To

My Spiritual Teacher

V. H Date

1 AUG 1962
reflect in a nutshell the point of view and the broad outline of Śaṅkara's philosophy as a whole.

In order to appreciate this, however, a mere dogmatic, a priori, speculative metaphysics will not be useful. No amount of mere theoretical or intellectual knowledge of the nature of Brahman will wipe out the stigma of avidyā that is rooted in the jivahood. For that, we must also take up another line of approach, which is at once epistemological, psychological, ethical, and theistic, and which, we may call, for the sake of convenience, the practical approach. If the Brahmanic life is to be lived at all by man, then, it is necessary that theory and practice must not go too ahead of each other. The nature of Brahman must be such as is realizable in degrees; and yet, it transcends the fact of human realization as such. As in Kierkegaard, so in Śaṅkara, truth is subjective to the extent to which it is experienced by man. But in Śaṅkara, the experience of the man is a pointer to the Truth which has also its own independent existence in Society and beyond it. It has been observed in the History of Western Philosophy that Subjectivity, carried to an extreme, ends either in solipsism or scepticism. Śaṅkara's Philosophy steers clear of these two dangers. The solipsist says, 'I alone am real in a world of phantoms'; for a Śaṅkarite there would be, in the first place, no world of phantoms when the position 'All this is Brahman' is reached. And, secondly, the 'I' in the proposition 'I am Brahman' loses its importance as a particular centre of egoism and becomes non-different from Brahman. What remains is Brahman alone, and so there is also no room for scepticism.

The existential aspect, viz., the svānubhava is, no doubt, the highest criterion of reality. It does go beyond the anubhava of the śāstras and of the Guru, but to say, that it alone constitutes reality is to rob a man of his spiritual companionship with other men in the world and to shut the eyes to the central common Spirit (God or the Absolute) itself on account of whose grace the very subjectivity and the spiritual companionship are possible. Śaṅkara retains both the factors of subjectivity and objectivity in the svānubhava itself. Brahman
as they were before. My daughter, Kamal, b.a., was immensely helpful to me in correcting the proofs. I am very thankful to Mr. Ramchandra Trivedi, M.A., one of my Research Students, who not only helped me in preparing the Index but also helped me in many other ways. Mr. S. R. Sardesai, b.a., ll.b., Manager of the Samarth Bharat Press, Poona, and my publisher, Mr. D. M. Tilak, b.a., deserve my thanks in full measure.

Finally, I am greatly indebted to the University of Rajasthan for making a generous grant towards the cost of publication of this volume.

Department of Philosophy,
University of Rajasthan,
Jodhpur,
16th September 1959.

V. H. Date
I have great pleasure in writing this small foreword to a very important work of my former student and now Prof. at Maharaja’s College, Jaipur, Dr. V. H. Date, M.A., Ph.D. The translation of Śāṅkara Bhāṣya has been attempted by very few persons in the history of Sanskrit Scholarship, and I am glad that Prof. Date can be placed in that list. His translation has this particular characteristic about it, namely, that it is not merely literal but expository. Dr. Date makes his translation always readable by introducing some stories from the Upaniṣads and similar works. I think the book would be useful to University students and scholars alike. At the end of each volume Prof. Date intends to give a summary of the contents of the volume which will enable the reader to have a short glimpse of the Bhāṣya. The primary interest of the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya, as Dr. Date tells us, is ethico-spiritual, the metaphysical portion being in the background. As he points out, is an extension of the experience of the Brāhmaṇas. Śāṅkarācārya has put this idea very beautifully in his Śataśloki: ज्ञानं भक्ति विद्यां जियायम्. Dr. Date has kept before himself the model of Dr. Radhakrishnan’s works on Indian Philosophy, who, as everyone knows, has eminently succeeded in creating interest in the minds of his readers by his lucid and comprehensive exposition. The transliteration and the translation of the Sūtras, along with the clear exposition of the objections and answers in the shape of अर्थविध्यां and उपसर्ग will be found very useful by students of the Bhāṣya in India or outside. If Prof. Date sometimes undertakes to expound the texts of the Upaniṣads seriatim, his expositions will also be found emi-
ently readable as they will introduce readers to the contents of the Upaniṣads at first hand in the same clear manner. Prof. Date is not merely well-versed in European Philosophy, but also in Indian Philosophy having learnt it, and particularly the Vedānta, from a Shastri of repute. Finally, I shall feel very glad, as Prof. Date will certainly feel, that his translation will enable some at least to rise on the ladder of Vedānta Philosophy to its real spirit, namely, a first-hand contact with Reality, which is the beginning, the end, and the life of the world—Tajjalān.

5th February 1954. R. D. Ranade
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>i—iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanskrit Sūtras, Transliteration, Translation, and Commentary</td>
<td>1—403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>404—422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important Extracts from Upaniṣads and other sources as found in Śaṅkara’s commentary</td>
<td>423—445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>विजयस्ते श्रीमचाँकराचार्यः:</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Light on the Philosophy of Śaṅkara</td>
<td>447—545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Aim and Method</td>
<td>447—459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Theory of Knowledge</td>
<td>460—482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Māyā, Avidyā, and Vidyā as Powers of Brahman</td>
<td>483—505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Brahman, nirguṇa and saguṇa</td>
<td>506—519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Karma, Upāsanā, and Jñāna</td>
<td>520—532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) From Theism to Mysticism</td>
<td>533—545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Important Topics</td>
<td>546—550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Errata</td>
<td>551—552</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IMPORTANT CORRECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Incorrect</th>
<th>Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>do combine</td>
<td>do not combine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>enjoin</td>
<td>enjoin certain meditations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Certain meditations</td>
<td>prescribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>prescribed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>352</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>it is</td>
<td>it is not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>446</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>साधने न</td>
<td>साधना</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Na-not; Viyat-a-kāśa; a-Sruteh—because not found in Sruti.

Akaśa does not (originate); for Sruti does not mention (it).

We have examined so far many philosophical theories and have found them all worthless on account of the various contradictions in them. But it is feared that our Vedānta doctrine too may be declared to be worthless on account of the same reason. The origin of elements, for example, is stated differently in different Vedānta-passages. The order in which the elements have come into existence, and their number, as also, the origination of the individual soul, the prānas and the senses are all under dispute. Therefore in order to remove the possible doubt that the Vedānta also may be as worthless as its opposing theories, we now proceed to the next two pādas of this adhyāya. We shall thereby be able to show that contradictions being reconcilable, the Vedānta doctrine is perfectly flawless.

To begin with the question whether ākāśa has origin or not. According to the pūrva-pakṣa the ākāśa does not originate. For the Chāndegyopanishad, after having introduced the subject of Brahman as 'That which is in the

1. The Mādhyandinas hold that the jivas originate; similarly, the Ātharvaṇas tell us that prāna, mind and indriyas originate (Mu. 2, 1, 3). 'There is no such reference elsewhere.
beginning one only and without a second, mentions immediately after it, the origination of fire from Brahman (6, 2, 1). Fire, which ought to have occupied the third place in the evolution of the elements, is mentioned first of all; and water and earth are mentioned subsequent to fire. In other words, there being no mention of ākāsa, the pūrvapakṣin holds that ākāsa does not originate.

अस्ति तु ॥ २ ॥

[ Asti—is; tu—but. ]

But there is (another Śruti passage which states the origination of ākāsa). 2

The Chāndogya may not contain any reference to the origin of ākāsa; but the Taittirīya does contain it. Having mentioned the Brahman as ‘Truth, knowledge and endlessness’, the Taittirīya says that ākāsa ‘has sprung forth from this Atman’ (2, 1). But this means that the two Upaniṣads have conflicting statements; one says that creation begins with fire, another says it begins with ākāsa. No doubt there may be one agent responsible for two successive actions; for instance, the same cook may be said to have prepared the soup first and the rice afterwards. But the two Upaniṣadic statements being about what is produced first, they cannot be combined into one statement which may refer to the two products of ākāsa and fire as being either successive or simultaneous. Neither can we say that ākāsa came first and fire afterwards, nor that they came forth simultaneously. Besides, whereas in the Chāndogya, the fire is said to have sprung from the Ātman, in the Taittirīya, it is said to have sprung from the wind. In short, the contradictions are such as will not be reconciled.

And yet some one may try to put forth the following reasoning:

गौण्यसंमचातुः ॥ २ ॥

[ Gauni—having secondary meaning; asambhavat—being impossible. ]
As it is impossible (for ākāśa to exist, the statement concerning its origination) has a secondary meaning (only).

The statement of the Taittirīyopaniṣad regarding the origin must be taken in a figurative sense, because as the followers of Kaṇāda point out, there exists none of the three causes for the origination of ākāśa. Ākāśa being partless, there cannot be any homogeneous inherent causes prior to ākāśa, and because there are no constituent or inherent causes there can be no non-inherent cause or the conjunction of these. And further, in the absence of these two causes, there is no function left for the instrumental cause.

There is moreover a difference between the prior and the posterior conditions of the elements which have origination. Fire, for instance, does not possess light and other qualities before it comes into existence; but it possesses them after its origination. No such difference can be pointed out to exist in the case of ākāśa. Can any one ever imagine the condition of ākāśa prior to its so-called origination and think of it as not affording room for big things like elements or for minute things like atoms? Besides, the peculiar characteristics of ākāśa, such as its all-pervadingness and partlessness make it so dissimilar in nature from other elements like earth and fire, that it can very readily be concluded that whereas other elements have origination, ākāśa is without it. And, just as the ordinary usage of language allows us to speak of making room or 'ākāśa' for some thing or person, or just as the same infinite ākāśa is spoken of figuratively as ākāśa confined in a jar or house, or just as the Vedic expression speaks of 'keeping the wild animals in ākāśas (or open spaces)', even so the Upaniṣadic reference to the origination of ākāśa is figurative only.

1. Just as there are threads prior to a piece of cloth.
2. There is no function for the potter in the absence of clay.
And Śruti too (says that ākāśa has no origin). 4

On the evidence of Śruti also the ākāśa cannot be said to have origin. For along with the wind, it is declared to be immortal (Br. 2, 3, 3), and whatever is immortal cannot have an origin. Further, Brahman is said to be like ākāśa in its two qualities of omnipresence and eternity. Other Śruti passages too point out that what is eternal has no beginning. The Atman is said to be 'eternal like ākāśa'; 'The Atman is ākāśa itself'; 'The ākāśa is the very body of the Ātman' (Tat. 1, 6, 2 and 1, 7, 1). All these passages point out that ākāśa is so identical with the Brahman, that like the latter, it also cannot have any origination. On the other hand, if ākāśa had a beginning, it would have been different from Brahman and so it could not be predicated of Brahman, as blue can be predicated of a lotus.

Like the word Brahman, the one (word 'sprang') may (have both primary and secondary meanings). 5

The pūrvapakṣin expects a doubt from the Vedāntin. If the chapter and the context of the Tattwārīyopaniṣad (2, 1) be the same, how can the same words 'sprang forth' be said to have been used in their literal meaning in connection with fire and other subsequent elements, but used figuratively in connection with ākāśa? This may happen, says the pūrvapakṣin, in the same way in which the word Brahman is used to indicate the primary meaning viz. 'bliss', as well as the secondary meaning, viz. 'food' etc. in a passage of the same Upaniṣad (3, 2). Again, in the same passage, 'Try to realize Brahman by penance, for penance is Brahman', Brahman is once used
To raise further doubts. If ākāśa has no beginning, that is, if it is as eternal as Brahma, how can Brahma be declared to be ‘one only, without a second’? And how can it be said that when Brahma is known everything else is known (Chā. 6, 1)? The pūrṇapakṣin replies that Brahma is said to be ‘one’ in the sense that none of the effects of Brahma exists. The proposition, ‘yesterday, there was here clay only’ means the absence of the various pots which are visible today; it does not mean other instruments such as ‘wheel’ or stick which were also present along with the clay. Even so, the proposition ‘Brahman alone was, nothing else’ means simply the denial of the existence of the effects of Brahma and not of ākāśa. It means also the denial of any other efficient cause except Brahma, though this cannot be asserted in the case of clay which requires a potter as the efficient cause of the vessels. Besides, ākāśa, though distinct from Brahma, does not exist as an altogether separate entity from it. For instead of possessing different attributes, the attributes of pervasiveness, immateriality, and partlessness are so common to both, that we may speak of Brahma and ākāśa as a mixture, like that of milk and water, existing even prior to creation of the world. It is only at the time of the creation that the difference between them becomes first manifest; Brahma becomes active for the act of creation, while ākāśa remains unmoved. That they are identical and form one substance becomes apparent from the Āruti-passage already quoted, viz. ‘Brahman has ākāśa for its body’. Hence, there should be no objection to the assertion that Brahma being known everything else becomes known. For just as to carry a jug of milk is to carry along with it a few drops of water which might have been mixed with milk, even so when the space-time relations of the effects of Brahma or of ākāśa are the same, to know the Brahma
is to know along with the effects the ākāśa which is contained in Brahman. The conclusion therefore is that the Sruti reference to the origin of ākāśa is to be understood in a figurative sense.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies:


Non-difference (of the world from the Brahman) will not make the fundamental assertion false; Sruti (also) says so.  

Consider the following fundamental assertion of the Vedānta as expressed in the different Upaniṣads: 'That which enables us to hear what is unheard, to think what is unthinkable, and to know what is unknowable (Chā. 6, 1, 3); verily, when the Atman is known, heard, thought of, all this becomes known' etc. (Br. 4, 5, 6; Mu. 1, 1, 3); 'There is no learning which is outside me (the Atman)' etc. This assertion will not be falsified only if the world and its objects are treated as non-different from the Brahman, and the non-difference of the two is possible only if the entire world is considered as the product of Brahman. Difference, on the other hand, will falsify the assertion. It is to impress this very truth viz. that Brahman is the cause, that Sruti declares it as 'one and without a second', as the only 'existent', which 'saw' within itself and 'produced fire' (Chā. 6, 2, 1 & 3); and further till the end of the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya we are told that all this is verily the Atman, just as truly as the vessels are the clay (Chā. 6, 8, 7). All this goes to prove that if ākāśa be not the product of Brahman, it would be impossible to have the knowledge of it, even if the Brahman is known. Other Sruti passages too, such as 'All this is Atman' (Br. 2, 4, 6), 'All this in front of (the beholder) is the immortal Brahman' (Mu. 2, 2, 11) go to show the same truth.
Akāśa therefore is a product of Brahman like fire and other elements.

As for the alleged conflict of the statements of the two Upaniṣads, we say that it can be resolved by reference to their common implication. The Taittiriyopaniṣad is clear on the point of the origination of fire. In the evolution of the elements, it occupies the third place; for it is definitely stated that the ākāśa sprang forth from the Ātman, that from ākāśa sprang forth the wind, and that from wind sprang forth the fire. The order stated in the Taittiriya is thus in no way modifiable. The statement of the Chāndogypaniṣad however can legitimately be construed in a different way. The mention of fire as being produced is no doubt prominent; but this leaves room for the production of ākāśa and wind before fire. The Chāndogya cannot be said to have necessarily contradicted the Taittiriya, unless it is presumed that the statement in it regarding fire has the double function of mentioning fire as the first product, and of refuting the statement regarding ākāśa in the Taittiriya. As a matter of fact, the two statements are not incompatible. One of them has the explicit reference to ākāśa and wind, the other has it implicitly.

