good, unaffected by evil, [for then he has transcended all sorrows of the heart]' (Brh. Up. IV,3,22);

'In this state a thief is no thief [. . . a mendicant no mendicant, an ascetic no ascetic]' (Brh. Up. IV,3,22).

32. 'The \( \text{Srutis} \) would not declare that \( \text{Atman} \) is by nature unrelated to the rituals, by nature unconnected with the class and other factors of the rituals, if it were not desirable that the rituals and such requisites of the rituals as the sacred thread be abandoned completely. Therefore, the seeker after final release should abandon the ritual together with its requisites since [they] are contradictory to the view of the identity [of \( \text{Atman} \)] with the highest \( \text{Atman} \). And [he] should realize that [his] \( \text{Atman} \) is the highest \( \text{Atman} \) since It has characteristics stated [about \( \text{Brahman} \)] by the \( \text{Srutis} \).

33. If [the pupil] says: 'Your Holiness, when the body is burned or cut, I (= \( \text{Atman} \) evidently perceive pain and I evidently experience suffering from hunger, etc. But in all the \( \text{Srutis} \) and the \( \text{Srutis} \) the highest \( \text{Atman} \) is said to be

'free from evil, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, hungerless, thirstless' (Chänd. Up. VIII,1,5),

free from all attributes of transmigratory existence. I (= \( \text{Atman} \)) am different in essence from It and bound up with many attributes of transmigratory existence. How then can I realize that the highest \( \text{Atman} \) is [my] \( \text{Atman} \) and that I, a transmigrator, am the highest \( \text{Atman} \)?—it is as if I were to hold that fire is cold! Though I am [now] a transmigrator, I am entitled to the means of [attaining] all prosperity and beatitude. How then should I abandon the rituals and their requisites such as the sacred thread which lead [me] to prosperity and beatitude?'

34. [then the teacher] should answer him: 'Your statement, 'When the body is burned or cut, I (= \( \text{Atman} \) evidently perceive pain,' is not correct.'

'Why?'

'The body, like a tree which is burned [or] cut, is the object [which is perceived by the perceiver]. The pain of burning or cutting is perceived in the body, which is the object; so the pain has the same locus as the burning [or cutting], since people point out the pain of burning [or cutting] right there where [the body] is burned or cut and not in the perceiver of burning [or cutting].'

'How?'

'When a man is asked, 'Where do you have pain?'; he points to the locus where [the body] is burned [or cut] and not to the perceiver, saying, 'I have pain in the head' or 'In the chest' or 'In the stomach.' If pain or the cause of pain such as burning and cutting were located in the perceiver, he would point to [the perceiver] as the locus of pain just as [he points to a part of the body as] the locus of burning and so forth.
35. "And [pain] itself would not be perceived as the form-and-color in the eye [are not perceived by the eye]. Therefore, pain is perceived as having the same locus as burning, cutting, and so on; so pain is merely an object like burning and the like.

As [pain] is of the nature of 'becoming,'72 [it] has its substratum like the cooking of rice. The impression of pain [also] has exactly the same substratum as the pain, since [the impression of pain] is perceived only simultaneously with the recollection [of pain]. The aversion to pain and its causes also has precisely the same substratum as the impression.73 So it is said,

'Passion and aversion have, and the latent impression of form-and-color, a common substratum [the intellect], and what is perceived as fear has the intellect as its substratum; therefore, the Knower is always pure and free from fear' (Upad I,15,13).

36. [The student may ask:] "What locus do then the impressions of form-and-color and the like have?"

[Then the teacher] answers: "[The locus] where there are desire and so forth."

"Where are there these desire and the like?"

"Right in the intellect according to such Śruti passages as,

'Desire, volition, doubt, [faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, meditation, fear—all this is truly mind]' (Brh. Up. I,5,3).

Right there are also the impressions of form-and-color and the like according to the Śruti,

'And on what are the colors and forms based?—On the heart'74 (Brh. Up. III,9,20).

Impurity [such as desire and aversion] is in the object and not in Ātman [which is the subject] according to hundreds of Śruti passages as,

'The desires that are based on heart' (Brh. Up. IV,4,7; Kaṭh. Up. VI, 14);

'For [then] he has passed beyond [all sorrows of the heart]' (Brh. Up. IV,3,22);

'This [person] is without attachments' (Brh. Up. IV,3,16);

'Even this is His form that is beyond desire' (Brh. Up. IV,3,21),

and according to Smṛti passages as such,

'He is declared to be unchangeable' (BhG II, 25);

'Because [He] is beginningless and attributeless' (BhG XIII, 31); moreover,

'Desire, aversion and so on are the attributes of 'the Field,'76 i.e., the object, and not those of Ātman (BhG XIII, 6).

37. "For this reason you (= Ātman) have no relation with the impressions of form-and-color and the like; so you (= Ātman) are not different in essence from the highest Ātman. As there is no contradiction to sense-perception and other [means of knowledge], it is reasonable to realize that I (= Ātman) am the highest Ātman according to such Śruti passages as,

'It knew only Itsel,' ["I am Brahma!"'] (Brh. Up. I,4,10);

'As a unity only is It to be looked upon' (Brh. Up. IV, 4,20);

'I, indeed, am below. [I am above. . . . ]' (Chānd. Up. VII, 25, 1);

'Ātman, indeed, is below. [Ātman is behind. . . . ]' (Chānd. Up. VII, 25,2);

'One should see everything as Ātman' (Brh. Up. IV,4,23);

'Where truly everything [has become] one's own Ātman, [then whereby and whom does] one smell?' (Brh. Up. II,4,14);

'This all is what this Ātman is' (Brh. Up. II,4,6);

'That one [is without parts, immortal]' (Praś. Up. VI,5);

[This Brahma is . . . ] without an inside and without an outside' (Brh. Up. II,5,19);

'[This is] without and within, unborn' (Mūnd. Up. II,1,2);

'Brahman indeed is this [whole] world' (Mūnd. Up. II,1,2);

'[So, cleaving asunder this very top of the skull,] He entered by that door' (Ait. Up. I,3,12);

[All these, indeed, are] names of intelligence' (Ait. Up. III, 1,2);

'[He who knows Brahman as the real,] as knowledge, as the infinite' (Taitt. Up. II, 1);

'[Space] arose indeed from this [Ātman]' (Taitt. Up. II,1);

'Having created it, It indeed entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II,6,1);

'The one God, hidden in all things, [all-pervading]' (Śvet. Up. VI, 11);

'[Ātman which is] the bodiless among bodies' (Kaṭh. Up. II,22);

'[The wise one is] not born, nor dies' (Kaṭh. Up. II, 18);

['Thinking on the great all-pervading Ātman, by which one
contemplates both] the dreaming state and the waking state, [the wise man is not grieved]’ (Kaṭha. Up. IV,4);
‘One should know that It is my Ātman’ (Kauś. Udd. III,8);
‘Now, he who on all beings [looks as indeed in Ātman and on Ātman as in all beings—he does not shrink away from It]’ (Īśā Up. VI);
‘It moves. It does not move’ (Īśā Up. V);
‘Vena (the longing one?), seeing It, [knows all creatures, where all have the same nest]’ (M.N.Up. II,1,2);
‘I was Manu and the Sun’ (Brh. Up. I,4,10; Rgveda IV,26,1);
‘The Ruler of the creatures entered into [them]’ (Taitt. Ā. X,1,1);
‘[In the beginning,] my dear, [this universe was] the Existent only, [one alone, without a second]’ (Chānd. Up. VI,1,1,1);
‘[The wise see the same thing] in a learned and well-behaved Brahman, [in a cow, in an elephant, and in a mere dog, and in an outcaste]’ (BhG V,18);
‘Unmanifold in the manifold’ (BhG XVIII,20; cf. BhG XIII,16);
‘Vasudeva (= Kṛṣṇa) is all’ (BhG VII,19).”

39. If [the pupil] says: “If, your Holiness, Ātman is ‘without an inside and without an outside’ (Brh. Up. IV,5,13), ‘without and within, unborn’ (Mund. Up. II,1,2), ‘entirely a mass of knowledge’ (Brh. Up. IV,5,13), like a mass of salt, like a mass of all the varieties of forms, and homogeneous like ether, then how is it that the object, means, and agent of actions are [either actually] experienced or stated in the Śruti? This is well-known in the Śrutis and Smṛtis and among common people, and is a matter which causes differences of opinion among hundreds of disputants.”

40. [then] the teacher should reply, “It is the effect of nescience that the object, means, and agent of actions are [either actually] experienced or stated in the Śrutis; but from the standpoint of the highest truth Ātman is one alone and [only] appears as many through the vision [affected] by nescience just as the moon [appears] as many to sight [affected] by tātimra eye-disease. Duality is the effect of nescience, since it is reasonable [for the Śruti] to condemn the view that Ātman is different [from Brahma] by saying, ‘Verily, where there seems to be another, [there the one might see the other]’ (Brh. Up. IV,3,31);
‘For where there is a duality, as it were, there one sees another’ (Brh. Up. II,4,14);
‘Death after death attains he [who thinks he sees manifoldness in this world]’ (Brh. Up. IV,4,19);
‘But where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else—that is the small. . . but the small is the same as the mortal’ (Chānd. Up. VII,24,1);
‘[As, my dear, by one clod of clay everything made of clay may be understood:] the modification is a verbal distinction, a name’ (Chānd. Up. VI,1,4); [untrue];
‘[So whoever worships another divinity than his Ātman, thinking that] He is one and I another, [he does not know]’ (Brh. Up. I,4,10).

And [the same conclusion is reached] from Śruti passages which establish oneness, for example:
‘[In the beginning, my dear, this universe was the Existent only,] one alone, without a second’ (Chānd. Up. VI,2,1);
‘Where, verily, [everything has become] one’s own Ātman, then whereby and whom would one smell?’ (Brh. Up. II,4,14; cf. Brh. Up. IV,5,15);
‘[Then] what delusion, what sorrow is there [for him who perceives the oneness]’ (Īśā Up. 7).”

41. [The pupil may ask:] “If this be so, Your Holiness, for what purpose is difference in object, means, etc., of actions as well as origination and dissolution [of the world] stated in the Śruti?”
42. Then [the teacher] replies: “A man possessed of nescience, being differentiated by the body, etc., thinks that his Atman is connected with things desirable and undesirable; [and] he does not know how to distinguish the means of attaining things desirable from that of abandoning things undesirable, although he desires to attain things desirable and to abandon things undesirable by some means. The scripture gradually removes his ignorance concerning this matter, but it does not establish the difference in object, means, etc., of actions, since the difference [constitutes] transmigratory existence which is undesirable by nature. Thus [the scripture] uproots nescience which is the view that [Atman] is different [from Brahman], the root of transmigratory existence, by showing the reasonableness of the oneness of the origination, dissolution, etc. [of the world].

43. “When nescience has been uprooted by means of the Shruti, Smritis, and reasoning, the only knowledge of one who sees the highest truth\(^8\) is established right in this [Atman] that is described as follows:

1. Without an inside and without an outside’ (Brh. Up. II, 5, 19);
2. Without and within, unborn’ (Mund. Up. II,1,2);
3. Like a mass of salt\(^8\);
4. [Entirely] a mass of knowledge’ (Brh. Up. IV,5,13);
5. And the homogeneous Atman which is all-pervading like ether.

It is not reasonable that [in Atman] even a trace of impurity should arise from the difference in object and means of actions, origination and dissolution [of the world], and so forth.

44. “A man who wishes to attain this very view of the highest truth should abandon the fivefold form of desire, viz., desires for a son, wealth, and worlds,\(^8\) which result from the misconception that [his] caste, stage of life, etc., [belong to his Atman]. And as this misconception is contradictory to the right conception, the reasoning for negating the view that [Atman] is different [from Brahman] is possible; for, when the conception that the sole Atman is not subject to transmigratory existence has occurred by means of the scripture and reasoning, no contradictory conception persists [any more]; for a conception that fire is cold, or that the body is not subject to old age and death, does not exist. Therefore, since all the rituals and their requisites such as the sacred thread are the effects of nescience, they should be abandoned by him who is established in the view of the highest truth.”

Notes

\(^1\)According to the BSBh (I,1,1, pp. 36-37) the following four requirements are referred to as conditions for the study of the Vedanta: (1) discrimination between things eternal and non-eternal (nityaṁ satiṇātisatyaṁ), (2) dispersion toward the enjoyment of the things here and in the other world (ādityaṁ brāhkaḥgautaṁ), (3) the attainment of the means such as tranquility and self-control (ānandaṁ dīrghaṁ kṣantānasmac), and (4) being a seeker after final release (sammukhyena). The condition stated in the Upad that one must be dispassionate toward all things non-eternal which are attained by means other than knowledge seems to correspond to the first requirement mentioned above (cf. note 2), which is also referred to in Upad II,1,4. Such conditions for the study of the Vedanta are again mentioned in Upad I,13,27; 16,72; 17,52; 17,85; 17,86. As for the qualifications of a teacher, see section 6, below, and also Introduction, IV,F, pp. 90-91. Cf. Vedāntaśāstra [IV] 4-27; P. Deussen, The System of the Vedānta, pp. 79-82.

\(^2\)Brh. Up. III,5,1 reads: “Having known that Atman, Brahmins overcome desire for sons (putrīṣṇaṁ), desire for wealth (niṣṭhaṁ) and desire for worlds (lokīṣṇaṁ) and live the life of mendicants.” Cf. Brh. Up. IV,4,22; Śāntkara ad Brh. Up. III,5,1; IV,4,22. The compound ṭyakeṭputrīṣṇaṁlokīṣṇaṁ is also used in Gbh II,55, p. 65. Here “worlds” means three worlds, etc. the world of men (maṇḍalaṁloka), of the fathers (piṭṭīloka), and of the gods (devoloka). According to Śāntkara the world of men is obtained by means of the son alone, that of the fathers by means of actions (karman), and that of the gods by means of the lower knowledge, namely by means of meditation and worship of Brahman as a personal god. These three worlds are non-eternal and should be abandoned by the seekers after final release. Cf. Brh. Up. I,5,16; Upad I,18,228; II,11,14. This condition seems to correspond to the second requirement for the study of the Vedānta (see note 1).

\(^3\)The life of a Brahmin is divided into four stages (ātmanas), namely that of the student (brahmaśtriṇa), of the householder (gṛhasthaḥ), of the forest-dweller (vanapattaḥ), and of the ascetic (saṁghaḥ). In many works ascetics are classified into four groups, namely kṣatriya, bhārataka, kṣaṇa, and paramaṁ kṣaṇa. Each succeeding one is higher than each preceding one. The paramaṁ kṣaṇa ascetic always stays under a tree, in an uninhabited house, or in a burial place. He begs alms from persons of all castes. He regards all as Atman. For a detailed description, see P. V. Kane, History of Dharmāstau, vol. II-I, pp. 990 f. Cf. notes 6; 26.

\(^4\)The attainment of these virtues constitutes the third condition for the study of the Vedanta (see note 1). This condition is based upon Brh. Up. IV,4,23, which reads: “He who knows thus becomes tranquil, self-controlled, withdrawn, patient, and collected . . .”

\(^5\)What Śāntkara means by “the qualities of a pupil” is not certain. Cf. Upad I,16,72; 17,52; 17,87. Ānandajñana refers to BhG XIII,7, which mentions the following virtues: absence of pride (ān进而), absence of deceit (adyamādibhūtaṁ), non-injury (ahimsa), patience (śrotritam), uprightness (śṛṣṭvam), service to the teacher (deśparaṁśa), and self-control (ātmavinsmītrata). Rāmānūtha
quotes a stanza from an undetermined source, which enumerates nine virtues. *Smrtis* such as the *Manu* (II,109; 112) and *Tattvasaṃgrahā* (1,28) prescribe the qualifications of a student who deserves to be taught. See P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśstrā*, vol. II-I, pp. 330-333.

The *Smrtis* are not in agreement with regard to whether the ascetic life (*sannyāsa*) is open to all or the upper three classes or only to the Brahmins. In Śaṅkara ed. Bṛh. Up. (III,1,1, p. 454; IV,5,15, p. 725) Śaṅkara definitely states that only a Brahmin can be a *sannyāsin*. Here in the Upad he excludes all the classes except Brahmin. It is to be noted here that in his *Vṛttikā* (v.1651, p. 758) on his teacher's commentary of Bṛh.Up. (III,1,1) Surendra rejects Śaṅkara's view and that in his commentary on Surendra's *Vṛttikā* (p. 759) Ānandajānāṇa quotes passages from the *Mahābhārata* to support that Kṣatriya can enter the ascetic life. Cf. P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśstrā*, vol. II-II, pp. 942-944. According to the *BS* (1,3,34-39) the upper three classes of people, excluding Śūdras, are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, not only the *sannyāsin* but also the householder is accepted as qualified for it; and even a person who does not belong to any state of life because of lack of means, etc., is regarded as qualified for knowledge of Brahman (*BS* III,4,36-39). Cf. Nakamura II, pp. 402-404; pp. 470-475; P. Deussen, *The System of the Vedānta*, pp. 60-64. It should be kept in mind in order to understand Śaṅkara's doctrine that he accepts as qualified for his teaching a Brahmin who is in the state of *paramahamsa* wandering ascetic (see note 3). It may, however, be interesting to note here that in the next chapter (section 45) it is a *brahmācārin* who approaches a teacher in the prescribed manner. Cf. note 26.

One of the observances (*ṣūjana*). See note 14.

What rules Śaṅkara has in mind is not known. However, there are certain rules. For example, one should not approach empty-handed one's parents, *ācārya*, sacred fires, houses, and the king, if the latter has not heard of him before. Another rule is not to pronounce the name of one's teacher without prefixing or affixing an honorific addition (such as *śri*, *bhūta*, *ācārya*). *Smrtis* prescribe rules about *apasaṃgraha*, which consists in repeating one's *guru's* name and saying 'I salute,' touching one's ears, and clasping the feet of the teacher with one's hands, when one meets his teacher. See P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśstrā*, pp. 333-346. Cf. Muṇḍ. Up. I,2,12-13 (see the next section); Bṛh. Up. IV,2,1; Chāṇḍ. Up. VII,1,2.

Śaṅkara presumes the study of the *Veda*, which is required of a *brahmācārin*, and knowledge of it as indispensable condition. Cf. P. Deussen, *The System of the Vedānta*, pp. 77-78.

The source of this quotation is probably *Mahābhārata*, *Mokṣadharma*, 12, 313, 23a-b (Poona Critical ed.): "ācārya jñātāḥ tiṣṭaḥ taṇḍa jñānāṁ plava ṭhayate." Some manuscripts (Aś, Aś, Aś, and S) take it as a quotation from a Śruti but it is not traced as far as I have tried.

See note 1.

Ānandajānāṇa says that "etc." indicates "saugrahā" and the like while Rāmacandra explains it as denoting "śākuna" and so on. *Apastamba Dharmāśtras* I,2,26,6 reads: *ākrodha harsa roṣa lobha moha dambha dvehaḥ ... śūnyopādhyāya nīyamā siddhāntīdikākarāḥ*; *Bṛg Gītā* XVI,2: *ahām śāyaṃ akrodhas tātāṁ āśrayataḥ*. Of these states that are not so different from those of a pupil (see section 2). The essential difference between the qualified pupil and the teacher seems to be in the fact that a pupil is a seeker after final release (*mokṣa*) whereas a teacher is released (*muktā*). Cf. Upad I,17,50-52. For the qualifications of an *ācārya* who is to perform the *upāṇya* (see note 35) and to teach him the *Veda*, see P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśstrā*, vol. II-I, pp. 324-325.

Cf. section 2.

Cf. section 2.

Cf. section 30.


The sentences *ātmanivedam saranam* and *brahmaivedam saranam* are also quoted in *GKBh* II,32, p. 91. The former comes from Chāṇḍ. Up. VII,25,2, but the latter is problematic. As far as I have investigated, the same sentence occurs only in the *Mṛtyuḥ-ḥatu-rātanapāya Up.* (VII,3), from which Śaṅkara cannot be expected to quote. As I have discussed elsewhere, I think that this is a quotation from the Bṛh. Up. This quotation must have originally been *brahmaivedam saranam* which occurs in Bṛh. Up. II,5,1. Furthermore, there is a possibility that *brahmaivedam saranam* was assimilated to *ātmanivedam saranam* which occurs just before the quotation in question (see S. Mayeda, "On the Author of the Māṇḍūkyopanisad- and the Gaudapāda-Bhasya," *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, vols. 31-32, 1967-68, p. 81, note 1).

Cf. section 18.

See note 2 of Upad I,15.

*brahmācārin*, viz. the first of the four stages of life. See note 3.

Cf. section 19.

There are three different opinions about the four stages of life: (1) exclusion (*bādha*), (2) orderly co-ordination (*samucaya*), and (3) option (*sikāla*). The first, exclusion, which is held by the Gātama Dharmāśtras (III,1 and 35), is that there is really one stage of life, i.e., that of a householder; the other stages are regarded as inferior to it. The *Manu* (IV,1; VI,1; VI,35-37; VI,61-83) represents the second opinion, that a man should resort to the four stages of life one after another in order without skipping any one of them. The third opinion, as seen in the *Jājñātyānudāṇa* (4), is that there can be an option after the stage of a student. In other words, a man may become a wandering
ascetic (parinibbāja) immediately after he finishes the stage of a student or the stage of a householder. The BS suggests that Jaimini, founder of the Mīmāṃsā school, held the first opinion (BS II,4,18), whereas Bādārakya, founder of the Vaiśēka school, might have been a supporter of the second opinion (BS III, 4,19, and 20). The Upadī reveals that Śāṅkara may have held the third opinion. Śāṅkara himself is said to have become a sāṃpūṣṭa without resuming to the life of a householder (cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Homage to Śāṅkara, pp. 3-11).

27BBG II,22 reads as follows: "Just as a man leaves aside worn-out garments and takes other new ones, so the embodied Ātman leaves aside worn-out bodies and goes to other new ones."

28See section 10.

29The word saṃskāra is sometimes translated as (Hindu) "sacrament." It generally means religious purificatory rites and ceremonies for sanctifying the body, mind, and intellect of an individual so that he may become a full-fledged member of the Hindu community. There is a great divergence of opinion among the law books concerning the number of saṃskāras. The Gautama Dharmaśāstra gives a list of forty saṃskāras with eight virtues of Ātman. It is, however, said that sixteen are the most popular saṃskāras, though the enumeration differs in different books. In the Upadī Śāṅkara refers to several saṃskāras (see Upadī II,1,20, and 21) such as birth ceremony (jātakarṇa) and initiation ceremony (upayogama). Cf. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, II,1, pp. 188-267; Raj Bali Pandey, Hindu Samskrātras (Banaras: Vikarama Publications, 1949).

30See section 23.

31See section 6.

32See sections 7 and 8.

33The whole section is based upon Chānd. Up. VIII,14,1 (ākñīj vai nāma nāmārtha pāpar nirvāśhī), and BS I,3,41 (ākñījī rāthantaarvadīcīryapadeśī). See Mayeda Upad, pp. 31-32.

34Herc, in the BS, Śāṅkara uses the term name-and-form (nāmārtha) in the sense of the primary material of the universe, which corresponds to prákriti (or pradhāna) in the Śāṅkāyā system. This usage of the term is peculiar to Śāṅkara. According to later Advaitins, the primary material of the universe is anātīd or matsya and not nāmārtha. For a detailed discussion, see Introduction, III,A,3, pp. 18-22.

35See Chānd. Up. VIII,12,1.


40See notes 33 and 34.

41By the expression, "indescribable as this or something else" (tattvabhūtātābhim anuvinanyyā), Śāṅkara indicates, as in the BS, the unsteadiness of the primary material nāmārtha (see note 34) which will be transformed into something. The expression denotes the unstable condition of the unevolved name-and-form (asaṅkritaātārtha), of which we can neither say, "It is this" nor "It is different from this." The expression is peculiar to Śāṅkara. The term anuvinanytā appears as an attribute of anātīd first in Mañjuśrīmātra's Brahmaśāstra (S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Brahmaśāstra by Āṣṭy Ānandarāma with Commentary by Śrikkāpāṇi. Madras: Government Press, 1953, p. 9, line 14. Cf. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 89; Ēigen, p. 255, note 1). The association of the term with anātīd occurs in the thinking of all Advaitins except Śāṅkara, Suresvara, and Toṭaśa. See Ēigen, pp. 261-264; D. H. Ēigen, "Śāṅkara on the Question: Whose Is Avidyā?", Philosophy East and West, vol. 3 (1953), no. 1, p. 69.

42See BS II,3,8.

43See BS II,3,10; Taitt. Up. II,1.

44See BS II,3,11; Taitt. Up. II,1; Chānd. Up. VI,2,3.

45See BS II,5,12; Taitt. Up. II,1; Chānd. Up. VI,7,4.

46There are two different theories which explain how the subtle elements (stūpaśāhana) are combined to produce the gross elements (stūpabhāva) one is the trikāyavada and the other is the paṭeliśkaraṇa. Śāṅkara's description here seems to point to the paṭeliśkaraṇa. For a detailed discussion, see Introduction, III,A,3, pp. 25-27.

47Secrecy (anātīd) is treated as a kind of psychic affection (kleśa). See Introduction, IV,D,1, p. 78.

48Probably these sacred formulas (mantra) are those which are uttered when the garbhaśāstra saṃskāra is performed. The garbhaśāstra is the rite through which a man places his seed in a woman. See Bh. Up. VI,4,1-22; P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, II,1, pp. 201-213; R. B. Pandey, Hindu Samskrātras, pp. 79-98.

49The garbhaśāstra saṃskāra (see note 51) should be performed at the time of ru when the wife is physically prepared to conceive. The proper time for conception is from the fourth to the sixteenth night after menstruation. See P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, II,1, pp. 204-205; R. B. Pandey, Hindu Samskrātras, p. 79.

50For Indian medical views of conception, see Carakasaṃhitā IV,2-3.

51A birth ceremony (jātakarṇa) is performed before the umbilical cord is cut (cf. Manus II,29), but there is no agreement among writers. There is also great divergence on the details which constitute the birth ceremony. According to Bh. Up. VI,4,24-28, which gives fairly elaborate description of the ceremony, it consists of the following parts: (1) a sacred fire (homa) of curds with ghee to the accompaniment of the sacred formulas (Brh. Up. VI,4,25), (2) giving him a name, which becomes his secret name (Brh. Up. VI,4,25), (3) feeding him curds, honey, and ghee out of a golden spoon (Brh. Up. VI,4,25), (4) giving him a name, which becomes his secret name (Brh. Up. VI,4,26), (5) putting him to the mother's breast to the accompaniment of a sacred formula (Brh. Up. VI,4,27), and (6) addressing the mother with sacred formulas (Brh. Up. VI,4,28). See P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, II,1, pp. 228-237; R. B. Pandey, Hindu Samskrātras, pp. 116-129.

52The initiation (upayogama) is one of the purifying ceremonies, by which a boy is taken to a teacher for learning the Vedas. Later the performance of the ritual and the commandments for observing yores (oratadeia) become more important than the study of the Vedas. If a boy is a Brahmin, this ceremony is performed at the age of eight; if he is a Śāstriya, it is performed at the age of eleven; if he is a Vaiśya, it is performed at the age of twelve. There are many other opinions about the age of initiation. This ceremony is called a second birth, and by virtue of its performance the initiated boy becomes twice-born (dvijā) and is distinguished from the Śūdras (ekaja) who have only one physical birth. In the course of the ceremony he is invested with a sacred thread

II, 1] PROSE PART


45The name-and-form in this case means the effect of the unevolved name-and-form. See Ēigen, pp. 259-261; Mayeda Upad, p. 32.

46See BS II,3,1-7; Taitt. Up. II,1,1.

47As P. Hacker points out in his Upaneshashastram of Meister Shankara, p. 19, note 71, this simile shows that Śāṅkara is at the transitional stage between the realistic view (parinamaavada) of the BS and the remarkable illusionism (niyrtanūdā) of later Advaita. See Introduction, III,A,2, pp. 22-26.