We come to the same conclusion in another way. No doubt, Brahman is mentioned as the only creator; but it can create things one after another. The Chāndogya itself has an earlier reference (3, 14, 1) to the creation of the entire world and not merely to that of ākāśa and fire from Brahman, as ‘all this begins, breathes and ends in Brahman’. Naturally, just as this reference to the creation of all objects is not incompatible with the later reference of the same Upaniṣad (Chā. 6, 2, 1) regarding the creation of fire, even so this latter reference to fire is not contradictory to the reference of the Taittiriya (2, 1) regarding the origination of ākāśa. One may say that while the reference to ‘tajjalān’ in the earlier passage of the Chāndogya is to the meditation on the Brahman with a tranquil mind, the other passage of
it refers to the order of the evolution of the elements. But this serves no purpose. For the order of the evolution of fire (Chā. 6, 2, 3) which is merely implied and not indicated by any special word, has in addition only a secondary importance when compared with the definite and explicit statement of both the order and the element of ākāśa in the Taittirīya (2. 1), as 'from Ātman came forth the ākāśa, from ākāśa the wind, and from wind the fire'. There is, therefore, no possibility of having an option with reference to the order of succession in the case of fire. It does not come first, but comes third in the order of evolution. Nor does fire come into being simultaneously with ākāśa, for it is explicitly mentioned that it is born out of wind. The lack of explicit reference to the first two elements of ākāśa and wind in the Chāndogya is in no way a contradiction to what is stated in the Taittirīya. What is explicitly wanting must be understood to be implicitly present, especially in view of the fulfilment of the statement at the beginning of the Upaniṣad, viz., 'If Brahman is known and heard, everything else, becomes known'. Ākāśa too must therefore be a product.

Regarding the opinion of the pūrvapakṣin that Brahman and ākāśa may be considered as existing together like milk and water, we say that the knowledge of things through the knowledge of Brahman is possible only on the view that the objects of this world are the effects of Brahman as their material cause. The Chāndogyopaniṣad tells us (6, 1, 4) that just as vessels are known in their essential nature by knowing the clay which is their material cause, even so all the objects of the world including ākāśa are known if only the Brahman, which is their material cause, is known. This excludes the possibility of ākāśa being necessarily known as mixed up with Brahman. Besides, the knowledge of ākāśa as mixed up with Brahman cannot be said to be genuine, just as the knowledge of water cannot be of water alone in view of
its being mixed with milk.' The knowledge of Brahman and consequently the knowledge of all things, on the other hand, as promised by the Upaniṣad, are to be taken as literally true and not as partially true and partially untrue. Again, if Brahman and ākāśa are to be taken as mixed together, it will contradict the statement of the Chāndogya itself, viz., 'Brahman is one, without a second' (6, 2, 1). In short, let us first remember that the two statements, 'Brahman is one, without a second,' and 'everything else is known when Brahman is known,' come after the passage, 'O Svetaketu, have you not inquired of your Guru as to what that thing is which when known everything else becomes known?' (Chā. 6, 1, 2). And then in the light of the illustration of clay and its vessels, we shall understand that the two statements point out clearly that Brahman alone, unmixed with ākāśa, is the cause which when known enables us to know everything else including also the element of ākāśa. Otherwise there will be no connection whatsoever between the earlier and the later passages.

As for the assertion that the origin of ākāśa is not to be understood in the literal sense, we have the reply in the next Sūtra.

यावदि कारं तु विद्यायो लोकवत् ।
[ Yāvat—whatever; vikāram—effect; tu—but; vibhāgah—a distinct entity; lokavat—as in ordinary life.]

But whatever is an effect is (also) a distinct entity, as is seen in ordinary life. 7

All things whether jars, ornaments or swords are seen to be distinct inasmuch as they are the effects of some or other things. As opposed to this, nothing which is not an effect is seen to be separate. Now we do

1. When milk and water are mixed together, no one, as a matter of fact, can have the knowledge of unmixed milk or unmixed water. Even so, the knowledge of Brahman or ākāśa as such will simply be erroneous if we accept the view of the pūrvapakṣa and say that both of them are combined.
find that ākāśa is distinct from the earth and other elements; hence, it follows that it also must have been originated from something else, just as surely as place, time, mind and atmos must have been.

The Ātman however cannot be said to be an effect of something else, even though it is distinct from ākāśa and other elements. For, in the first place, we are told that ākāśa has sprung forth from the Ātman (Tat. 2, 1, 1) beyond which Śruti has no reference to a further cause. Secondly, if the Ātman were to be only an effect, then in the absence of an original cause, the effects will not be what they are, and there will be nothing but the theory of void. Thirdly, the knowledge of the Ātman is self-revealed and not dependent on perception and other means of knowledge, just as the knowledge of all other objects is. The Ātman is the knower, who employs the means of knowledge and knows the objects, and so exists prior to everything else. None can doubt its existence; for it is involved even in doubting. Fire cannot cancel its own heat; even self-consciousness can never doubt itself. And finally, the Ātman is not like other objects a thing which may undergo change with the passage of time. It is eternally present. And so it is not destroyed even when the body is reduced to ashes. It is the eternal subject, and is therefore different in every respect from ākāśa and other objects.

The pūrvapāksin is also wrong, in holding the view that ākāśa does not originate because there are no homogeneous causes prior to it. For we do find that a piece of cloth is produced by dissimilar causes. The threads of it are the inherent cause, their conjunction is the non-inherent cause, and the loom and the shuttle are the efficient cause of it. Nor can it be said that by the homogeneous causes we mean only the inherent causes; for even then we find, as in the case of a rope made of threads and hair, or of a fabric made of cotton and wool, that the constituent causes are different in character.
And if again it is further said that the homogeneity of plural causes refers to some such common qualities as existence, substantiality and so on, then there would be no difference at all between one cause and another. All objects in the world, all causes whether substances, qualities or actions will necessarily be homogeneous on account of their common quality of existence, and there will be no point in saying that homogeneous causes are required to produce an effect. Not only homogeneity is not required, but also the plurality of causes is sometimes not required to produce an effect. For as admitted by the pūrvapakṣa, the mind or an atom by itself can initiate its primary action without coming in contact with other substances. As against this, it may be pointed out that the plural causes are required in the case of the origination of substances though not in the origination of actions etc. This could have been the correct view if the production (āraṃbha) of some substance were dependent on some other substance and on the conjunction between them. But what happens, as a matter of fact, is that the cause itself becomes known as the effect when it undergoes some change (parināma). No doubt in some cases, several substances may together undergo a change, as when a sprout comes forth out of the seed and the soil; in other cases, one substance alone may change, as when milk changes into curds. In short, it does not appear to be the divine law that several causes must combine to produce an effect. Therefore, on the authority of Sruti, we say that Brahma alone is the cause from which have sprung up ākāśa, and after it, in succession, the other elements and the entire world. (cf. Adhyāya 2, 1, 24).

Equally erroneous is the contention of the pūrvapakṣin that ākāśa does not originate, because no specific

1. This view of the Vedāntin is known as the Parināmavāda as against the Āraṃbhhavāda of the pūrvapakṣin. The effect is nothing but a novel form or state of the cause; it is not a new substance as altogether different from the cause. The effect is identical with the cause, and not different from it.
difference is found to exist between the condition prior to its existence and the condition after it. For the sound which is a quality of ākāśa, and from which we ascertain that ākāśa exists, cannot exist before the origination of ākāśa. But Brahman, on the other hand, whether we consider it as prior to the origination of ākāśa or as posterior to it and to other elements, is not affected by them in the least. Just as Brahman is 'neither gross nor subtle', even so it is 'without ākāśa' (Bṛ. 3. 8, 8). This means that prior to creation there was Brahman alone, and not ākāśa.

As for the inference of the pūrvapakṣin that ākāśa has no beginning because it differs from other created elements in being pervasive and partless, we say that it is fallacious because it goes against the teaching of Sruti. The correct inference even from this fact of difference, on the other hand, as we have already seen, is that ākāśa must have been originated, because whatever differs (except the Ātman) from other things must be the effect of something else. Besides, ākāśa must be non-eternal, because it has the non-eternal quality of sound in it. It may be supposed that this argument may go against the eternal nature of the Ātman as the Vaiśeṣikas view it, inasmuch as the individual soul is linked up with intellect, desire, etc. But it does not go against the view of the Vedāntin. For according to him the Ātman is nirgūṇa. And further the so-called pervasive quality of ākāśa does not exist, because whatever is produced must be limited in nature.

Now, the interpretation of the Sruti (referred to under II, 3, 4) which speaks of the immortality of ākāśa is that ākāśa has relatively got a longer duration than other elements, just as gods are spoken of as immortal, because they live for a relatively longer duration than human beings. Similarly, the comparison of Brahman with ākāśa in being omnipresent and eternal is not to show their identity, but to show that the Brahman possesses these qualities in the highest degree. As an
example of such a mode of description, we may say that the Sun moves like an arrow. This only indicates that the Sun moves very fast and not that he has the speed of an arrow. Other passages from Śrutī, on the other hand, such as, 'It is greater than ākāśa' (Chā. 3. 14), 'There is nothing to compare with him' (Śve. 4. 19), 'Everything else is perishable in nature' (Śve. 3. 4. 2) are so obvious regarding the difference between Brahman and all other things including ākāśa, that they all go to refute the suggestion of the pūrvapāksin that the Śrutī passage which speaks about the origin of ākāśa is not to be taken in a literal sense. Both Śrutī and reasoning have shown us so far that ākāśa is the effect of Brahman and has got origination.

2 भारस्वर्विकरणम् । (८)
एतेन मातरिष्या व्यास्थायात् । ।

[Etena—hereby; mātarisvā—wind; vākhyātah—explained.]
Air (also) is explained hereby. 8

The argument of the previous Sūtra extends to the case of the air, since air has its shelter in ākāśa. Here too there appears to be a conflict between the Chāndogyaopanisad which makes no reference to the origination of air, (4, 3, 1) and the Taittirīya which definitely states that air springs forth from ākāśa (2, 1, 1). This leads the pūrvapāksin to hold that the Śrutī reference to the origin of air should not be taken as literally true. Besides, there are direct references to the immortal and non-perishable nature of air; it is said to be 'a deity which does not set' (Br. 1, 5. 22).

As opposed to this, we hold that air is originated; for, in the first place, as seen already, it is only on this view that we can hold that everything else is known when the Brahman is known. Secondly, air too is distinct and separate from other elements, and so must be a product of Brahman, just as other things are. The so-called immortality or non-setting of the air is to be understood
only relatively with reference to other elements like fire, which are actually seen to be perishable. Real immortality belongs to Brahman, the knowledge of which is said to be the higher or para vidyā as opposed to the lower or aparā vidyā of air and other elements.

This Sūtra has been used only to remove the possible doubt which may arise in the minds of ordinary people that air may not have any origin and that it may be eternal, inasmuch as it is praised in the saṁvargavidyā as an object of worship.

3 असंभवार्थिकरणम् । (९)
असंभवस्तु सतोद्वूपने: । ९

[Asamābhavaṭi—absence of origination; tu—but; sataḥ—of existence; an-upapatteḥ—not being possible.]

The being (as a whole) cannot have any origin; for this is impossible. 9

If ākāśa and vāyu which are sometimes spoken of as having no origin, are ultimately found to have it, it is likely, as some one may say, that Brahman also may be originated from something else. But in the first place, to suppose that it must have come out of itself is meaningless. Secondly, to suppose that it must have come out of some particular being distinct from it is to contradict experience. For we do see that jars as particular things are made up of clay, and not clay, made up of jars. And thirdly, nothing comes out of nothing, as the Chāndogyaopaniṣad tells us (६, २, २). So we can never say that the being of Brahman comes out of the original non-being or void, or absolute non-existence. The Śvetāsvatara also is emphatic on the point that the ‘Ātman is the ultimate cause of all and the Lord of the so-called lords of the senses, and that there is nobody beyond this Ātman who should be considered as its lord and creator’ (६, ९). If, in spite of this, Brahman were to be assumed as an effect only and therefore requiring a further cause of it, it will lead us only to regress ad infinitum. But, to
avoid this, if some ultimate cause is to be assumed, it would be no other than what the Vedāntin calls by the name Brahman.

4 तेजोविक्ररणम्। (१०)
तेजोस्तस्तथा हाँ। १०

[Tejah—fire; atah—from this; tathā—thus; hi—for; āha—has told.]

Fire (originates) from it (viz. the air); so says (the Sruti). 10

The Chāndogyopaniṣad refers to Brahman as the cause of fire; for the same Sat which existed in the beginning is said to have produced it (6, 2, 2; 6, 2, 3). This is quite consistent with the statement about Brahman that everything else becomes known when Brahman is known. Besides, the statement regarding 'Tajjalān' from the same Upaniṣad (Chā. 3, 14, 1) explains how all this universe (including fire) comes forth from the Brahman, moves and has its being in it, and is absorbed in it. The Mundaka also makes an explicit reference to the creation of prāna and all other things without exception from Brahman alone (2, 1, 3). We find, again, the same thing in the Taittiriyopaniṣad, according to which the Ātman performed a penance and produced all this visible world (2, 6). But as against this, when we read in the Taittirīya that fire comes forth from air (2. 1, 1), what it means is, according to the pūrvapakṣin, that fire is produced in succession after air, although fire is produced from Brahman alone.

To this we reply that fire is produced out of air, and not produced merely after air. For the word 'Vāyu' (air) which is used in the ablative case indicates that it is the source from which fire has come into being. This is consistent and analogous to the use of the words 'ātman' and 'prthivi' (earth) in the ablative, just before and after the statement about fire, to indicate respectively that the Ātman is the source of ākāśa, and that the earth
is the source of the herbs and corn (Tai. 2, 1, 1). To interpret, on the other hand, the ablative case of ‘Vāyu’ as meaning ‘after vāyu’ is to supply by imagination the preposition ‘after’, in place of ‘from’ in the expression ‘from vāyu’. Fire therefore must be said to have come out of air.

As against this, however, it may be pointed out that the Chāndogyopaniṣad refers to Brahman as the source of fire (6, 2, 3). But we must note that there is no contradiction in holding that fire, though born out of air, is ultimately due to Brahman alone. For instead of saying that Brahman produced the fire directly, we can very well say that Brahman which successively assumed the forms of ākāsa and air, produced fire after them. Do we not say that we get curds and cheese¹ from the cow, though instead of getting them directly from that cow, we get them, as a matter of fact, from milk? And does not Lord Kṛṣṇa himself tell us that ‘intellect, knowledge, and steadiness of the mind etc., as also the numerous modifications of the elements, spring forth’ ultimately from him alone (B. G. 10, 4-5), even though they are caused by their respective causes? Similarly, there is no contradiction between the passage (Br. 6, 2, 3) which speaks of fire as ultimately due to Brahman, and the passage (Tai. 2, 1, 1) which speaks of the coming forth of fire out of air, or of Brahman which has assumed the form of air. We find a passage in the Taittirīyopaniṣad itself (2, 7) which tells us that ‘Brahman abides in the form of its effects, and in them it manifests’. The only difference between the two kinds of passages is that while one describes the creation of the world as due to Brahman without any order of succession, the other describes it as ultimately due to Brahman, but proximately due to some entity such as ākāsa or vāyu, in order to show that there is some order of succession in the act of creation. So, in short, the statement of the Chāndogya that fire is

¹. Cheese is known as that which we get by mixing curds with hot milk.
due to Brahman is not only not contradictory to the statement of the Taïtirīyaka that fire is due to vāyu, but is also sufficient to show the truth of the statement that everything becomes known when Brahman is known.

5 अत्राधिकरणम् | (११)  
आपः | ११  

Water (is produced out of fire). 11

In this Śūtra, the argument used in the previous Śūtra is extended; and so we should also supply the words previously used, viz., 'from this,' and 'Śruti says so,' in order to complete the sentence necessary for the composition of this Śūtra which has the single word, viz., 'water'. Another reason why a separate Śūtra is used can be said to be the anxiety of the Śutrakāra not to omit the necessary intermediate link of water, in the course of creation, by proceeding straightaway from the being of fire to that of earth.

6 प्रथिविधिकराधिकरणम् | (१२)  
प्रथिविधिकरसङ्ग्रहवद्यवद्वेष्यः | १२  

On account of the subject-matter, colour, and other passages, (the word 'anna' means) the earth. 12

In a passage of the Chāndogyopaniṣad (6, 2, 4) water is said to have thought (lit. 'seen') of becoming manifold and of having produced food (anna). Now, a doubt arises as to the meaning of this word 'anna'. Are we to mean thereby the cooked rice, or the corn of barley and rice, or the earth? In view of the ordinary meaning of the word as food, and in view of the ordinary experience expressed in a subsequent passage, that where there is abundance of rain there is abundance of corn, the
pūrvapakṣin maintains that 'anna' means food or corn, and not earth.

To this we reply that the word 'anna' means the earth and not food or corn. For, in the first place, when the subject-matter under discussion is the creation of the elements, it will be natural to expect the mention of the earth after the fire and the water have been mentioned as being produced (Chā. 6, 2, 3). It will be improper, on the other hand, if instead of this natural course, we omit the earth and jump at the next created entity, viz., the food or corn and then say that 'anna' means the food or corn. Secondly, the black colour which, in the subsequent sentence of the passage (Chā. 6, 4, 1) has been declared to belong to 'anna', is found to belong to the earth. For, while, on the one hand, the food which we eat, or the corn which we use, is not necessarily black, the earth is found, more often than not, as black in colour. The purāṇas describe the night which is black in colour as the shadow of the earth. Besides, in the third place, there are other Śruti passages which, dealing with the same subject-matter of the creation of the universe, declare that from 'water comes forth the earth' (Tai. 2, 1), 'the froth of water hardens into earth' (Br. 1, 2, 2). Nay, in the Taittirīyaka itself (2, 1, 1), we are definitely told that herbs, rice and food are produced out of earth. In view of all this, the word 'anna', which comes after 'water' in the context of the creation of the universe, means nothing but earth. What is meant then by the abundance of food consequent upon the abundance of rain is the formation of the earthly element of food due to water, and not the increase in the quality of corn or food.
He (i.e. the highest God) alone, however, (produces all things) after having contemplated about them; for (there exists) a character peculiar to him. 13

A question may arise as to whether the entire creation is worked out by the elements themselves or by the highest God who resides within the elements. Depending on the Sruti-passages, such as, "from ākāśa has come forth the air", "from air, the fire", etc. (Tai. 2, 1, 1), and "fire thought, water thought" (Chā. 6, 2, 4), the pūrvapakṣin maintains that the elements are, in the first place, capable of acting independently, and that they are, in the second place, endowed with the capacity to reflect, in spite of their being non-intelligent.

It is the highest God, we say in reply, who assumes the forms of the different elements, and who after residing within them thinks of all their modifications and produces them. A passage like "the earth does not know him, though he resides within it and controls it, as the soul resides within the body" (Br. 3, 7, 3), shows that the elements become active only if they are presided over by an intelligent principle. Wishing to become many, the highest God became the perceptible and the imperceptible world (Tai. 2, 6 and 7). In other words, he is the internal self of all. As for the 'seeing' or 'thinking' on the part of the elements, it must be understood that it must be the 'seeing' of the highest God alone; for "there is none else besides him who has got the capacity to see" (Br. 3, 7, 23).

14 Since there is no definite information regarding the order of dissolution in Sruti, as there is regarding
the order of creation, the pūrvapakṣin may be inclined to think that either the dissolution of elements and things in the world takes place in the same order in which creation takes place, or in any indefinite manner.

As against this, we hold that dissolution occurs in the reverse order of creation; it is, as if, the descending of the steps which were ascended before in creation. Earthen jars merge back into clay, snow and hailstones into water; even so, it will be proper to say that the earth merges back into water, and water back into fire. It is in this order that every effect will merge back into its immediately antecedent and subtle cause, till ultimately all the things in the world will merge back into the final and the most subtle of all the causes, viz., the Brahman. Hence, it will be absurd to think that an effect should get itself merged in anything but its proximate cause.

Besides, the order of creation, as told by Sruti and Smṛti, cannot be directly applied to dissolution. So long as an effect lasts, it is impossible to conceive the dissolution of its cause; for in the absence of the cause, the effect will never exist. On the other hand, the cause may continue to exist even though the effect is destroyed. Clay, for instance, will continue to exist even though the jars made out of it are destroyed.

If, on account of characteristic marks (which are available), the intellect and the mind (should be inserted somewhere) between (the Brahman and the elements), we say 'no'; for there is no difference (between their respective orders of creation and dissolution).
We have shown so far that the creation and the dissolution of the elements take place in opposite directions, and that the Atman is both the beginning of creation and the end of dissolution. We have now to account for a fresh difficulty of the pūrvapakṣin regarding the position of some additional entities such as mind and intellect, and the interference which they may cause with the order of creation and dissolution which we have fixed so far. The existence of mind, intellect and the senses is approved by both Sruti and Smrti. 'Intelect is the charioteer, mind is the reins, and the senses are the horses' (Ka. 1, 3, 3-4). Now, if all things proceed from Brahman, and if what the Ātharvaṇa Sruti mentions is true, viz., that 'from Atman alone has come forth the prāṇa, the mind, the senses, and the five elements' (Mu. 2, 1, 3), then, the pūrvapakṣin holds that the order of creation (as also that of dissolution), for instance, of ākāśa from the Atman, will necessarily be disturbed. Ākāśa, as this Sruti points out, is produced from the senses and the mind, and not from the Atman.

We do not accept this argument. For if 'mind, prāṇa and speech are but modifications of earth, water and fire respectively' (Chā. 6, 5, 4), what holds true regarding the order of creation in the case of the five elements, holds true also in the case of the mind and the senses. And if on the analogy of the distinction between mendicant brahmins and brahmins in general, a distinction is made between the senses and the elements (Mu. 2, 1, 3), it is only to make us aware of their different functions, inspite of their being of the nature of elements.

And, even supposing that the sense-organs are different in nature from the elements, the order in which the latter are produced need not alter in any way. For there may now be two different orders, one referring to the sense-organs and the other to the elements; and these two may not interfere at all, whether the senses are produced before or after the elements. The Āthar-
vāna Sruti, which has been cited above, only mentions the senses and the elements one after another, but does not refer to the exact order in which they are all produced. On the contrary, we find in another Sruti that all this visible gross world was formerly of a subtle elemental nature known as Prajāpati, that it was Prajāpati who first reflected and produced the mind, and that mind reflected in its turn and produced speech and so on. This shows us, however, that the order of production of the members in the series of the senses is independent of the order of production of the elements, and that the two orders do not cause any conflict between them.

\[ \text{\textit{Cara—movable}; acara—immovable; vyapāśrayah—applies to; tu—but; syāt—may be; tat vyapadesaḥ—mention of that; bhāktah—secondary; tat-bhūva—their existence; bhāvītvāt—on account of existence.} \]

Attributing (birth and death) however applies to movable and immovable (bodies and things); it is metaphorical (when applied to individual soul), for existence of these (i.e., birth and death) depends on the existence of them (i.e., bodies and things). 16

It is likely that some people may wrongly believe that the individual soul is amenable to birth and death, because it is a common mode of speaking that some one is born or dead and because it is customary to perform the ceremonies known as ‘jātakarma’ and ‘antyeṣṭi’ after the birth and death of persons. But we dismiss this false belief by saying that the individual soul is neither born nor is dead. If it were to perish, all the religious injunctions and prohibitions recommended for the purpose of having pleasures and avoiding pain in a life beyond, for instance, in heaven or hell, would be of no avail. The truth is, as the Chāndogyopanisad tells us (6, 11, 3):
'verily, the body dies when the soul leaves it, but the soul does not die'. Birth and death apply to bodies and things which are movable and immovable; for such things come into existence and are destroyed. But with reference to the indwelling soul, birth and death have only metaphorical meanings. Birth, in other words, means the manifestation or conjunction of the body; and death means the disappearance or the disjunction of it. Apart from this connection or severance of the body, the soul by itself is never seen as being born or dying. This same meaning is conveyed to us by another passage, 'This person is said to be born, means this person has assumed a body; this person dies, means he has gone out of body' (Br. 4, 3, 8). The 'jātaka' ceremony therefore belongs to the body when it becomes manifest, or is born. The soul, on the other hand, is never born; naturally it never dies.

11 आत्माविकरणम् । (१७)
नात्माश्रुतेनित्त्वच्च तत्म्यः । १७

[Na—not; ātmā; aśruteh—not mentioned by Šruti; nityatvāt—being eternal; tābhyaḥ—according to them.]

The Ātman is not (born) as there is no statement of Šruti, and as it is eternal according to them (i.e. Šrutis). 17

There are conflicting statements of Šrutis regarding the birth or otherwise of jīvatman who is generally considered as the ruler of the body and the senses, and as bound by the effects of his actions. While, on the one hand, it is considered as being produced from Brahman, like a 'spark emanating from fire' (Mu. 2, 1, 1), on the other, it is considered as a condition of the unmodifiable Brahman itself on account of its entering into the body (Tai. 2, 6). So there arises the doubt as to whether the individual soul is produced from Brahman like ākāśa and other elements, or whether, like Brahman itself it is unproduced.
The pūrvapakṣin, maintains that the individual soul is produced from the Brahman; for then alone, and not when it is independent and unproduced, everything else will be known after the Brahman is known. Nor is the jīvātman the same as the highest Ātman. For while the latter possesses characteristics, such as freedom from sin, the former does not. Besides, just as the elements which are separate and limited are considered to be effects and therefore have an origin, even so the individual soul, which lives separately in all beings and is subject to pleasure and pain on account of its good and evil deeds, must be considered as having an origin. In support of this, Sruti tells us first how the entire assemblage of objects of experience along with 'the prāṇas come forth from the Ātman as sparks from fire', and then adds that 'all these souls are produced' (Br. 2, 1, 20). Another Sruti passage tells us not only about the origin of the souls but also of their destruction. 'Like sparks which have the same nature as of fire from which they emanate, the various beings arise out of that Aksara and merge back into it' (Mu. 2, 1, 1). It is evident that the beings referred to in this passage must be the individual souls, for they alone are similar in nature with the highest Ātman in point of intelligence.

So, it does not stand to reason to say that the souls are not produced because there is no such mention in the account of the creation of the elements as given to us by the Taittiriyopanishad. As a matter of fact, we must accept even a new thing as true, provided it does not contradict what we already have accepted as true. The view that souls have an origin, instead of being contradicted by the Sruti statement, 'the highest Ātman entered itself into the body', is therefore explained by it. It means, as the statement 'he manifested himself' meant in the context of the creation of the elements, (Tai. 2, 7) that the highest Ātman itself assumed the modified form of the effect or of the individual soul.
In reply to this we say that the individual soul is not born. For not only is there no reference to this question on most of the occasions on which the problem of the creation of the elements was discussed, but also whenever the nature of the soul is referred to by Sruti, it is said to be eternal, unchanging and without any origin. The jīva which is declared to be of the nature of Brahmā can never be said to have an origin. We cite in support the following passages: ‘The jīva does not die’ (Chā. 6, 11, 3); ‘This Ātman (jīvātman) is great, and is the fearless, eternal Brahmā’ (Br. 4, 4, 25); ‘This intelligent Ātman is without birth and death’ (Ka. 1, 2, 18); ‘Having created the body, the highest Ātman himself entered into it’ (Tai. 2. 6); ‘He entered in the form of jīvātman with a view to create names and forms’ (Chā. 6, 3, 2); ‘He entered to the very tips of the finger-nails’ (Br. 1, 4, 7); ‘Thou art that’ (Chā. 6, 8, 7); ‘I am Brahmā’ (Br. 1, 4, 10); ‘This ātman (jīva) is Brahmā, the knower, of all’ (Br. 2, 5, 19), etc. All these passages give the lie to the view that the jīva is born.

As for the argument of the pūrvapākṣin that the soul must have an origin inasmuch as it is divided, we say that it appears to be so on account of the upādhis of the mind and the intellect, just as the ākāśa appears to be divided on account of the upādhis of jars and other things. The jīvātman is Brahmā itself. ‘It is the one, hidden, internal God of all beings, the all-pervading Ātman’ (Śvē. 6, 11). We may talk of the jīva as made up of knowledge, mind, life, sight, hearing, and so on, so long as these hide the real nature of the jīva; but once we know that jīva is Brahmā itself, the distinctions which were there on account of the upādhis will not be there.

It is on account of the connection of the soul with the adjuncts that we may also indulge in speaking about the birth and death of the soul. As the Brhadāraṇyaka-kopaniṣad tells us, ‘It is this Ātman which, in spite of
its being full of intuitive knowledge, arises (as if) out of these elements and perishes after they perish, and then knows nothing’ (4, 5, 13). What this passage means is explained by the sage Yājñavalkya to his wife Maitreyī in the passage which immediately comes after it (4, 5, 14): ‘No, I do not wish to bewilder you at all; verily, my beloved, the Ātman is imperishable; imperishable is his nature or knowledge. The absence of knowledge on his part after death means only that he becomes dissociated from the body and the sense-organs’. Besides, the assertion that everything else becomes known when the Brahman is known, is fulfilled only when the individual soul is considered as a mode of the unmodified Brahman itself, and not as distinct and separate on account of specific qualities, which are only due to the presence of upādhis. It is to impress this very idea of the non-difference of the jiva and the Brahman, that we get immediately afterwards in the same Upaniṣad (Br. 4, 3, 14-16) the assertion that the soul has none of the qualities which belong to this transitory existence, that it is, in reality, nothing but Brahman, and that to realize this constitutes the final liberation. All this therefore goes to point out that the soul is without birth or death.