48See BS II,3,8.

49See BS II,3,10; Taitt. Up. II,1.

50See BS II,3,11; Taitt. Up. II,1; Chānd. Up. VI,2,3.

51See BS II,5,12; Taitt. Up. II,1; Chānd. Up. VI,7,4.

52There are two different theories which explain how the subtle elements (stūpaśāhana) are combined to produce the gross elements (stūpabhāva) one is the trikāyavada and the other is the paṭeliśkaraṇa. Śāṅkara's description here seems to point to the paṭeliśkaraṇa. For a detailed discussion, see Introduction, III,A,3, pp. 25-27.

53Secrecy (anātīd) is treated as a kind of psychic affection (kleśa). See Introduction, IV,D,1, p. 78.
The purifying ceremony for union with a wife (patiyoogasasyakara) may mean the marriage ceremony (stivaha). For a detailed description of the marriage ceremony, see P. V. Kane, History of Dharmastra, II-I, pp. 427-541; R. B. Pandey, Hindu Samskaras, pp. 261-406.

The word tapana is used as a synonym of vanaprastha (forest-dweller). When Sankara comments on Brh. III,4,20, he says that tapas (self-mortification) is a distinctive attribute of the forest-dweller whereas indriyastram (restraint of the senses) and so on are the distinctive attributes of the mendicants (bhikṣu). The forest-dweller who may go to the forest with his wife has to keep fires and perform the daily and other rites (yajna), at least in the beginning.

The sentence “anyo evakham... anyo ‘sau’ is based upon Brh. Up. I,4,10 (see section 26).

This is based upon Chānd. Up. VI,16,1-3. See Upad I,17,65 and 73.

The sacred thread (yajnopavita), the composition of which is full of symbolism, consists of three threads of nine strands and is worn under the right arm and over the left shoulder. It is prescribed that the sacred thread of a Brahmin should be made of cotton, that of a Ksatriya of hempen threads, and that of a Vaisya of woolen threads (cf. Manu II,44). But the option of cotton thread is available for all. It should reach as far as the navel and is said to be spun by a virgin Brahmin girl and twisted by a Brahmin. At the time of upanayana (see note 55) the skṛtya invests the student with this sacred thread. It is also prescribed that a man must wear it when waiting upon teachers, elders, guests, at the time of handling sacred fire (home), in performing japa (murmuring prayer), in taking meals and in sipping water (ācamana), and at the time of daily Vedic study (cf. Āpastamba Dharmastra I,5,15,1). Cf. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmastra, II-I, pp. 287-300; R. B. Pandey, Hindu Samskaras, pp. 224-227.

Prosperity (abhyaṣṭhā) is the reward for worship of Brahman but belongs to transmigratory existence (saṃstha). On the other hand beauty (niḥśreyas) is generally a synonym for final release (mokṣa). Cf. P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp. 98-115; S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 518-520. The word paramārtha (Pali: paramakut) is not found in the ancient Upanisads but appears in old Buddhist texts (cf. Sūtanāthaprakāra and Sādhanapuṇḍarīka (ed. by U. Wogihara and Tuchida), p. 86, line 9; p. 107, line 1; line 21; p. 257, line 3; Sāndhāvānanda XV, 19); it has come to be a very important term in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Such a conception of the highest truth was first introduced into the Vedānta system by the author of the Māndukyopanisad (I,17; II,18; IV,19; 74), in which a Buddhist distinction between the highest truth (paramārthasātu) and the conventional truth (saṃyogārtha) is recognized (IV,73 and 74). Sākāra adopted it for his purpose. See Nakamura III, pp. 509-510.

Timira is a class of morbid affection of the coats of the eye.

See variant readings in Mayeda Upad. D. V. Gokhale suggests in his edition of the Upad (Bombay: Gujarati Printing Press, 1917) that this is a quotation from Chānd. Up. VII,2,1, etc. It is, however, to be noted here that in his BS Bh (II,1,14, p. 373) Sākāra quotes the same sentence (yathā... vīrakṣam śāntam nāmadhyamam uttiṣṭha) from the Chānd. Up. and that he explains the sentence, interpreting “nāmadhyamam” as “nāmadhyamāmyaṁ āyeyas taṁ ārṇan.” Therefore, “ārṇam” may not be a quotation but Śākāra’s explanatory insertion.

Cf. note 60.

Cf. note 79.

According to Śākāra’s commentary on the Brh. Up. (III,9,20, p. 508), the word “heart” (drṣṭipāla) comprises both buddhi and manas (buddhiṁ matsa sthitrya nirdeśāḥ). Śākāra probably understands it as a synonym of the internal organ (antākṣara).

Cf. Upad I,15,2.

The sentence “manat prajna viśeṣ bhuvannā vidhānā jatras yatra viśeṣaḥ bhavati ekānīṭam” is also used in Upad I,12,4; I,16,51.


Cf. sa yathā sāndhāvānandaḥ... Brh. Up. IV,5,13.

By accepting two standpoints, paramārtha (standpoint of the highest truth) and upāpratvārtha (standpoint of the daily life) or avidyārtha (standpoint ofnescence), Śākāra tried to interpret consistently the mutually contradictory Upanisads, BS and so forth, and to explain contradictions between daily experiences and the truth.

Cf. P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp. 98-115; S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 518-520. The word paramārtha (Pali: paramakut) is not found in the ancient Upanisads but appears in old Buddhist texts (cf. Sūtanāthaprakāra or Sādhanapuṇḍarīka (ed. by U. Wogihara and Tuchida), p. 92, line 9; p. 93, line 1; p. 12, line 21; p. 257, line 3; Sāndhāvānanda XV, 19); it has come to be a very important term in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Such a conception of the highest truth was first introduced into the Vedānta system by the author of the Māndukyopanisad (I,17; II,32; III,18; IV,73; 74), in which a Buddhist distinction between the highest truth (paramārtha) and the conventional truth (saṃyogārtha) is recognized (IV,73 and 74). Śākāra adopted it for his purpose. See Nakamura III, pp. 509-510.

Cf. note 80.

Cf. note 81.

Cf. note 82.

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CHAPTER 2

AWARENESS

45. A certain student, who was tired of transmigratory existence characterized by birth and death and was seeking after final release, approached in the prescribed manner a knower of Brahman who was established in Brahman and sitting at his ease, and asked him, "Your Holiness, how can I be released from transmigratory existence? I am aware of the body, the senses and [their] objects; I experience pain in the waking state, and I experience it in the dreaming state after getting relief again and again by entering into the state of deep sleep again and again. Is it indeed my own nature or [is it] due to some cause, my own nature being different? If [this is] my own nature, there is no hope for me to attain final release, since one cannot avoid one's own nature. If [it is] due to some cause, final release is possible after the cause has been removed."

46. The teacher replied to him, "Listen, my child, this is not your own nature but is due to a cause."

47. When he was told this the pupil said, "What is the cause? And what will remove it? And what is my own nature? When the cause is removed, since one cannot avoid one's own nature. If [it is] due to some cause, final release is possible after the cause has been removed."

48. The teacher replied, "The cause is nescience; it is removed by knowledge. When nescience has been removed, you will be released from transmigratory existence which is characterized by birth and death, since its cause will be gone and you will no longer experience pain in the dreaming and waking states."

49. The pupil said, "What is that nescience? And what is its object? And what is knowledge, remover of nescience, by which I can realize my own nature?"

50. The teacher replied, "Though you are the highest Atman and not a transmigrator, you hold the inverted view, 'I am a transmigrator.' Though you are neither an agent nor an experiencer, and exist [eternally], [you hold the inverted view, 'I am an agent, an experiencer, and do not exist [eternally]]—this is nescience."

51. The pupil said, "Even though I exist [eternally], still I am not the highest Atman. My nature is transmigratory existence which is characterized by agency and experiencership, since it is known by sense-perception and other means of knowledge. [Transmigratory existence] has not nescience as its cause, since nescience cannot have one's own Atman as its object."

Nescience is [defined as] the superimposition of the qualities of one [thing] upon another. For example, fully known silver is superimposed upon fully known mother-of-pearl, a fully known person upon a [fully known] tree trunk, or a fully known trunk upon a [fully known] person; but not an unknown [thing] upon [one that is] fully known nor a fully known [thing] upon one that is unknown. Nor is non-Atman superimposed upon Atman because Atman is not fully known, nor Atman [superimposed] upon non-Atman, [again] because Atman is not fully known."

52. The teacher said to him, "That is not right, since there is an exception. My child, it is not possible to make a general rule that a fully known [thing] is superimposed only upon a fully known [thing], since it is a matter of experience that [a fully known thing] is superimposed upon Atman. [For example,] if one says, 'I am white,' 'I am dark,' this is [the superimposition] of qualities of the body upon Atman which is the object of the T-notion. And if one says, 'I am this,' this is [the superimposition of Atman,] which is the object of the T-notion, upon the body."

53. The pupil said, "In that case Atman is indeed fully known as the object of the T-notion; so is the body as 'this.' If so, [it is only a case of] the mutual superimposition of body and Atman, both fully known, just like [the mutual superimposition] of tree-trunk and person, and of mother-of-pearl and silver. So, is there a particular reason why Your Holiness said that it is not possible to make a general rule that two fully known [things] are mutually superimposed?"
54. The teacher replied, “Listen. It is true that the body and \textit{Atman} are fully known; but they are not fully known to all people as the objects of distinct notions like a tree-trunk and a person.”

“How are they known then?”

“They are always known as the objects of constantly non-distinct notions. Since nobody grasps the body and \textit{Atman} as two distinct notions, saying, ‘This is the body, that is \textit{Atman},’ people are deluded with regard to \textit{Atman} and non-\textit{Atman}, thinking, ‘\textit{Atman} is thus’ or ‘\textit{Atman} is not thus.’ This is the particular reason why I said that it is impossible to make a general rule.”

55. [The pupil raised another objection:] “Is it not experienced that the thing which is superimposed [upon something] else through nescience does not exist [in the latter]? For example, silver [does not exist] in a mother-of-pearl nor a person in a tree-trunk nor a snake in a rope; nor the dark color of the earth’s surface in the sky. Likewise, if the body and \textit{Atman} are always mutually superimposed in the form of constantly non-distinct notions, then they cannot exist in each other at any time. Silver, etc., which are superimposed through nescience upon mother-of-pearl, etc., do not exist [in the latter] at any time in any way and \textit{vice versa}; likewise the body and \textit{Atman} are mutually superimposed through nescience; this being the case, it would follow as the result that neither the body nor \textit{Atman} exists. And it is not acceptable, since it is the theory of the Nihilists.\textsuperscript{10}

If, instead of mutual superimposition, [only] the body is superimposed upon \textit{Atman} through nescience, it would follow as the result that the body does not exist in \textit{Atman} while the latter exists. This is not acceptable either since it is contradictory to sense-perception and other [means of knowledge]. For this reason the body and \textit{Atman} are not superimposed upon each other through nescience.”

“How then?”

“They are permanently connected with each other like bamboo and pillars [which are interlaced in the structure of a house].”

56. [The teacher said.] “No; because it would follow as the result that \textit{Atman is} non-eternal and exists for another’s sake\textsuperscript{11}; since [in your opinion \textit{Atman} is] composite, \textit{Atman exists for another’s sake and is non-eternal} just like bamboo, pillars, and so forth. Moreover, the \textit{Atman} which is assumed by some others to be connected with the body exists for another’s sake since it is composite. [Therefore,] it has been first established that the highest [\textit{Atman}] is not connected with the body, is different [from it], and is eternal.

57. [The pupil objected:] “Although [the \textit{Atman}] is not composite, It is [regarded] merely as the body and superimposed upon the body; from this follow the results that [the \textit{Atman}] does not exist and that [It] is non-eternal and so on. Then there would arise the fault that [you will] arrive at the Nihilists’ position that the body has no \textit{Atman}.”

58. [The teacher replied.] “Not so; because it is accepted that \textit{Atman}, like space, is by nature not composite.\textsuperscript{12} Although \textit{Atman} exists as connected with nothing, it does not follow that the body and other things are without \textit{Atman}, just as, although space is connected with nothing, it does not follow that nothing has space. Therefore, there would not arise the fault that [I shall] arrive at the Nihilists’ position.

59. “Your further objection—namely that, if the body does not exist in \textit{Atman} [although \textit{Atman exists}], this would contradict sense-perception and the other [means of knowledge]: this is not right, because the existence of the body in \textit{Atman} is not cognized by sense-perception and the other [means of knowledge]; in \textit{Atman}—like a jujube-fruit in a pot, ghee in milk, oil in sesame and a picture on a wall\textsuperscript{14}—the body is not cognized by sense-perception and the other [means of knowledge]. Therefore there is no contradiction with sense-perception and the other [means of knowledge].”

60. [The pupil objected.] “How is the body then superimposed upon \textit{Atman} which is not established by sense-perception and the other [means of knowledge], and how is \textit{Atman} superimposed upon the body?”

61. [The teacher said.] “That is not a fault, because \textit{Atman} is established by Its own nature. A general rule cannot be made that superimposition is made only on that which is adventitiously established and not on that which is permanently established, for the dark color and other things on the surface of the earth are seen to be superimposed upon the sky [which is permanently established].”
[The pupil asked,] "Your Holiness, is the mutual superimposition of the body and Atman made by the composite of the body and so on or by Atman?"

62. The teacher said, "What would happen to you, if [the mutual superimposition] is made by the composite of the body and so on, or if [it] is made by Atman?"

63. Then the pupil answered, "If I am merely the composite of the body and so on, then I am non-conscious, so I exist for another's sake; consequently, the superimposition of body and Atman is not effected by me. If I am the highest Atman different from the composite [of the body and so on], then I am conscious, so I exist for my own sake; consequently, the superimposition [of body] which is the seed of every calamity is effected upon Atman by me who am conscious."

64. To this the teacher responded, "If you know that the false superimposition is the seed of [every] calamity, then do not make it!"

65. "Your Holiness, I cannot help [it]. I am driven [to do it] by another; I am not independent."

66. [The teacher said,] "Then you are non-conscious, so you do not exist for your own sake. That by which you who are not self-dependent are driven to act is conscious and exists for its own sake; you are only a composite thing [of the body, etc.]."

67. [The pupil objected,] "If I am non-conscious, how do I perceive feelings of pleasure and pain, and [the words] you have spoken?"

68. The teacher said, "Are you different from feelings of pleasure and pain and from [the words] I have spoken, or are you identical [with them]?"

69. The pupil answered, "I am indeed not identical."

"Why?"

"Because I perceive both of them as objects just as [I perceive] a jar and other things [as objects]. If I were identical [with them] I could not perceive either of them; but I do perceive them, so I am different [from both of them]. If [I were] identical [with them] it would follow that the modifications of the feelings of pleasure and pain exist for their own sake and so do [the words] you have spoken; but it is not reasonable that any of them exists for their own sake, for the pleasure and pain produced by a sandal and a thorn are not for the sake of the sandal and the thorn, nor is use made of a jar for the sake of the jar. So, the sandal and other things serve my purpose, i.e., the purpose of their perceiver, since I who am different from them perceive all the objects seated in the intellect."

71. The teacher said to him, "So, then, you exist for your own sake since you are conscious. You are not driven [to act] by another. A conscious being is neither dependent on another nor driven [to act] by another, for it is not reasonable that a conscious being should exist for the sake of another conscious being since they are equal like two lights. Nor does a conscious being exist for the sake of a non-conscious being since it is not reasonable that a non-conscious being should have any connection with its own object precisely because it is non-conscious. Nor does experience show that two non-conscious beings exist for each other, as for example a stick of wood and a wall do not fulfill each other's purposes."

72. [The pupil objected,] "Is it not experienced that a servant and his master, though they are equal in the sense of being conscious, exist for each other?"

73. [The teacher said,] "It is not so, for what [I] meant was that you have consciousness just as fire has heat and light. And [in this meaning I] cited the example, 'like two lights.' This being the case, you perceive everything seated in your intellect through your own nature, i.e., the transcendentally changeless, eternal, pure consciousness which is equivalent to the heat and light of fire. And if you admit that Atman is always without distinctions, why did you say, 'After getting relief again and again in the state of deep sleep, I perceive pain in the waking and dreaming states. Is this indeed my own nature or [is it] due to some cause?' Has this delusion left [you now] or not?"

74. To this the pupil replied, "Your Holiness, the delusion has gone thanks to your gracious assistance; but I am in doubt as to how I am transcendentally changeless."

"How?"

"Sound and other [external objects] are not self-established, since they are not conscious. But they [are established] through the rise of notions which take the forms of sound and other [external objects]. It is impossible for notions to be self-established, since they have mutually exclusive attributes and the forms [of external
objects] such as blue and yellow. It is, therefore, understood that [notions] are caused by the forms of the external objects; so, [notions] are established as possessing the forms of external objects, i.e., the forms of sound, etc. Likewise, notions, which are the modifications of a thing (= the intellect), the substratum of the 'I'-notion, are also composite, so it is reasonable that they are non-conscious; therefore, as it is impossible that they exist for their own sake, they, like sound and other [external objects], are established as objects to be perceived by a perceiver different in nature [from them]. If I am not composite, I have pure consciousness as my nature; so I exist for my own sake. Nevertheless, I am a perceiver of notions which have the forms [of the external objects] such as blue and yellow [and] so I am indeed subject to change. [For the above reason, I am] in doubt as to how [I am] transcendentally changeless.

75. The teacher said to him, "Your doubt is not reasonable. [Your] perception of those notions is necessary and entire; for this very reason [you] are not subject to transformation. It is, therefore, established that [you] are transcendentally changeless. But you have said that precisely the reason for the above positive conclusion—namely, that [you] perceive the entire movement of the mind—is the reason for [your] doubt [concerning your transcendentally changeless]. This is why [your doubt is not reasonable].

If indeed you were subject to transformation, you would not perceive the entire movement of the mind which is your object, just as the mind [does not perceive] its [entire] object and just as the senses [do not perceive] their [entire] objects, and similarly you as Atman would not perceive even a part of your object. Therefore, you are transcendentally changeless.

76. Then [the pupil] said, "Perception is what is meant by the verbal root," that is, nothing but change; it is contradictory [to this fact] to say that [the nature of] the perceiver is transcendentally changeless."

77. [The teacher said,] "That is not right, for [the term] 'perception' is used figuratively in the sense of a change which is meant by the verbal root; whatever the notion of the intellect may be, that is what is meant by the verbal root; [the notion of the intellect] has change as its nature and end, with the result that the perception of Atman falsely appears [as perceiver]; thus the notion of the intellect is figuratively indicated by the term, 'perception.' For example, the cutting action results [in the static state that] [the object to be cut] is separated in two parts; thus [the term, 'cutting,' in the sense of an object to be cut being separated in two parts] is used figuratively as [the cutting action] which is meant by the verbal root."

78. To this the pupil objected, "Your Holiness, the example cannot explain my transcendentally changeless."

"Why not?"

"'Cutting' which results in a change in the object to be cut is used figuratively as [the cutting action] which is meant by the verbal root; in the same manner, if the notion of the intellect, which is figuratively indicated by the term 'perception' and is meant by the verbal root, results also in a change in the perception of Atman, [the example] cannot explain Atman's transcendentally changeless."

79. The teacher said, "It would be true, if there were a distinction between perception and perceiver. The perceiver is indeed nothing but eternal perception. And it is not [right] that perception and perceiver are different as in the doctrine of the logicians."

80. [The pupil said,] "How does that [action] which is meant by the verbal root result in perception?"

81. [The teacher] answered, "Listen, [I] said that [it] ends with the result that the perception [of Atman] falsely appears [as perceiver]. Did you not hear? I did not say that [it] results in the production of any change in Atman."

82. The pupil said, "Why then did you say that if I am transcendentally changeless I am the perceiver of the entire movement of the mind which is my object?"

83. The teacher said to him, "I told [you] only the truth. Precisely because [you are the perceiver of the entire movement of the mind], I said, you are transcendentally changeless."

84. "If so, Your Holiness, I am of the nature of transcendentally changeless and eternal perception whereas the notions of the intellect, which have the forms of [external objects] such as sound, arise and end with the result that my own nature which is perception falsely appears [as perceiver]. Then what is my fault?"
85. [The teacher replied,] "You are right. You have no fault. The fault is only nescience as I have said before."38

86. [The pupil said,] "If, Your Holiness, as in the state of deep sleep I undergo no change, how do I experience the dreaming and waking states?"

87. The teacher said to him, "But do you experience [these states] continuously?"

88. [The pupil answered,] "Certainly I do experience [them], but intermittently and not continuously."

89. The teacher said [to him,] "Both of them are adventitious [and] not your nature. If [they] were your nature [they] would be self-established and continuous like your nature, which is Pure Consciousness. Moreover, the dreaming and waking states are not your nature, for [they] depart [from you] like clothes and so on. It is certainly not experienced that the nature of anything, whatever it may be, departs from it. But the dreaming and waking states depart from the state of Pure Consciousness-only. If one's own nature were to depart [from oneself] in the state of deep sleep, it would be negated by saying, 'It has perished,' 'It does not exist,' since the adventitious attributes which are not one's own nature are seen to consist in both [perishableness and non-existence]; for example, wealth, clothes, and the like are seen to perish and things which have been obtained in dream or delusion are seen to be non-existent."

90. [The pupil objected,] "[If] so, Your Holiness, it follows either that my own nature, i.e., Pure Consciousness, is also adventitious, since [I perceive in the dreaming and waking states but not in the state of deep sleep; or that I am not of the nature of Pure Consciousness."

91. [The teacher replied,] "No, Look. Because that is not reasonable. If you [insist on] looking your own nature, i.e., Pure Consciousness, as adventitious, do so! We cannot establish it logically even in a hundred years, nor can any other [i.e. non-conscious] being do so. As [that adventitious consciousness] is composite, nobody can logically deny that [it] exists for another's sake, is manifold and perishable; for what does not exist for its own sake is not self-established, as we have said before. Nobody can, however, deny that Ātman, which is of the nature of Pure Consciousness, is self-established; so It does not depend upon anything else, since It does not depart [from anybody]."39

92. [The pupil objected,] "Did I not point out that [It] does depart [from me] when I said that in the state of deep sleep I do not see?"

93. [The teacher replied,] "That is not right, for it is contradictory."

"How is it a contradiction?"

"Although you are [in truth] seeing, you say, 'I do not see.' This is contradictory."

"But at no time in the state of deep sleep, Your Holiness, have I ever seen Pure Consciousness or anything else."

"Then you are seeing in the state of deep sleep; for you deny only the seen object, not the seeing. I said that your seeing is Pure Consciousness. That [eternally] existing one by which you deny [the existence of the seen object] when you say that nothing has been seen, [that precisely is the seeing] that is Pure Consciousness. Thus as [It] does not ever depart [from you] [Its] transcendental changelessness and eternity are established solely by Itself without depending upon any means of knowledge. The knower, though self-established, requires means of knowledge for the discernment of an object to be known other [than itself]. And that eternal Discrimination, which is required for discerning something else (= non-Ātman) which does not have Discrimination as its nature—that is certainly eternal, transcendently changeless, and of a self-effulgent nature. The eternal Discrimination does not require any means of knowledge in order to be Itself the means of knowledge or the knower since the eternal Discrimination is by nature the means of knowledge or the knower. [This is illustrated by the following] example: iron or water requires fire or sun [to obtain] light and heat since light and heat are not their nature; but fire and sun do not require [anything else] for light and heat since [these] are always their nature."

94. "[If you object,] 'There is empirical knowledge in so far as it is not eternal and [there is] no empirical knowledge, if it is eternal,'"

95. "[Then I reply,] 'Not so; because it is impossible to make a distinction between eternal apprehension and non-eternal ap-
prehension; when apprehension is empirical knowledge, such distinction is not apprehended that empirical knowledge is non-eternal apprehension and not eternal one.'

96. "If [you object,] 'When [empirical knowledge] is eternal apprehension, it does not require the knower, but when [empirical knowledge] is non-eternal apprehension, apprehension requires [the knower], since it is mediated by [the knower's] effort. There would be the above distinction,'"

97. "then, it is established that the knower itself is self-established, since [it] does not require any means of knowledge.

98. "If [you object,] 'Even when [apprehension or empirical knowledge] does not exist, [the knower] does not require [any means of knowledge], since [the knower] is eternal,' [my reply is,] 'No; because apprehension exists only in [the knower] itself. Thus your opinion is refuted.

99. "If the knower is dependent upon the means of knowledge for its establishment, where does the desire to know belong? It is admitted that that to which the desire to know belongs is indeed the knower. And the object of this desire to know is the object to be known, not the knower, since if the object [of the desire to know] were the knower, a regressus ad infinitum with regard to the knower and the desire to know would result: there would be a second knower for the first one, a third knower for the second, and so on. Such would be the case if the desire to know had the knower as its object. And the knower itself cannot be the object to be known, since it is never mediated [by anything]; what in this world is called the object to be known is established, when it is mediated by the rise of desire, remembrance, effort, and means of knowledge which belong to the knower. In no other way is apprehension experienced with regard to the object to be known. And it cannot be assumed that the knower itself is mediated by any of the knower's own desire and the like. And remembrance has as its object the knower to be remembered and not the subject of remembrance. Likewise, desire has as its object only the object desired and not the one who desires. If remembrance and desire had as their object the subject of remembrance and the one who desires respectively, a regressus ad infinitum would be inevitable as before.

100. "If [you say,] 'If apprehension which has the knower as its object is impossible, the knower would not be apprehended,' you say,] 'If apprehension which has the knower as its object is impossible, the knower would not be apprehended,'

101. "not so; because the apprehension of the apprehender has as its object the object to be apprehended. If [it] were to have the apprehender as its object, a regressus ad infinitum would result as before. And it has been proved before that apprehension, i.e., the transcendentally changeless and eternal light of Ātman, is established in Ātman without depending upon anything else as heat and light are in fire, the sun, and so on. If apprehension, i.e., the light of Ātman which is Pure Consciousness, were not eternal in one's own Ātman, it would be impossible for Ātman to exist for Its own sake; as It would be composite like the aggregate of the body and senses, It would exist for another's sake and be possessed of faults as we have already said."

102. "How?"

103. "If the light of Ātman which is Pure Consciousness were not eternal in one's own Ātman, it would be mediated by remembrance and the like and so it would be composite. And as this light of Pure Consciousness would therefore not exist in Ātman before Its origination and after Its destruction, It would exist for another's sake, since It would be composite like the eye and so on. And if the light of Pure Consciousness exists in Ātman as something which has arisen, then Ātman does not exist for Its own sake, since it is established according to the existence and absence of that light of Pure Consciousness that Ātman exists for Its own sake and non-Ātman exists for another's sake. It is therefore established that Ātman is the eternal light of Pure Consciousness without depending upon anything else."

104. [The pupil objected,] "If so, [and] if the knower is not the subject of empirical knowledge, how is it a knower?"

105. [The teacher] answered, "Because there is no distinction in the nature of empirical knowledge, whether it is eternal or non-eternal, since empirical knowledge is apprehension. There is no distinction in the nature of this [empirical knowledge] whether it be non-eternal, preceded by remembrance, desire, and the like, or transcendentally changeless and eternal, just as there is no distinction in the nature of what is meant by verbal root such as sthā (stand), whether it is a non-eternal result preceded by 'going' and other [forms of actions], or an eternal result not preceded [by 'going' or any other forms of actions]; so the same expression is
depends upon any other notions due to sense-perception and senses, and their objects exist for their own sake, since it is experienced that they depend for their establishment upon the notions due to sense-perception and other means of knowledge for their establishment. This is true of the senses. Sound and other [external objects] are indeed transformed into the form of the body and senses; so, [the body and the senses] depend upon sense-perception and other means of knowledge for [their] establishment. And 'establishment' (siddhi) is apprehension, i.e., the result of the means of knowledge as we have already said, and this apprehension is transcendentally changeless, self-established, and by nature the light of Atman.”