12 ज्ञातिकरणस् (१८) श्रेष्ठ एवं १८
[ Jñāh—knower; atah—therefore; eva—only. ]

For the same reason (the jīva is) the knower (i.e. self-effulgent). 18

Like the followers of Kaṇāda, the pūrvapakṣin thinks that the individual soul is in itself non-intelligent, but that intelligence or knowledge appears in it as an accidental character. For had it been a natural quality of the soul, it would have been manifested even during the states of sleep and swoon. On the contrary, when a man wakes up, he comes to know that he knew nothing
when he was sleeping. So the knowledge of the soul in the wakeful condition is intermittent and adventitious, and is due to the conjunction of the soul with the mind, just as the redness of the jar is on account of its conjunction with fire.

To this we reply. The jīvātman is eternally intelligent for the same reason for which it is said to be without any origin; but we call it as a state of the unmodifiable Brahman on account of upādhis. And that Brahman has the essential nature of pure consciousness or intelligence is known from such passages as: ‘Brahman is intuitive knowledge and ānanda’ (Br. 3, 9, 28); ‘Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite’ (Tai. 2, 1, 1); ‘One homogeneous direct knowledge which has neither any break nor anything outside it’ (Br. 4, 5, 13). Besides, we do get in Sruti direct references regarding the self-effulgent or the self-conscious nature of the jīvātman itself: ‘during sleep, he does not himself sleep, but looks at the sleeping sense-organs; he is self-effulgent during dreams, and consists of imperishable knowledge’ (Br. 4, 3, 9 & 11 & 30). Had the individual soul been without such eternal knowledge, which is being variously expressed or manifested by means of the sense-organs in the desires of man such as ‘Let me smell this, or see this, etc.’ (Chā. 8, 12, 4), knowledge would have been the property of the non-intelligent sense-organs. This does not mean that the organs of sense are useless. They do serve the purpose of defining the special object of knowledge. Smell, for instance, is the special object to be cognized through nose. It is due to the absence of special objects in sleep and not due to the absence of knowledge, that the soul appears not to be seeing or knowing anything in sleep. As a matter of fact, he is the eternal seer of things and ‘sees’ in sleep in spite of the appearance that he is not seeing. There being nothing else but the Ātman, what should he see or know in particular, except being eternally aware of himself (Br. 4, 3, 23)? The Ātman therefore is eternally conscious of itself.
On account of leaving the body, going to (Candra-loka) and coming back (from it, the soul is atomic in size). 19

Let us now consider whether the soul is atomic, or of the size of the body, or infinite. One may suppose that there is no need to discuss this, inasmuch as we have now come to the conclusion that the individual soul is Brahman itself, and that it is therefore eternally intelligent and without any origin or limitation. But as the pūrvapāksin maintains, there are definite statements regarding the passing out of the soul from the body and its journeying afterwards towards a particular region. In the first place, the soul is said to pass out of the body at the time of death along with speech, etc. (Kau. 3, 4); secondly, it is described as making its journey afterwards to the region of the moon to reap the fruits of actions (Kau. 1, 2); and thirdly, it is said to return to this world again to do fresh actions (Br. 4, 4, 6). Now, if the soul were really as infinite as the Brahman or aksa, there would be no possibility of its movement. That it cannot be of the size of the body has been proved while refuting Jainism. Therefore, according to the pūrvapāksin, the soul is atomic in size.

It is likely that the fruits of actions of a particular soul may be completely exhausted, and so the soul may not look upon itself as in any way connected with the
body. This ceasing of the soul to consider itself as the lord of the body, may possibly be said to be the ‘passing’ of the soul from the body, just as the ruler of a town can be said for all practical purposes to go out of the town, if he ceases to look upon himself as the ruler. But the journey of the soul towards and from a certain region after death, cannot thus be construed metaphorically. They must be taken literally as activities belonging to a soul which moves. And if motion is to be explained, the size of the soul, as already noticed in the preceding Śūtra, must be atomic in character. And when this is established, the passing out of the soul must also be actual and not metaphorical. How else, resides, can the two journeys of the soul take place at all, if it does not actually pass beyond the body? As a matter of fact, certain parts of the body, such as mouth or skull, are mentioned as the points at which the soul departs from the body after death (Br. 4, 4, 2). It is said to go into the heart during sleep along with the tejomātras or the senses as constituted by light (Br. 4, 4, 1), and to come back and reside in them during the wakeful condition (Br. 4, 3, 11). All this proves that the soul is atomic in size.

The purvapakṣin anticipates an objection which may be stated thus. The soul is not atomic, because ‘The Atman who resides in the prānas and in the ākāśa of the heart, is known as being full of knowledge, and as being great and unborn’ (Br. 4, 4, 22); it is ‘all-pervading and eternal-like ākāśa’; ‘Brahman it is which is truth,
Gangā. To this is given the reply of the pūrva-pakṣa in the next Sūtra.

अविरोधवन्दनवत् । २३

[ Avirodhah—without contradiction; candana—sandal; vat—like.]

No contradiction, as with the paste of sandal. 23

Just as a drop of sandal-paste applied to a portion of the body gives a refreshing touch to the whole body, even so the atomic soul comes in contact with the skin and derives the experience of pleasure and pain all over the body.

अवस्थितिविशेषायादिति चेताम्बुप्रमाणादिदे हि । २४

[ Avasthiti—residence; vaiśesyāt—on account of difference; iti cet—if so; na; abhyupagamāḥ—being available; rdhi—in the heart; hi—for.]

If it be said (that the illustration of sandal-paste is not adequate) on account of difference of location, (we say) it is not so; for (the Śruti tells that the residence of the soul is) in the heart. 24

An objector may say that the comparison is not adequate. For whereas in the case of a drop of sandal-ointment, both the location of it on a particular portion of the body and the subsequent diffused experience of pleasantness all over the body are objects of direct perception, in the case of the soul, it is only the experience of pleasure and pain all over the body, and not the location of the soul that is directly perceived. Inference too is not possible in this respect; for it cannot resolve the doubt whether the experience of pleasure all over the body is due to the presence of soul all over the body like the tactual sensation all over the skin, or is due to the all-pervading nature of the soul like ākāśa, or is, like a drop of ointment, due to the very minute soul which resides in one spot of the body only.
To this the pūrvapakṣin replies that notwithstanding the inability of perception and inference to come to any conclusion, we have the following Sruti on this point. ‘It is this Ātman who resides in the heart, and is the internal light, the purusa, the knowledge incarnate amidst the prāṇas’ (Br. 4, 3, 7; Pr. 3, 6; Chā. 8, 3, 3; Tai. 2, 1). So the comparison indicated in Śūtra 23 is not inadequate.

शुक्ला लोकवत्। २५

[Guṇāt—due to quality; vā—or; lokavat—as in experience.]

Or on account of the quality (viz., of intelligence), as in ordinary experience. 25

Or just as a lamp or a jewel kept in a room spreads its light in the whole of the room, even so the intelligence of the atomic soul may spread itself all over the body, and cause the experience of pleasure and pain. This will dispose of the possible objection that the soul being partless may not act in the same way as the drop of ointment, which consists of minute particles and is therefore capable of covering the whole body as the particles get themselves diffused over it. But there may come forth another objection. The quality of a thing does not wander away beyond that thing in which it inheres. The whiteness of a piece of cloth remains in it and not beyond.’ Besides, as suggested in the illustration, the light cannot be said to be the quality of the flame. It is a substance, as the Vaiśeṣikas also held it; so that, whereas in the flame the particles are held close together, in the light they are only scattered.

To this the pūrvapakṣin replies in the next Śūtra.

व्यातिरेको गंधवत्। २६

[Vyatirekaha—extending beyond; gandhavat—like odour.]

1. Even if the soul is atomic in size, its quality of intelligence will not be diffused all over the body, but will be restricted to a small portion only.
Like odour (the intelligence) may exist beyond (the atomic soul). 26

It is no argument to say that odour may not be felt at a distance away from its substance, because colour is not seen anywhere beyond the thing in which it inheres. For the odour is experienced at a place away from the odorous thing to which it belongs. If now somebody were to say that instead of being a quality, the odour too is a substance, inasmuch as it consists of particles of the odorous substance, he will have to admit that the separation of the odorous particles from the substance means the decrease in the heaviness of the substance. But as no one finds the original substance decreasing in this manner, we need not admit that odour is a substance. Some one may say against this that the original odorous substance does decrease in weight, and that it is not a perceptible difference, because the particles of odour which depart from the substance and which enter the nose and produce smell are too minute. We must, however, remember that if the particles of odour are atomic in size they are, in the first place, suprasensible; and secondly, even supposing that they combine, they will not be able to produce strong odours like that of a nāgakesāra flower. Moreover, do not the people generally say that they smell an odour and not the odorous substance itself especially when it is at a distance? So, it is proved beyond doubt that, unlike colour, odour does travel beyond the substance to which it belongs.

तथा च दर्श्यति। २७

[ Tathā—in the same way; ca—and; darṣayati—declares. ]

And (Sruti also) tells the same. 27

Passages like, 'He lives up to the end of hairs, unto the tips of the nails' (Kaum. 4, 20; Br. 1, 4, 7), convince us further that the same soul which is indicated to be atomic in size by its residence in the heart, is said to pervade the whole body by its attribute of intelligence.
28

[Prthak—separate; upadesāt—being mentioned.

And because (the soul and intelligence) are separately mentioned. 28

The same is confirmed by saying that the soul pervades the body by means of its quality of intelligence, (Kau. 3, 6) or that it possesses the intelligence which is manifested as belonging to the various senses (Br. 2, 1, 17).

To this we reply.

29

[Tat—that; guṇa—quality; sāravāt—being the essence; tu—but; tat; vyapadesāh—mention; prājñavat—like the prājña.]

But it (i.e. the jiva) is described thus (as atomic) because it (appears) to have for its essential nature the qualities of that (i.e. buddhi); as with Prājña (i.e. Brahman, when it is considered as atomic on account of the saguṇa aspect or of its being an object of worship.)

The jiva is not atomic in size, for it is not mentioned by Śruti as having an origin. On the contrary, the Brahman is spoken of as having entered all the elements and bodies, and of having assumed the form of jiva. It is on this account that the jiva is declared to be identical with the Brahman; and so it follows that the jiva is as all-pervading as the Brahman is. Therefore it is that the statement about the jiva that 'it is surrounded by the prāṇas etc. applies to Brahman, because it is spoken of as 'the great unborn Ātman, consisting of knowledge' (Br. 4, 4, 22). How again can the soul experience the sensation of pleasure and pain extending over all the parts of the body, if it were atomic in size? To say that it can have such an experience on account of its connection with the skin which extends all over the

body is to falsify our actual experience. For instance, the pain of the pricking of a thorn is located in the sole of the foot only and is not experienced all over the body. Nor can it be said that the jīva pervades the entire body by means of its quality (of intelligence); for if the jīva is atomic in size, its quality also must reside in it, and cannot go beyond it in order to pervade the entire body. A quality which wanders beyond the substance ceases to be a quality. The light of the lamp which goes beyond the flame is a part of the substance itself and not a quality only, as we have already shown. Similarly, the odour, in so far as it is a quality, travels in space along with the substance in which it inheres; or else, if it travels alone leaving behind the substance in which it resides, it will cease to be a quality. ‘The ignorant call a particular water to be fragrant’, says Dvaipāyana. ‘As a matter of fact’, says he, ‘the fragrance is a quality which belongs to the element of earth which may exist to a certain extent in water or air’. If intelligence, therefore, as the quality or essential nature of the soul, is said to pervade the body, it is as good as to say that the soul is not atomic in size. That it is not of the size of the body, we have already seen in II, 2, 34. The soul must therefore be all-pervading or infinite.

Why then is the soul described as minutely small and as residing in the heart by certain Śruti passages, as seen in Sūtra 24, above? It is, we reply, with reference to the superimposition of the qualities of mind and intellect, such as desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, and others on the Ātman, that the latter is spoken of as being of the nature of mind and intellect. Consequently, the Ātman which is eternally free from sāṁśāra is wrongly considered as the actor and the enjoyer, and as having the size 1 of buddhi. The Śvetāśvatara clearly brings out the difference between these two notions of the self, when it says that it is atomic, viz., that it has “the

---

1. Buddhi is said to have size on account of its being located in the heart.
size of a hundredth part of a hundredth part of a hair, and that it is yet infinite" (5, 9). Now both the sizes cannot be true. The soul being declared as Brahman in the statements like ‘Thou art that’, must be infinite; its atomic size is to be understood as simply metaphorical or as having reference to its being falsely connected with the qualities of buddhi, as is clear from the statement, ‘The jiva is seen like the point of a pin on account of its being endowed with the qualities of mind or body’ (Sve. 5, 9), and not on account of its own nature. Again, the passage, ‘This Ātman, who is ānu, is to be known by the inner light’ (Mu, 3, 1, 9), is not meant to indicate the atomic size of the soul, but to indicate that Brahman, which is the subject-matter of the chapter, is to be realized through knowledge and grace, and not to be apprehended by the senses. The jiva being in essence identical with Brahman, it cannot be described as atomic in size. So by the word ‘atomic’ we are to understand that either the nature of the soul is too subtle to be discerned, or that the size has reference only to the limiting adjuncts of mind and intellect and not to the Ātman.

Such a metaphorical ascription of the qualities of buddhi to the soul is found in other Sruti passages also. When the soul is said to take possession of the body and of the various objects of experience (Kau. 3, 6), it is said to do so on account of the qualities of buddhi; and not on its own account, in which case the soul would be understood as different from the Ātman or Brahman. Just as the body of a statue made of stone is not different except in name from the stone itself, even so the soul is not different, except for the false ascription to it of the qualities of the limiting adjuncts, from the consciousness of the Ātman. There is no distinction between the soul and the consciousness thereof, just as there may be between a thing and its quality. The reference to the ‘heart’ as the abode of the soul is, therefore, really speaking, the reference to the buddhi which abides in the heart. The Praśnopaniṣad too, in a
like manner, explains the passing out of the soul from
the body and the consequent departure of it to another
region and its coming back to this mortal world, as
ascribed to it falsely on account of the passing out of
the prāṇas and the distinctions made by buddhi (6, 3, 4).
The soul or the Ātman can never be spoken of as depart-
ing or coming back; for what leaves the body is the
prāṇa and not the Ātman. In short, just as the Brahman
is spoken of for the purpose of devotion or worship as
'smaller than the grain of rice or barley, or as endowed
with mind, prāṇa, odour, taste, etc.' (Chā. 3, 14, 2-3),
even so the soul is said to be atomic so long as it is
engrossed with samsāra on account of the qualities of
mind and buddhi being superimposed upon it.

The opponent may point out that this hypothesis of
the samsārika condition of the soul as being due to the
ascription of the qualities of buddhi to it, may lead us
to believe that the soul may either altogether vanish, or
vanish from the worldly point of view, the moment
there is dissociation of the soul from buddhi. To this
the Sūtrakāra replies:

यावदात्मसाधिविन्यासं दौप्तदर्शैनात् । ३०

[Yāvat—so long as; ātma-bhāvitvāt—on account of the
soul's being; ca—and; na—not; dosāḥ—defect; tat-darśanāt—
because Śruti says the same.]

There is no defect, because (the connection of
buddhi with the soul) exists so long as the soul (exists
in samsāra); Śruti tells the same. 30

The objection cannot stand. For the connection of
the buddhi with the soul will last so long as the
samsārika condition of the latter does not end on account
of the right kind of knowledge; or we may say the other
way, viz., as long as the connection of the soul with
buddhi will last, so long will last the samsārika condition
of the soul. As a matter of fact, there is nothing like
ījva except the imaginary entity believed to exist on
of the limiting adjuncts of buddhi. For throughout the Vedanta-passages we do not meet with any intelligent being except the omniscient, eternally word of the universe. E.g., 'There is no other hearer, perceiver or knower but he' (Br. 3, 7, 23; 11); 'Thou art that' (Chā. 6, 8, 7); 'I am thou' (Br. 1, 4, 10). Besides, the word 'vijñāna-' which means the same as 'buddhimaya', on

int of its being used along with other words viz. omaya, prāṇamaya, cakṣurmayā, and śrotamaya,' respectively consisting of mind, breath, eye and

Br. 4, 4, 5), is used to qualify the 'Puruṣa in the'; and then it is this person 'consisting of light' is described as having as if a sojourn in both the Is, and as thinking like the buddhi on account of proximity with it (Br. 4, 3, 7). This is like the

way of speaking about the womanish (stīrā) character of Devadatta when we find him possessing divine love etc. for a woman. This clearly means in the first place, the connection between buddhi and the soul remains unbroken even though the soul has

urn to another world; and that, secondly, the soul itself and in its true essence does neither move nor appear to move or think on account of its attachment to buddhi which really moves and

We come to the conclusion therefore that as there does not arise the experience of 'I am the soul', the connection of buddhi and other adjuncts of buddhi does not come to an end. As the svatāra says, 'there is no other path to go, to pass death, except to know the great Person who proceeds like the sun and is beyond all dark-

(3, 8).

One may still raise the objection and say that the connection of the buddhi with the soul can hardly be said to exist during the conditions of sleep and

ation, for as the Sruti tells us 'the jīva then as one with the Truth' (Chā. 6, 8, 1). To this Sūtra comes as a reply.
On account of the manifestation of that (connection) which exists (in the form of seed), like manliness and others. 31

Just as the manly power, though not actually seen in children, is all the same potential in them and is manifested only when they become adolescent, even so the connection of the buddhi and the soul exists potentially during sleep and dissolution, but becomes manifest at the time of waking or creation. It can never be said that there originates something out of nothing; for, in that case, manly power would arise even in the eunuchs. Besides, the reason for having a waking life after deep sleep, as for believing in birth after death, is said to be the ignorance of this very fact of being merged in the Real during sleep and death; and that is why after 'having merged in the Truth during sleep, the beings come back again to wakeful consciousness as lions, wolves, etc.' (Chā. 6, 9, 2 and 3). It is therefore proved that the connection of the buddhi and the soul exists unimpaired so long as the latter exists in the condition of samsāra.

The internal organ which may be said to be the upādhi of jīva is spoken of differently as manas, buddhi,
vijñāna, and citta. It is called manas when it is in the
crersion of doubt, and buddhi when it is in the condi-
tion of determination. Now, in the absence of this
internal organ, there will either be the constant percep-
tual knowledge or the non-perception thereof. For in
both the cases the other three causes of knowledge, viz.,
the soul, the senses and the objects of experience will
be always there. Either the knowledge follows them as
their effect, or it does not. But what we find in our actual
experience is that it is the presence or absence of mind
which makes the difference between knowledge and
ignorance. ‘When the mind is absent one does not hear
or see’ (Br. 1, 5, 3). Apart from this explanation, we
shall have either to suppose that the soul, which is then
its real essence, is incapable of any modification, or that
the senses lose their power to cognize all of a sudden,
and without any cause. Therefore the internal organ
with all its mental modifications such as, desire, imagina-
tion, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness,
shame, reflection and fear, is necessary as the
upādhi of the jīva in order to bestow upon the latter
the characteristic of atomic size as shown in Śūtra 29.

14 कप्रविक्रेणम् । (३२-३९)
कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवच्च । ३३

[ Kartā—doer; lāstra-artha-vattoḥ—on account of the uti-
ality which Sruti will have.]

( The soul is ) the doer; for Sruti will ( then be said
to ) be useful. 33

It is only on the hypothesis that the soul is the
doer, that the Sruti injunctions, such as ‘One should
sacrifice, offer oblations, or give wealth in charity,’ have
any significance at all. The various actions to be done

1. When there is ahāmākāra the same internal organ is
known as vijñāna, and when it consists mostly of consciousness
it becomes known as citta; e.g., ‘Vijñāna performs the sac-
rifice ’ (Tai. 2, 5); ‘ He must be cognized by citta.’ (Mu. 3,1,9).
point out the conscious nature of the soul, and not the unconscious nature of the buddhi. The soul, however, in its real nature being the Ātman, 'is the only doer, the seer, the perceiver and the knower.' (Pr. 4, 9)

विहारोपदेशात्। ३४

[ Vihāra—sport; upadeśāt—because it is told. ]

Because (Sruti) speaks about the sport (of the Ātman). 34

And for this reason also the jīva can be spoken of as the doer; it 'wanders at its will during the state of dream' and 'moves within the body' (Br. 4. 3, 12; 2, 1, 18).

उपादानात्। ३५

[ Upa-ādānāt—on account of taking. ]

On account of its (power of) taking. 35

The jīva is the doer on account of its being spoken as receiving intelligence through the instruments of the senses, when it sleeps in the heart, i.e., in the Ātman (Br. 2, 1, 18; 17).

व्यपदेशाच्च क्रियायां न चेतीदेशविपययः। ३६

[ Vyapadesāt—it being indicated; ca—and; kriyāyāṁ—regarding actions; na cet—if not; nirdesa-viparyayah—opposite indication. ]

1. Just as the soul and its atomic character owe their existence to the Upādhi of buddhi, even so the purposive activity of the soul is conditioned by buddhi. This does not however mean that buddhi is the source of activity; that source is the Ātman or Brahman which is the real nature of the soul. It is in this sense that the soul as Ātman is active. If buddhi, on the other hand, is considered to be source of activity, it becomes difficult to reconcile how the soul as the enjoyer of the fruit can be said to be inactive, as also the receiver of the injunctions regarding actions.
(The soul is the doer) also because of such indication with regard to actions; if this were not (true) there would have been different indication. 36

The Taittirīyopaniṣad speaks of ‘Vijñāna as the performer of sacrifices and actions’ (2, 5). This means that ‘vijñāna’ is just a synonym for the soul. For if it were to mean ‘buddhi’ as in the Brhadāranyaka passage quoted above while discussing the previous Sūtra (2, 1, 17), the word ‘vijñāna’ would have been used in the instrumental case and not in the nominative, which indicates that it is the independent subject other than buddhi. Hence it is the doer of actions.

It may be contended that an independent person may do only such things as are beneficial and pleasant, and not such as are harmful and unpleasant. How then are we to reconcile this harmful activity with the independence of the soul? To this the Sūtrakāra replies:

उपलब्धि-वद्वनिमय: | 37

[Upalabdhi—sensuous experience; vat—like; aniyamah—no restraint.]

Like sensuous experience, (activity too) is without restraint. 37

The Ātman may be the doer of both pleasant and unpleasant actions just as it can be the subject of pleasures and pains in ordinary experience. It will be wrong to say that the Ātman is not free even in the act of having knowledge, because it is dependent upon the senses; for these senses or the instruments of knowledge are only useful in bringing the objects of knowledge in contact with the subject of experience. But so far as the act of experiencing is concerned, the Ātman is not dependent on anything else, because the experiencing itself is connected with only the consciousness of the Ātman. Similarly, in the sphere of actions, the doer may be dependent on place, time and circumstances, just as a cook may be dependent on fuel,
water and other things; and yet just as the cook is responsible so far as he cooks well or bad, the doer also is responsible for actions which bring about pleasant or unpleasant results. The doer has unrestrained activity both in the spheres of knowledge and action.

**Shāktrivāryayataḥ | 38**

[Sakti—power; vipāryayāt—on account of change.]

On account of change in powers. 38

Besides, if 'vijñāna' were to mean buddhi and not soul, we shall have to suppose buddhi, in the first place, to be endowed with the power of the doer, instead of with the power of an instrument of the doer. And because every activity has its origin in the consciousness of the self, or 'I', for instance, in 'I come', 'I go', 'I eat', etc., we must, in the second place, identify buddhi with this consciousness of the self. And then thirdly, we shall have to conceive of some instrument whereby buddhi achieves all it wants. But this means that what we intend to call by the name of soul may now be called by buddhi. It will be only a difference in naming a thing. The point that remains to be admitted is that the doer, whether soul or buddhi, is different from the instrument it uses.

**Samaścātyāvacāya | 39**

[Samādhi—equipoised condition during meditation; abhāvāt—due to absence; ca—and.]

And because of the absence of meditation. 39

The realization of the Ātman through meditation will not also be possible unless the jīvātman is assumed

---

1. So instead of supposing that all these things belong to buddhi in order to raise it to the status of the doer, and of supposing a separate instrument of knowledge in place of buddhi, it is better to think of the soul and buddhi as the doer and instrument respectively.
as the doer. And that he is the doer will be clearly seen from the Vedānta passages, such as ‘The Ātman is to be, seen, heard and meditated upon’ (Br. 2, 4, 5); ‘The Ātman must be sought and found out’ (Chā. 8, 7, 1); ‘Meditate on the Ātman as Om’ (Mu. 2, 2, 6).

15.  तक्षाविकरणम्। (४०)  
यथा च तक्षोभयः। ४०

[Yathā—as; ca—and; taksā—carpenter; ubhayathā—both ways.]

And like the carpenter, (the jivatman appears) both ways. 40

So far, from Sūtra 33 to Sūtra 39, it has been proved that the jiva is the doer. The Sutrakāra will now point out that the doing or the authorship of actions is not natural with the jiva but is due to its limiting adjuncts.

If, in the first place, the authorship were natural, the jiva would never be able to get rid of it, just as fire can never get itself free from heat. Secondly, activity being essentially painful it will not enable the jiva to attain the end of life. Some one may contradict this and say that man can achieve the end of life or final liberation in spite of his capacity to become active; he may simply avoid being active, just as fire, with all its capacity to burn, does not actually burn if fuel is withdrawn from it. But we reply that the occasions to be active cannot totally be avoided; for the causes that make the man active are themselves active and are inextricably connected with the soul. Nor can it be said that liberation can be achieved by the employment of certain means; for what is thus achieved or

1. ‘Ca’ is here used in the sense of ‘but’.
2. The dharma and adharma which act upon the soul and produce activity are never destroyed, but live in the soul as seeds possessing the capacity to make the soul active.
produced anew remains for a short time only. The conception of liberation is possible only in the light of what is stated in the Sruti, viz., that the 'Ātman is pure, intelligent and free'; and we cannot have any meaning of this statement, if the authorship of actions is to become the natural attribute of the jīva. The doing or the authorship of the actions is, on the contrary, due to the superimposition of the attributes of the adjuncts on the real nature of the jīva. Passages like, ‘The Ātman appears as if meditating, as if moving’ (Br. 4, 3, 7), ‘when he comes in union with body, mind and senses, he is called the enjoyer by the wise people’ (Ka. 1, 3, 4), clearly show that it is the Ātman alone which passes as the enjoyer on account of the ascription to it of qualities that really belong to the limiting adjuncts. To those who discern the truth, there is no such separate entity as jīva apart from the Ātman. ‘There is no seer other than He’, as the Sruti says (Br. 3, 7, 23).

If the intelligent deer, viz., the individual soul is different from the senses, mind and buddhi, and is non-different from the highest Ātman, one may say that it would mean that the Ātman alone ought to be called the enjoyer and the doer in this samsāra. But this is wrong. For the attributes of enjoying and doing are said to arise out of avidyā or ignorance, and have no existence during the condition of knowledge. Sruti says: ‘when there is duality, as it were, one sees the other’, but ‘when everything becomes for him the Ātman, who should see whom?’ (Br. 4, 5, 15).

This same truth is gathered from the comparisons of the soul with the falcon and the carpenter. Like a

1. Bondage and liberation have no meaning with reference to the Ātman who is pure consciousness; nor have they any meaning with reference to buddhi, manas etc., for these are non-intelligent. But bondage and liberation are supposed to belong to the intelligent soul on account of the upādhi of buddhi etc. which arise out of avidyā and are supposed to belong to the soul.
ary on account of flying in the air, or a weary on account of working with his axe tools, the soul gets tired with the dualities of presented in the conditions of waking and and as the falcon ceases to fly and comes to the carpenter lays down his tools and finds rest, even so the soul enters into deep sleep to ed by the highest Atman and be relieved ness. It is this condition of being embraced best Atman that is said to constitute the of all the desires of the jiva’. As the tells us, it is nothing but the ‘Atman who is rief and desire, and is truly the āptakāma or ma’ (Br. 4, 3, 21). Continuing the topic, Upaniṣad tells us that ‘the Atman alone the best abode, the best wealth, the highest the highest joy’ (Br. 4, 3, 32). It is in this mokṣa, in other words, that the jiva can be dispelled the darkness of ignorance by the wledge, and to have attained the tranquillity of the Atman.

It would be noted that the simile of the carpenter might be carried too far. The carpenter may be of actions such as the cutting of wood and e cannot be said to have any such relation if. Even so, the jiva may be said to be regard to the functions of its adjuncts the senses, the mind, and the buddhi. With regard to its own real nature, viz., the this partial comparison of the carpenter ul need not make us believe that the soul parts corresponding to the limbs of the o that it may accept or reject the instru- owledge or action as it likes.

āma is one whose kāma or desires are all āpta or arly, ātmakāma is one who has no other desire man.
As for the argument of the pūrvapakṣa that either the authorship of the soul is real and natural, or else the Sruti passages enjoining action will be useless, we reply that the Vidhi-śāstra which deals with these passages has only assumed the authorship of the soul established somehow, and that it does not aim at proving it. The authorship of the soul, as we have already shown, is not its real nature, but is due to avidyā. The real nature of the soul being Brahman, the Vidhi-śāstra or the Vedic injunctions apply only to that authorship of the soul which is due to avidyā. It is not necessary, in short, that the soul must in its real nature be the doer of actions in order to save the utility of Vidhi-śāstra; it is sufficient even for this purpose if the soul has authorship which is superimposed on it. It is this latter type of authorship which is indicated even by such Upaniṣadic statements as ‘the puruṣa is the doer, and is of the nature of vijñāna’ (Pra. 4, 9), or by what was said under Śūtras 34 and 35, regarding the soul.