108. Here [the pupil] objected, saying, “It is contradictory to say that apprehension is the result of the means of knowledge and that it is by nature the transcendentally changeless and eternal light of Atman.”

To this [the teacher] said, “It is not contradictory.”

“Although [Apprehension] is transcendentally changeless and eternal, [It] appears at the end of the notion [forming process] due to sense-perception and other [means of knowledge] since [the notion-forming process] aims at it. If the notion due to sense-perception and other [means of knowledge] is non-eternal, [Apprehension, though eternal,] appears as if it were non-eternal. Therefore, [Apprehension] is figuratively called the result of the means of knowledge.”

109. [The pupil said,] “If so, Your Holiness, Apprehension is transcendentally changeless, eternal, indeed of the nature of the light of Atman, and self-established, since It does not depend upon any means of knowledge with regard to itself; everything other than This is non-conscious and exists for another’s sake, since it acts together with others.

And because of this nature of being apprehended as notion causing pleasure, pain, and delusion, [non-Atman] exists for another’s sake; on account of this very nature non-Atman exists and not on account of any other nature. It is therefore merely non-existent from the standpoint of the highest truth. Just as it is experienced in this world that a snake [superimposed] upon a rope does not exist, nor water in a mirage, and the like, unless they are apprehended [as a notion], so it is reasonable that duality in the
waking and dreaming states also does not exist unless it is apprehended [as a notion]. In this manner, Your Holiness, Apprehension, i.e., the light of Ātman, is uninterrupted; so it is transcendentally changeless, eternal and non-dual, since it is never absent from any of the various notions. But various notions are absent from Apprehension. Just as in the dreaming state the notions in different forms such as blue and yellow, which are absent from that Apprehension, are said to be non-existent from the standpoint of the highest truth, so in the waking state also, the various notions such as blue and yellow, which are absent from this very Apprehension, must by nature be untrue. And there is no apprehender different from this Apprehension to apprehend It; therefore It can itself neither be accepted nor rejected by Its own nature, since there is nothing else.  

110. [The teacher said,] "Exactly so it is. It is nescience that is the cause of transmigratory existence which is characterized by the waking and dreaming states. The remover of this nescience is knowledge. And so you have reached fearlessness. From now on you will not perceive any pain in the waking and dreaming states. You are released from the sufferings of transmigratory existence."

111. [The pupil said,] "Om."

Notes

1 Brahmacarīn. See notes 6 and 24 of Upad II,1.
2 See note 6 of Upad II,1.
3 A similar simile is used in GKB, Introduction, p. 6 (rāgaratayas ca rāgyavitthau svatthatah. tataḥ duḥkhātmanakṣayatvātmano duṣṭagopaliṣṭopāsamā sosthāta).
4 For a detailed discussion of avidyā, see Introduction, IV,D, pp. 76-84; Mayeda Upad, pp. 29-30.
5 Commenting on BhG IV,34 which explains how to obtain knowledge, Saṅkara gives examples of questions to be put to teachers: "How does bondage come about? How does release come about? What is knowledge? What is nescience?" (katham bandhaḥ katham mokṣaḥ kā avidyā kā cidvidyāt, p. 232). Here in the Upad as well the teacher and his pupil are going to discuss the same topic. It is certain that these four topics are of primary importance in Saṅkara's doctrine.
6 Avidyātmanā. This is a kind of popular etymology: avidyā from avidhātmanā (not existing).
7 See Introduction, IV,D,2, pp. 79-83.
8 In BS Bh, Introduction, pp. 10-13, Saṅkara defines superimposition (adhyātma) as the appearance, in the form of remembrance, of one thing previously perceived, in another (emtyirāpe pūtaḥ pūtrodṛṣṭāvabhyāṣāḥ). Then he gives his only definition of nescience: "The learned men regard this superimposition thus defined as avidyā." (BS Bh, Introduction, p. 19). In other words, nescience is superimposition, i.e., mutual superimposition of Ātman and non-Ātman such as the body, the senses, and the internal organ. See Introduction, IV,D,1, pp. 76-79.
10 "The Nihilists" (Vaināikī) indicates the Buddhists, especially the Śānyavādins (or Madhyamikas) who hold the view that everything is empty (ātyaya) and who have Nāgārjuna (150-250) as their founder.
11 Saṅkhyākārttikā 17 proves the existence of Purusa (Spirit) from several reasons, one of which is that the composite things exist for another's sake (samyagpaṭārthataḥ). The Unmanifest (ayatā), the great (mahat), "I"-consciousness (ahamkāra), and so forth are all considered to be composite of pleasure, pain, and delusion and they are compared to the bedstead, the chair, and other things (cf. Vīcāpatīnīkā on Saṅkhyakārttikā 17). And the "another" (pare) for which they exist is the non-composite Ātman. Cf. P. Hacker, "Saṅkara der Advaitin," WZKSO, vols. XII-XIII (1968/1969), pp. 142-143.
12 See section 55.
13 See section 55.
14 The simile "a picture on a wall" is not intelligible, but may mean that in a dark place like a cave.
15 This question, which is discussed in sections 62-85, is a variation of the question, "Whose is avidyā?" or "What is the locus (ātyaya) of avidyā?" Here Saṅkara does not give any definite answer to it (see note 16). See Introduction, IV,D,2, pp. 79-83.
16 This answer is very characteristic of Saṅkara's attitude toward the problem of the locus of avidyā. See Introduction, IV,D,2, pp. 79-80.
17 See Upad II,1,33-38.
18 See Upad I,7,1 and note 1; 18,155-157; Introduction, III,B,2, p. 36.
19 A similar discussion takes place in BS Bh II,1,4, p. 356.
20 In reply to the same question Saṅkara gives elsewhere the following answer: "This analogy does not hold good because in the case of servant and master also the non-conscious part of the former is subservient to the conscious part of the latter, for a conscious being subserves another conscious being only with the non-conscious part belonging to it, such as the intellect, etc., but a conscious being itself acts neither for nor against any other conscious being" (BS Bh II,1,4, p. 356).
21 Cf. Section 71.
22 In the Saṅkhyā system both Purusa and Prakṛti are eternal, without either beginning or end. But the eternity of the Purusa is different from that of the Prakṛti; the former is described as "kūṭasthāsya" (eternal without change) and the latter as "paristhāsya" (eternal with change). Cf. Vījñānabhaṭṭa on Śrītra I,75; R. Garbe, Die Śānyakṣa-Philosophie (Leipzig: Verlag von H. Haessel, 1894), p. 289. According to Saṅkara's non-dualism eternity with change is not acceptable, since everything subject to change is non-eternal; everything, with the only exception of Brahmān-Ātman, which is changeless (kūṭastha), is non-eternal. The word kūṭastha is used as an antonym of pariṣṭhāna (Upad I,2,75) and nākṛṣṭyāvat (Upad I,2,74). See note 3 of Upad I,13 and the discussion starting in section 74, below.
24 Rāmatīrtha interprets "a thing" (astu) as the internal organ (antākṣara).
Among Indian grammarians there are various opinions about the meaning of the verbal root (dhatoarth a). Cf. R. C. Pandeya, The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banaridas, 1963), pp. 117-123. As in Mahabhāṣya III,2,8, the meaning of the verbal root is here conceived to be "action" (kriyā). Cf. L. Renou, Terminologie Grammaticale du Sanskrit, pp. 168-169. In the Nyāya and the Vaiṣeṣika "upalabdhi" and "jñāna," which are considered to be (the nature of) Ātman by Śaṅkara, are treated as synonyms of "buddhi" and "pratyaya" (see Nyāyasūtra 1,1,13; Vaiṣeṣikopakṣa IV,1,1; Nyāyakosa, pp. 604-608).

For a detailed discussion, see Introduction, III,B,3, pp. 38-40.

In the Nyāya and the Vaiṣeṣika perception is a quality (guna) of Ātman, i.e., perceiver. The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga regard it as a modification (prātyā) of the intellect (buddhi or citta). The Buddhist and the Mīmāṃśa systems commonly describe it as an activity. Cf. S. Chatterjee, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, pp. 9-20.

See section 77.

See section 75.

See sections 48-50.

Cf. BhG II,22; Upad II,1,12.

Cf. sections 56; 74; etc.

Cf. sections 89; 93.

Section 90.

Pramāṇa, which is here translated as "empirical knowledge," generally indicates the valid knowledge which results from the means of knowledge (pramāṇa). The pupil wants to say here that pramāṇa requires pramāṇa for its establishment; so pramāṇa is non-eternal.

Cf. sections 93-98.

See note 27.


According to Rāmatīrtha this is a refutation of the Mīmāṃśakas.

Rāmatīrtha suggests that this is a refutation of the Naiṣayāṇikas.

Rāmatīrtha suggests that this is a refutation of the Lokāyātikas.

Cf. section 77.

Rāmatīrtha suggests that this is a refutation of the Sāṃkhya.


This is the conclusion of the discussion which started in sections 48 and 49.

112. This parisamkhyāna meditation is described for seekers after final release, who are devoting themselves to destroying their acquired merit and demerit and do not wish to accumulate new ones. Nescience causes faults (= passion and aversion); they cause the activities of speech, mind, and body; and from these activities are accumulated karmans of which [in turn] the results are desirable, undesirable, and mixed. For the sake of final release from those karmans this parisamkhyāna meditation is described.

113. Now, sound, touch, form-and-color, taste, and odor are the objects of the senses; they are to be perceived by the ear and other [senses]. Therefore, they do not have any knowledge of themselves nor of others, since they are merely things evolved [from the unevolved name-and-form] like clay and the like. And they are perceived through the ear and other [senses].

And that by which they are perceived is of a different nature since it is a perceiver. Because they are connected with one another, sound and other [objects of the senses] are possessed of many attributes such as birth, growth, change of state, decay, and destruction; connection and separation; appearance and disappearance; effect of change and cause of change; field (= female?) and seed (= male?). They are also commonly possessed of many [other] attributes such as pleasure and pain. Their perceiver is different in its nature from all the attributes of sound and the other [objects of the senses], precisely because it is their perceiver.

114. So the wise man who is tormented by sound and the other [objects of the senses] which are being perceived should perform parisamkhyāna meditation as follows:
115. I (= \textit{Atman}) am of the nature of Seeing, non-object (= subject) unconnected [with anything], changeless, motionless, endless, fearless, and absolutely subtle. So sound cannot make me its object and touch me, whether as mere noise in general or as [sound] of particular qualities—pleasant [sounds] such as the first note of music or the desirable words of praise and the like, or the undesirable words of untruth, disgust, humiliation, abuse, and the like—since I am unconnected [with sound]. For this very reason neither loss nor gain is caused [in me] by sound. Therefore, what can the pleasant sound of praise, the unpleasant sound of blame, and so on do to me? Indeed a pleasant sound may produce gain, and an unpleasant one destruction, for a man lacking in discriminating knowledge, who regards sound as [connected with his] \textit{Atman} since he has no discriminating knowledge. But for me who am endowed with discriminating knowledge, [sound] cannot produce even a hair’s breadth [of gain or loss].

In the very same manner [touch] does not produce for me any change of gain and loss, whether as touch in general or as touch in particular forms—the unpleasant [touch] of cold, heat, softness, hardness, etc., and of fever, stomachache, etc., and any pleasant [touch] either inherent in the body or caused by external and adventitious [objects]—since I am devoid of touch, just as a blow with the fist and the like [does not produce any change] in the sky.

Likewise [form-and-color] produces neither loss nor gain for me, whether as form-and-color in general or as form-and-color in particular, pleasant or unpleasant, such as the female characteristics of a woman and the like, since I am devoid of form-and-color.

Similarly, [taste] produces neither loss nor gain for me who am by nature devoid of taste, whether as taste in general or as taste in particular forms [, pleasant or unpleasant,] such as sweetness, sourness, saltiness, pungency, bitterness, astringency which are perceived by the dull-witted.

In like manner [odor] produces neither loss nor gain for me who am by nature devoid of odor, whether as odor in general or as odor in particular forms, pleasant or unpleasant, such as [the odor] of flowers, etc., and ointment, etc. That is because the \textit{Sruti} says:

“That which is soundless, touchless, formless, imperishable, also tasteless, constant, odorless, . . . [— having perceived that, one is freed from the jaws of death]” (\textit{Ka\textth{}. Up. III,15}).

116. Moreover, whatever sound and the other external [objects of the senses] may be, they are changed into the form of the body, and into the form of the ear and the other [senses] which perceive them, and into the form of the two internal organs and their objects [such as pleasure and pain],\textsuperscript{6} since they are mutually connected and composite in all cases of actions. This being the case, to me, a man of knowledge, nobody is foe, friend or neutral.

In this context, if [anybody,] through a misconception [about \textit{Atman}] due to false knowledge,\textsuperscript{7} were to wish to connect [me] with [anything], pleasant or unpleasant, which is characteristic of the result of action, he wishes in vain to connect [me] with it, since I am not its object according to the \textit{Smrti} passage:

“Unmanifest he, unthinkable he, [unchangeable he is declared to be]” (BhG II,25).

Likewise, I am not to be changed by [any of] the five elements, since I am not their object according to the \textit{Smrti} passage:

“Not to be cut is he, not to be burnt is he, [not to be wet nor yet dried]” (BhG II,24).

Furthermore, paying attention only to the aggregate of the body and the senses, [people, both] devoted and adverse to me, have the desire to connect [me] with things, pleasant, unpleasant, etc., and therefrom results the acquisition of merit, demerit, and the like. It belongs only to them and does not occur in me who am free from old age, death, and fear, since the \textit{Sruti}s and the \textit{Smrtis} say:

“Neither what has been done nor what has been left undone affects It” (Bṛh. Up. IV,4,22);

“[This is the constant greatness of the knower of \textit{Brahman}]; he does not increase nor become less by action” (Bṛh. Up. IV,4,23);

“[This is] without and within, unborn” (\textit{Mund. Up. II,1,2});

“[So the one inner \textit{Atman} of all beings] is not afflicted with the suffering of the world, being outside of it” (\textit{Ka\textth{}. Up. V,11});

etc.

That is because anything other than \textit{Atman} does not exist,—this is the highest reason.

As duality does not exist, all the sentences of the \textit{Upani\textad{\textad{\textad{s}}}ds} concerning non-duality of \textit{Atman} should be fully contemplated.
Notes

1As far as I have investigated, this is the only place where Śaṅkara describes the pariṣamkhyāna meditation. P. Hacker translates it as “Rekapitulierende Betrachtung.” Judging from its description here given, it seems to be a kind of meditation which consists in recapitulating the conclusion which has been arrived at through one’s previous study and discussion with a teacher. It is interesting to note that Śaṅkara rejects the prasamkhyāna meditation (or prasamcaksa, see Upad 1,18,9 ff. and note 13 of Upad 1,18) but recommends the parisamkhyāna meditation (cf. PBh 1,5,29, p. 24). But the difference between them is not clear.

2See Upad I,1,3-5.

3See Upad II,1,18-20.

4According to Nirukta 1,2, there are six modifications of becoming (sadbhavavikara): (1) birth (jayate), (2) existence (asti), (3) alteration (viparinamate), (4) growth (vardhate), (5) decay (apaksyate), and (6) destruction (vinsyati).

Śaṅkara points out a self-contradiction in the Śāṃkhya system, saying that it describes the internal organ as three in one place and as one in another place (BSBh II, 2,10, p. 425), but he himself does not make his position clear with regard to the number and concept of the internal organ. See Introduction, III,B,1, pp. 30-31.

Rāmatirtha interprets their objects as pleasure and pain. Cf. Upad I,15,13; 18,201; II,1,34-35.

False knowledge (mithyājñāna) is a synonym for nescience (avidya) in Śaṅkara’s usage. See Mayeda Upad, pp. 24-25; Introduction, IV,D,1, p. 78.

As in Upanisads such as Chānd. Up., Ait. Up., Kaṇḍ. Up., Kena Up., and Śvet. Up., the Prose Part ends with a repetition of the last word. See Mayeda Upad, p. 66.

INDEX TO INTRODUCTION

Note: An index of Sanskrit words in the Upadesasthāhārī is attached to Śaṅkara’s Upadesasthāhārī, Critically Edited, with Introduction and Indices by Sengaku Mayeda (Tokyo: Hokusaido Press, 1973).

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|| उपदेशसाह्री ||

(Metrical Section)

US-P01.001ab चैतन्यं सर्वं सर्वं सर्वभूतगुणाशयम् ।
US-P01.001cd यतू सर्वविषयानंतं तस्मी सर्वविवे नमः ॥
US-P01.002ab समाप्यं किया: सर्वं दारान्याधानपूर्विका: ।
US-P01.002cd ब्रह्मविद्यामध्येपाँ बक्तुं बेद: प्रचक्षे ॥
US-P01.003ab कर्मीणि देव्योगार्थं देह्योगे प्रियाप्रिये ।
US-P01.003cd भूवे स्यातां ततो रागो दृष्टेश्व सत: किया: ॥
US-P01.004ab धमोधार्मिक ततोद्वास्य देह्योगस्तथा युनः ।
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US-P01.006ab निदेवज्ञानानानानं कर्ममेत्तकूलतः ।
US-P01.006cd नाजान्यात्म्याप्ने हि गान्धुस्त्रयों भवेत् ॥
US-P01.007ab गान्धुस्त्रयमाथे कर्मं देववन्यं धृवम् ।
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US-P01.008cd विवायय: सहुकारित्वं मोक्षं प्रति हि तदु ब्रजेत् ॥
US-P01.009ab यथा विवायं तथा कर्मं चोऽविचित्विविषेत:।
US-P01.009cd प्रत्यायस्मूर्तेश्वः कार्यं कर्मं मुमुखर्भिः।
US-P01.010ab ननु ध्रुवश्ला विवाय नान्यतः किनिविषेक्षे ।
US-P01.010cd नागिनां खर्वान्यं ध्रुवकार्यानविषेक्षे ॥
US-P01.011ab तथा ध्रुवश्ला विवाय कर्मं नित्यविषेक्षे ।
US-P01.011cd इत्येकं केचिदविच्छिन्ति न कर्मं प्रतिकूलताः ॥
US-P01.012ab विवाययः प्रतिकूल हि कर्मं स्यात्साभमानतः।
US-P01.012cd निविष्कर्मात्मविद्विश्व विवेचित्वह प्रकृतिताः ॥
US-P01.013ab अहं कर्तां ममें स्यार्थविनित कर्मं प्रयत्नाति ।
US-P01.013cd वस्त्रनीनं भवेदं विवाय कर्तीयों भवेदं विधि: ॥
US-P01.014ab कार्याण्यमूर्त्वमुनाति विवायाः ब्रुद्धिविषेक्षे ।
US-P01.014cd तत्सत्यमतिमावध्य कर्मं कर्तृं व्यवस्थित हि
US-P01.015ab ब्रुद्धिवादतः शक्यं कर्मं कर्तृं न विवायः ॥
सहेज विद्वान तस्मात कर्म देवं मुमुशुना
बेदान्तरिवशिष्य देशिनो ग्रहनं निजम्
प्राणिस तदविशेषस तात्तु कर्मविविषे सत
नेति नेतीति देशाधिपोह्यात्माप्रोष्टिः
अविशेषात्मबोधायं तेनाविवा निविदतता
असत्येवाविवे धि प्रत्यगाभ्यामने केवले
न चेद्र भूयः प्रसूतेत कर्ता भोक्ते थाईः कथम्
सदस्मीति च विज्ञानं तस्माद् विद्यासहायिका
अत्येन्द्रियजित्वं त्यासः श्रुत्यात् एव धि
कर्मभ्यां मानसान्त्वे एताविविष वाजिनाम्
अमृतलम् श्रुतं तस्मात् त्याज्यं कर्म मुमुशुनि
अनिष्टोर्तविज्ञेतं तत्रेकमोभिभीते
नैकारकरसाध्यायवात् फलाल्पचः च कर्मणः
विज्ञा तद्विपीतातो इत्यतलो विपिनो भवेत्
कृष्णविवेच फलाल्पवादन्यकमोऽपूण्यम्
अनिष्टोऽत्वेकः विद्याम्यत किमेरुष्टे
प्रत्यवास्यस्तु तस्तेवेय यस्तांद्वां इत्यते
अहंकारफलाधिप्ते विवेच्यं नाल्लेविदिन्
तस्माद्रजानप्राः संसाराविनवृतते
ब्याबिध्विधिर्वारायणाय प्रार्थ्योपपिनिषत् विच्यम्
सदेशोपपूर्वोर्विषि चोपिणिषि भवेत्
मन्दिकरणमानाच च गमदि: शात्नात् तथा
प्रेणेहुमशक्यत्वान् नेति नेतीति शेषितम्
द्वं नामधिन्त नामधिन्यद्वा प्रतिपुत्
देशीरिद्वमातोल्या वाचारमध्यकोरा
निष्ठालोकावस्तु सा न पुनस्तेश्कराय
मूर्त्वे मन्त्राविधिताय नोचरा जायते भवति
द्रृष्टिर्क्षि: स्वयंसिद्ध: फलत्वाविनय स न वाच्यते
द्वन्द्वनिर्मितकम्य शोकमोहाविद्विषम्
वनाद गन्धारको यदुत्स्वास्तमानः प्रपन्धते
ईश्वरकेदनात्मा त्यानु नासाध्यस्वीति भारयेत्
आत्मा चेदीश्रोत्स्वीति विज्ञा साध्योनवित्का
आत्मोद्यथस्य चेदू धर्मं अस्यूतितवाचयो मता:
अहंप्रत्यविशेषं यथाहंप्रत्यवत्सितं ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

परत्र चेन निशेषार्धे शृण्यतरवर्णं हि तत् ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

वृहद्योर्यविद चान्त्रस्त्र प्रत्यगातस्य इष्ठयते ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

अप्राणो ह्यमनः शुश्रू इति चान्त्रस्त्रं वचः ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

अहंप्रत्यविशेषं यथाहंप्रत्यववत्सितं ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

दृष्टवच चेत् प्रोहः स्यान्नान्यकथा से इष्ठयते ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

तत्सिद्धे कथे तत् स्यान्नान्यकथा से इष्ठयते ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

वृहद्योर्यविद चान्त्रस्त्र प्रत्यगातस्य इष्ठयते ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

मृगाधान्तो यथोदासं नायान्त्रदृष्टिः ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

कर्मनार्थाद्वैतस्य जन्तोत्तरानान्त्रहर्षस्थता ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

बुद्धद्विधर्वतिवक्त्स्मथयतीविस्मयं च दृष्टयते ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

नीतिस्मयं यथा वृष्णप्रर्तदृष्टिः संसारविश्वं ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

नीतिस्मयं प्रार्थतोभवेन नगान्तर्गमनं यथा ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

आसमनं संसृतीप्रदृश्यं ध्यात्वतीत्तथा प्रक्षिप्तं ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

चेतन्यप्रतिविवेचनं ध्यायतो बोधों प्रक्षिप्तं ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

बुद्धं श्रव्यमविनोभस्तेन मोमुद्राते जगतु।

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

चेतन्यभावात्मानाभस्तेन च तदस्य यथा ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

इदमंश्राप्रणां न परं सोनुन्दबो मयेतु।

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

छिद्घ्या यज्ञवेत्तेन इत्से न्यं नात्मा विशेष्यते ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

तथा प्रितेन सर्वेन येन येन विशेष्यते ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

तत्सामाय यज्ञवेत्तेन इत्से न्यं सर्वं विशेष्यस्म।

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

अनाल्पमच्छे ततस्माज्ज्जो मुक्तः सर्वविशेषयोः।

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

विशेषयतिं सर्वं जातः आत्मन्यसदैव भवेत् ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

अध्यास्तमतः सर्वं जातः आत्मन्यसदैव भवेत् ॥

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

जातिवाल्मीकिस्माच्छा प्राणों भैरवमूल्यव्यक्तिः।

उस-पौराणिकरसामायन्यत्र ततोस्यूक्ताकिर्मृ।

अहृमित्यपि यदृ प्राणों व्यपेतादास्संहि तत् ॥
US-P06.005ab  यावान् स्वादिष्ठलोको यः स स्वतोऽन्यो विशेषणम्
US-P06.005cd  विशेषप्रक्षयो यष्टिस सिद्धो वैशिष्ठगुणयथा
US-P06.006ab  इदमश्रुःहहृदित्यत्र त्याज्यो नात्मेति परिभतः
US-P06.006cd  अह्ं प्रधो० न श्यातोऽनृभूतपूर्ववागतभवित्

US-P07.001ab  बुद्धारुः सदा सर्व दृश्यते यत्र तत्र वा
US-P07.001cd  मया तस्मात् परं ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञानस्तमात् सर्वम्
US-P07.002ab  यथामुद्विचारार्यं साक्षी तद्वृत्ते परेषपि
US-P07.002cd  नेतापूः न वावातु यध्यस्तस्मात् परो द्विहृः
US-P07.003ab  विकारमशुःद्वृत् भौतिकलवां न परातः
US-P07.003cd  अशेषुद्विचाराक्षित्वात् दृश्यचुः चाल्वेदना
US-P07.004ab  मणि प्रकाश्यते यद्दु रक्तावृकारतात् पते
US-P07.004cd  मणि सद्दृश्यते सर्वमात्सनेवे तन् मया
US-P07.005ab  बुद्धारुः भवेद बुद्धी सत्यां नास्ति निवयः
US-P07.005cd  द्वृष्टायस्मात् सदा द्वृष्टा तस्मात् हृतं न विचते
US-P07.006ab  अविवेकात् परामायं यथा दृश्यविवेत् तथा
US-P07.006cd  विवेकात् तु पराधल्यः स्वयं चापि न विचते

US-P08.001ab  विज्ञस्वरूपः स्वतेषां एव मे मते रसाधियोगस्तव मोहकारिति
US-P08.001cd  अतो न किंचित्तर तव चेतितेन मे फले भवेत् सर्वविशेष्यानम्
US-P08.002ab  विमुच्या मायामयकाल्यात्मिन्ह प्रशान्तिमायायस्वदीहितात् सदा
US-P08.002cd  अहं परं ब्रह्म सदा विमृग्धत्वम् तथासेवां दुःस्वर्जितं यतं
US-P08.003ab  सदा च भूतेऽक्षोऽसमोऽस्मिन केवलो यथा च संवासम्पर्यं शिवम्
US-P08.003cd  निरन्तरं निश्चलत्वाधिन्यं परं ततो न मेंदृस्तीःः फले तवेहितं
US-P08.004ab  अहं मेमको न तवददिष्यते तथा न कस्यापहृत्स्वस्म्यस्मात्
US-P08.004cd  असंभूपोऽहितो न मे त्यथा कृतेन कार्यं तव चाल्वितः
US-P08.005ab  फले च हेतुत्व च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च च
US-P08.005cd  जनस्य संवाचस्मिं प्रक्षरत्वभाय लघुलघुस्तवस्मायम्
US-P08.006ab  संवाचस्तं यदि विन्याण्यमि नरो विमुच्यते ज्ञानमाह्यभयामात्
US-P08.006cd  विमृग्धकामश्च तथा जनं सदा चत्रत्वशोः सम आत्मित् मुखी

US-P09.001ab  सुख्ष्मतत्त्वपिते जे ज्ञानोदरुत्तरोत्तरारम्
US-P09.001cd  प्रवगचारसामान्यं पूर्वपूर्वप्राप्ताणं
US-P09.002ab  शारीरिक पृथिवीं तावद यावद बाह्या प्रमाणं
US-P09.002cd  अवबद्धमचि तत्वाणि तावज् ज्ञानिन कृत्तन्तः
US-P09.003ab  पाण्ड्राणां यथोत्तरते पूर्वं श्रे सर्वगं तथा
अहमेकः सदा सर्वभिषिक्मात्र: सर्वगोदयः ॥

ब्रह्मायाः स्थारान्ते ये प्राणिनो मम पूः स्मृतः ॥

कामजोधायों दोषा जायेनूँ मे कृतोदयः ॥

भूलोकैः सदास्तुं सर्वभूतस्मानंकरम् ॥

नीति योम यथा वालो दृष्ट तो वीक्षते जनः ॥

मच्छन्यत्वभास्यस्वातः सर्वप्राणिधिः सदा ॥

पूर्मम प्राणिः सदा सर्वज्ञ विपार्यन्सः ॥

जनिमाजः जानिवज्ञायं स्वजानविनियोगः ।

नित्यं निविष्यं जानं तस्माद् द्वेतं न विचारः ॥

जातुजित्वं नित्योक्तं सुसुप्तः लघुवास्मृतः ॥

ब्राह्मणातिस्तवगुरुवातस्तु ग्राह्याः चाससिद्धस्ताम्भ ॥

पुरवत्तकास्तवात् न दृष्टोऽः कर्मं तथा ॥

एवं विजानाकर्मवं भूमिनो नास्ति स्तितं गम्यते ॥

सृष्टिस्वरूपं गगनोपमं परं सकृद्धिभातं लघुरक्षाकशरम् ॥

अलेकः सर्वगतं यद्यन्ते तद्रेव चाहं सततं विनिल्लक आऽम् ॥

शृङ्गस्तु सद्दालोकविकियत्तस्त्र हेतु में सतति काश्चक्रियं विशयः स्वभावः ॥

पुरांस्त्रश्रोतं स्वाह्यं सर्वं सुपूर्णंभुमा त्वग आलमि स्थितः ॥

अप्रजोडङ्गशर्क प्रथाजोडङ्गमृतः स्वायतः सर्वगतोऽन्तः ॥

न कारणं कार्यं तिनं निम्नः सदेव तृप्तं तरतो विनिल्लक आऽम् ॥

शृङ्गस्तु जार्तिस्तवपुरा दश्मणं न में सतति किचिदं स्वभिवेच्छ मोहनम् ॥

स्वतः तेषा परतोऽन्तस्वतःस्तुः प्रचोदिमं सदा दुःखद्रुः ॥

अर्थर्वद्विविशिष्यः कारणसभीमेयं में न चाहं मम निविष्यं कर: ॥

शृङ्गस्तुपञ्चविनियमः स्वभावः स्वभावः स्वभावः स्वभावः एवास्मि सदा दुःखद्रुः ॥

दुःखेश्वनन्तः ततेव संतेरस्वस्समः स्वपतो हि शृङ्गवबत् ॥

द्वयं तु सतं मम नास्ति विनिष्या विकाराद्वीपन् हि में दुःखद्रुः ॥

न पुण्यपापे न च मोक्षबन्धने न चात्मृ वर्णेन्द्रताशङ्गितः ॥

अनादिता निमुष्यठों न कर्मेः फलं च तस्मात् परमोऽन्तः ॥

यथा नमः सर्वगतं न नित्यवतें तथा ह्वाः देहातोऽपि सुक्षमं ॥

सदा च भूतेषु समोऽन्तविकारः क्षरकारायं परमो ह्योऽच: ॥

प्रतांतवच्च तथायोऽपि सनु विपर्यये भावक्षेत्रविविषय ऐः ॥

अविविष्या भाववयं च कर्मभिविष्यक्तं आत्मायवविष्यं सुनिम्नम: ॥

दुःखद्रुः त्रिविषयं स्तहत्त्वः तथायु गगनं स्वाह्यं ॥

अहं परं ब्रह्म विनिल्लकः पद्मसः न जायते भूय त्रिति शृङ्गवत्वः ॥

च न चेत्त तेजस्ति प्रजायते फलं न जन्मात्तितं ततो ह्योऽचः ॥

ममेव नयं तं तवाद एकः च तथाह्यं च परोऽपि चाच्यथा ॥

विमूढङ्गकश्च जनस्य कल्यानः सदा समेः ब्रह्मायाः चाह्यैः जिवेः ॥
यदद्रभ ज्ञानमतीव निमित्त महानसं तत्र न शोकमोहता।

तयोयभावे न हि कर्म जन्म वा भवेदरय वेदविवां विनिषयः।

सुषुंश्वज जागसिरि यो न पश्यति द्रव्यं तु पश्यसयिष्ठा।

तथा च कुवाशिष्य निषिद्ध व: स आत्मविश्व नाय्य इतीह निषिद्धः।

द्विद्वामुक्ति परमभीयं वयः हि वेदान्तविनिषितं परम्।

विमुच्यतेदस्मिन् यदि निषिद्तो भवेन न लिप्यते व्योमवदेय कर्मभिः।

ईश्वरतवं स्वतं सिद्धं जन्मात्र: च तत्तोष्टन्तः।

अज्ञानं तयतोतान्तं सति सति निविन्यं।

एताप्य ध्यमारुतं न किंचिद्वन्तं सहायस्य।

जानस्विति द्वृथ्वत्वं सतिं मार्गेऽति वाय।

सर्वेण्यं मनोत वृतत्तविशेषाणम पश्यतः।

तथां मेव निविन्यास्य विशेषः स्वातु कर्मचन।

मनोवृत्तं मनोवृत्तं स्वातेऽवज्ज जागरणिस्वितः।

संग्रास्दे द्रव्यासत्वाय चिन्मात्रः सर्ववेडः।

स्वप्नं सति यथा ॥५॥ वोभादु वेदात्मानः तथेषव च।

प्रत्येकादेः प्रमाणात्तं जागरत व्याय सत्त्वेत्तात्।

योमवृत्तं सर्वमूलस्य भूतवेदीविविष्णः।

साक्षी चेतागुणः शुद्धा श्रद्धावृत्तार्थी केशः।

नामशक्तियाम्यावाहस्य नित्यस्मुक्तस्वरूपावः।

आहमात्म परं द्रव्य चिन्मारोहं सवादायः।

अहं द्रव्यास्विति कालो व भोक्ता वास्तिनात व च।

ते नेता जानकर्मयाचाया नासिकः: स्वयम समंजयः।

धमोधमवल्योऽधे इत्दोहम्मोऽयथामनः।

शास्त्राद्व भ्राम्मतमयस्य मोक्षशानात तथ्यत्ताम्।

या महाराजनायास्ता वासना: स्वप्नविविष्णः।

अनुभूयन्त्य एवेऽत तत्तोष्टन्तः: केवलो दृष्टि:।

कोशाविभ विनिष्कृतः: कार्यकारणविनिष्टः।

यथायस्विदृश्यते स्ववने तद्वद बोधा स्वयंप्रमः।

आपेक्षाते प्रतिस्वद्वस्य ज्ञस्य स्वभावविं न पदः।

उक्तं नेत्याविवाहयुग कल्यतस्त्यापनेतृत्वा।

महाराजादिऽऽलो भो यदत्म प्रकल्पित:।

स्वंते तद्वद दृश्यं विद्यादू रूपं वासनया सह।

देहमुच्यर्थम न कार्यां वासनारूपिणा किया।

नेत्रनेत्रायामरुपका न मे कार्यों किया कवतित्।

न तत्तोष्टमृतताशास्ति कर्मणोऽजनिेष्टुऽ।
प्रकाशस्य यथा वेदं सालोकमभिमन्यते।

प्रकाशस्य यथा चाभं नाते नेतीत्वायम् प्रियो मम।

विपरीतमतोद्भवं यथू त्यजेत् तत्त सक्रियं ततः।

प्रकाशस्य यथा वेदं सालोकमभिमन्यते।

एकादीको कर्थ्या स्थातां विरुध्दो न्यायोऽया वद।

देवधधामामनि दुःखो नादेवस्यस्यभावः।

त्ये द्रव्यं तद्विद्वयं मृधो लोको न चण्यं।

त्यं कुरु त्यं तदेवे वियावेककालिकी।

एकादीको कर्थ्या स्थातां विरुध्दो न्यायोऽया वद।

देवधधामामनि दुःखो नादेवस्यस्यभावः।

स्त्राणवत् तत्त्रहणाय तत् त्वमेत्यावृत्तो तुषे।

स्यायमुवस्तं यथा यथा मुखं नुष्ठापयेव दर्शे।

पश्यस्तं प्रत्ययं योगी दृष्ट आत्मेति मन्यते।

तं च मृधं च यथं प्रत्ययं वेति नो दर्शे।

स एव योगिनां भेधो नेतरः स्थासु न संख्यं।

विज्ञातवेद्यु विज्ञाता न्यूनमित्यावृत्ते यतः।

स स्यायमुवस्तं यथा यथा मुखं नुष्ठापयेव दर्शे।

हृदयेपं सदा नित्ये दर्शनार्दभो भय।

कर्थ्या स्थातां ततो नाय्यं इच्छितेदुस्वस्तम्।

यवस्त्यस्तस्तत्वावेदेव हृदेषु स स्यायस्य तथा।

प्रतिच्छेद्यद्यश्च श्राक्रमपरः समवेकारसः।

नित्मुक्तस्वभावं शुद्धं सोऽहं ब्रह्मात्मिकं केवलं।

विज्ञानुवैव विज्ञाता परोद्ध्वः संभवत्यतं।

विज्ञातान्त्यरी मुक्तं सब्वोत्तेः सब्वंद्रा।

यो वेदालोगः ब्रह्माद्वित्यमातेन कर्त्ताम् तथा।

ब्रह्मविवर्तवाद यथा मुख्यां स आत्मजो न चेत।

जातिवाहाविविज्ञं शुद्धं मुक्तं सववेत्यपि।

विवेकप्रायो तु हि इत्त्वथ्यात् न ज्ञ्यविलयः।

अच्छेस्मा स्वात्मनो दृष्ट्नात्माया कारके यं।

दृष्यमयो चानाया दृष्यं जन्यस्तास्या: प्रकाशिता।

देवधधामामनि दुःखो नादेवस्यस्यभावः।

नेव किंचिद् करोमीति सत्या हुद्धः प्रमाणजसः।
अमनस्तथ्याविकारित्वे विदेश्वशिपिनो मम ||
उस-13.015cd

इतःतदृ यावदजानं तावत् कायः ममाभवत् ||
उस-13.016ab

नित्यमुक्तस्य शुद्धि भुद्धि च सदा मम ||
उस-13.016cd

सामाधिवासामाधिवारस्मिना कायः प्राप्तं कुतो भवेत् ||
उस-13.017ab

मां हि ध्यात्ता च द्वृद्धा च महत्त्ते कृत्कृत्यतां ||
उस-13.017cd

अहं प्रविष्टस्मि सर्वाःस्मि शुद्धो बुद्धो च विष्णुसितः सदा ||
उस-13.018ab

अजः सर्वग एवाहिमज्जुर्गाम्यते श्रावः ||
उस-13.018cd

मद्द्वम्: सर्वोत्तेऽधृतः श्रव्याण न विचते ||
उस-13.019ab

कर्मोपक्रमेण साधीं च चेतु नित्योऽगुणोऽद्भवः ||
उस-13.019cd

न सच्च चाहं न चायस्च च नोभयं केवः: निवः: ||
उस-13.020ab

न मे संध्या न रात्रिवः नाहर्वः सर्वधा दृश्ये: ||
उस-13.020cd

सर्वधृतिविद्युतं यद यथा खं सूक्ष्मसमस्यम् ||
उस-13.021ab

दातायाय: विद्वानं ब्रजोऽवाहं तथाद्यम् ||
उस-13.021cd

मायात्स्वत्य ता आत्मिति भयं व्याम्यो यथा भवेत् ||
उस-13.022ab

एक्षम्य शुष्णिष्ठेन तथा मम विकल्पत: ||
उस-13.022cd

भेदेभेदस्तथा चेतु नाना नाना चेतं विकल्प्यतम् ||
उस-13.023ab

जेयं: जाता गतिरंग्नाति श्रुत्येक्षेत्तम् कुलो भवेत् ||
उस-13.023cd

न मे हेमं न चादेयमविकारी यतो द्वृम् ||
उस-13.024ab

सदा मुक्तस्तथा शुद्धा: सदा बुद्धो:गुणोऽद्भवः ||
उस-13.024cd

इत्येवं सर्ववातः विधाताः सर्वं संभावितं: ||
उस-13.025ab

विमात्रा मां स्वदेहस्यं ऋपिमुक्तः: भृष्यो भवेत् ||
उस-13.025cd

कृत्कृत्यश सिद्धश्यो: ग्राहण: एव च ||
उस-13.026ab

यदेवेव वेद तत्वादशमन्या द्वात्स्तं भवेत् ||
उस-13.026cd

वेदाण्य: निषिद्धो द्रुप: समासेन मयोदितं: ||
उस-13.027ab

सत्यत्त्यव: प्रवक्त्व्य: शान्तेभ्यं: शालिवद्विन: ||
उस-13.027cd

उस-14.001ab त्वर्मस्मृत्योर्वर्द्धीमुः: रूपःभास: प्रदृश्यते।
उस-14.001cd

पुरा: मुने तद्वकारा: भीड्येत्यत्सत्तमीलीये: ||
उस-14.002ab

भिक्षामादं यथा स्वने वृहो वेद्ये: न स्वयम्।
उस-14.002cd

जागृहुस्यात् तथा देवः द्रृश्यार्द्धं एव सं:।
उस-14.003ab

मूर्छितं यथा तत्रां मति मित्रां जायते: तथा:।
उस-14.003cd

रूपादीन: व्याजुवचो: विंत्ति तेनि दृश्यते: भृवंसम्।
उस-14.004ab

व्याजुको यथा वाक्यो: व्याजुवचार्यतामिति॥
उस-14.004cd

सर्वाध्यायकाल्यां विरयाकारां प्रदृश्यते॥
उस-14.005ab

भीरेवाध्यायसर्वप्रत्य यथा पुंसा दृष्टा पुरापि च।।
उस-14.005cd

न चेत् स्वने: कथं पश्येत् स्मरितो: वाकृति: कुतः।।
उस-14.005cd
US-P14.006ab व्यञ्जकत्वं तदेवस्या स्पष्टाचाकारदुरुस्त्यता 
US-P14.006cd द्रष्टृक्तं च दुःशेषस्तुद्दुः व्यञ्जितं: स्मादुः धियु उड़वे। 
US-P14.007ab विन्मात्रिज्योतिष्य सब्दाः सब्देहुः बुद्धयः। 
US-P14.007cd मया समातू प्रकाशयन्ते सब्दात्मान ततो ह्राहसम्। 
US-P14.008ab करणं कर्म कर्ता च किरिया स्वप्ने फलं च धी:। 
US-P14.008cd जाप्रथेयं यतो दृष्टा दृष्टा तस्मात्त ततोद्यन्त्यरः। 
US-P14.009ab बुद्धवदीनामात्मात्व देहोऽपदवेदृष्टयुपयतः। 
US-P14.009cd हानोपादानकर्त्ता त्याययो न च गृहते। 
US-P14.010ab सराहाभ्यस्त ररे शुद्ध प्रस्वाने करो च। 
US-P14.010cd बादूमात्रिज्योति चाव्यतुः कथे हेये प्रकार्न्ते। 
US-P14.011ab य आत्मा नेति नेतिति परापोहेन येषितः। 
US-P14.011cd स चेदु ब्रह्मविद्वादमेतो येततात: परं कथम्। 
US-P14.012ab अशान्यायसिंहकान्तः ब्रह्मविद्वामम मन्त्यारम्। 
US-P14.012cd कार्यवानू स्यां कथं चाहां विमूृषेवदेवमण्डलः। 
US-P14.013ab पारागन्तु यथा नागास्त्थि: पारं वियस्ति। 
US-P14.013cd आत्मज्ञेत तथा कार्यं कर्तुमन्यविकृत्ति। 
US-P14.014ab आत्मस्थापि यस्य स्मादुः धानोपादात यदि। 
US-P14.014cd अ मोक्षाः: स विजेयो बान्तोदसी ब्रह्मणा भूवम्। 
US-P14.015ab साधित्वं हि जगत्त प्राणस्तमानू नाइनिशेव वा। 
US-P14.015cd प्राणस्थापि नाया तं कुतो ब्रह्मविद्वेदप्ये। 
US-P14.016ab न ज्ञात्वात्मनो धात्मा विस्मरेद वायुज्वधित:। 
US-P14.016cd मनोदिकः स्मर्तित्वेतज्जृ ज्ञानजानहेतुम।। 
US-P14.017ab ज्ञातुज्ज्व: परेऽ धात्मा सोंधविधाकरित्वं: स्मृत:। 
US-P14.017cd अरोपः विशेषास्तिन रज्ज्वं सर्प इववादः।। 
US-P14.018ab कर्तुमन्यवाद्वाकान्तः सुवादाभ्यस्त राज्ज्वम्। 
US-P14.018cd ममाहं चेति नो भवस्वस्सिन कथे कुतो भवेत।। 
US-P14.019ab आत्मा धात्मीय इतेष्य मावोऽविधाविकारित्वं।। 
US-P14.019cd आत्मभूतवे धाती नासित बीजाभावे कुत: फलम्।। 
US-P14.020ab ददुः श्रोतुः तथा मनु विज्रात्वेव तब्यक्षम्।। 
US-P14.020cd द्वस्ताहचिन्यन न तदु यस्मातु तस्माद द्वस्ताहक्षरम्।। 
US-P14.021ab स्वाभावरं जनामं जैव द्वस्ताहाधिकारियव्ययुताम्। 
US-P14.021cd सुवमश्रमेवताः सुवमात्माश्रं लहा।। 
US-P14.022ab अकार्यांशात्मानक्षात्मिकाविवक्षानम्।। 
US-P14.022cd निर्ममं निरलक्षणं ये: पश्यति स पश्यति।। 
US-P14.023ab ममाहं चार्यवलेछ: शून्या एव स्माहात:।। 
US-P14.023cd आत्मनीति यदि ज्ञात्मापन्त स्वस्था: किमिभलेतः।।
US-P14.024ab योःहङ्कतारमात्मानं तथा वेत्तारमेव यः।
US-P14.024cd वेत्तानालाम एवासो योतन्यवांः स आत्मवित्॥
US-P14.025ab यथान्यत्वेश्चि तादात्म्यं देहानिवात्मवाः मतम्॥
US-P14.025cd तथात्वेश्चि जीवात् लक्ष्मीमात्सातः॥
US-P14.026ab दृश्यति: शुभतितर्कांति: स्वजने दृष्टा जने: सदा॥
US-P14.026cd तासमात्मात्समवत्वाद: प्रात्मक्षात्मानं॥
US-P14.027ab परलोकभयं यथा नास्ति मूलपत्त्यं तथा॥
US-P14.027cd तस्यात्मक्षात्मा शोचया: सुः: सब्रह्मन्यं अपीर्यत॥
US-P14.028ab ईश्वरत्वं किं तस्य ब्रह्मस्थानव वा युनः॥
US-P14.028cd तृष्णा चेतु सवर्तिष्ठानं सवर्देन्योडात्मयुभाः॥
US-P14.029ab अहुमित्तात्मप्राणों च मममुत्तात्मप्राणीवर्गः॥
US-P14.029cd अर्थायुक्ते ययो यथा स आत्मजों भवेत् तदा॥
US-P14.030ab बुद्धियोदी सत्यपापी च तथासत्यविशेषता॥
US-P14.030cd यथ्य वेदास्तमो जाता सत्स कार्यं कथं भवेत्॥
US-P14.031ab प्रसेष्व विमले व्योमिन प्रजानेकरसेद्वये॥
US-P14.031cd उप्पातशाखायो नृत्त किमन्यत् कार्याविवेचः॥
US-P14.032ab आरामान्त सवर्मृतस्थमांसं चामोऽनं वर्गः॥
US-P14.032cd पञ्चमीच्छलसिंहूं नूः श्रीतकेशुं विभाससुः॥
US-P14.033ab प्रजापतिणुकायो खाण्यवाक्षाविगोचः॥
US-P14.033cd भृत्यावीठि चोकस्तो हि शुद्धो मुक्तः स्वतः हि स:॥
US-P14.034ab अप्राणस्यामनस्तत्स्य तथासनंगिनो हृदे:॥
US-P14.034cd व्योमचुर् व्यापिनों हृदस्य कथं कार्यं भवेन मम॥
US-P14.035ab असामाधी: न परायमि निभिकारस्य सवर्दा॥
US-P14.035cd ब्रह्मचर्य: में विशुद्धस्य शोकांच चान्यह: विपाकनः॥
US-P14.036ab गन्त्वन्य: च तथेवाहुं सवर्मृतस्या च॥
US-P14.036cd नोभ्यं नाप्रस्त्विरो वाच्यो निश्चालस्यागुण्यतं:॥
US-P14.037ab विनमुक्तोपिनों नित्यं तमस्तस्मिन न विचुर्ते॥
US-P14.037cd कथं कार्यं मनोवा नित्यमुक्तस्य शिर्यते॥
US-P14.038ab अमनस्तस्य का चिर्या: किष्ठा वानिन्द्रयस्य का॥
US-P14.038cd अप्राणो हृदोऽहमन: शुद्ध इति सत्यं हृदत्वः॥
US-P14.039ab अफलत्यावदेश्वतविविकादनिमित:॥
US-P14.039cd आन्तो: नेव कालोऽह्वेये भयावहः सदा॥
US-P14.040ab यस्मिन् देवाशः देवाश पवित्रं कृत्तमेकलाम्॥
US-P14.040cd ब्रजेत् तनं मानसं तीथे यस्मिन् स्नात्मामृतो भवेत्॥
US-P14.041ab न चास्ति श्रव्यिन्नमन्येवन: परस्परं शापिन न च दृष्टते॥
US-P14.041cd परेण दृश्यात्स्य यथा रसायस्यस्तेघ्व दृश्यत्तत्त एव दृष्टिः:॥
अहं ममेवण्यवल्लविक्रिया: सुखाद्यस्मद्विद्युप्रद्वश्यतः ।
दृश्यत्योगाच च परस्परवेण तेन दृश्यता यथित ततः परो भवेत् ॥
अहंकारायं हि समस्तविक्रिया सकार्त्वा कर्मवेदन संहिता ।
वितिश्रृंपण समनोकृतः प्रकाश्यमानाभिनितात्मो श्रद्धा ॥
दृश्यत्योर्ण हि सर्वविद्विनां विचरं यथा विज्ञ प्राणः स्वस्विश्वेतः ।
भवते न तस्मादपरङ्गस्वतं वेदिता परोऽपि तस्मात् एक ईश्वर: ॥
श्रीरज्जुम्पौयंदि चाण्युद्धर्मसा निरालम्बादा: सुमुनिराशा मया ।
परम सिद्धो हि विश्वुपस्वातां अविवशोिन्देय: सर्व्यतासिद्धां ।
पदाविरुपं यदि ते न गृह्यर्तं चन: प्रवृत्तं बहुभा स्ववृत्तिभि: ॥
अशुद्धो चिन्दिशेषविकारायोऽभित्वा मतेवभाव वारतितुं न पायंते ॥
अशुद्धो चिन्दिशेषविकारायोऽभित्वा मतेवभाव वारतितुं न पायंते ॥
यथा विश्रुतं गस्तां निरन्तरं न सजज्ञे नापि च लिप्तं तथा ।
समस्तभूतिं संवेदं तेष्यं समं सदात्मा ज्ञातिद्वेगाभयं ।
अत्युत्तमानि च कर्मवासानां दृश्यत्योपरस्य वृहि: प्रकाश्यता: ।
अविभया द्वात्मलि विद्वृत्तिविद्यमानं नेतीति अविभयो दृष्टि: ।
प्रवेशपः मनसे सद्यं योगज स्मृती: च सुनाच्य: च दृष्यत्योपर्वतः ।
तथेऽव दद्दात्तमानंति पृथ्वीं दृश्यं: शरीरं च मनोत्युद्दश्य: ॥
स्वाभवशृंद: गगने वचनादिके चिन्दिशेषके सति चाविशेषातः ।
यथा च तद-चुंचुंदं चिन्दितविरुद्धवये सदाविशेषों गगनविस्मे दृश्य: ॥