This may again create the doubt that the wandering or the sporting of the soul during dream (Br. 2, 1, 18) may not be due to any upādhi like the senses etc., but may be due to the soul itself; for whereas the upādhis are all absorbed in the dream, there is yet the actual experience of the doing of the soul. Similarly, it may be said that the accusative and the instrumental cases denoting the buddhi and the senses, in the statement which refers to the ‘taking over of the powers of the senses by means of intelligence’ (Br. 2, 1, 17), indicate that the authorship belongs to the soul exclusively and apart from its relation to buddhi and the senses. To this we reply that even during dream, the means of knowledge, in the first place, are not completely absent. For we are told that the soul ‘goes beyond the waking life and becomes a dream along with buddhi’ (Br. 4, 3, 7). Smṛti also defines the ‘dream as that in which the senses are at rest, but the mind is occupied with objects’. Desires which are the ‘modifications of the mind’ (Br. 1, 5, 3) are
present in a dream, and so it can be said that the soul wanders in the dream along with the mind. And yet, we must remember, in the second place, that the wanderings in the dream are only mental in character and not real. Our doings in the dream are therefore described by us and by Sruti with the qualification of 'as if'. 'Laughing and rejoicing with a woman as if, or looking as if at terrible sights', is the Upaniṣadic description of dreams (Br. 4, 3, 13); 'I went on the top of a mountain, as it were, and saw a row of trees', is the ordinary way of putting a similar experience. This means that if the dream itself is unreal, the wanderings in the dream, as also the authorship of these wanderings as due to the soul, are equally unreal. Thirdly, the accident of the language and the use of cases need not pin us down to one interpretation only. The two expressions, 'warriors fight' and 'the king fights by the help of his warriors' really mean the same thing, though the cases used in the two sentences with reference to the word 'warriors' are nominative and instrumental respectively. This means that in spite of the instrumental case, buddhi can be the author of actions, and that we need not say on this account that the soul alone apart from buddhi is the doer. Besides, finally, the statement regarding the 'taking of the powers of the senses' means the automatic cessation of their activity during the condition of dream or sleep, and not the exclusive or independent activity of the jīvātmā.

As for the authorship implied in the passage 'Vijñāna performs the sacrifice' (Tai. 2, 5), referred to in Sūtra 36, we say that it refers to buddhi only. For, in the first place, 'Vijñāna' is known to mean buddhi. Secondly, as the word 'Vijñāna-maya' comes after the mention of 'mano-maya', the word 'Vijñāna' by association means buddhi. Thirdly, faith is mentioned as the head of the Vijñānamaya Ātmān, and as representing the attribute of buddhi (Tai. 2, 4). Fourthly, in the mantra that immediately follows, viz., 'All the gods (i.e. the senses) worship Vijñāna as the oldest, as
Brahman (Tai. 2, 5), buddhi is known to be the oldest or the first-born. And finally, in the Sruti-passage which mentions that 'sacrifice takes place in the order of citta and speech', priority is given to what is thought of by buddhi.

In view of this, even if buddhi and other instruments be said to be responsible for actions, there would be no reversion of appropriate powers. The instruments are active with regard to their specific functions, but with reference to some other actions they may be passively helpful. Buddhi and other instruments are valuable as instruments only so far as perception belongs to the Ātman. And yet the Ātman cannot be said to be the author of perception or knowledge; for the Ātman is identical with knowledge or anubhava; he is of the nature of everlasting knowledge itself. Nor is the knowledge of the Ātman in need of some conscious, egoistic prior action on its part; for the egoism itself can become an object of knowledge. In short, the Ātman appears as the conscious doer on account of the upādhi of buddhi; otherwise so far as the pure consciousness or the Ātman is concerned, neither the ahamkāra nor the buddhi can be called an instrument; nor can the Ātman be called as the doer.

The argument of the pūrvapāksin that samādhi and meditation will not be possible unless the jīva is supposed to be active is met by what we have said regarding the Vedic injunctions. These have value

1. Buddhi is identified with Hiranyagarbha.
2. The function of burning is directly inherent in the wood. With reference to this action, wood may be said to be the active doer; but it has got also the power of helping the cooking of food.
3. Buddhi works as an instrument so far as the knowledge of different objects is concerned. So long then, the Ātman too being associated with buddhi, is said to have ahamkāra and is declared to be the doer. But so far as the everlasting, undifferentiated knowledge of the Ātman is concerned, buddhi and ahamkāra fall away; and there can be no talk of doer or instrument.

V. E. 4
only with reference to the authorship of the jīva which is due to upādhis.

16 परायताधिकरणम् । (४१-४२) परातु तथावते । ४१

[Parāt—from the highest Ātman; tu—but; tat—that; Śrutēh—from Śruti.]

But as the Śruti tells (the doings of the jīva regarding sāṁsāra and mokṣa arise) from the highest Ātman. 41

Let us now discuss the question whether the aupādhika authorship of the individual soul is dependent or independent of the Lord. According to pūrvapakṣa, it is not dependent, because the various feelings and emotions like love and hatred which work as motives, and the various instruments which are used to achieve the objects of desire, are sufficient to account for the independent authorship of the soul. Actions of common experience, such as ploughing by oxen, do not depend on God. On the contrary, if all the actions of men depended on God, it would mean that God himself is cruel and unjust; because he will first compel men to do such actions as will result in pain, and secondly, assign to these actions unequal results. No doubt, it was shown by the Vedāntin while discussing Sūtra 34 of Adhyāya II, Pāda 1, that God may not be so accused, inasmuch as he himself is dependent for his behaviour on the merits and demerits of the actions of men. But here we are discussing whether man’s activity itself is dependent on God or not. God’s dependence on merits and demerits of men can be accepted only when the merits and demerits are the results of the independent activities of men. But if the entire activity of men is dependent on God, it follows that the merits and demerits accruing from these activities are also dependent on God; and so there will be left nothing further on account of which we may be able to say that
God is dependent on the activities of men and so absolve him from the guilt of being cruel and unjust. Besides, if God is to behave without reference to the merits and demerits, it may come to mean that man may reap the fruit which he does not deserve. Therefore we hold that man’s activity is independent of God.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies that God alone is the ultimate efficient cause of all, in spite of what we find in ordinary experience. It is he who makes men do good and bad deeds, according as he wishes them to lead up or down from this world (Kau. 3, 8); it is he who dwells within and controls the jīva (Sat. Brā. 14, 6, 7, 30). This show of samsāra with the soul as the enjoyer and the doer in it, has been accomplished by the will of the Lord, the highest Ātman, the superintendent of all actions, the witness residing in all beings, and the source of consciousness. The soul has been blinded by the darkness of avidyā and is unable to distinguish itself as distinct from the complex of phenomenal causes and effects; but it must achieve its release through the grace of God.

As for the possible defects of cruelty and injustice in God, the next Sūtra comes as a reply.

कृत्रमयनापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिपिद्यावेयथ्यादिद्व: || ४२ ||

[Krata—made; prayatna—effort; apekṣah—desire for; vihita—desirable; pratisiddha—prohibited; a-vaiyarthya—not useless; ādibhyah—on account of this and other.]

But because injunctions and prohibitions may not be useless, (God) is dependent on the efforts done (by the soul). 42

The objections do not stand. For God, like rain, acts as a general occasional cause. Just as the different shrubs, plants and corn arise out of different seeds, and yet are dependent on the common cause of rain, even so the unequal results and the difference in circumstances arise out of the unequal virtuous and vicious actions of men, but are ultimately dependent on the wise dispen—
sation of God. He does not arbitrarily create favourable or unfavourable circumstances, or allots unequal results, but takes into consideration the difference in the actions of men. It can never be said that the activity of men is entirely dependent on God. Man acts himself, and God causes him to act in such a way as is consistent with his former efforts. The former efforts of man again are being done by him, because God wishes him to do so in view of his still former efforts, and so on. To say this by way of regress is no logical defect, because samsāra is without any beginning.

But how can we know for certain that God locks to the efforts of men made in previous birth? It is on this assumption, says the Sūtrakāra, that the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions such as, ‘One who desires to go to heaven should make a sacrifice,’ ‘A Brahmin must not be killed’, are possible at all. If, on the other hand, the soul were to be absolutely dependent on God, prohibitions and injunctions would lose all meaning, and God would be free to inflict pain on those who would act up to injunctions, and pleasure on those who would do what is forbidden. But this would mean to put an end to the authoritativeness of the Vedas. And if God is to behave without any regard to human effort, then the latter too with all its conditions of place, time and cause would have absolutely no value. And besides, man will reap the result in any manner even though he has not made any efforts.

Amśah—a part; nānā-vyapadesāt—on account of indication of difference; anyathā—in a different way; ca; api—also; dāśa—fisherman or slave; hītava—player at dice; āditvam—the fact of being this and other things; adhiyate—is studied; eke—some.}
ADHYĀYA II, PĀ. III, SŪ. 43

(The soul is) a part of God, because (Sruti) mentions difference, as also the opposite of it. Some study (in their branch of the Veda) that Dāsas and Kitavas and others (are Brahman). 43

Now if the relation between the soul and God is between what is acted upon and what acts, we have to decide whether it resembles the relation between the servant and the master, or between the sparks and fire. The pūrvapakṣin holds that this relation may remain indefinite; or if we must specify it, it resembles that of the master and the servant, because it is this relation which exists between the ruler and the ruled.

The sūtrakāra replies that though God is partless, and the soul cannot be a part of God, the relation must be one which is, as if, of a part to the whole, as for instance, of the sparks to the fire. Of course, the soul cannot be the same as God, because Sruti speaks of the difference between the two. Passages like, ‘One must search out and understand the highest Ātman’ (Chā. 8, 7, 1). ‘He is a sage who knows the Ātman’ (Br. 4, 4, 22), ‘The Ātman resides in the soul and controls it from within’ (Br. 3, 7, 23), clearly indicate that the jīva and the Ātman are distinct from each other. Yet, there are some passages which show the opposite of it, viz., that the soul and the God are non-different from each other. In Brahma-Sūkta of the Atharvaveda, even low beings such as fishermen, slaves and gamblers are described as Brahman. This means that all these individual souls who have entered into the physical bodies and senses, which, in their turn, are nothing but names and forms, are in fact Brahman. The same truth is conveyed in other passages such as ‘Thou art man, woman, youth, and maiden, as also an old man tottering along by the help of a stick, and art born with thy face turned in every direction’ (Sve. 4, 3), ‘Having produced things of different forms, the wise Ātman calls them by several names’ (Tai. Ār. 3, 12, 7), ‘There is no other seer but the Ātman’ (Br. 3, 7, 23). There is no
difference between the jīva and the Ātman, because both of them have in common the same intelligence or caitanya, just as heat is common to the sparks and fire.

It is in view of these opposite views of identity and difference regarding the nature of the relation between the jīva and the Brahman, that the jīva is called a part of Brahman, though, strictly speaking, this is wrong because the Brahman is partless.

मंत्रशास्त्रः ४४

[ Mantra—hymn; varnāt—from words; ca—and. ]

And because of mantra. 44

The Person is mentioned ‘as having his three immortal feet in heaven, and only the fourth foot as constituting all beings’ (Chā. 3, 12, 6). The word ‘beings’ (bhūta) stands for all movable and immovable things, as also for living creatures (Chā. 8, 15). So when all the beings are said to constitute only one pāda or foot, it means that the soul is a part of the Puruṣa or the Brahman.

अष्टि च स्मर्यते ४५

[ Api—also; ca; smaryate—told in Sṛti. ]

Besides it is told in Sṛti also. 45

The Bhāgavadgītā also mentions that the soul is a part of God (15, 7). And yet we say that the relation of the ruled and the ruler is conceivable, because we can now think of both God and soul as endowed with limiting adjuncts. Now, one may say regarding this category of the parts and the whole that if Devadatta (as a whole) suffers though there is pain in one of his limbs, the Lord may likewise be supposed to suffer if there is some samsārika pain for some soul, and that if the whole is greater than any one of the parts, to attain the condition of Brahman is to attain the maximum of pain or sorrow, compared with which the sorrow of samsāra would be nothing. What then is the use
of complete knowledge or knowledge of Brahman? To this the following Sūtra comes as a reply.

प्रकाशादिव्यन्तं परः ४६

[Prakāśa—light; ādi—beginning with; vat—like; na—not, evam—thus; parah—the highest.]

Not so, the highest (Ātman); as with light and others. 46

We hold that the highest Lord is not affected by the sorrows of sāṃsāra as the soul is. For whereas being deluded by avidyā the soul falsely supposes it to be identified with the senses, the mind, and the body, and with the pains due to these, the highest Ātman makes no such identification either through love or imagination. The soul further makes similar false identification with other persons and their sorrows, and becomes itself full of sorrow. Pain and sorrow then are seen to arise from error due to false imagination. We reach the same conclusion from considering negative instances. If in a meeting of ordinary men and sannyāsins, some one brings the sad news of the death of some one’s friend or son, we find that only those who are connected with the dead person become filled with grief; the sannyāsins, on the other hand, who have freed themselves from imagining as related with sons and friends, do not become sorrowful at all. If the knowledge that they are in no way connected with other men is of so much use for the sannyāsins in being free from grief, how much more it must be valuable for him who realizes that the Lord is nothing but the pure, eternal, intelligence, and that He sees nothing else but Himself? How can any one say that realization of the Ātman is without any value?

To illustrate this in another way. Just as the light of the sun or the moon which pervades the entire space appears straight or bent, as it were, on account of the straight or bent shape of the things with which it comes in contact, or just as ākāśa which does not move
may be said to move, when the jars containing it are moved, or just as the image of the sun in the moving water may appear to tremble, even so the Lord is not affected by pain, though the soul which being, as if, a part of the Lord appears to be affected by pain on account of avidyā. As already seen, even the pain that affects the jīva is due to ignorance. It is therefore due to the teaching of the Vedānta passages, such as ‘Thou art Brahman’, that the jīva overcomes the jīva-hood created by avidyā, and becomes the Brahman. It is impossible therefore to hold that the highest Ātman will ever be affected by the sorrows of the jīva.

स्मरन्ति च ४७

And the Smṛtis mention (the same). 47

Vyāsa and other authors of Smṛtis tell us that just as a lotus-leaf is not stained by water, even so the highest Ātman being eternal and devoid of qualities is not stained by the fruits of actions. The jīvātman, however, being bound with the five organs of sense, the five organs of action, the five prāṇas, mind and buddhi, is bound by its action, and by the rounds of birth and death. Sruti says, ‘Out of the two, one (viz., the jīva) eats the sweet fruit (of actions), and the other (viz.; the Ātman) looks on without eating’ (Mu. 3, 1, 1); ‘The one who is within all things and also outside is not contaminated by the miseries of the world’ (Ka. 2, 5, 11).