नान्यदल्यद्व भवेद् यस्मान् नान्यत् किंचिद् विचित्येत् ।
अन्यस्यान्यान्याभावे हि नाशस्तस्य धूर्वे भवेत् ॥
समर्थो दुष्टेऽदुः पर्यं च चिचित्यापितम् ।
यत्र येन च तौ ज्ञेयी तवस्यकर्तव्रजसह: ॥
फलान्तर चानुकूऽ यथ: युक्तं कर्त्तव्यकारके: ।
स्मर्येमाण धि कर्मयं पूर्वं कर्मेय तत्त: तत: ॥
इद्दात्यद्व भवेद् दद्दात् दृष्यत्युद्दश्य: घटवत: यस्य ।
दृश्यत्य इत्याकारतीयो न भीमत्य साक्षितान्यथा ॥
स्वात्मवृद्धिमुक्तिप्राप्तासी विवेचनान्त्वात् प्रयोजन: ।
जात्याच: शवशत्य तेन तदनु नानात्मान्यथा ॥
न प्रियाप्रिय इत्युक्तेंदुशं किरिकल्य ।
देहयोग: किरिकल्यत्स्माद् विद्वान: किरिकल्यजत: ॥
कर्मस्थानम् स्वतन्त्रसंवप्ता निरूपी तय: तययायताम् ।
अदेहते च फलेकारं जाते कुर्यांतं कर्यं किरिक ।
जात्यादीनं संपरिवृज्य निरूपी कर्मयं बुढः: ।
कर्मेव विरुद्ध यथ: स्वरूपं श्रास्त्र: स्मरेित: ॥
आत्मक: सर्वभूतेन तानि तस्मिन्शं से यथा ।
पर्यङ्गाद् योमवत् सर्व शु्रां दीपितमदिव्यते ॥
उद्विष्णुस्मायोभन्ते स्तूलं वेषं निवारेयते ॥
शुद्धानुपतत्वा तेन लिङ्गं चाकायमित्वत ॥
उद्विष्णुवेश्वरं यथाश्च यवेष्ठे चारवीतर ॥
तद्रुवं वेति य आत्मानं समं स गुत्वक्षितमः ॥
यथा हन्नशरीरं ममाहत्ता न चेष्यते ॥
अस्मिन्दापि तथा वेषं धीमाशिवलाविशेषत् ॥
रुपसंस्कारतुल्यार्थी रागद्विगुणं च यत् ॥
गृहाते भीमशेषं तस्मात् ज्ञाता शुद्धोभयं सदा ॥
यथा नास्तिन्योद्धत्वं नात्त्वात्ता किरात्तमि ॥
आत्मानं चाचन्तेश्वरतवात् सापेक्षा हि न तत्र स्वयम् ॥
खंभीकरसा जन्तिरविभक्ताजरामला ॥
बर्तमानसुपाध्यायं सा विपरीता विभावते ॥
दृश्यकल्पतृत्वमिलस्य नामस्मामृण्य अविविधत ॥
तथान्त्ये प्रत्यया जेया धोषात्मकम् लोकं ध्वंत ॥
सर्वप्रत्ययसाश्चिक्तेष्वरिकारी च सम्भवः ॥
विविधतेऽवद खंडं बुद्धद्विवात्न्यावरुणविव ।
न दृष्टीन्दुप्ते ब्रह्मशुष्कवेष्येन तु ॥
नहीं इद्दुःलितं ह्यकं तस्मात् इद्दु स्वप्नं भुक् ॥
संपाद्यात् वासिन्म भूतानां करणां तथैव ।
व्यस्तं वान्ततःयात् वासिम को वाम्सीति विचारेयत् ॥
व्यस्तं नाई समस्तं वा भूतसनस्धियमेव वा ॥
जेयवत्तैः करण्तवाच च जातायोद्धमाः प्रतादिवलः ॥
आत्मानेकरिन्त्वा बुद्धद्विवात्न्याकार्कममं ।
दीपिता प्रज्वलन्येष द्वारे शोकाविद्वधिं सदा ॥
दक्षिणाक्षिक्रान्तेऽयदा बुद्धविविधे त्व ।
विषयेविन्द्रिक्वीति दीपिता आत्मार्गः स्तूलज्वृक्त ।
हूलमते तु हुविष्णुरं रूपादिग्रहणे स्मरन् ॥
अरागोधः आत्मामनी जाग्राहोपरि निष्ठेत ॥
मानसे तु गृहं व्यक्ता अधिवायम्बवासना ।
पश्चस्थितं अच्योक्तं श्वयंज्योति: प्रकाशिता ।
विष्णु वासना वापि चोखलस्ते नेव कर्ममं ॥
यदा बुद्धी तदा जेयः प्राण आत्मा उपनयन्त्युक्त ॥
मनोबुद्धीतः इत्याद्यो अवस्था कर्मादिता ।
चेतन्येनेव भास्यन्ते श्रवणेऽव घटादये ॥
तत्रैव सतिः बुद्धीर्ज आत्माभासावासयनः ॥
पार्थिवः कठिनो धातुर्भो वेदेहस्मतमः॥
परिवर्तितावस्त्राशः स्युद्धिवियम्बरोऽव्यासः॥
प्रशान्तिनि तद्विश्व उपत्यायिताःः कमागः॥
सङ्कलितविदं भ्व स्युजातीयार्थमिन्द्रयमः॥
ब्रह्मविद्यायहेतुनि बाक्पाण्याद्विनि कर्मेऽः॥
तद्विक्याध्यायान्त्यमनस्त् मनो एकार्थेन भवेत॥
निश्चयार्थे महेभु दुःखस्त स्वर्णस्तुनुभिैपैः॥
वातामोक्षः स्वरुपेण ज्योतिषा व्याज्यन्त् सवः॥
वद्यक्षके डूः यथातोऽव्यायस्याखारातश्च गतः॥
त्वत्कीर्तिष्यकेस्यस्तिस्माटृदृशः प्रत्येकः सवः॥
स्थितो दीपोऽयोऽपि सवं प्रकाशितेत्॥
श्वासाकारं दृश्यातः प्रात्स्थापत्तु प्रश्यति॥
श्रीरेवन्न्यथस्थवा आत्मवेजः गतां धिष्यमुः॥
नित्यात्मव्यााशिः दीपां विशिष्ठुण्टु मुखायः॥
श्रीतोऽर्जुनानां दृःस्त्विशः प्रश्यति धिः पश्यति॥
भस्मान्यो शुक्लानां दृःति ख्रात्वाच च न दृःख्यती॥
गुणाना समभावस्य अंशों न हुए उपरकते ।
अविवाद: प्रसुमतल्वानु न चान्यो हेतुरिक्यते ॥
इनर्तरहेतुर्वष्ट वार्त: स्थान सवान न वा ॥
निनयमों न दुर्भूतीयो गुणेष्वात्मि वा भवेत् ॥
विशेषो मुख्तारामां तार्टवेय च न दुर्भूते ।
अथार्थिनो विषाद्विन नार्ध्यो जो नेतरोपिः वा ॥
प्रधानस्य च वरारि दुर्शस्याविकारतः ॥
न दुर्भूतं संख्यास्तेदिपि विकारोपिः न दुर्भूते ॥
संबन्धानुपपत्तेश प्रकृते: पुरुषस्य च ॥
मिथोद्युक्तं तद्वर्त्यं प्रधानस्याविविदितः ॥
कल्योन्तस्यो दिवाहित्वं ज्ञानमने च वृत्तवतः ।
निर्मिते मनोरीकः: प्रधानस्य प्रसज्यते ॥
न प्रकाश्यं यथाकालं ज्ञाननेन सुखदयं ।
एकनिद्द्वितादिपिः: स्पूर्तुः: कृताद्वितमपत्यामाः ॥
युगप्रच चामहेतुतयः तु कृतानिग्नानोपिः ।
कृतानायेव केवलेत एव त्यागाविकारतः ॥
तथान्वेत्तो च भवेत् गुणपवज्ञम नाश्याते ।
गुणाना समवेत्तवं ज्ञान चेयः न विशेष्णात् ॥
ज्ञानेव विशेष्यवेष्टः ज्ञानानात्त्वं स्मृतत्वः ॥
सुखम्बः ज्ञातं मये त्येवं तवाज्यात्मकात्य च न दुर्भूतयें ॥
सुखादेवीतम्बमध्यमावस्तेदिविकारतः ।
राजानस्य कम्मं न मनसो वार्यविशेषः ॥
राजान राजापरिहार्ययो तू ज्ञान में चेजः जेतां व्रजते ।
युगपद वापी वोपतिनरिः युगपेतुदात ।
अनवस्थान्तरवाचः च वन्यो नात्मिन निववः ॥
नामान्त्रिवत्सलावादसंविद्धो हीति च छुट्ते ॥
सुश्रृकामेत्तवर्ध्या च न लिप्यत इति छुट्ते ।
एवं तत्र न मोक्षोद्दत्त बन्धानवात्त कर्यक्षण ॥
शाश्वानांकवमेवं र्यादानु न बुद्धानन्तिनिष्ठ्येते ।
वन्यो मोक्षस्य तत्त्वात् स यथोलको न चान्यम ।
दुधामात्योरताः दीया दोभमात्मिन मन्यते ।
बुद्धान्त्रिवत्सलस्य संसारं न बुद्धानन्तिनिष्ठ्येते ।
बौधस्यात्मल्वस्य पत्तवानु नत्यं तत्क्रियते ॥
अविधेयकवायनात्तवं संसारो नाम्य इत्यते ।
मोक्षस्यात्ताश्च एव र्यादानुपपत्तिः ।
तेषां वस्त्रावर्तान्तिनामिनो नास्त्यु तेर्म्यं ॥
अन्यापेक्षात् यो नामः सोधनुविद्वस्मिवः।
अन्याविदिवसः स्मातं तत्राशो मोक्ष उच्चते।
जानेव तु सोधिर स्माय विरोधितवचानं न कर्मवाण।
कर्मकार्यस्वविद्वत्त्वः स्मादविद्वाकामकाणः।
प्रमाणं वेदा एवात्र ज्ञानस्वरूपां वन्यः।
जानेकर्षितार्थवातं व वाक्यमेकं ततो विदु:।
एकवे ह्याःस्य श्रेयं वाक्याध्यक्षप्रतीतितः।
वाच्यरेवदातं तु तड्ड तथा कल्प्यो वाच्योपि तच्छुतः।
विविधेऽविविधं नाम च कर्म च।
असदेतत्वं व तस्माद्योगवेन हि कल्पितम्।
कृतो वर्णः घा शाब्दच्छूतो न्यप्रि पिया बहिः।
दृश्य चापि यथारूपः हुँदूः: शाब्दिक वल्पते।
एवं वेदात्त्वं जगात तस्माथृिविविधाकल्पितम्।
असदेतत्वं ततो युक्तं सच्चिवाच्यः न कल्पितम्।
वेदाध्यापिसं एवाणो वेदाध्यात्त्वम् कल्पितः।
येन वेत्ति स वेदः स्मात्व स्मणे सर्वं तु मायया।
येन प्रश्यति तच्छ: चक्षः: शुद्धिति श्रोत्रमुच्यते।
येन स्वप्नगतो विनिः सा वाण प्राण तथेऽवचः।
र्वस्त्याशः च वेदं मन्यायात्त्वं तथेन्द्रियम्।
कल्प्योपाधिभिरवैतत्त्व मिन्न ज्ञानमेकक्षा।
अधिभेदाद्व यथेष्व मनोपक्षम् जायते।
जापतत्व तथा भेदेः ज्ञानस्वरूपं स्वित्तितः।
वृद्धिः व्याकरोत्त्वं भान्त्याः तुषोइविन्यः।
स्मणे यथात् प्रवचोधे व विविधानात्त्त्वेऽवचः।
आलेख्यायने यथाह: तद्वन्योगोविन्यः।
यादाय कल्प्ये भेदं तत्कारः सन्न यथाकछुः।
यत्कामिनितकुपुरूत्वा कृतं यतः ततः परमायते।
अविवारप्रवचं सवंसंसत्वं तस्मादिवं जगतः।
तत्तो यथाश: स्मात्य सुः सुः न च गम्यते।
विविधेऽविविधं श्रुतिः प्राप्ते एकवात्त्वदिहियो सि:।
तस्मात् सवेद्रोलानेन शास्त्रे विवा विधीयते।
विचे व्याध्रिवो यस्मात्त्व चः विधेय आपनेते।
यमेन्नित्येश्व यज्ञेश तपोमितस्त्वम् शोभनम्।
शारीराविद्वात: कुर्यात् तद्विश्वुद्धेशस्मृतस्मृत:।
मन्त्रादिसमाधानं तत्तंतिताशेषायस्मि।
दृष्ट जागारितं विवात् स्मृतं सध्यं तदेव तु:।

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बुध्यादेवज्ञानस्तथास्त्वानि न देही पूर्ववर्द्धित भवति ॥
सत्यं ज्ञानमन्त्रं व रसादेः पञ्चकात् परम् ॥
स्माभुष्माविश्वासोकतंत्रामहं ब्रजेति निभयः ॥
यस्माद भीता: प्रवर्तने वामनः पञ्चकादयः ॥
तदमान्तवत्त्वाजो न विभेति कुत्यथ ॥
नामांलथः: परे भूतं स्वाराज्यं चेतु स्थितोद्वैये ॥
प्रणेमेत् कं तदात्मजो न कार्य कमेन तदा ॥
विराते वेदार्णो वाय्यः स्मरन्तः प्रजापतिः ॥
प्रविलिने तु सर्वसिन्न प्राणोऽव्यकृतामुच्यते ॥
वाचार्यम्भणात्रत्वातः सुभुमाविष्कर्त्तच ॥
सत्यो ज्ञातामिथ्येऽवं सत्यसङ्को विमुच्यते ॥
भारुप्तवादू यथा भानोर्तहोरार्थे तथेव तु ॥
जानाः जाने न मे स्वाता चिन्मायवानेष्टतः ॥
शास्त्रस्मानातिश्रव्यत्वातु ब्रह्मेऽवं स्मानं सदा ॥
प्रवर्त्ते मे न हृयं स्माद प्राणं वेति च संस्मरेरेन ॥
अहुद्धेक च भूतेऽवं सर्वेदेवों नभो यथा ॥
मथि सत्याणि भूतानि पश्येऽवें न जायते ॥
प्रविलिते यथापि बानतिविङ्गश्च न्यत: क्षति: ॥
अवार्जाण्याः शुदे: किंचित्त: तस्माच्छुद्ध: स्वत्मर्ग: ॥
नेतिनेत्याविभाष्येकं प्रपमोशमोद्वः: ॥
अविज्ञातिविश्वासाच नैव ज्ञेऽस्य हृतोद्व्यथा ॥
सर्वस्मानात्मेववितत ब्रह्म चेद विदितं परम् ॥
स आत्मा सर्वभूतानामात्मा हरणामित्युः ॥
ज्ञेत् परामात्मानुस्तवनात्माद वनमस्वस्य ॥
देवोपास: स देवानां पशुव्यव: च निवर्तिते ॥
अहुद्धेक सदान्त: शुद्धस्वत्वोष्याश्चतम् ॥
हलेर्वं सत्यपस्तवादात्ताता न बध्यते ॥
कृपान्तिध्येन्चेतानेव विदुःखः परं हि थे ॥
स्वराभ्योगोन्याहं स्मास्तमस्तव्य देवा असन बनेः ॥
हितवा जात्याविएवतं वाचोद्वन्य: सह कर्ममिः ॥
अोमिलेवं स्मातमां सवं शुद्ध प्रपक्ष: ॥
सेवु सर्वव्यस्मानांहोरात्मिवज्ञितम् ॥
लिङ्गमृत्यूः सवं सकृष्योतिरनामवम् ॥
सम्प्रभूपर्वित्तिः भूतर्ष्यात्तु कृतकुतातु ॥
स्मातमां परं विवादुविमुक्तं सवव्यमने: ॥
अकृवृचं सर्वकृष्ठदुःस्त्रप्रत्येक्ति भाव: ॥
सदस्मीति प्रमाणोत्त्वा धीरन्त्या तत्प्रश्रुतवर्त्ता ।
प्रत्यक्षाभिनिभा वापि वायथे विग्रहात्मवत् ॥
करतौ ओकोतिति यथास्वं लोकबुद्धानुसारिति तद् ॥
सदस्मीति श्रुतेजातास्त वायथे द्विनैस्यतेवथ धीः ॥
सेवेव तपस्वीत्वेवे नात्मेनो मुक्तं मनो स्तिराम् ॥
प्रचते प्रसंचक्षेतमो दुःखानुस्विनत्येव ॥
सकृद्वक्त न गुहान्ति वाक्याङ्गजोधस्य विभेदः ॥
अपेक्षतेवते एवान्यदेशाना द्वेः हि तद् ॥
नियोगोष्टिप्रसंचतात् कर्मणां स यथा भवेत् ॥
अविरूढः भवेत् तावृद्धावत् संबोधवावधा ॥
चेतिन्ति च तथा मिथ्या स्वच्छन्दः प्रतिपच्छते ॥
प्रसंच्छायनमल्ल कार्य यावदाल्मानुभूयेत् ॥
सदस्मीति च विज्ञानमक्रोजो वापि ख्रिः ॥
श्रुतीत्यूढ़संस्कारो वेदेत श्रुतामुक्तेऽविहः ॥
श्रुतानुरामन्त्रामानी सामान्यविवेष्यो यत् ॥
प्रत्ययाः वक्षाङ्गजोनाय प्रसंस्कटस्य दीक्षार्थः निवार्येः ॥
वाक्यांगं प्रतिपत्येः कक्षं निःकूऽनोपविभयहेतु ॥
यदि वा दृढ़ते कक्षं वाक्यार्थश्रुतस्यात् ॥
निःकूऽनोपविभयहेतु ॥
चविः नोदशापस्वच्छुवर्त्ता स्वार्थनियत्व तथा सतः ॥
सदस्मीति फलं चोक्रवा विपेच्यं साधनः यत् ॥
कतर्कानुभुवार्यत् प्रसंस्कटस्य निवार्येः ॥
तत्समादुभवायेः प्रसंचक्षीत्व यत्वः ॥
त्यजन्त साधनवत्त्साध्यविरुद्धं श्रमान्याद्रमान ॥
बैतपेव रहस्यानां नेतिनेत्रवसान्तः ॥
कियायाप्यं पुरा आचारं न मोक्षो नियस्मिदः ॥
पुष्कुऽर्यं यथायास्तं निश्वासः स्व आत्मः ॥
अहं कर्मान्त्यथायास्तं पिन्त्रः स्व आत्मः ॥
सोदशापानां नेतिनेत्रति प्राप्तवत्त प्रतिश्चित्येः ॥
भूयोधयासविधि: कक्षं कुर्क्षितं नोपविभयहेतु ॥
आत्मनीः यथायास: प्रतिष्ठितस्यथेव ।
मलायासपनिधिः के कित्वेत्स्य यथावुधः ॥
प्राप्तकेत्त प्रतिश्चितेऽ मोक्षोऽनित्यों मनवेद्य ख्रिः ॥
अतोद्प्राप्तेऽपनिधिः द्विशिवनिचरंद्वित् ॥
संभाव्यौ गोचरे श्व: प्रत्येक्रो वा न चान्यथाः ॥
न संभाव्यौं तदात्मवादहं तुषः नीयायेः ॥
US-P18.025ab अंकक्षात्मक न्यस्तं वैधत्यं कार्त्तिकं यतृत्वादिति यति।
US-P18.025cd नेति नेतीति तत्त्व सर्व साइनकर्ण निःस्वतिः।
US-P18.026ab उपलब्धि: स्वयंप्रेयतस्वि: प्रत्यक्षविक्रयः।
US-P18.026cd साक्षात् सर्वान्तर: साक्षी चतुर निद्धे गुणोद्वृत्तत्।
US-P18.027ab संस्कृति सर्वं तद्वयः स्यात् तदवभोधे॥
US-P18.027cd आत्मानीयं द्वे चाह: स्यावहस्ममोऽधिरः॥
US-P18.028ab जातिकमात्माध्यमोऽधिक सम्मिल्यं शब्दस्वंहृती।
US-P18.028cd न किं व वर्तमानं ख्यातस्तद्भावाभ्यं स्व आत्मानि।
US-P18.029ab आभासो यत्र तत्रैव शब्दः प्रत्यगृहिः स्थिताः।
US-P18.029cd लक्षेणयुन्तं साक्षात् तमभिध्यु: कथ्यनं॥
US-P18.030ab नान्त्यान्त्याविदानं किंविद्दः श्चैविनिपः॥
US-P18.030cd आत्माभासो यतोऽहृदवात्म्यश्चैवस्यच्यते॥
US-P18.031ab उल्लेखायो यथास्थितवः परार्थवात् न चाचार्यः॥
US-P18.031cd मुखान्त्यो मुखाभासो यथावर्णयुक्तिकारतः॥
US-P18.032ab आभासात् मुखमपेयवादानुवर्तनात्॥
US-P18.032cd अहृत्यात्मानिन्धायो मुखाभासाविद्यते॥
US-P18.033ab मुखवत्व न्यस्तं आत्मान्योपविविकतः ती स्येव च॥
US-P18.033cd संसारी च स इत्येक आभासो यत्वहृतकृति॥
US-P18.034ab वस्तु विषयस्य स्मृतेऽर्जनः माधुर्यादि च कारणम्॥
US-P18.034cd जैकदेशों विकारो वा तदवभासश्वः परे॥
US-P18.035ab अहृत्वं संसारी स्वतन्त्र ईति केवः॥
US-P18.035cd अहृतकारकसंतानः संसारी नान्त्यी वृत्तः॥
US-P18.036ab इत्येव सीमात्व आहृत्व न्यायो विवाहतान्त्यः॥
US-P18.036cd संसारिणाः कथा त्वस्तं प्रकृत्व लघुभोज्यते॥
US-P18.037ab मुखाभासो या आद्वेशं धर्मं नान्त्यतरस्य सः॥
US-P18.037cd द्वयोरेक्ष्यं चेष्ट धर्मं वियुक्तेऽवन्तिरे भवेत्॥
US-P18.038ab मुखेन व्यपदेशात् च मुखवदेवेति चेष्टा मतम्॥
US-P18.038cd नादान्त्यविभावात् च मुखे सत्यविभावः॥
US-P18.039ab द्वयोरेवेति चेष्ट तत्सदेन स द्वयोरेववयवन्ति॥
US-P18.039cd अहृत्वं सतो दृष्टि: स्यात् राहोष्णम्यः॥
US-P18.040ab राहोः प्रागेव वस्तुल्यं सिद्धं शौचार्यमण्डतः॥
US-P18.040cd चार्यस्तेन व्यवस्तुल्यं तस्य स्यात् पुर्वयुक्तिः॥
US-P18.041ab चार्याकान्तेमिनिष्ठोऽयं न तु वस्तुत्साधकः॥
US-P18.041cd न द्वयविभावान्ते च शास्त्रमथ्यान्तरं वदेत्॥
US-P18.042ab माधुर्यादि च यत् कार्यमुण्डव्याघास्वेनायत॥
US-P18.042cd चार्यायां न त्वृस्त्वादापमेव च दर्शनात।॥
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राष्ट्रीय पत्रिका एवं माहिमा निराकरणा ।
US-P18.061ab

स्वस्थयक लोकस्वरूप यदि प्राप्त किया निराकरण।
US-P18.061cd

अभिप्रेरकता प्रतिकृतिक वृद्धि द्वारा उपलब्ध करता।
US-P18.062ab

दूर दूर के व्यक्तियों का निराकरण संबंधमय: ।
US-P18.062cd

आर्थिक मुख्यान्तर मुखस्थें द्वितीय मानने: ।
US-P18.063ab

स्वस्थय प्रतिकृतिक हि मुखप्रेम के दृष्टि में ।
US-P18.063cd

जानातीति किवसं लोकों के विकल्प स्वभावतः ।
US-P18.064ab

बुद्धः कार्त्तिकित्रस्य जानातीति ज्ञेयते ।
US-P18.064cd

तथा वैद्यतन्त्रिकाश्रयः ज्ञेयं बुद्धरिविविवेकतः ।
US-P18.065ab

स्वस्थ्यं चतुर्वेदं ज्ञानं नित्यं अयोग: शुद्धेऽथः ।
US-P18.065cd

न मुद्गेऽय मित्रेऽत तथावान् नात्राभावन वा सदा ।
US-P18.066ab

देहःवृत्तिः प्रत्येकः यद्वजः जानातीति च मौदिका: ।
US-P18.066cd

बद्धिन्त जानकृत्वं तद्वृद्धि वृद्धान्तात्मन: ।
US-P18.067ab

वैद्यः वैद्यवेयेंविन्द्रिणेः जिन्द्रियेः चिन्निते: ।
US-P18.067cd

मोहितः: किएऽको जाननित्याहुस्ताखीकना जना: ।
US-P18.068ab

तत्सभाजः जानाभाषुद्वृद्धीनामविवेकात् प्रकरितः।
US-P18.068cd

जानातीत्वाविविष्यत्व यथाः या च तत्स्मृताः।
US-P18.069ab

आद्वानुभावातत्वं द्वाराया अस्यते मुखे।
US-P18.069cd

बुद्धमानुष्कायित्वं जानाभाष्यम तथेऽवितः।
US-P18.070ab

बुद्धिः प्रत्येकायाः स्त्रियाः विद्येष्यः चिन्निते:।
US-P18.070cd

मोहितः: किएऽको जाननित्याहुस्ताखीकना जना:।
US-P18.071ab

मानवात्त्वात् जानाभाषुद्वृद्धीनामविवेकात् प्रकरितः।
US-P18.071cd

प्राप्तः इव भास्तं दातातीविन्नुकाययः।
US-P18.072ab

स्वभाववानामेवान्यो ग्राहकः: स्वयमेव च।
US-P18.072cd

इङ्के ग्राहकास्तीत्वं विविष्यति लोकता:।
US-P18.073ab

यद्येव नात्माध्यात्तमः किं तद्वारणमुच्यतम्।
US-P18.073cd

भावानन्तु हि तेषा: यथा नात्माशां संव यदिः।
US-P18.074ab

अन्त्यं ग्राहकलेखाशामिन्तश्रद्धि तत्समम:।
US-P18.074cd

अविश्वत्वाः वृद्धावत्त्वान्याणम्याण ग्राहकः सति।
US-P18.075ab

अभिप्रेरकः समीपे तु सिद्धि: स्वत्विति चेतन मतम्।
US-P18.075cd

नाथ्यक्षेत्रोऽर्जनान्यानाश्रयार्थ हितसमात:।
US-P18.076ab

अर्थं दु:सो च य: ऊस्ता स त्वथ्यक्षोऽथवेतर:।
US-P18.076cd

अभिप्रेरकः च दुःखितमाहितं च न ते मतम्।
US-P18.077ab

कलात्थः सदास्मीति नेव तद्रहिमहेति।
US-P18.077cd

सदेवानुत्तिति मिथ्योक्तिः शुद्धेऽरूपः न युज्यते।
US-P18.078ab

अविचित्वोन्हं बन्धु वृद्धिशेष च स्वादुः प्रहस्तित्व:।
US-P18.078cd

अस्मदस्तु विविष्यैव त्वमेवेति वदेदुः यदि।
प्रत्यायनविनियमूंको दोषः प्रसज्यते ॥

त्वमित्रवचनमित्रसिद्धां मधुरमन्यितगुणः कथम् ॥

संबन्धो वाच्य एवात्र वेन त्वमिति लक्ष्येतुर् ॥

इश्तवर्तवसन्न्वो यथायथकोऽक्षये कथम् ॥

अकिंत्वन्तेपि ताकात्मायमध्यक्षस्य भवेदु यदि ॥

आत्मायमधुरात्माः ममस्तीति संवव्यप्रणेन न भीः ॥

संवव्यप्रणेन शास्तादिति वेनमन्यसे न हि ॥

पूर्वोक्तः स्युतिभा दोषाः प्रहो वा भ्यानुममेिति च ॥

अहृतशिरोऽसुपेश्यं भाति बुध्यं देवसदा ॥

प्रत्यया अपि तस्यः स्युतस्तत्तवायोविस्मुलिभावत् ॥

आभासायमवचनेदाः तन्न निराकृतम् ॥

लोकस्य युक्तिः स्यातं तद्गृहः तथा सति ॥

नवन्तं दृश्यमन्त्रान्तिः पिणेदिनवद्भेतुर् ॥

मुखाभाससविश्वाविदीविश्वाविदीविनायीता तत् निराकृतम् ॥

कृष्णाः पोहिताभासमितेतदु दृश्यमयात् ॥

दृश्यांवन्तत्त्वायेन न तु सवार्तनमा क्यविता ॥

तत्त्वायेन चतन्ताभासं चिरं चतन्त्वदेवभेतुः ॥

मुखाभाससो यथादशम्भासास्वदितो मृणा ॥

चिरं चतन्तमित्यविश्वामत्युक्तिविविज्ञतम् ॥

देहापिन्यासना: स्याचचं चक्षुरावेस्वत्ववेद च ॥

तद्यौत्स्तिति चेतु तन्न न लोकायतिकिंगतं च ॥

च भौतिजाशिरस्वीति यथाभासो न चेतसि ॥

सदीदीति भिंपोभावे व्यथे स्यात् तत्त्वमस्थयि ॥

युक्तसदगिरीकः स्यादध्वसिदशमथि वचः ॥

ममेदप्रत्ययो ज्ञेयो युक्तस्दगः न संशयः ॥

अहृतिज्ञसवसैत: स्यादध्वसस्मीति चोभयोः ॥

अन्योन्यायेपश्वा तेषां प्रधानगुणवेष्टे ॥

विशेषसन्विशेषत्वं तथा ग्राहः हि युक्तिः ॥

ममेद इश्वर्येतन्त मध्यस्तविषयणः ॥

धनी गोमान् यथा तद्वेब देहोऽहुक्पुरुःकरितवाच ॥

बुध्यारुः सदा सर्व साहिीव्य च साश्वैः ॥

तस्मात्से सर्वाभासो जः किंचिद्वस्युवाचः सदा ॥

प्रतिलोमिंदं सर्व यथोऽक्तो लोकुविद्वितवाच ॥

अविद्वेकाभियामांस्त्त्व नायोः सर्व विद्भिनानाम् ॥

अन्यव्यवितरिको हि पदार्थवी गदनस्य च ॥

स्यावेददहमित्त्रु युक्तिर्वावधारणे ॥
US-P18.097ab नादामहामिति अवस्मान सुपुलेटन्यन्त्र मनागपि
US-P18.097cd न वारायत दर्षिं स्तवं प्रत्यथं दुः निषेधति
US-P18.098ab व्यज्ञयोगिनं द्वि इतिरित्येव सविवरोधस्थिताम्
US-P18.098cd कौशिकस्य च तथा तत्स्य: प्रत्यथं च तुष्टतम्
US-P18.098ef स्वसमाकर्षितं स्तम्रसीत्याऽथ श्रोतुमाऽहापनुष्ठते
US-P18.099ab एवं विज्ञातवाक्यायेऽऽथ भृतितोक्ष्यस्विद्विंतः
US-P18.099cd श्रुतिर्भवत् त्वमसीत्याऽथ श्रोतमाऽहापनुष्ठते
US-P18.100ab श्रुता दाशरथेऽदुह्क्षीवापावात् तम:
US-P18.100cd तस्य विश्युन्नमंसंभो न यत्नातांमूचिवान्
US-P18.101ab अन्हंशवशयं या निश्चा ज्योतिषं प्रत्यगात्मनि
US-P18.101cd सैवोक्ता सदसीविरं फलं तत्र पिमुक्तता
US-P18.102ab श्रुतमाचे न चेतं स्मातुं कार्यं तत्र भवेदुः भृवम्
US-P18.102cd यब्धारातु पुरापिपः सङ्ग्र: स्यामालमः
US-P18.103ab अशान्यायदिनिन्मुंक्वैत् तत्कलाः जायते प्रमा
US-P18.103cd तत्त्वस्मादवाक्यायं अविष्का कालेष्वसंख्यं
US-P18.104ab व्यवहरायं पुरापिपः सङ्ग्र: स्यामालमः
US-P18.104cd जायते इव द्वमा स्यामान्यं न संख्यं
US-P18.105ab किं सदवायमस्मीति किं वान तु प्रतिपथंते
US-P18.105cd सदेव चेतेश्वरः सत्यं मुख्याश्च इम्यातम
US-P18.106ab अन्यच् चेतं सदायमार्गितार्थमिश्च सा
US-P18.106cd तस्मान मुख्यग्रहः नासि वारायणवतेरिह
US-P18.107ab प्रत्यथी व्यत्यश्शेव यदानासी सत्यताः
US-P18.107cd त्र्यर्थितितिमल्लच् च चैतन्ये कल्प्यते फलम्
US-P18.108ab कुन्दस्ते शपि फलं योगेऽर राजनीव जयाधिकम्
US-P18.108cd तदनाल्लं देशत्वमुण्यां कियायः प्रत्यथम च
US-P18.109ab आदर्शस्तु यदानासी मुख्यकारः स एव स: द
US-P18.109cd यथेऽं प्रत्यथा शासनों यदानासस्तवदा ह्यः
US-P18.110ab इत्येऽं प्रतिपर्वत: स्मातं सदसमीति च नान्यथा
US-P18.110cd तत्त् त्वमत्त्वमेशदेशशोष्पि द्वारामातवनर्धकः
US-P18.111ab श्रोतुं: स्यादुपेशेशहेशरवत्वं तथा भवेत्
US-P18.111cd अथ्यक्ष्यं न चेविष्ट्ष श्रोतुल्यं कल्पं तदं भवेत्
US-P18.112ab अथ्यक्ष्यं समीपे स्यादु बुद्धेवेष्टिः चेतं मतम्
US-P18.112cd न तत्कृताःपकारोऽस्तिः काठाद्यद्वृत्तं न कल्प्यते
US-P18.113ab बुद्धि चेतं तत्कृतंः किंस् नवेऽं परिणामस्वरूपः
US-P18.113cd आभासोऽपि च को वोः सति भृत्यवायनुष्ठाः
US-P18.114ab आभासे परिणामवेषेन न रञ्ज्वासितिन्म्भवत्
सपदिश तथावोचमाद्वें च मुख्तवत् ॥

नात्मभास्यसिद्धिद्वाराद्वमो ग्रहणात् पृथक् ॥

मुखाद्वेंतु पृथिकसिद्धिरूहः त्वम्योगसंधिय: ॥

अध्यक्षस्य पृथिकस्वाभासतिव पद्यवता ॥

आभासतिव तदीयतेः हाथापथ्यांस्विरिक्तता ॥

नैवं स्वापे पृथिकस्वेदः प्रत्ययस्य दृश्यस्यत् ॥

रथान्तरं शून्यत्वाः प्रत्ययस्यात्मना ग्रहः ॥

अवगत्य दि संयाप्त: प्रत्ययों विषयावृत्ति: ॥

जात्वे स यदाकारः स जात्वे विषयोऽवतः ॥

कर्मसिद्धतमत्त्वात् स तदानु कार्यं निषुर्भयते ॥

आकारो यत्र चार्ध्वं करणं तविष्क्वत्ते ॥

यदान्तुन संयाप्त: स जात्वेति निगच्छते ॥

भयेत विविधात्रो स जानाति स आत्मविनः ॥

सम्प्रसंश्चम्योक्तिं: प्रत्यया व्यविचारण: ॥

एक्षावगतिस्ते प्रभुस्तु प्रत्यप्रक्षृत: ॥

आधिभेदादि स्थानं भेदों मणिवगतिस्थथा ॥

अप्रज्ञ: परिलक्ष्य सर्व प्रत्यसंश्चयात् ॥

प्रथगं ग्रहणं सिद्धं: प्रत्याक्षामिहायन्तः ॥

आपरोक्षातः तदवस्त्ममुमानं प्रदीपवृत्तः ॥

किमं ग्रहेश्च कष्टं प्रमाणेन तु केतनिष्ठ: ॥

विनेत्व तु प्रमाणेन निरूप्त्यायस्य अतिष: ॥

श्रावणेन प्रमाणेन निरूपितेष्विद्धायते ॥

अध्यक्ष्यस्यार्थस्यद्वाजम्मत्वते व प्रस्स्यते ॥

चेतनस्य कथं देहु इति चेतन नाप्रसिद्धित: ॥

चेतनस्यान्तादिद्वाराद्वें त्वाद्यान्तान्तः ॥

अध्यक्षः स्वायस्य चेतनस्यार्पोक्षत: ॥

तुल्य एवं प्रवोधः स्वायस्यात्मवादिना ॥

अहंमातिसिद्धा प्रव्यतितः तोक्ष्मृतीर्घः ॥

करणं कर्म कल्लो स दिधास्वस्वक्षणं किल ॥

प्रामाण्येति प्रस्तु: जैप्रयादो शौचपथं विभावते ॥

क्रमेन ग्रहणं पूवमुर्तं: पर्शात: तथेत्वं च ॥

अजासिद्धिमं मां चेतनेपेक्षा जात्वे धृतमः ॥

विनेत्रोपक्ष्यते यत्र तच तच नैवेककालता ॥

आत्मनो ग्रहणं चापि ब्राह्मणिमहं संमवत: ॥

आत्मनास्वकावितुत्वं न त्वात् करणकर्मण: ॥

व्यपतुमिर्थं च यतः कर्तु: क्रियया कर्मं तत् मृत्वम् ॥
अलो त्रिवृत्तिश्रृंगी तत्स्वरूप नान्यतन्त्रता।
शाश्वत वाष्टुमितेवानिः प्रमाणादेक्ष्ठ वा तत्त्वन्यन्तरस्त॥
सिद्धि: सर्वस्वत्वर्कानां स्यादेक्ष्ठ गति नान्यतन्त्र।
अस्यस्तिध्यायैः सिद्धि: स्यात् प्रमाणे विनेयव। वा
विना स्यात् प्रसिद्धभूत नाजुं प्रत्यूत्पुरुषेभये॥
स्वतेवाज्ञात्मर्कृतेः चेत्से ग्राह्यताव्यथ गतिभविकैः।
अन्त्येऽेवाज्ञातायों च तत्त्वानि धृष्टवा भावेत्॥
ज्ञातात् स्वामलाभी वा सिद्धि: स्यात्त्वेवेभवे॥
शृवत्वेवानन्तरनि तं पदो संस्मृतमहसि॥
सिद्धि: स्यात् सत्साम्यभेदे यत्नस्तत्र निरङ्खे॥
सर्वलोकसिद्धत्वात् स्येंहुत्यस्तत् वस्तुः॥
ज्ञानेयाविवेद्यत: सिद्धिः अतितत्मुच्।
अस्यस्थात्मन्यस्योः सिद्धि: स्यात्त्वेवेभवे॥
स्यात्त्वत्स्यहस्यते स्यातात्मन्यस्येव न चात्मनः॥
अन्यत्वेव चात्मस्य तद्धीरभवो वदद्य तु॥
कर्यते: स्यात्िम्मा चेद् इत्त्त्त्यक्षकरूपः॥
अनुभूतोऽः किम्भूतिस्मिन् स्यात् त्वापेक्षया बद।
अनुभवितीर्वा श्यात् सोऽहस्यनुभूतित्व: न॥
“अभिश्रोतिः हि बुद्धृयात्माविसिद्धतिवद्वनि:॥
ग्राह्यग्राह्यकंवर्चितिभेदवाचिनिव: लक्ष्यते॥
भूतिर्यः किया राव् कारके स्यात् चोच्चे॥
सत्वं नाजितम्स्यवःत्व सकून्तवं भोजरेत्ताम॥
न कर्षु: चेप्यते धर्म: इति चेत् पक्षानात्॥
नवासितवादयों धर्मां नासितवाचितिन् वृत्तत:॥
न भूतेस्तहि नाजितवं स्वाक्षरयं हि ते॥
स्वाक्षरणावचिनानशो नाशोऽनाशनवृत्तिता॥
अग्नीरस्तव गोलवं ते न तु तदु गोः स्वाक्षरम्॥
क्रणवाच्छोदिषिः योऽवः: स्यात् सोऽहस्यनाभाव एव ते॥
भेदाभेदवाच्छोदिषिः स्यात् सोऽहस्यनाभाव एव ते॥
भेदाभेदवाच्छोदिषिः स्यात् सोऽहस्यनाभाव एव ते॥
अभिरस्त गोव: स्यात् सोऽहस्यनाभाव एव ते॥
नामजात्यादयों यद्वत संविद्वतुविश्वस्त:॥
प्रवेशकम्मुनामस्य व्यवहारः यदीच्छुसि॥
ढियादारकेवेदस्ताद्वृपेयं धृवं भवेऽ॥
तस्मान् नीलं तथा दीपं घटादिवारं विशेषणम्।
संविद्रस्तुपेत्यं स्वादं येन चाप्युस्वयते।
सुपादानं यथायः स्वादं प्राहुः त्वादं प्राहुः।
प्रत्ययम् भवायः स्वादं व्याहकल्यायं च दीपवत्।
अध्यक्षम् दूरोऽनं संबंधं संभवत्र्यति।
अध्यक्षसम् तु दृष्येन मुक्तस्वान्यं इत्यंश्यताम्।
अध्यक्षणं कूला बृहद्धर्ष्यं व्यानोत्यतांि वा।
नित्याध्यक्षकः दच्चुपप्कारो भवेदं धिरायम्।
स चोक्तस्ततिभवतं प्राकं संयोगिनाञ घटादिवु।
यथालोकादिर्यं कविस्थितं ब्याप्तजळवातु ध्यायतं।
आनोक्षम् चदो यदवं वृद्धायः भवेत् तथा।
धीरायतं स्वादं घटारोहों धियों व्याप्ती कर्मों भवेत्।
पूर्वं स्वाते प्रत्ययाध्यक्षितंसरोतुनेत्रं आत्मः।
कृत्त्वा ध्यायस्य सोरुःकृतं कालाकाशायदिवतं कमः।
विषयाध्य यस्य कारणपेशेयः भवेत्।
सत्येय प्राहुःस्य च परिशाली स चिन्तवत्।
अध्यक्षोत्तमात्मा जानं बुद्धेरेव विनिषयः।
नाध्यक्षस्याध्येक्षोत्तमानुः न तस्यार्धित परो यत्।
कर्मों चवृद्धिमित्रस्य भवेत्नूः यकऽ भुक्तता।
सुक्ष्मः विलिनामों नाइंकर्तरं बुल्यते।
वेदाद्ययभमानोत्त्यं दुःखीति प्रत्ययं ध्रुवम्।
कुण्डलिन्यप्रत्ययं यद्वतं प्रत्यगाति भमानिना।
वास्तों प्रत्यगेनेन विलेकनाविवेकवान्।
विषयमेणसदन्तं स्वातं प्रमाणस्य अभ्रावणं।
दाहेक्षद्विनाशेणः दुःखितं नायमातिनेन।
नैव द्वान्स दाहावक्षयों दुःखी भवेत् क्वचिद्।
अस्यस्तादेहेढलत्वान नाइं दाहों यतं सदा।
तस्मान् मिथ्याभिमानोत्त्यं मृते पुरे मृत्युष्याः।
कुण्डलिन्यमिति द्वात्र वास्तवेतं विलेकिना।
दुःखीति प्रत्ययस्तहतु क्वेलाहीथिया सदा।
सिद्धं दुःखितं इत्यं स्वातं तत्क्षितं सदात्मन:।
मिथ्याभिमानानोऽहुः तेनार्थापदिनाः।
अस्याशोपः यथा स्यमंचलनः नादि च।
अध्वेकात् तथा दुःख मानसं चातमनीश्वते।
विवेकात्मिविय सुः नुश्चे चत्वादिवित।
अध्वेकस्तम्बावेन नमो गच्छतयनिच्छं।
US-P18.168ab तदानुष्ठाते दुःख नैषध्ये नैव तस्य तत् ।
US-P18.168cd प्रत्यगात्मनि तस्मात् तं दुःख नैषध्ययथे ॥
US-P18.169ab त्वस्तते तुल्यनीक्षतानु नीलाष्टव्यं भवेत् ।
US-P18.169cd निर्दुःखवाचिनि योगात् त्वमंश्यं तदविना ॥
US-P18.170ab प्रत्यगात्माभिहानेन तच्छव्यं युक्तेतथा ।
US-P18.170cd दशमस्वसत्मस्तिईयेयां वाक्यं स्वात् प्रत्यज्ञात्मनि ॥
US-P18.171ab स्वार्थेः स्यंग्रहायेन विनिर्धार्यसयंकोऽः ।
US-P18.171cd प्रत्यगात्मावगत्यन्तौ नान्यपथाःधारिद्विरोध्यतः ॥
US-P18.172ab नवदुःखायारसर भिः स्वात्माने दशमूरःथम् ॥
US-P18.172cd अवस्यज्ञा वातुमैवेच्छेत त्वमस्वानि जनस्तथा ॥
US-P18.173ab अतिवाच्यवच्छ्वतावत् कामापहरथि: सबा ।
US-P18.173cd विविषत्त दृष्टिमात्माने नेखते दशम यथा ॥
US-P18.174ab दशमस्वसत्मस्तिईयेयं तत्त्वस्यात्माविवायि: ।
US-P18.174cd स्वात्मान्त्रिविज्ञानि कृत्तान्तः कारणेष्क्रमम् ॥
US-P18.175ab नदं पूर्वाभिसरसादः पत्रं वाक्यं भवेत् ।
US-P18.175cd नियमाः नैव वेदयुस्ति पदसद्गंतमयंतं: ॥
US-P18.176ab वाक्ये हि शूयमाणानां पदानामध्वसंस्मृति: ।
US-P18.176cd अन्ययथितिरक्षायां ततो वाक्यार्थवोधननम् ॥
US-P18.177ab यदा नित्येणु वाक्येणु पदार्थस्तु विविच्यते ।
US-P18.177cd वाक्यार्थअनसत्स्तिये तथा प्रार्थनो न युज्यते ॥
US-P18.178ab अन्ययथितिरक्षितिः पदार्थस्मरणाय तु ।
US-P18.178cd स्मृत्याभावे न वाक्यायेन ब्राह्मण: हि केनचित् ॥
US-P18.179ab तत्त्वस्यादिवाक्षयेयु त्वपदार्थाविवेकत: ॥
US-P18.179cd व्यज्ञते नैव वाक्यायो नित्यमुखतोहिमित्यतः ॥
US-P18.180ab अन्ययथितिरक्षितसद्विवेकाय नान्यथा ।
US-P18.180cd त्वपदार्थविवेके हि पाणाबिनितविल्ययतः ॥
US-P18.181ab वाक्यायो व्यज्ञते नैव केवलोहिपदार्थतः ।
US-P18.181cd दुःखीत्वेतपनेन प्रत्यगात्मविनिश्चयात् ॥
US-P18.182ab चावं संभवत्वमेव शुभदानास्तार्थिः ।
US-P18.182cd नैव रूपीयितुः युक्ता पदार्थार्थकोविचे: ॥
US-P18.183ab प्रत्यख्यादीन वाधिरनो कृष्णतादिदिपु पावकतः ॥
US-P18.183cd अध्याजनासिन्हेतोऽः कथं स्वाध्वायवाननम् ॥
US-P18.184ab दुःख्यस्तिः सति जाने निर्दुःखीति न जायते ।
US-P18.184cd प्रत्यख्यादिनिधनाच्छेति वायवान् न अभिचारः ॥
US-P18.185ab स्वामे दुःखमयाद्वार ध्वजःध्वज्यिन्तुः ॥
US-P18.185cd तत्त्वस्यादिब्विन्याथुः वासं क्रियते यदि ॥
समाप्तिस्तर हुँ: स्वस्थ्य प्राकृतिक च तद्भाव इथ्यताम्।

न हि हुँ: स्वस्थ्य संतानो न्यान्वेताः दृश्यते कवचितू।

प्रत्यगात्मन आलमचं हुँ: स्वस्थ्यस्तर वाभया।

दशमं नरवस्येव वेद चेदविरुद्धता।

नित्यमुक्त्विविघ्नां वाक्यां भवति नान्यतः।

वाक्यांख्यापि विज्ञानं पदार्थसूचिपूर्वकम्।

अन्वयव्यालंकारायं पदार्थं: स्वयंते ध्रुवम्।

एवं निर्देशितामानकिं प्रतिपद्यते।

सदेशेत्याविवाक्षेयं: प्रमा स्कृतिर्भवेत्।

दशमं स्वस्थ्यस्तरां यथैव प्रत्यगात्मनि।

प्रवोधनेन यथा स्वाभाविकं सर्वं द्वेषं निवेचते।

प्रत्यगात्मधिया तदेव हुँ: सिद्ध्वं सवेदाल्मन:।

कृष्णलाब्धं प्रमाजनं तदन्यायार्थमुक्ततः।

तत्त्वमस्याविवाक्षेयं न तेवस्मविरोधं।

वाक्ये तत् त्वमित्यस्मि ज्ञातार्थं तदलत्वम्।

त्वमित्यस्मृत्तमानाभ्याद वाक्यं नोज्ञायेत् प्रमाम्।

तत्त्वमस्याविवाक्षेयं न तेवस्मविरोधं।

तत्त्वमस्याविवाक्षेयस्तर वाक्यं नोज्ञायेत् प्रमाम्।

तच्छवचं: प्रत्यगात्मधियार्थस्तच्छवचार्थस्तवन्तः।

दुःखितवाप्रत्यगात्मचं वारेययात्मामाविपि।

एवं च नेषितेन्तः समय्यत स्तरमुक्तम्।

एवं तत् त्वमित्यस्मि गाभ्यस्ते फलं क्षमम्।

अप्रभाण्ववस्त्रयोद्धत्व नियोप्यवस्त्रमुक्तये।

तम्मादायन्तस्येतु सुखित्वन्तदि: विरोधमयत्।

न कल्यंमुक्त्वन्ति: च भूत्वत्यागोऽन्यं न: न:।

यथानुभूतं वृद्ध्विनेवोक्तां: न गृह्यते।

वायस्य विप्रूपीतलद्वाद गोशकृत्तवायस्यसिकिय॥

सत्यन्वेदनामात् वाक्यात् यत्रोपकोणम्बनम्।

प्रत्यगात्मिनि न लेवं संह्याप्रामाणिववदश्चुमुक्तम्।

स्त्रवेशद्वयम्बै: स्मरस्मिनकं इथ्यताम्।

निवृत्तावहः: सिद्धं: स्वात्मनोहुन्नवश्च न:॥

बुद्धिमान: विशययो द्वेषं ता विश्लेष्या मता:॥

कृष्णबलस्य हुँ: द्वस्तंस्वभे: उः: स्वात्त्र प्रत्यगात्मन:॥

दुःखितेवानुभूतं स्वेत्वानुभवत्स्या।

तदाभास्तथा जन्म स्थियोगायनं: स्मृत:॥

अश्वात्सरिणिमिन्तत: सिद्धं मोक्षस्वेद्यमेव: सः॥

श्रोत्वादि तत्वायेत विरूद्ध कथमुच्यते॥
सैन्यस्थितिकात्मक चेतु तत्क्षणतया वहतः विद्याधिकारिणामनाय तथा भवेतः।

सैन्यस्थितिकान्तर्वते स्यात् विरोधेवान्यथा वचः॥

श्रोतोऽश्रव्यतव्ययोभवती यादेशः स्यात् भवेविद्मः॥

द्वाराधिकोप एवं स्यात् न युक्तं सर्ववा वचः॥

सिद्धोऽर्मित्वमेवतेस्य जातवातस्य भवेदु यदि॥

अस्मिन् श्रद्धामात्मा शास्त्रव चोधात्यत्त्वपि॥

न द्विद्धत्य कर्तव्यं सकारोप्य न स्वद्वृत्ताः॥

उभयालम्बनोऽर्मित्वमेवतेस्य वज्यत्त्वसौ॥

तद्विमान् सिद्धोऽर्मित्वमेवतेस्य वस्तुमात्रेऽर्मित्वात्॥

श्रोतुस्थात्वविजानेऽप्रकृतिः स्यात् कथं त्विति॥

कर्ता दुःश्वसमिति प्रत्यक्ष्यनानुमूयते॥

कर्ता दुःश्वं च मा भूवमिति यतान्व भवेत् ततः॥

तद्विमानं युक्तव्यादि कर्तव्यं श्रुतिरस्त्रवीतो॥

कर्तृवाचकु नुवादेन सिद्धत्वनुभायतु॥

निष्ठुःसो निष्ठित्योऽर्कामः सिद्धोऽर्मित्वमित्वपि॥

सौत्र विषयंस्वयमाधार्यात् कथमेव ति॥

सकारातता दशि मेधानुभवं कथम्॥

अतो मे विपरीतत्व तद्व भवानं वक्तुमहासि॥

द्वेष घटते प्रश्नो न युक्ततवानुमूयते॥

प्रमाणन्व विरोधी वा सोऽर्थार्थः प्रशस्महिति॥

अहं निम्नुक्ता इत्येष सदसीत्यन्त्यमानाः।

प्रत्यक्षाभासाजन्त्यवादुः दुःशिवत्वं प्रशस्महिति॥

पृष्ठाकाशिक्षतव वाच्यं हुः शाबाबनवमीस्ति तम॥

कर्मं हींदं निर्वर्ततं दुःशिव सर्वान्यं मम॥

इति प्रश्नातुरुपं यदु वाच्यं हुः सन्यवत्कम्॥

श्रुते स्वत्मनि नाश्यका प्रमाण्ये सति विभुते॥

प्रमाणन्व विरोधी वा सोऽर्थार्थः प्रशस्महिति॥

तस्मादतत्वविवृक्ततवं प्रत्यायतिः तद्वच॥

वक्तव्यं तु तायं तरापं स्यात् विरोधेवस्ति कृतथिति॥

इतो प्रश्नानुभवं कष्टवात्मनो नोपयते॥

अविज्ञातं विज्ञानन्तवं विज्ञातारमिति श्रुते॥

लघुचक्रविष्वेकाय संन्यासः सर्वक्षेत्रामृ॥

सहस्रनामं ज्ञायते शास्त्रों दानादिशाशास्त्रात्॥

त्वमार्थं प्रत्यगात्मानं पश्चत्वद्वात्मात्मात्मानि॥

वाक्यार्थं तत आत्मानं सर्व पश्चितं केवलम्॥

सर्ववाक्योपलोकणिताय विज्ञातस्य प्रमाणः॥

असत्ये द्वन्द्यानामस्य विशिष्टं योजयेतु कथम्॥

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प्रहोक्त्वेहेकुर्वृष्णिनलस्त्वनिन्धनो यथा प्रशार्न्ति परमां तथा ब्रजेत्॥

विमथ्य वेदोद्धिपति: समुद्रूतं सुरेमहाभेस्तु यथा महालोमभि:।

तथासृष्टं व्यावहिमं हि वै: पुरा नमो गुप्त्यः परमिक्षितं च वै:॥
अथ मोक्षसापोपदेशविधि व्यास्यास्त्यामो मुमुख्यां
श्रद्धानामाधिनामाधिनययः ॥ १ ॥

तदविद् मोक्षसाधनं जानं साधनसाधयादनित्यात् सर्वस्माद् विरक्ताय
त्यक्तपुनःविततलोकेष्णाय प्रतिपद्यरहस्यपरार्थाय
श्रमद्वयादिव्युक्ताय शास्त्रप्रसिद्धशिष्यगुणसम्पन्नाय शुचे ब्राह्मणाय
विविधवुपस्नाय शिष्याय जातिकर्मवृत्तविवाक्षणः परिशिलय भूयात्
पुनः प्रवर्त्तं ग्रहणं बुद्धीविवाट ॥ २ ॥

श्रुतिः -- " परिश्री ... तत्त्वो ब्रह्मविवः " इति ।
दुःखार्हिता हि विवातमः अत्यं सततले च भवति । विवातसत्तें श्रूत्यगृहाय भवति नौर्विस्व नदी लिंगियोः । शास्त्रां च -- " यदापि
अस्मी इमानवकः परिगृहितां धनस्य पूर्णा वद्यादिरेव ततो भूयः " इति ।
अन्यथा च ज्ञानप्राप्त्यभावात् -- " आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेदं "
आचार्यं पैव विधा विदिता (साधित्वं प्राप्तं ) " " आचार्यः प्लाब्यति
तस्य (सम्पृक्तं) जानं प्लाब्यर्थाय ॥ इत्याविशुद्धिः वृत्तिभयः ॥ ३ ॥

श्रीमत्स्व ज्ञानग्रहणं च संगीतवदूवा
तदग्रहणंतहनसमलोकाऋनायदनित्यावनलये(वस्त्रुति)
विवेकविश्वासांताजात्वृष्टत्वातोकुशीतोक्षणात्या तिमयमामयाधिनादिरीति
प्रतिपद्धति: श्रुतिस्मृतिविविद्येरनन्येरकोथाधिनिविहितसादिचिन
यमेलानाआविरिवेद नियमे: ॥ ४ ॥

अमानिितवाचिनिगुणं च ज्ञानोपावं सम्पृक्तं ग्रहयेत् ॥ ५ ॥

आचार्योऽलोकसापोह्रणारणश्रमद्वयादनुःग्रहाविस्मयोऽत्र्यां लभामो
सुस्तावतीसमोऽवस्तुक्तस्यक्तसत्तक्तसर्वतक्तसाधनों ग्रहविवे ग्रहणी
स्थलोभिभ्रम्भुतो
सम्भद्भवन्तकारादयामात्मात्मात्मात्मात्माः सांताक्षराधितेविवर्णजितः:
केवलसतानुक्रमात्र消जनों विद्योपयोगाभी ूर्वमुपदिशेत् -- " सदेव
सांतेयेमणम आसीदेवमेवादितियाः " " यथ नान्यतू प्रथित" " आस्त्वा वा
इद्मेक एवंग्राह्वासीत् " " सव खलिवं ब्रह्म" इति(आचः)

५०
आत्मेक्तं प्रतिपादनपरम: श्रुति: ॥६॥

उपविद्या च ग्राहेष्वं ब्रह्माणो तत्करणं -- "य ात्माप्रतिपादनम्" "यत्र साक्षात्परोक्षाद: ब्रह्मा" "योऽर्थात्म्ये" "स वा एषः" "अप्राणो ज्ञाना:" "सदासाध्येन्यात्रो ब्रजः" "विज्ञानचन एव" "अनन्तरमयानि" "अन्यदेव तद्विद्विदाध्वो अविद्विदात्" "आकाशो वेद नाम" इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः ॥७॥

स्मृतिभिः -- "न जायते स्रियते वा" "नावंते कस्यचित्त् पापं" "यथाकारश्चतः नित्यः" "क्षेत्रभः चापि मा विद्विः" "न सत्तं तनं नासुद्धऽते" "नानादिवनः निरूपणंवात" "समं सर्वं भूलेवा" "उत्तमं पुरुषः" इत्यादिभिः: श्रुतिपुक्तलक्षणानिविद्धभिः परमात्मासंसारित्वप्रतिपादनपराभिः तत्त्व सर्वेश्चात्तत्त्वप्रतिपादनपराभिः ॥८॥

एवं श्रुतिश्रुतिश्रुतिश्रुतिश्रुतिपरमात्मालक्षणोऽशिष्यं संसारसागराश्चर्चितीशु पुरुषेषु -- कस्त्वांसिसोम्येपि ॥९॥

स यदि ब्रह्मात् -- ब्राह्मणपुनोष्ठोद्वन्योऽयां गुरुस्यो वेदानीममस्य परमहृदयपरिप्रचारं संसारसागरात् जन्मात्मायमहाद्वादुषितिषुरिति ॥१०॥

आचार्यो ब्रह्मात् -- भेई ते सोम्य मृत्यु नरीरं वयोभिष्टते मुखां वापच्छते तत्र कथं संसारसागराश्चर्चितीषोधिति ॥११॥