At this point, an objection may be raised. If the Ātman who resides within all beings is one, how will the ordinary and the Vedic prohibitions and injunctions be available at all? And to whom will they apply? To say that these are meant for the jīva who is said to be a part of God is not a satisfactory reply. For the various Sruti-passages which speak of the entrance of the Ātman through all the bodies (Tai. 2, 6) and describe the Ātman as the only seer (Br. 3, 7, 25) and speak
of the identity between the ‘thou’ or the ‘I’, on the one hand, and the Brahman, on the other, (Chā. 6, 8, 7; Br. 1, 4, 10) and of the fate of being moved from death to death in the case of the person who sees distinctions here (Br. 4, 4, 19), are all intended to convey to us the idea of identity between the jīva and the Brahman. To say again that it is on account of this double import of Sruti, viz., of pointing out the difference and non-difference between the jīva and Brahman, that the jīva is, as already pointed out in Sūtra 43, a part of the Brahman, is no satisfactory reply. For the real import of the Sruti is obviously to make us aware of the identity of the jīva and the Brahman. It is the knowledge of this identity that constitutes the Summum Bonum of life, the statement about difference being only an incidental one. So, when there is the one life of Brahman everywhere, the recommendation regarding actions is purposeless.

अनुज्ञापरिहारी देहसंबंधाज्ञयोतिरादिविदत् । ४८

[Anujñā—injunction; parihāra—prohibition; deha—body; sambandhat—due to connection; jyotih—light; ādi-vat—like this and other.]

As with light and others, injunctions and prohibitions (arise) on account of connection with the body. 48

Injunctions and prohibitions such as, ‘Kill the animal offered to Agni and Soma’, ‘Do not hurt any animal’, ‘Help your friends’, ‘Avoid your enemies’, arise on account of the connection of the Ātman with the body. This connection is nothing but the erroneous conception that the Ātman is the same as the body, the senses and other things. It is on account of this wrong notion of avidyā that all living beings give expression to such ideas as ‘I go’, ‘I come’, ‘I am blind’, etc. Right knowledge alone will put a stop to this.

Are we to suppose then that injunctions and prohibitions have no purpose for one who has attained.
knowledge? No; they are not useless unto him, so that he may behave in any way in spite of them. Things will be done or not done by him if they have a distinct meaning for him. But, as a matter of fact, for one who has realized the Atman there exists nothing else which is to be accepted or rejected. What applies to such a realized soul applies to the Atman all the more. Nor can we say that these injunctions and prohibitions are useful for all those who know that the Atman is different from the body; for they may include such persons who have realized right knowledge and not simply those who know intellectually what is right knowledge. To those who have realized the right knowledge, as said above, injunctions and prohibitions have really no meaning; but those who know that the Atman is different from the body, but cling in practice to the erroneous notion that the Atman is connected with the body have necessarily to do with the obligatory duties implied in those injunctions and prohibitions.

Can we now suppose that a man who has realized the Atman may behave in any way he likes, without the sense of obligation? No, we cannot. For if one, (who is asleep and is therefore) free from the notion of connection with the body, cannot be said to be under any obligation to do a thing in a particular way, how can one who has realized the Atman and is absolutely free from the sense of egoism or attachment to the body and senses be said to behave under the influence of likes and dislikes?

1. Those who think that the Atman is the body can be utterly indifferent to what is enjoined or prohibited. For all things good or bad, are to terminate with death of the body and will bear no further consequences. Such people may behave in any way they like, without any sense of obligation.

2. There would be no rise of knowledge unless there is first the freedom from desires. So in the case of one who has realized the Atman there being no special desires which remain to be fulfilled, and no egoism of body etc., there would be no special cause for being indifferent to the doing or non-doing of something according to injunctions or prohibitions.
In short, the Ātman is one, but with reference to upādhis we may say that it becomes amenable to injunctions and prohibitions. To illustrate this: Fire is one, but we do not accept the fire on the cremation ground as holy. The sun is one, but we avoid a dirty place even though the sun shines on it. We desire to have diamonds and rubies, but not other things made of earth, such as dead bodies.

असंतेशाव्यतिकरः I ४९

[Asantateḥ—not being pervading; ca—and; avyatikarah—no confusion.]

And because there being no pervasion (of the soul), there would be no confusion (of action and results of actions). 49

One may grant the possibility of injunctions and prohibitions on the hypothesis of the connection of the one Ātman with several bodies. But it may be said that if the jīvātman is one and all-pervading, the actions done by one man may be the occasion of enjoyment of the fruit thereof by another. But this cannot be because the jīvātman is not all-pervading. It cannot, in other words, establish its connection with all bodies at once, because the upādhis on which it is dependent are not themselves all-pervading. So, as there are different actions and different fruits, there are also different doers and enjoyers.

आभास एव च | ५०

[Āhūsah—image, appearance; eva—only; ca—and.]

And (the individual soul is) a reflection only. 50

The individual soul is not directly the highest Ātman, because it is seen to be different on account of the upādhis; nor is it different from the Ātman, because it is the Ātman who has entered as the jīvātman in all the bodies. We may call the jīva as a mere reflection of the Ātman. But just as when one image of the sun
in some water trembles, the other images in other portions of water need not, even so if one soul is connected with actions and fruits thereof, the others need not be so connected. So, there would be no confusion. And, as the reflection itself is the effect of avidyā, the whole of the saṁsām as connected with this reflection is also the effect of avidyā. Naturally, with the destruction of the avidyā there will be the destruction of the so-called reflection of the Atman on buddhi, and the consequent justification of the instruction that the soul is nothing but the Brahman.

It is on the view of the Sāmkhyas and the Vaiśe-ṣikas, on the other hand, that there will be a confusion with regard to the arrangement and working of actions and their fruits. The selves of the Sāmkhyas are many, all-pervading, conscious, devoid of qualities, and of paramount excellence. The Sāmkhyas also believe in pradhāna through which the souls obtain enjoyment and release. But the characteristics of intelligence, non-activity, and proximity to pradhāna being the same in all, the connection of pleasure and pain with one of them means the connection of them with all. It may satisfy the Sāmkhyas to say that it is the activity of pradhāna which causes a difference in the actions and the consequent pleasures and pains of the souls, and that this may bring about the release of some particular souls and not all of them. But we reply that there is no proof for showing that such a difference takes place on account of the activity of pradhāna, and for holding that, instead of simultaneous release, there is release for the souls one after another. In short, there remains the confusion regarding the actions and their fruits in the system of the Sāmkhyas.

According to the followers of Kāṇāda, the selves are many and all-pervading, but are, like jars and walls, non-intelligent substances. The internal organs or the minds, which co-operate with these selves, are also atomic and non-intelligent substances. And when
these two, viz., the selves and the minds come in contact there arise the nine special qualities, viz., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, and samskāra. And when all these qualities come to inhere in the selves we call it as samsāra. As opposed to this, when the nine qualities cease to have origination, we have what is known as final release.

As against the Kāṇādas also we have to say that inasmuch as the substantiality and the proximity suggested by inheritance between selves and qualities are the same, the occasion of pleasure and pain for one soul means a similar occasion for all souls. The Vaiśeṣika thereupon may take resort to the principle of adṛṣṭa, to which the next Sūtra replies.

अद्द्वानियमात् । ५१

[ A-dṛṣṭa—unseen; a-niyamāt—there being no rule. ]

And there being no fixed rule regarding the unseen principle. ५१

As there are many, all-pervading souls like ākāśa, and as they are equally proximate to all bodies from within or without, the adṛṣṭa or the unseen principle of merit or demerit is gathered slowly through mind, speech and body, i.e. by thoughts, words and actions. Now, as the Sāmkhya believes that the soul is devoid of qualities, the adṛṣṭa must abide in pradhāna, but the pradhāna being the same for all, the difference between the pleasures and pains of different souls cannot be accounted for by adṛṣṭa. As for the Vaiśeṣika also, the conjunction of the minds and selves being the same on all occasions, there is no reason why a particular adṛṣṭa should belong to a particular soul. The Vaiśeṣika may say in return that this can be inferred from the various inclinations and avowed wishes of a particular being. To this the next Sūtra comes as a reply.
And this is the case also with regard to resolutions etc. 52

What we have said against the unseen principle applies equally against the resolutions etc. They too arise on account of the contact of minds with souls. And the contact being the same, they cannot be said to be the cause of particular pleasures and pains of the souls.

If it be said (that distinctions arise) from parts (of souls), it is not so, for (the souls) are within (all bodies). 53

It may however be argued by the pūrvapakṣin that notwithstanding the all-pervasive nature of the soul, the contact which takes place between it and the mind is not with the entire soul, nor with the other souls or parts thereof, but with the part of a particular soul as determined by a particular body. It is due to this, he may say that particular souls are bound by particular adṛśta, and by particular pleasures, pains, desires, and thoughts of the minds. But this is inadequate. For due to its all-prevasive nature, every one of the souls will necessarily pervade all the bodies in the world. The Vaiśeṣika cannot, as a matter of fact, and on his own theory, conceive of a part of soul as determined by a body. Even if the soul is imagined to have parts, how can such parts be of any use in determining that the particular thoughts, the pleasures and the pains are connected with particular souls? In the same way, if all the bodies are in close vicinity of all the souls, how can any one body be said to be connected with any one
soul in particular? Besides, on the hypothesis that souls have parts, it is conceivable that two souls having the same adṛṣṭa will have their experience of pleasure and pain in one body only. The same adṛṣṭa may make the two souls of Devadatta and Yajñadatta pass through a particular region of pleasure and pain, provided the adṛṣṭa occupies the same spot, and so it may happen that when Devadatta is pleased, Yajñadatta also will be pleased. And if the adṛṣṭa occurs in fixed places, and if the souls have parts, the attainment of heaven etc. will be impossible; for whereas the actions will be in one place, in a Brahmin’s body, for instance, the enjoyment of the fruit of the action will be in another place, such as, the heaven.

Again, there is no sufficient reason to say why the souls are many and all-prevading. It may be said that this is analogous to the qualities such as colour, taste, smell and touch, which, though being different and partless, are yet found residing in the same substance. But it must be noted that these qualities have each one of them, an exclusive, peculiar characteristic of its own, and that, as qualities, they are non-different from the substance. But the so-called many souls have no characteristic differences amongst them. Besides, the conception of the plurality of souls and that of their having distinctive characteristic features involve the defect of mutual dependence. To adduce other parallel instances of the all-pervading ākāśa, direction, and time is also inadequate. For the Vedantin1 these are the instances of mere effects, and are not therefore all-pervading like the Brahman.

All this goes to show that the only doctrine which is free from defects is that the Ātman is one.

---

1. Instances to be adduced must be such as will be acceptable to both the parties.
The third pada was devoted to resolve the conflict of the Śrutī passages regarding the origin of ākāśa and other elements. The fourth pada now is intended to resolve a similar conflict with regard to the origin of the prāṇas. On the one hand, we find that passages dealing with the origin of the elements like fire and ākāśa from the Brahman (Chā. 6, 2, 3, Tai. 2, 1) do not make any mention of the origin of prāṇas. On the other hand, the passage which speaks of non-being in the beginning (Tai. 2, 7) speaks about the non-origination of the prāṇas. Another passage which identifies the non-being with the ṛṣis known as prāṇas, speaks of their existence before the origin of things (Sat. Brā. 6, 1, 1, 1). We read again of their origin in the passages: 'As the sparks emanate from the fire, even so the prāṇas come forth from the Ātman' (Br. 2, 1, 20); 'From this Ātman are born the prāṇas, the mind, and all the organs of sense' (Mu. 2, 1, 3); 'He created the prāṇa, and from prāṇa came forth faith, the five elements, the senses, the mind and food' (Pr. 6, 4); 'From him spring the seven prāṇas' (Mu. 2, 1, 8) which mean the five organs of sense, speech and mind. Thus in view of these conflicting opinions, the pūrvapakṣin is tempted to say that nothing can be said for certain, or that, at the most, it may be said that the description of the origin of the prāṇas is only poetical in character.

To this the sūtrakāra replies. First of all we may note that the word 'thus' in the Sūtra presents a
difficulty; for there appears nothing with which the matter under discussion can be compared. The plurality of all-pervading selves which was discussed at the end of the third pāda, in Sūtra 51, has also no similarity with prāṇas, on account of which a comparison can be made. It may be said that the prāṇas resemble the adṛśta inasmuch as, on account of the close-proximity of both of them with the souls, it cannot be told to what particular soul the prāṇas and the adṛśta belong. But, as already explained, there is no knowledge as to which body is related to which soul. And, if what applies to body must apply to prāṇa, a reference again to prāṇas here would make this Sūtra superfluous. Nor can the prāṇas be compared with the jiva (discussed in Sūtra 17 of pāda III), or else a conclusion opposed to the one we reached earlier would be established here. In other words, whereas, on the previous occasion, the individual soul was shown to have no origin, the prāṇas will now be shown to have an origin. Hence, it may appear that the word 'thus' has no apparent connection with anything. And yet this is not so. For the point of comparison may be found even in the passages (Br. 2, 1, 20, Mu. 2, 1, 3) chosen for explaining this Sūtra. These passages tell us that the prāṇas also have their origin from the Brahman, just as the world, the gods, and beings like ākāśa and so on have their origin from Brahman,—a point made amply clear in the beginning of the third pāda. To take such a remote object for the sake of comparison is not unusual, for we have a similar instance in the Pūrva Mimāṃsā. What we may do when there is vomiting while drinking soma-juice is compared with what we may do when we give away a horse as gift' (Pū. Mi. 3, 4, 28-33).

1. In the Paundarīka sacrifice one thousand horses are given away as gifts. And as it believed that one who accepts the gift suffers from a disease known as 'jalodara', an additional sacrifice is recommended in order to please the Varuṇa-god. And it is decided that it must be performed by the doner. This decision is said to follow another decision, viz., the person who vomits the soma-juice in a sacrifice has to offer oblations to Soma and Indra.

V. E. S
Now, it is true that in some places, the origin of prāṇas is not mentioned. But this cannot invalidate the statements about their origin which are made in some other places. So it is proper to hold that like ākāśa and other things, the prāṇas too are produced.

The secondary (or poetic description) being impossible. 2

The statement regarding the origin of the prāṇas (Mu. 2, 1, 3) is not secondary; for it is made only to fulfil the prior statement in the same Upaniṣad that everything else including the prāṇas is known, if Brahman, as the material cause of all is known (Mu. 1, 1, 3). On the contrary, if the reference to the origin of prāṇas is merely poetic, they would be independent of Brahman, and hence the knowledge of Brahman may not cause the knowledge of the prāṇas. It is to emphasize this truth that we read in the same Upaniṣad further on that ‘all this world, karma and penance are verily the Puruṣa, the immortal Brahman, the best of all’ (Mu. 2, 1, 10; 2, 2, 11). Elsewhere also, we are told that ‘All this is known, if the Ātman is seen, heard, thought of, and realized’ (Br. 2, 4, 5).