स यदि ब्रह्मात् -- अन्योऽष्ठो शरीरात्। शरीरं हूँ जाते स्रियते वयोभिष्टते, गुरुमायमाप्यते यथाग्यात्मिभिः च विनाशयते यथैवाभिभिः युज्यते। तत्समायों गृहस्यमूर्त्तधर्मवशात्यस्ती। नीदमव प्रविष्टः पुनः पुनः। शरीरविनाशों धर्माधर्मशाःत्वीरान्तर्यास्यामिः पुरुषीविनाशों पश्चातं नीतिनऽत्तरम्। एवमहमाद्वनावी संसारे देवतिवमुखसिद्धिः स्वरमभादुपां शरीरं त्यजनवन्तं न। नवं चायुपापदानों जन्मसमश्रवन्त। न्यात्वचे श्रव्यस्य भ्राम्यमाण:। क्रमेदेपं शरीरसागरं संसारचक्षुःस्मानं निर्विवेकों भवनव्यथोऽस्मात्स्मात्त्वगच्छन्ति। तत्सामान्यनित्यं एवां शरीरान्तरः। शरीराणाम्यूद्यत्वपगच्छन्ति च वासांसीव पुरुषयति ॥१२॥
आचायों दृढ़तः साध्वाधी: सम्मक पश्यसि । कथं मृणावधीः
ब्रह्मणुप्रोदोऽन्यो ब्रह्मचर्यांसं गृहस्यो वा इदानीमस्मि
परमेष्ठपरिगुणातितः ॥ १३ ॥

स यदि दृढ़तः -- भगवन्; कथंमहं मृणावादिष्ठमिति ॥ १४ ॥

tे प्रति दृढ़तःाधार्थः: -- यतस्यं भिन्नजात्यन्यसंस्कारं शरीरं
जात्यन्यसंस्कारवरजितस्यात्मः प्रत्यजासीब्राह्मणुप्रोदोऽन्यं हत्यादिना
वाक्येनेति ॥ १५ ॥

स यदि पृथवीं: -- शर्यो सोम्यव्यथं शरीरं त्वतो भिन्न
भिन्नजात्यन्यसंस्कारं त्वं च जात्यन्यसंस्कारवरजितं इत्युक्तः
स्मारणेतु: -- स्मृतमहं सोम्य परमात्मानं सर्वात्मानं यथोक्तलक्षणं
श्राविलोक्ति स “ सदेव सोम्यव्यथं” हत्यादिति(भिं): श्रुतिभिः: स्मृतिभिः
लक्षणं च तत्स्य शृविभिः: स्मृतिभिः ॥ १६ ॥

लब्धपरमात्मक्षणस्मृतेः दृढ़तः -- योः साधारणाशाशं
नामस्त्वायमभूतत्वसूतोऽश्रीरोऽद्भूतादिलक्षणोऽपहरतपापमत्वाविलक्षणं
अश्रु सवेः संसारभूतंगत्रप्रभिन्नत: “ यत् साधारणसिद्धं ब्रह्म...
...एव त आत्मा सर्वात्मसति: “ अद्वृत्तः इण्टय अश्रुत: श्रोता अमतो
मन्त्रा अविज्ञातो विज्ञाता” नित्यविज्ञानस्वरूपोऽन्न्तोऽद्भावः: “
विज्ञानवन एव” अरिपूणां आकाशवतन्ता: शक्ति: आत्मा स सर्वस्य,
अश्रुविदित: अन्यायाविविध्यं: अन्यायोपीतोऽन्न्तोऽद्भावः
स्वात्मविलक्षणस्मृतोऽन्न्तोऽद्भावः: स्मृताचस्यः:
तत्त्वावस्त्वायमविश्वाचिन्तामिति: योऽद्भावः; सत्त्वावस्यः: सद्गामधेभिः
चिन्तामिति: योऽद्भावः: स्मृताचस्यः: ॥ १७ ॥

ते नामसुपेद्वायकृते सति व्याकरणेण तस्माददेतस्मात्मतः आकाशनामाकृती
सवृत्ते । तत्च चाकाशायां भूतमनन्त्र प्ररकारेण परमात्मानं: सम्बूतं
प्रसंस्कृतिः सलिलानं मलमव फेनः । न सलिलं न च सलिलाद्वृत्ताभिष्मं
फेनः । सलिलविद्यापरं विदशयानातु । सलिलं तु स्त्रव्यमन्त्र फेनान्त मलमपूतः
एवं परमात्मा नामसुपेद्वायमिति: नामस्वात्मायामिति: शुद्धः
प्रसंस्कृतक्षणं: । ते नामसुपेद्वायकृते सति व्याकरणेण फेनस्वात्माधी
आकाशनामाकृती सवृत्ते ॥ १८ ॥

ततत:ोऽपि स्मृतिभावाध्यायामाः नामसुपेद्वायकृते व्याकरणेण वायुभावाध्यायोऽेते
ततोः त्वपनिनामावमनेनेभावरत: पूर्वभीवाविभिन्तवनिमोणेन पूर्वपूर्ववः (तत्रो) तरानुमद्वेशेन पञ्चमहाभूतानि प्रत्यव्यवस्थानुपस्थानिः।
तत: पञ्चमहाभूतगुरुविषाणा पुष्क्र(ई) च। पुष्क्र(ई) व्याक पञ्चात्मक्यो ब्रह्मव्यक्तय अश्रुमहायो जायते। ताभी: भक्षितमायो: वहितमुहु: च रसीपुस्तकरस्वबन्धः जायते। तदुभयं
अकुलकेश्वरप्रयुक्तकामकशनिमायेनोकु तं मन्त्रसंस्कृतं गम्भीरयो निषिद्धयते।
तत: त्योर्मनसानुमद्वेशेन विवर्त्तमानं गग्नभूतं दशमे नवमे वा मासिः सज्जयते॥ २०॥

तञ्जातिं लभ्यनामाकृतिकं जातकर्माविभिन्नवस्तुसंकृतं पुनरुपयंसंस्कृतायोगेन गुह्स्तप्रसंजं बभवति। तदेव शरीरं पल्लीस्योगसंस्कृतायोगेन गुह्स्तप्रसंजं बभवति। तदेव वन्यस्यस्यसंस्करण तापसंजं बभवति। तदेव
क्षिप्राविन्वृतिनिमित्तसंस्करण परिणामसंजं बभवति। इत्येव तवत: भिन्न भिष्मजात्यन्त्रसंस्करण शरीरम्॥ २१॥

मन्त्रेणिन्यायानि च नामरूपतकायायेः “ अर्जपमय हि सोम्य मनः”
इत्यादेश्वत्वत्वत्वः॥ २२॥

कथे चाहं भिष्मजात्यन्त्रसंस्करणवर्जितं इत्येतद्विशु। वोंसी नामरूपोप्यवक्तानि नामरूपम्यविलक्षणः स एव नामरूपे व्यावर्तन्
सृज्जवं शरीरं त्वंसंस्कराधिमर्जितो नामरूपं इह
प्रविष्टेः भूतं भूपत: स्वरूपस्य स्वप्रसंस्करणम्। ज्ञानमो न्यायानि
मन्त्रान्योव्यवज्ञाताविजयांं “ सर्वाणि रूपाणि विविधतं धीरो नामानि
कृत्याभिवंदनं वददस्ते” इति। अस्मानेऽभ्रुम: सहस्र: “ ततौ
सृज्जवं तदेवसंस्करणश्रुत: “ अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्त्राः ज्ञानान्” “ स
एष इह प्रविष्टः” “ एष ता आत्मा” “ स एतेवेऽ सीमानं
विद्वायंतया द्वारा प्राप्यंतः” “ एष सर्वं भृत्तेऽ गृहस्ततमः”
“ संये देवतेस्रस इत्याभिमाचारियो देवता:” “ अश्रीरसम
शरीरे पः” इत्यादः॥ २३॥

स्मृतयोगसि “ आत्मेऽदेवता: सर्वाः” “ नवद्वारे पुरे देही” “
क्षेत्रं चापि मः विविधः” “ संसंवेदु भृतेऽ” “
उपदेतामुन्मन्त्र च” “ उतम: पुरुषस्वन्यः” इत्यादः।
तस्मात्
जात्यन्त्रसंस्करणवर्जितस्थितिमिति सिद्धः॥ २४॥
स यदि ब्रूयात् — अन्य एवायमः: सुश्री दुःशी वदः: संसारी, अन्योदसी मद्विलक्षणोः संसारी देवः: तथाः
व्युष्महारस्त्वकाराधिविञ्ज्ञानसंस्कर्मबिविष्ण्यान्
संसारसागराःमुखाग्निमयुक्तस्मिन कथमहः स एवेति ॥ २५ ॥

आचार्यन् ब्रूयात् — नेवं सोम्य प्रतिपच्चुमृद्दिः प्रतिदित्तवादए
भेदप्रतिपते: । कथे प्रतिध्वं भेदप्रतिध्वं भवित्तद्व्यायां आहिः —
अन्योन्नवन्योदसम्मिति न स वेद्” “मृत्योऽस मृत्युमानोति य इह
नानेव पश्यति” इत्येवमाध्य: ॥ २६ ॥

एता एव भुतयो भेदप्रतिपते: संसारगमनं दर्शयति ॥ २७ ॥

अबेदप्रतिपतेषु मोक्षं दर्शयति सहवशः: — “स आत्मा ततु
त्वमसि” इति परमात्मां विभाय “आचार्यन् पुरुषोऽवेद”
इत्युक्तवा “तस्य तावदेव चिरि” इति मोक्षं दर्शयत्यभेदविज्ञानेऽदेव
सत्यसत्यात्सकरस्येव बाहुव्वाभवद्रुव्यान्न संसाराभावं दर्शयति
भेदवेदारसाविश्वास्य संसारगमनं दर्शयति तत्कारस्येव
बाहुव्वाभवद्रुव्यान्न ॥ २५ ॥

“त इह व्याप्रो वा” इत्यादिना चाभेदवेदानात् “(स) स्वराग्न भविति”
इत्युक्तवा तव्वृप्तिलेन भेदवेदं संसारगमनं दर्शयति — “अथ
येद्यथातो विदुर्स्याराजानस्ते क्रयलोका भविति” इति प्रतिशास्म ।
तस्मात् मृत्युवाचवादी: — ब्राह्मणपुनःदोन्यः संसारी परमात्मविलक्षण
इति” ॥ २१ ॥

तस्मात् प्रतिदित्तवाद भेदवेदानस्य भेदविष्णयत्वाच च कर्मायानस्यकर
कर्मसाधनत्वाचु च यजोपवीतादि: कर्मसाधनोपादास्य
परमात्माभेदप्रतिपत्या दर्शयति कृती वेदितवय: । कर्मण्या
तत्साधनानां च यजोपवीतादिकं च परमात्माभेदप्रतिपतिविश्वुद्वात्।
संसारिणो हि कर्मणि विधीयते तत्साधनानि च यजोपवीतादिनि न
परमात्मोऽयेदवेदशिं: । भेदवेदश्च च ततोऽविक्षेत ॥ ३० ॥

यदि च कर्मणि कर्तव्यानि न निवर्त्यस्ति नित्यतित्वितानि कर्मसाधनसामवेश्चिन::
कर्मनित्वजात्याभामाद्वस्यनिवेश्च येद्यथाभेदप्रतिपतिः
नावक्षयत: “स आत्मा ततु त्वमसि”
इत्येवमाध्यातियर्जुत्सेवायेवेदप्रतिपतितिनिन्नन्नान्न नाभ्यभास्यत्।"
एष नित्यो महिष्माब्रह्माणस्य “ अनन्वागतं पुष्येनानन्वागतं पापेन”
“अनि स्वेतोऽस्तेन” इत्यादिना ॥ ३२ ॥

कर्मसंभन्धयुपत्वं कर्मसिद्धितवर्णवियसे सब्वन्धरुपतां (च) नाभ्यधायस्य
कर्मणि (च) कर्मसाधवनानि (च) ज्ञोपवीतादीनि ज्ञयितानित्वाजितितानि
तस्मात् सताधनं कर्म परित्यक्तवच्य मुख्यस्य परमात्माभेदद्वितरिवरोधात्
आत्मा च पर एवंतः प्रतिपुष्ट्व साम्यत्वयुक्तस्रवणः ॥ ३३ ॥

स यदि ब्रह्मात् — भगवन् द्वन्द्वानं छ्वध्याने वा वेद्यानं विद्यात्
अश्वायादिनिमित्तं च प्रत्यक्ष कुः भयम । परशात्मा “ अपहृतपापमा
विज्ञो विमृगुविविषेऽश्विन विज्ञचतस्तोपिपासः” सर्वसंसारमभिरभिन्ति:
श्रीयते सर्वुज्जुतु स्वृत्तिः च । कथं
तद्विक्रयणेनकसंसारसभिरभिन्तुः परमात्मानामत्त्वलेन मां च
संसारिणिः परमात्मत्वं सनातनिः शीतत्वेन प्रतिपवेयम् । संसारी च सन्
स्वयं-सुधयनः:ष्ठ्यसिधानेनभिकृतो-मुदयनः:ष्ठ्यसिधानेन कर्मणि
तत्संधनानानि च ज्ञोपवीतादीनि कथं परियज्ञयमिति ॥ ३४ ॥

तं भूतत् ब्राह्मणं — यदवचो द्वन्द्वाने वा वेद्यानं वेदनोपलनयते
ममति तदसतुः । कर्मात् । द्वन्द्वाने छ्वध्याने इव वृश्च
उपलभ्याणामानोकमणि शरीरे दाहच्छवेदनया उपलभ्यामानत्वादुः
दाहविसमामायेच वेदना । यथा हि दाहः छेवः वा क्रिये तत्रैव
व्यपदिशि दाहविदेश्या लोकेऽना दाहच्छुपलभरिती । कथम् । कथे
वेदनेति पूर्वः निर्गृहः मे वेदनोपस्युद्वृत्तं यदव पापार्थत
व्यपदिशि नोपलभरिती । युग्मक्ष्याती वेदना स्माद वेदनानिमित्तं वा
दाहच्छवच वेदनायथर्वलोकिनिदशेद दाहायाभयत ॥ ३५ ॥

स्वयं च नोपलने चषुरुदारुहस्य । तस्मात्
दाहच्छवचविसमामायेचनेपलमानवत्वादु दाहाविदेशु दाहाविदेशु
कर्मभूतेऽव वेदना ।
भवरूपवच । च साधव्य तनेत द्वितपकवत् । वेदनासमामायेच एवत तस्तस्कारः ।
स्मृतिसमानकालं एकोऽपलमानत्वादु । वेदनास्मिनितविनितविषयका द्वितोऽपि
सम्बंधार्थानामायेच एव । तथा चोक्तं — “ रूपसंकारतुल्याधि
रागंधी भवण्य च यतुः । गृहः ते भीमः तस्मात् ज्ञाता शुद्धीधि: ।
सवाः” ॥ ३६ ॥

किमाक्षयः पुनस् रूपादिसंकाराध्यात्मि । उच्यः । यथा कामायदः । कथे पुनस्ते
कामायदः । “कामः सज्जल्लो विचितक्तसा” इत्यादिद्वृत्तेद्विवेव ।
तथेष् कुमान्तनु बुधाणि प्रतिष्ठितानीति हुद्ये ॥ "कामा वेद भुदि सितात्: " तीर्थो हि
"असम्मा हायं " तद्वा अस्येत्ततितच्छन्द्यः"

इत्यादित्रुस्तित्तेषं "अविकार्येद्युम्बसेत् " अनाविक्ष्वान् निरुष्णतात्
इत्यादिः -- इत्युद्धारापि तथे मॅद्य स्वर्णस्य धृतम् नात्मन इति --
समर्थवापेषु त्रिभुवनामास्त्या इति ॥ ३६ ॥

अतो कुमान्तनु कुमान्तानां न परस्मावत्मनो विलक्षणस्वमिति
प्रत्यक्षाविद्विरोधभावाद युक्तं पर प्रवाहामिति प्रतिपदं -- "
तवामानेवावेदं (अहं ब्रह्मार्थम्) " एकपेवानुमृद्वयं "
अहेञ्जस्ततात् " आलेखाध्वस्तात् " सर्वमान्यान पश्वेत् "
यज्ञवर्ष सर्ववातेष " इदं सार्व यद्यमाला " स एषो"
(कल:) " अनन्तरवेदं " सार्वावम्यानतरो ज्ञौ: "
ब्रह्मातेषं " एववा द्वारा प्राप्य यत् " प्रजानस्य
नामेवायानि " सत्यं जनामन्यं ब्रह्म " तस्मात् वा "
तत् सूत्वा तयेवापश्वेत् " एको देव: सर्वभूतेषु गुढ़त् "
अहं रेववेषो (शरीरेण) " न जाप्ये ग्रहणे " स्वाद्यात्मः
जागरितानि " स म आत्मेति विद्वेष " यस्तु सवाणि भूतानि"
" तद्वेजति तन्त्र नेजाति " वेदस्त्वस्तु पश्चयन्ति " तद्वाविर्भि"
" अहं मनुष्यवं सूर्यवश " अत: विनिविनिव शास्ता जनानो"
" संदेव सोमवः " तत्त सत्यं स आत्मस्त तत्त त्रिभवसि " इत्यादित्रुश्चतिमिः: ॥

सस्मित्यंस्य " पूः: प्रविष्ट: " गुहारास्यस्य " आत्मेव
देवता: " नौद्वादः पुरेऽ " न स सर्वं भूतेषु "
विद्वान्विनयसंपुषे " अविभक्तं विभक्तेषु " वासुदेव: सर्वे�ः
इत्यादिः, एक प्रवासा परं ब्रह्म (सर्व) संसारर्थविनिमुक्तस्वमिति
सिद्धम् ॥ ३५ ॥

सं यदि गृहात् -- यदि भवेन " अनन्तरोऽवाहः " सार्वावम्यानतरो
हाजः " कुलम्: प्रजाननम् येव " सैन्तवम्यानवातासा
सर्वस्मृतिमेववर्जित आकाशवेदकसा: किमिदं दृश्यते ब्रह्मेते वा साध्यं
साधनं (वा) साधकेति शृविष्टितिश्चतिलोकप्रभुश्रुद्धं
वादितविच्छतिप्रतिविषय इति ॥ ३६ ॥

आचार्याः गृहात् -- अविचारकृतेतदुः यदिं दृश्यते ब्रह्मेते वा
परमाध्यतस्थे अवात्मा अविचारस्येवरनकंदवविभासते
तिमिरवृद्धामकन्तवतः। "यत्र वान्यदिव स्यात्" च यत्र हि
दृश्तमिव भवति इतर इतरं प्रवधित। "मृत्युः स मृत्युमानोति"
"अथ यदानुमत यथय-यथय-भौतिकस्वय विज्ञापकम् तद्वत् ... अथ
यदलं तनू मल्यं" इति "वाचार्मणं किरां नामपथेयं" ("अनृतं"
) "अनंतसाल्योद्धु" इति भेदशृंगानिन्द्रोपतिसविचारकृतः हृते "एकोवाहतीयं" च
यत् त्वसि। "को मोहः को शोकः" हत्यावेक्तविविधशृंगित्वेष्यति
॥ ४०॥

येशों भववन्, किमथं श्रुत्या साध्यसाधननादिभद्वे उच्चते उत्तप्तः
प्रत्येकतिः ॥ ४१॥

अत्योच्चते -- अविचारं उपात्तशृंगारं तथ। येषां निन्द्रोपविविधशृंगितम्
मन्यमानस्य साध्यसाधनस्य निन्द्रोपितविविधम्यक्षमजातं इत्यपातिं
चाविदेशस्तु च केवलतः शनेत्रस्तु सज्जनां निवर्त्यं शास्त्रं न
साध्यवस्तुविविध्यं विचारे। अनित्यः संसारं हि स इति तद्व
भेदशृंगाएविविधां संसारमूलमुन्नुपूर्वति
उत्तप्तिश्रवायेकत्वविविधशृंगित्रवपि ॥ ४२॥

अविचारायमूलमूलितायं श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायेयं: "अनन्तरमवावः"
"सवाभ्यामवायः हुजः" सैक्वेदवनवत् "प्रजाननवन एव"
एकरत्र आत्मा आकाशवत् परिपूर्ण हत्यावेक्का प्रजा प्रशिक्षिता
परमाध्यतस्थे भवति न साध्यसाधनोपितश्रवायेकत्वदेवनाधिलीगं निन्द्रो
पूपस्यते ॥ ४३॥

तत् च चेतनं परमाध्यतस्था प्रतिपूर्वमित्वात्
वाणश्रमायाममकृत्यपापः सप्ततिर्ग्नितलोकेषां दिभ्यो युव्यतां
कर्तव्यम्। स्मृतक्षेत्रायोरोधात् तदविभासस्य
भेदशृंगानप्रतिपूर्वपितश्रवायेकस्य। न
होकालितविवृत्तां शास्त्रयोगोपाधितात् तद्विपरीतात्
बुद्धभवति। न हुस्न आनी चित्ततिर्वुद्भ:; शरीरे वाजारमणवुद्भः।
तस्मादविचारायंत्वत् तत्स्वर्णस्य तत्साधनानां च यज्ञोपविदादीनां
परमाध्यतशृंगितेन त्यागोऽकर्तव्यः कर्तव्यः ॥ ४४॥

इति श्रुति प्रतिपूर्वम् (विवध:) प्रकरणम् ॥ १॥
तं गुरुरुपान -- श्रूणं वत्स न तत्वां स्वभावं। नैसिदित्य: ॥ ४५॥

इत्युक्तः शिष्य उवाच -- किं निमित्तमु, किं वा तस्य निर्विविधमु, को वा मम स्वभावं, यद्यमनं निवते निवासेति नैसिदित्यकामानं; रोगनिमित्तनिव्वातिविव रोगी स्वभावं प्रतिद्वेषयेति ॥ ४६॥

गुरुरुपान -- अविद्या निमित्त विद्या तस्य निर्विविध, अविद्याय निवतां निरुपिनिर्दिशेऽस्तेषां संसारां स्वप्नजागृहः कं नानुभविष्यति ॥ ४७॥

शिष्य उवाच -- का साधित्या किंविषयां वा विद्या च काविश्वानिविधिता यथा स्वभावं प्रतिद्वेषयेति ॥ ४८॥

गुरुरुपान -- ततं परमात्मां संसारसंसारिणि संसारायुक्तम्म्तीति विप्रीतं प्रतिद्वेषयेः, अक्तरं सन्तं करतेति, अभोक्ताः सन्तं भोजतेति विद्मानं चाविविधानिमित्त, इत्यिनिविद्य ॥ ५०॥

शिष्य उवाच --यथायंव विद्मानस्तथापि न परमात्मा।
कतृत्वभोक्तव्यलक्षणं संसारं मम स्वभावं प्रत्यप्रेषितं।
प्रमायेतनुभुमानलक्षणं । नाणिनिमित्त�, अविद्याः।
स्वात्मविश्वतवापुपतेः । अविद्या नामामिनिमिन्याध्यायोरां यथा।
प्रसिद्धा रजतं प्रसिद्धाय शुक्लकायाः यथा प्रसिद्धा पुरुषं।
स्वात्मविश्वायोरायति प्रसिद्धा वा स्वायं पुरुषेः।
नाणिसिद्धा प्रसिद्धा
प्रसिद्धा वा प्रसिद्धा । न चाल्म्यनास्तिकामध्यायोरायति। आत्मोप्रसिद्धायतवात्।
तथात्मनास्तिकाः, आत्मोप्रसिद्धायतवादः ॥ ५१॥

तं गुरुरुपान -- न व्यभिचारात्त्। न हि वत्स प्रसिद्धं प्रसिद्धं
एवाध्यारोपयति नियन्त्रित शक्यमु। आत्मन्त्रध्यारोपणदर्शनात। गौरोपाकः कृष्णोपनिथमिति भेदभर्मस्याहृत्यप्रत्याविशेषस्य च वेदेन्यमहामहस्मीति ॥ ५२॥

शिष्य आहं -- प्रसिद्ध एव तद्वाँत्माृत्यप्रत्याविशेषतया वेदाध्यारोपिति ।

tैत्रियं सति प्रसिद्धयोरेव देशाल्मनोतरतराध्यारोपण(त) ।

स्वाध्यायुपर्योऽशुक्लसिद्धार्जुनपरिवः । तत्र करं विशेषभाषितं

भगवानोऽवस्थितं प्रसिद्धयोरितरतराध्यारोपयति नियन्त्रि न शक्यत इति ॥ ५३॥

गुरुश्वाचं -- श्रीनु । सत्यं प्रसिद्धी देशाल्मनां न तु स्वाध्यायुष्णानविविवेकप्रत्याविशेषतया सर्वस्तोकप्रसिद्धी । कथं तद्यथः । नित्यमेव

नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव ।

न स्मृतं देवोऽयमात्म्यिति विवेकप्रत्याविशेषतया

प्रत्याविशेषां देशाल्मनां गृहात्मिति यतं कावितं । अतं एव हि मोहुऽविद्वारे लोकादानात्मायिष्ये, एवमात्मा नैवमात्म्यिति । इसं विशेषप्रभणितथावोऽवें नैवं

शक्यमिति ॥ ५४॥

नन्दविद्याध्यारोपितं (यतं) यतं तदसि (तत्र) दृढं यथा रजतं

शुक्लकायणं, स्वानी प्रृथं: रज्जवं सर्पं: आकाशे तत्तमलिनि

तथा देशाल्मनोपि नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव नित्यमेव

कृतं स्वातं तत्ततिरतरयोनित्यमेवावस्तवः स्वातं । यथा

शुक्लकार्यविद्याध्यारोपितानां रजस्वानां नित्यमेवावत्नास्तवं,

तद्विपरीतानां च विपरीताः दृढं रजस्वानाः स्वातं भवतीत ।

तत्वानिन्त्य ध्याद्विवरोधात् । तत्समादं देशाल्मनानी

नाविवेकेऽतरतरस्मिन्तथाध्यारोपितं । कथं तद्यथः । वंशस्तम्भवनं

नित्यमेयुक्तीं ॥ ५५॥

न। अनित्यपराध्यामित्यसमात् । संहृत्तत्वात् (पराध्यामित्यसमात्वं च)

वंशस्तम्भवदेवेव । किं च यस्तु परीक्षेण संहृतं आत्मा स संहृत्तत्वात्

पराध: । तेनासंहृत: परोऽविद्वानो नित्यं: स्थितान्तवः ॥ ५६॥

तत्स्पर्शान्तस्तत्वतते देहेऽवहामस्तथाध्यारोपितवेनास्तथाविनित्यवाद्विविद्वाद् प्रस्तां भवति । तत्र नित्यालमको देहं इति वैनाशिकपञ्चप्रान्तितोऽवें । स्वातं ॥ ५७॥

न। स्वतं एवात्मन आकाशत्वान्तसंहृतत्वान्तस्य नुपात। संहृतासंहृतः

समर्प्ये नित्यालमको देहाति: सर्वं: स्वातं । यथा चाकाशं कर्पणासंहृतमिति

न निराकाशः भवितं, एवमु। तस्मात् न वैनाशिकपञ्चप्रान्तितोऽवें । स्वातं ॥
यत् पुनर्वते देहस्यात्मनयस्त्रिव प्रत्यक्षाविद्याविरोधः स्वाधिविदति। तत्र। प्रत्यक्षाविद्याविरोधविद्भावतमनस्तः देहेऽस्य सत्त्वावनुपलवणेः। न द्वारतमनस्तः कुण्डे बदवर्षी दवर्षी। तिलेन तैलेन भितिविच च। प्रत्यक्षाविद्याविरोधस्य उपलब्धः। तस्मान् न प्रत्यक्षाविद्याविरोधः। \(\text{॥} ५९ \text{॥} \)

कथं तद्विप्रत्यक्षायप्रस्त्वाद्विमनस्तः देहाद्यायोपणं देहेऽ चात्मारोपणं। \(\text{॥} ६० \text{॥} \)

नास्य दोषः। स्वाभावः। सिद्धावात्मनः। न हि। कावर्चितकसिद्धावेवाध्यायोपणं न नित्यसिद्धाविविदमुर्ती न शक्त्यमाकाशेन। तलमलावः। अध्यायोपणं दर्शनात्। \(\text{॥} ६१ \text{॥} \)

किं भगवन् देहात्मनोनिरस्तराध्यायोपणं देहादिशंभाद्वितः। अध्यायोपणं वान्यात्मकृतिति। \(\text{॥} ६२ \text{॥} \)

गुरुवाच -- यदि देहादिशंभात्कृत्य यदि वान्यात्मकृत्य किं तत्र स्वातः। \(\text{॥} ६३ \text{॥} \)

इत्युक्तः। शिष्य आह। -- यथाऽद्विद्यादिशंभातमात्रः। ततो ममाचेतनत्वात्। परार्थार्थिविदित्न न तन्त्रात्। देहात्मनोनिरस्तराध्यायोपणं। अध्यायार्थात्। परार्थात्। विदितस्या विदिताविदित स्वर्थं इति। यथेव। विदितविदित-मन्न्याघोपणस्य। जियते। वर्णवेदीजम्बूतः। \(\text{॥} ६४ \text{॥} \)

इत्युक्तो गुरुवाच। -- अनन्तति जम्बूतः। चेत्मभ्यायोपणां। जानोच। मा। कार्यंस्ततः। \(\text{॥} ६५ \text{॥} \)

नेत्र भगवन्। मनोभिमानं। महत्त्वं।। अन्येन केनातिद्विप्रयुक्तः। न स्वस्तन्त्र। इति। \(\text{॥} ६६ \text{॥} \)

न। ततविदमात्रविदित स्वर्थस्वर्थम्।। यथे प्रयुक्तोऽस्वतन्त्रः। प्रवृत्तसः स। चित्मानाः। स्वार्थः। संपाद एव तद्भवः। \(\text{॥} ६७ \text{॥} \)

वचेत्तोऽस्स्वस्तन्त्रः। कथं सुखः। स्वतेनानां। नवदुक्तां।। च। जानामि। \(\text{॥} ६८ \text{॥} \)

गुरुवाच। --। किं सुखः। स्वतेनानां। महत्त्वाचार्यस्य। किं वान्यः। एवम्। \(\text{॥} ६९ \text{॥} \)
तं गुरुग्यात् -- एवं तस्मिन स्वार्तस्तं चित्तिमतः चामुक्‍षनूप्तस्य न परेष प्रयुक्तेत
चित्तिमतः कः समशः सम्बलत्वः चित्तिमतः प्रकाशरोिव
नायाचित्तिमतः कः समशः प्रकाशरोिव। नायाचित्तिमतः
चित्तिमतः भूति अधीचित्तिमतः प्रकाशरोिव चामुक्षसंब्द्धनूप्तस्य
नायाचित्तिमतः प्रकाशरोिव चामुक्षसंब्द्धनूप्तस्य। न हि काश्यकः कान्योष्णायः
कुवंते ॥ ७१॥

ननु चित्तिमतं समेदेपि भूयस्वाभिमानः नायाचित्तिमतः चामुक्षसंब्द्धनूप्तस्य
न हि काश्यकः कान्योष्णायः। कुवंते ॥ ७२॥

नेवमग्नेः प्रकाशवत् तव चित्तिमतः स्वाभिमानः विद्विषत्वात्। वशीतश्च
वृद्धान्तः प्रकाशरोिव च। तत्रेव सति स्वदुःस्य सम्बलत्वः
सर्वमुपलभस्य प्रकाशावतेन कूटस्थितिविचित्तिमतस्यस्वृपेष। यदि
चेतात्मनः सर्वदा निविषेशत्वम् प्रभुपरमाः। किमित्यूर्विवान् सुपुरोते
विश्रम्य विश्रम्यः जागवत्त्वान्। किमित्योऽमोऽऽस्य समनुवभावः। किमित्योऽमोऽऽस्य
किं वा नैनमित्क श्रवत्। किमसी व्यामोपपति। किं वा न ॥ ७३॥

इत्युक्तः शिष्यं उचाच -- भगवानवेगस्त्ववः प्रकाशवत् व्यामोऽऽस्य: किं तु मम
कूटस्थतायां संशयः। कथम्। शब्दादिनां स्वतः: सिद्धतिसति अनेतनवात्।
शब्दाचारप्रत्ययोप्यतस्तु तेषस्य। प्रत्यावाचाराहेतुविशेषणां नीलपीताचकारवात्तां
स्वतः सिद्धसम्बन्धवत् कथम्। तस्मात् वाह्याचाराधिनितर्वथे गम्यत इति
वाह्याचारप्रक्ष्यवाचाराधिनितस्विद्धः। तथा प्रत्यावाचाराहेतु ग्यताः
प्रत्यावाचारप्रत्ययोप्यतस्तु नीलपीताचकारवात्तां संहतवाचकारवातः प्रत्यावाचार
स्वस्थितिरिक्तवाचकारवात्तां स्विद्धः। शब्दाचित्वः असंहततामेव चाति
चेतात्मकस्थवत्। स्वाभिमानः प्रत्यावाचारारमुपलभस्य सिद्धिः। सिद्धिः विकर्षितावाचारवात्
कूटस्थः इति संशयः। ॥ ७४॥
तं गुरुरवाच -- न युक्तस्तव संशयः। यतस्तेषा प्रत्ययाः
निम्नमैश्वर्येत उपलब्धेरेवाप्रिणामित्वात् कृदिस्तवसिद्धि
निम्नश्रेणीवापश्रविविदात्रारोपणातोरविविदायतिः संशयहेतुमात्रः। यदि हि तव
परिणामितं व्यापरेश्वरविज्ञातप्राचारोपणक्योऽपविविदायेत्। व्यापरेश्वरभविष्यैः
स्विष्यच्यतः यथा चेदिन्यायाँ स्विष्यभयेषु। न च तथात्मनस्तव
स्विष्णुकेदेशोपलब्धि:। अतः कृदिस्तवाद तत्वति ॥ ७५॥

तत्वाह -- उपलब्धिनांम धात्वयाँम विक्रियेव उपलब्धः। कृतअस्त्य(आत्म) अता
चेति विरुद्धम् ॥ ७६॥

न । धात्वमेवविक्रियायामुपलब्धुपचारात्। यो हि बौद्धः प्रत्ययः स
धात्वयानं विक्रियात्मक आत्मन उपलब्धिनोपचार्यते। यथा चिन्तितया
द्विभिन्नाश्विदोपलब्धिस्तिः। धात्वमेवविक्रियायामुपलब्धिस्तिः
द्विद्वेबनोपचार्यते तद्वेद्वेबनोपचार्यते ॥ ७७॥

इत्युक्तः श्रीयु आह -- नन्दु भगवन् मम कृदिस्तवप्रतिपदानं
प्रत्ययसामयं दृष्टान्तः। कथमः। चिन्तितः। चिन्तितःमेवविक्रियायामुपलब्धिस्त
यथा धात्वमेवविक्रियायामुपलब्धिस्तिः। धात्वमेवविक्रियायामुप
धात्वमेवविक्रियायामुपलब्धिस्तिः। इत्युक्तः श्रीयु आह -- नन्दु
अता तत्त्वसत्व इवविद्वेबोपलब्धिर्यतः। उपलब्धः। न तु तत्त्वसत
सम्यकं इवविद्वेबोपलब्धिर्यतः। उपलब्धः। ॥ ७८॥

गुरुरवाच -- सत्यं एवं स्थात् यथुपलब्धुपललभ्रोंविशेषः।
मित्योपलब्धिमात्र एवं हि उपलब्धः। न तु तत्त्वसत्व इवविद्वेबोपलब्धिर्यतः।
उपलब्धः। ॥ ७९॥

नन्दुपलब्धिमुपलब्धिस्तिः। धात्वयां कथमिति ॥ ८०॥

उच्चते -- नन्दु, उपलब्धिमुपलब्धिस्तिः। इत्युक्तः किं न शृंगः त्ययः। न
ल्लेभनो विक्रियोत्पादानवासान इति यमोक्तम् ॥ ८१॥

श्रीयु आह -- कथं तस्मिन् कृदिस्तवः
मित्योपलब्धिमेवविक्रियायामुपलब्धिर्यतः। ॥ ८२॥

तं गुरुरवाच -- सत्यमेवविद्वेबोपलब्धिर्यतञ्चतवः। ॥ ८३॥

यथेवं भगवन् कृदिस्तवप्रतिपदानस्य अति
शब्दात्याकारवैद्वेद्येशु प्रमोद्वाराः। ॥ ५२॥
मत्स्वरूपोपलब्ध्याभासलवासानवसवृत्तयामानेिः कस्त्वपराधो मम। ॥ ५४॥

सत्यं नास्त्यपराधः किं त्वविचारामस्मधिव अपराधं इति प्रागेवावोचम्। ॥ ५५॥

यदि भगवन् सुपुजत इव मम विक्रिया नास्ति कथं स्वपनजागरिते। ॥ ५६॥

तं गुरुवाच -- किं ल्वनुभृतये त्वरथा सन(न) ततम्। ॥ ५७॥

वादमनुभावम् किं विचिढ्याः विचिढ्याः न तु सनतम्। ॥ ५८॥

(तं) गुरुवाच -- आगमतुः ल्वते न तवात्ममूले ठ। यदि तवात्मभृते चैतन्यवरुरूपतः स्वतःसिद्धे सनते एव्य स्वात्मम्। किं च स्वपनझागरिते न तवात्मभृते व्यभिचाररिवात् व्यभिचारैव। न हि यस्य यत्वृत तत्तत्ताभिचारिः तु। स्वपनझागरिते तु चैतन्यमात्तयावीत व्यभिचारः।

सुपुजते चेतृ श्रृवत्त्वृत व्यभिचरेत तनं नथं नास्तीति वा वायुमेव स्वात्तान्त्यकानां। अतः समाधिमानुभयात्मकवधानात् यथा धनवस्वाधीनाः। नाशो तृष्णः स्वपनझागरिताः त्वभावो तृष्णः। ॥ ५९॥

नन्यन्त्रभगवन् चैतन्यवरुरूपायागमनुक्षारं स्वपनझागरितायोरविसुपुजतेऽतुपलभे। अचैतन्यवरुरूपो वा स्वामहः। ॥ ६०॥

न ययात्त तद्वृम्भितः। चैतन्यवरुरूपं चेदागमनुक्ष्यति पश्चयं।

नेति वर्षोत्तेनायुरूपस्य उपपत्तय वस्त्विष्ठें शक्तुः मित्रो वत्तमन्योऽवाचैतन्योऽधि। (ततः) संहत्तत्त्वात् पाराध्यमनेिकः नास्तितवं च न कैन्तिषुपपत्तय वाराधियुं शक्तम्। अस्वाध्यात्मः स्वतःसिद्धभयावाद्यीकारम्।

चैतन्यवरुरूपः त्वात्त्वन: स्वतःसिद्धहरावानेषष्ठे न कैन्तिषु वाराधियुं शक्तम्यभिचाराः। ॥ ६१॥

ननु व्यभिचारो वर्षितो मया सुपुजते न पश्चयातिः। ॥ ६२॥

न्। व्यभिचारः। कथं व्यापारः। पश्चयानुन्तः न पश्चयामित्यावहते वचनम्। न हि कदाचिदं भगवन् सुपुजते मया चैतन्यन्त्याद वा किचिदं दृष्टं। पश्चयेनहि सुपुजते तव। वस्माद दृष्टेऽवेत प्रतिधिष्ठितसि न दृष्टिः। तस्मात् दृष्टिस्तुच चैतन्यमिति मयोक्तं। वया तव विद्यमानया

न किचिदं दृष्टिति प्रतिधिष्ठितसि सा दृष्टिस्तु चैतन्यं। तत्तवं स्वपन्नावायभिचाराः। कृष्टिस्त्वनित्यस्य सिद्धः स्वतः एव न प्रामाण्यपेश्यं।
स्वतःसिद्धस्य गृह्यस्य प्रमादुर्द्वन्द्वस्य प्रमेरस्य परिच्छेदिति प्रति प्रमाणपेश्या ।
या लीन्या नित्या परिच्छेदिता सा हिन्दौवीव कृतस्याम स्वच्छ्यतोतिःवथावा ।
आत्मनि प्रमाणये प्रमादुर्द्वन्द्वे वा न तं गृह्य प्रति प्रमाणपेश्या तत्त्वभावतवात् ॥
यथा काशन्युक्तिः वा लोहोद्वतिकारुः पर्नित्यङ्गितवेशः स्वादिशःशिश्वधिः ।
अतत्त्वभावतवात् नाग्याविद्या नान्तर सर्ववा तत्त्वभावतवात् ॥ ९३॥

अनित्यत्व एव प्रमा स्यानेन न नित्यत्व इति चेतु ॥ ९४॥

न अवगतेनित्यविषयकानित्यलिङ्गोऽवशेषानुपपते । न ह्राहगते:
प्रमादुर्द्वन्द्विवशेषांगति: प्रमा न नित्यतिः विशेषोऽवशेषांगमते ॥ ९५॥

निषयाः प्रमादुर्द्वन्द्वाभावः । अनित्यायां तु यत्नान्तरितव्यवस्थायितप्रक्ष्यत
इति विशेषः स्वादिशानात् ॥ ९६॥

सिद्धा तदान्तमम: प्रमादु: स्वतःसिद्ध: प्रमाणनिरपेश्यतथेवेति ॥ ९७॥

अभावेत् प्रेशेषाभावः नित्यत्वाविद्यति चेतु । न असतेरवात्मनि एवात्मनि
साधाविद्यति परिहृतमेतात् ॥ ९८॥

प्रमादुर्द्वन्दु: प्रमाणाविद्यासिद्धः कथ्य प्रतिल्लस्य तवात् । यथा प्रतिल्लस स एव
प्रमादुर्द्वन्दु: यथाः। तदीया च प्रतिल्लस्य प्रमयविषयवेष न प्रमादुर्द्वन्दुः ।
प्रमादुर्द्वन्दु: वेशः नस्तवाविद्यायः प्रमादुर्द्वन्दु: इत्यति: ।
प्रमादुर्द्वन्दुः यथवेद्वेषः नस्तवाविद्यायः। तदीया च प्रतिल्लस्य स्वाधिशः
सिद्धानात्। न च प्रमादु: प्रमादु: स्वाधिशः यावेद्वेषः। केनसिद्ध:
वेशः कार्यं स्वाधिशः यावेद्वेषः। स्मृतिशः
स्मृतिशः यावेद्वेषः। तदेवेद्वेषः इत्यात्मनमेव
नक्षत्राविद्यत्वम: । स्मृतिशः वेद्वेषः नहुः प्रशंसनस्य
पूर्ववाद्विधाया तवात् ॥ ९९॥

ननु प्रमादुर्द्वन्दुविणवागवत्यन्तरावङ्गस्य एव प्रमादु: स्वाविद्यति चेतु ॥ १००॥

न अवगतेनित्यविषयत्वे चालम्यवः
पूर्ववाद्वेशः । अवगतिश्वतिः कृतस्यविधिः प्रमादु: प्रमादुः
सिद्धानात्। अग्निविद्यायुः प्रकाशविद्यति पूर्ववेषः प्रसाधितमः ॥

५४
अगते तन्त्रात्मक योगिता: स्वात्मन्यत्यत्व आत्मन: स्वार्थतानुपवत्ति: कार्यकरण(संपात): वतु: संहतत्वः पाराध्यं दोषवत्तवच: चारोचाम। कर्मः। चैतन्यात्मक योगिता: स्वात्मन्यत्यत्वे स्मृताधिविविधवभानात् संहतात्वः।

तत्वं तथा चैतन्यज्ञेयात्मक: प्रत्यागुणसंपर्यं: प्रायहसंचार: चोर्ध्वामात्मनेवाभावात: चक्षुराधिनामिव संहतत्वः पाराध्यं स्वात्तः। यथा च तदुपजमात्मनेहितादि न तदात्मन: स्वार्थमः। तत्त्वाभवायः भौतिकान्तात्मनोऽस्वार्थमौर्धर्थसत्ति:। तत्त्वात्तमनोऽन्तरधिप्रेमनेव स्वत्तात्मकप्रेमतिः सिद्धं। || १०१||

नन्वें सति असति प्रमातृस्वचे कर्म प्रमातुः: प्रमातृत्वम्। || १०२||

उच्चते -- प्रामायना नित्यन्त्रवद्वित्ते च रूपविशेषाभावात्। अगतिर्धि प्रमा।। 

तत्सं: स्मृताचाण्डवाच्याय अनित्याय: कृत्यनित्याया वा न (स्व) 

रूपविशेषो विनवते। यथा भाताक्षम्र तिष्ठत्वाद्: फलस्य 

गत्यादिन्युक्तस्यानित्यायमूर्धर्थमवित्तुनित्याय रूपविशेषो नास्तिति तुल्यो 

व्यपदेशों दृष्ट: -- तिष्ठत्व मुनुथि:। तिष्ठत्व पर्यता इत्यादि।।

तथा 

नित्यावगतिस्वरूपेन प्रमातिरत प्रमातृत्वव्यथादेशो न विरूढ्यते 

फलसामान्यदिविति। || १०३||

अनन्त्रुः श्रीः: -- नित्यावगतिस्वरूपास्यात्मनोऽविक्रियत्वात् 

कार्यकरणीसंहत्त्रत तक्षादीनामिव वायुवायिनः। कर्मां नोपपत्तेऽ

अंहतस्वभावस्य च कार्यकरणोपादानेननवत्त्वा प्रसज्यतेः

तक्षादीनां तू 

कार्यकरणीनित्यमेव संहतत्त्वमिति वायुवायुपादाने नानवस्त्रा 

वायुदिविति। || १०४||

इद्द्व तवसंहतस्वभावस्य करणानुपादाने कर्मां नोपपत्त इति 

करणमुपदेशमुः। तदुपादानामपिविक्रियेति: तत्रूपत्तैः करणात्म्युपदेशमुः। 

तदुपादानेत्यन्तिदिति प्रमातु:। त्वात: त्वात: 

स्वभावस्य च कार्यकरणोपादानेननवत्त्वा प्रसज्यतेः। तत्त्वादीनां 

तु कार्यकरणीनित्यमेव संहतत्त्वमिति वायुवायुपादाने नानवस्त्रा 

वायुदिविति। || १०५||

शब्दः त्वसंहतस्वभावस्य करणानुपादाने कर्मामुपदेशमुः। तदुपादानामपिविक्रियेति: तत्रूपत्तैः करणात्म्युपदेशमुः। 

तदुपादानेत्यन्तिदिति प्रमातु:। त्वात: त्वात: 

स्वभावस्य च कार्यकरणोपादानेननवत्त्वा प्रसज्यतेः। तत्त्वादीनां 

तु कार्यकरणीनित्यमेव संहतत्त्वमिति वायुवायुपादाने नानवस्त्रा 

वायुदिविति। || १०५||
ननु देहस्थावगती न कष्टत् प्रत्यक्षादिप्रत्यथानात्मकप्रेष्टं ॥ १०६॥

बांझ जागतेवन्य स्थात्। मृत्तिकवन्योलोकु देहस्थापि
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रत्यथानात्मकप्रेष्टं सिद्धि:। तथे वन्यद्रामाण्। बांझा एवं हि
श्रव्यायो वेदान्तिज्ञाकरतिर्थणं इति प्रत्यक्षादिप्रत्यथानात्मकप्रेष्टं (हि)
सिद्धि:। सिद्धिरिति च प्रमाणपलमगतिमायवाम सा चावगति: कृतस्था
स्वयत्तिद्वागतम्योरि: स्वरुपेति च ॥ १०७॥

अध्यासोऽदेशं: -- अवगति: प्रमाणां फलं कृतस्थनित्यागतिम्योरि:स्वरुपेति च
विप्रतिलिप्तिः। इत्युक्तवन्यमाण्: -- न विप्रतिलिप्तः। कथं तस्मिन
कृतस्थनित्यापि सति प्रत्यक्षादिप्रत्यथानां लक्षये तदार्थायंत् ॥
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रत्यथास्थानात्मित्यदिन्त्येव भविष्यति ॥ तेन प्रमाणां
फलभित्तु पुष्चयते ॥ १०८॥

यथा हि काव्योऽवगतेरात्र स्वविभावनात्मित्यदिन्त्येव भविष्यति:
स्वरुपे भविष्यति आत्मनि प्रमाणनित्यावतात् ततो स्थितेकारतात् पराणम्
यथा: च सुध्दुः समोद्वयावतिरुपेष्ट च पाराध्व: तेनेव
स्वरुपात्मानन्तरनास्वतिः स्तव न न्यायत: इति नास्तित्वभेदम् परमार्थ:।
यथा हि लोकेऽराज्युपेमायागतानां तदवगतिक्षणार्थाय युक्त:।
एवं समानं भगवनवगतेरात्रित्योत्परे नैर्नात्मकम्यत् कृतस्थनित्यात्
विभावनात्मित्यदेवम्योरि: प्रत्यथापस्थान। अवगतिः प्रत्यथावतिरुपेष्ट
विभावनात्मि। यथा स्वेष्टे नीलपितादाकारस्वेशः प्रत्यथावतिरुपेष्ट
विभावनात्मि। यथा स्वेष्टे नीलपितादाकारस्वेशः प्रत्यथावतिरुपे
विभावनात्मि: परमार्थो न स्तित्वान्त्यंते एवं लोकानि
नीलपितादित्यवेदात्मस्वविभावनात्मि: विभावनात्मित्यदिन्त्रोत्वस्तिः ॥
तस्यावगतेरात्रित्यदिन्त्रोत्वस्तिः नास्तीति न स्वेष्टै: स्वरुपे भविष्यति द्वारा
वा श्रवयो; अन्यथा चाबहावात् ॥ १०९॥

तथे वन्य:। एषाविष्य विश्रित्मि: संसारो जागत्वन्तत्क्षण:। तस्या
अविवाया विष्य नविन्तिका:। इत्येव त्वमवस्त मापतोज्जसी:। नात्म: परे
जागत्वन्तु: समुत्तमविभवियसि संसारोऽदुः स्तवान् मुक्तोऽद्वितीयं। ॥ ११०॥

आद्विति: ॥ १११॥

इति अवगतिप्रकरणम् ॥ २ ॥
तत्र शब्दस्य रूपस्य संगत्वां विषयां श्रोतादिग्रहणात् स्वाधमनि परेषु वा विज्ञानाभावः तेषस्येव परिणातां यथा लोटादीनाम्।
श्रोतायां दिशायेत् जायन्ते। येन च माययेत् स ज्ञातव्यावत्त्यात्त्वात्।
तेषु हि शब्दविद्यायोऽन्यसंसरूपस्य सिद्धां जन्मवृद्धिः (वि)
परिणामार्जनसंज्ञायोगवियोगचिन्तारात्माविवेकाविवक्षयत्रक्रियाकारिकश्रेष्ठत्रियानेव
अभ्यासः सामाजयेय च सूक्ष्मः व्यावहर्षकमार्जनः। तद्विद्यातृत्वादेव
tद्विजाता सर्वस्यादिधिर्मििविकन्तः। ॥ ६६॥

तत्र शब्दादिभयुपलयनः पीढानां विद्यानेव परिधिक्रिययत॥ ६६॥

शब्दस्तु ध्यानस्मार्नावेयां विशेषधर्मां विषयां तत्त्वावित्त्रिः प्रियः:
स्तुत्यदिनिकः अनिश्चितवस्तिबर्तवाटत्वाविभिधवचने: मा
व्यासमयावनसंसर्गादिधिर्मििविकृष्णवाचलमविप्रलिनमभयमत्स्यतूस्माविषयः

गोचरीकृत्य स्याहु नेवाहेत्यसंसर्गादिधिर्मििव भावम। अत एव न
शब्दनिपिता हायिनिविर्विंद्रिवाः। अतो भा किं कारिष्यत
स्तुतिनिदिनिदिविप्रियाय्यात्वादित्वक्षणः: शब्दः। अतिरिक्ततं हि शब्दादिववेयान
गतां प्रियः: श्लोक वर्षीयायात्वादित्वक्षणं न तु क्षमा विवेकिनो
वालायात्वादित्वक्षणं कतृत्वस्यत् इति। एवेकम् श्लोकसमावेयान तद्विद्याशेष
शिक्षायाय श्रावणार्जुनानुवादित्वक्षणः
शतोऽणमुदरकशार्ज्जरोदरशून्यविकित्रिक्षणः।
कैलिच्छुरीरसरसमवाधिभिः भावाणुकृत्तमितिवेत् न मम भाषाविमानेन
वृद्धाशिरिक्षणः अध्यायः चकितं कियते व्योमः इव मृडिष्टाविधिभिः। तथा
रूपसमायानेन तद्विद्याशेष प्रियायावे: स्त्रीवाणानादित्वक्षणः: अरूपवान:न
मम काकुद्ध धानवुद्विद्विदां कियते। तथा निगमायानेन तद्विद्याशेष
(प्रियाप्रिये:) महुत्मानलवणकट्टितक्षणेवृद्धाशिरिक्षणः। परिकृति: अरसात्मकः
मम काचिच्छ धानवुद्विद्विदां कियते। तथा गन्धारायानेन तद्विद्याशेषः
प्रियाप्रिये: पुष्पादित्वक्षणः: अगमानकश्य न मम
काचिच्छ धानवुद्विद्विदां कियते। “ अश्वधान्तविशेषमथमानवं तथारसं
नित्यमगमन्त्रः च यतः।” इति शुद्धे। ॥ ६७॥
किं च य एवं बाध्यः शब्दावस्ते शरीराकारण संस्थिता: तद्ग्राहायेष श्रोतायाकारणेत: करण्ड्रेत्तित्वायाकारणेः च, अन्योन्यसंस्थिताः सहात्वाच च सर्वक्रियासु । तत्रेव सति विद्वेषो मम न कच्चिरः छद्मविद्वेषो वास्ति । तत्र यदि (कश्रिन्तु) मिथ्याभावाभिमानेन प्रयम्पित्वं वा प्रयुक्तेऽक्षते क्रियाकलापम्मुः पनु मृतेऽपि प्रयुक्तस्वति सः । तस्याविषयात्त्वाम् मम -- “अव्यक्तोऽथ्यम्विन्योध्यूः” इति स्मृते: । तथा (सर्वेषा) पञ्चायामिय भूतानामविकारः अविषयत्वात् । “अव्यवहृतोऽथ्यमान्योध्यूः” इति स्मृते: । यापि शरीरंत्रिवसंस्थानमात्रसंपन्नक्षण मद्यक्तानां विपिनानां च प्रियाप्रियाविद्युत्स्वरुः तज्ज्ञा च धर्माधमाविद्याप्राप्तः: सा तेषां मेवः न तु मद्यजर्ततेऽक्षते भमयः “नै मृत्यूते प्रत्येकः प्रति न तु मृत्यूते कथते नो कीन्यानः” “सवाहायम्यन्तरो द्वारः” “न तिपते लोकः केवल वाध्यः” इत्यद्वित्वस्तुमित्रित्यः: । अनात्मसत्वत्वमात्राविद्यूः परस्तः हेतुः । अत्मसत्वत्वमात्राविद्यूः द्वस्यासैत्व मात्राय सार्वाणुपनिषद्वायाः विस्तारः समीक्षात्म्यानि समीक्षक्ष्यानि समीक्ष्यानि समीक्ष्यानि समीक्ष्यानि || १९६ ||

इति परिसंभवानप्रकरणम् ॥ ३ ॥

इति श्रीमत्तपरमहंसपरिश्रावज्जायामाणीस्विद्विदंविद्विदम्बगतवधात्म्यविश्वविश्वमकरंभवतः कृति: सकलवेदोपनिषत्सारसेरापदेशाः साहित्यी समाज्य ॥ २॥ तत्सत॥

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Please send corrections to sanskrit@cheerful.com
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