How then, one may ask, are the prāṇas said to exist before the creation? And the answer is that they are prior to all other things created by the subordinate cause known as the Hiranyagarbha who is endowed with prāṇas, and not prior to the Brahman which is not only the ultimate cause of all, but is also ‘that heavenly Puruṣa who is without prāṇa, without mind, pure, and higher than the high aksara’ (Mu. 2, 1, 2).

This Sūtra is just the repetition of the earlier one, viz., 2, 3, 3. But the difference between the two is that whereas the earlier Sūtra represented the view-point of the pūrva-pāksin, this represents the view-point of the
siddhāntin. That is why, on the earlier occasion, the Sūtra was split into two parts, ‘gaumi’ and ‘asamābhavāt’, and it meant that the statement about the origin of ākāśa must be taken as having a secondary meaning. It was then shown that the view could not be accepted because it went against the important assertion that everything is known when the Ātman is known. Here we have taken the Sūtra as a whole to constitute one compound word, and have given expression to the siddhānta-view that it is impossible to have a secondary meaning with reference to the origin of prānas. If we were to interpret the Sūtra on this occasion also in the same way in which it was interpreted on the earlier occasion, we would be overlooking the fact that the statement regarding the knowledge of all implied in the knowledge of Brahman would be completely abandoned.

तत्तःक्षुटेः - ३

[ Tat—that ; prāk—before; Śruteḥ—of Śruti; ca—and. ]

And also because that (word indicating origin is used) already in Śruti, (the prānas have origination). 3

We have already proved that the origin of ākāśa and other elements is to be understood as literally true. Now since the word ‘jāyate’ which means ‘is born’, and which is used in connection with ākāśa and other things, is first used in the same Upaniṣadic passage in connection with the word ‘prānas’ (Mu. 2, 1, 3), and since it is absurd to think that a word has different meanings in the same sentence, and in the same context, it is proved that the prānas too have a real origin. Similarly, in the Śruti-passage, ‘He created the prāṇa, from prāṇa the faith, etc.’ (Pr. 6, 4), the word ‘created’ which is used in connection with prāṇa is used with things which are also created after prāṇa. In the same way, the words ‘come forth’ indicating creation, and used at the end of the sentence, ‘From the Ātman, all the beings come forth’, can be connected with the word prāṇa which comes before it (Br. 2, 1, 20).
Because speech, (prāṇa and mind) spring from these (bhūtas, prāṇas can be said to have originated from Brahman). 4

It is true, the Chāndogyopaniṣad makes no explicit mention of the origin of prāṇas. Yet after having stated that the elements of fire, water and earth are born out of Brahman, the Upaniṣad proceeds to tell us in the same chapter that ‘mind is of the nature of food (earth), prāṇa of water, and speech of fire’ (6, 5, 4), meaning thereby that mind, prāṇa and speech are produced out of earth, water and fire, or are produced along with their respective causes from Brahman only. It means, in other words, that mind, prāṇa, and speech as also their proximate causes, viz., the earth, water and fire are included in the evolution of names and forms as effected by Brahman. Besides, the introduction of the Upaniṣadic section, ‘That by which one hears what is not heard’ (Chā. 6, 1, 3), and the conclusion of it ‘All this is verily the Ātman’ (6, 8, 7), will be said to have meaning only when the statement about mind, prāṇa, and speech is meant to convey the idea that they are the products of Brahman.

2 सप्तगत्यचारिकरणम् । (५-६)

सम गतेर्विशेषित्तबलच् । ५

(The prāṇas are) seven; because of knowledge (from Sruti) and of their specification. 5

Having shown that the prāṇas have originated, let us now find out their number, excepting however the chief prāṇa, about which we shall know in Sūtra 8 below. In one place, they are said to be seven, i.e. the five organs of sense, mind, and speech (Mu. 2, 1, 8). In another place, they are mentioned as eight; the seven above with
the eighth as hands. They are known as ‘grahas’ because they capture the jīvātman, with the help of their corresponding ‘objects’ of experience which are known as ‘atigrahas’ (Br. 3, 2, 1). In another place, they are mentioned as nine, viz., the two ears, the two eyes, the two nostrils, and speech which are located in the head, and the two lower organs of evacuation and generation (Tai. Saṃ. 5, 3, 2, 5). In another place, still, as ten, viz., the nine mentioned above with the navel as the tenth (Tai. Saṃ. 5, 3, 2, 3). In another place, again, as eleven, viz., the five organs of sense, the five of action, and the mind (Br. 3, 9, 4). In another place, where skin has been mentioned as the organ of touch they are mentioned as twelve, viz., the eleven above and buddhi (Br. 2, 4, 11). And, in another place, thirteen, viz., the twelve above and ahamkāra.

According to the pūrvapakṣin the prāṇas are seven in number, because this is the number that is mentioned in Śruti (Mu. 2, 1, 8), and because they are mentioned as located in the head (Tai. Saṃ. 5, 1, 7, 1). In the same passage of the Mundakopaniṣad (2, 1, 8), it may be pointed out that the number seven is mentioned twice with reference to the prāṇas. But the repetition of the number seven does not mean, according to the pūrvapakṣin, that the number is fourteen, but means that there are different persons, each of them possessing seven prāṇas. And though there are several passages which speak of the prāṇas as numbering eight or more, it is better to assume a small number and to think that statements regarding other numbers are only modifications of the statement with regard to the seven prāṇas.

To this the next Sūtra comes as a reply.

हस्ताद्यस्य स्थितेत्स्वो नैवसः । ६

[Hasta—hand; ādayaḥ—and others; tu—but; sthite—this being settled; atah—hence; na—not; evam—thus.]

But this is settled that hands and others (are prāṇas mentioned in addition to seven). So not thus (i.e., prāṇas are not seven only). 6
With the mention of hands and others as ‘grahas’, i.e., instruments by means of which a man works, and therefore mentioned as prāṇas in addition to the seven prāṇas (Br. 3, 2, 8), it should be accepted as settled that the greater number of eleven, and not the lower one of seven is the correct number of prāṇas. It is mentioned no doubt that prāṇas are twelve or thirteen; but eleven is the adequate number which comprises all the organs which give their exclusive functions. We have the five organs of sense which give us the knowledge of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell; the five organs of action which enable us to speak, to take, to walk, to evacuate and to beget; and lastly the mind, which is known differently as manas, buddhi, ahamkāra, and citta on account of its different functions of having doubt, resolution, egoism, and recollection. It is one, though on account of memory and imagination, it refers to the past and the future also; and it refers to the present tense to its various modifications.

While counting the prāṇas as eleven, we should not include the ear, the eye, and the nose twice, as if they are, each one of them, two in number. Similarly, hands, feet, etc., are not, as the pūrvapakṣin thinks, the modifications of the seven prāṇas that are located in the head; for, the functions of hands, feet, etc., are entirely different from what they are in the case of the seven prāṇas. Again, when they are said to be ten including the navel, we must remember that they indicate mere openings in the human body and not prāṇas. Sometimes, some prāṇas are mentioned only for the purpose of meditating upon them. For instance, buddhi and ahamkāra are mentioned as additional prāṇas, because the motive is that man should meditate on them. The motive is not to distinguish them as separate from mind. So, we conclude that the number of prāṇas is eleven, though it is differently mentioned in different Śruti-passages.

1. These are mentioned while discussing Sūtra 50 of Adhyāya II, Pāda 3.
These two Sūtras may be construed differently. (Sūtra 5)—According to pūrvapakṣa, the prāṇas are seven in number; for when a man dies it is stated ‘that life and all the prāṇas depart after him.’ People say that ‘he does not see, hear or think’, because he is said ‘to become one’ with the Ātman, and ‘the person in his eye returns to the Sun’ (Br. 4, 4, 1–2). Now all the prāṇas that are mentioned as departing along with the eye are no other than the nose, the tongue, the speech, the ear, the touch, and the mind. Just as the word ‘all’ in the expression ‘feed all the Brahmins’ means ‘feed all those who are available at a particular place and time’, similarly, the word ‘all’ with reference to prāṇas means the seven prāṇas only. No doubt the Upaniṣadic passage mentions vijñāna or buddhi also, but it must be remembered that buddhi and manas are not two different principles; they are only modifications or aspects of one and the same thing.

To this we reply. (Sūtra 6):—The same Upaniṣad (Br. 3, 2, 8) makes us believe that hands and other limbs of the body are also prāṇas. The hand, for instance, is said to be a ‘graha’, i. e., a thing which binds or captures the soul by the means of the objects of sense. And it does not bind the soul in one birth only, but binds it in several births, as it moves from one body to another, just as the seven prāṇas do. The soul is bound, we are told in a Smṛti, ‘by the collection of the eight in the city of the body,’ and so we see that till we attain final release, we are not free from the bonds of these ‘grahas’ also. Similarly, in the Praśnopaniṣad of the Atharvaṇaveda (4, 8), we find that hands, feet and other limbs of the body and their respective objects are mentioned in the same way in which the eye and ear are mentioned with their objects of sight and hearing. This

1. These eight things are: 1. The five prāṇas known as prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, and samāna; 2. The five subtle elements; 3. The five organs of sense; 4. The five organs of action; 5. The four-fold internal organ; 6. Avidyā; 7. Kāma; and 8. Karma.
means that hands and feet are to be treated as prāṇas, just as the eye and the ear are. That the prāṇas are eleven is again definitely shown in the passage which tells us that a man cries with agony when all these eleven depart from the body (Br. 3, 9, 4). Besides, the word ‘all’ in connection with the prāṇas need not be taken to mean seven only, if a higher number is possible. ‘Feed all the Brahmins’, need not mean ‘feed all that are present’, but means ‘feed all that can be found on the face of the earth’. That the word means only those that are invited, is because no one who is not invited can possibly be fed. But in the case of the prāṇas, there is no reason why we should restrict the meaning of the word to seven only. So the word ‘all’ in connection with prāṇas means that we have to take note of all the prāṇas without exception. That they are sometimes mentioned to be seven is only to illustrate their nature and number, which, as we have seen so far, is eleven and not seven.

2 अनावासुत्वाधिकरणम् | (७)
अग्निकर्त् | ७

[Anavah—minute things; ca—and.] And (the prāṇas are) minute. 7

Another characteristic mark of the prāṇas which the Sūtrakāra mentions is that they are minute, i.e., subtle and of limited size. They must not, however, in the first place, be understood as atomic in size; for otherwise there would be no explanation of effects which will extend all over the body. Secondly, had they not been minute, they would have been seen while coming out of the body of a dying man, just as a snake is seen while coming out of its hole. Thirdly, if they were all-pervading and not limited, then there would be no meaning in their being described as passing out of the body, going to a destination, and coming back from it. And, lastly, it could never have been established, as we did establish

1. In support of this interpretation, vide Jaimini, Pū. Mi. 3, 3, 13.
it in Śūtra 29 of Adhyāya second, Pāca third, that the individual soul appears to be of the nature of manas and buddhi, even though, really speaking, it is not atmic in size. Now, if it be said that the prāṇas may be all-pervading and yet function in the body only, we reply that it is this function which we call as the instrument of knowledge or action. So there is no disagreement except in name; but we gain nothing by assuming that these instruments or prāṇas are all-pervading. Hence we say that the prāṇas are subtle and of limited size.

4 प्राणश्रृङ्ख्याधिकरणम् | (७)
अध्यायः <

[Sresthah—the best; ca—and.]
Also the best (of prāṇas is born of Brahman). 8

When it has already been stated that 'from Him are born prāṇa, mind, and all the organs of sense' (Mu. 2, 1, 3; Pr. 6, 4), why again, it may be asked, is this formal extension made to the 'mukhya' or the best of the prāṇas? It is to remove the possible doubt that because prāṇa existed even before creation, it might not have been produced from Brahman. This doubt may arise by considering the following mantra of the Nāsadiya-sūkta, whose purpose is to expound the nature of Brahman. ‘There was neither depth nor immortality; nor the signs of day or night (i.e., neither the sun nor the moon). Abiding in its own power, the One was breathing without wind; there was nothing else which was different or higher than it' (Rk. Sm. 10, 129, 2). Here ‘breathing’ being referred to as the function of prāṇa, it may appear to some that prāṇa was prior to creation, and that it is therefore eternal and uncaused. It is this doubt which this Śūtra is intended to remove.

The word ‘breathing’ need not suggest to us that there was prāṇa before creation: for the mantra mentions the existence of the One ‘without mind’. We have the Sruti that ‘He is without breath, without mind, and is pure’ (Mu. 2, 1, 2), and we mean thereby that
shines and becomes active on account of the fire of wind (Chā. 3, 18, 4). If prāṇa were the same as wind, this would mean that prāṇa shines by means of itself. Similarly, prāṇa would not have been mentioned separately from the organs, if it were simply the function of these. The passage, 'From him is born prāṇa, mind, and all the organs of sense, ākāśa and wind' etc. (Mu. 2, 1, 3) shows that prāṇa is mentioned separately both from air and sense-organs. Nor can we say that prāṇa is the name of the common function of all the organs taken together; for whereas we do find that each of the organs has got an exclusive function of its own, it is nowhere seen that all of them have got an additional function to perform. It may be said that we can conceive this on the analogy of the birds in a cage. Every bird is doing its own action; but apart from this, all the birds taken together may act in common and move the cage. Even so, it may be argued that the eye may see, and the ear may hear, but all the organs, including the eye and the ear, may in common be able to sustain the life. But we reply, that the analogical argument is wrong; because one is a case of observation, and another is a mere assumption without proof. The sustenance of life is altogether different from functions like hearing and seeing.

What, then, is meant by saying that 'prāṇa is vāyu' (Br. 3, 1, 5)? We reply that it is vāyu which comes to stay in the body and has got the capacity to divide itself fivefold. Prāṇa is neither simply the same as wind, nor absolutely different from wind, and so we may have apparently conflicting Sruti-pasages.

Now, if the chief prāṇa is considered to be the best of all and as alone awake, when all the other prāṇas or

1. The moving of the cage is the mechanical result of the addition of the several forces; life is no such summation of the several functions of seeing, hearing, etc. For even if some of these functions are wanting in the case of the blind and the deaf, life does not cease to be. Life is altogether different from any and all of these several functions put together.
And because (the chief prāṇa) is not a sense-organ, the objection is not (valid); Sruti also declares like that.

The objection is not valid. For the chief prāṇa is not a sense-organ like an eye, and so we are not required to imagine that corresponding to the chief prāṇa we have a specific object of experience. But this does not mean that it has no function of its own. The Chāndogyopaniṣad (5, 1, 6) tells us how when all the prāṇas, that is, the prāṇas and the senses, had a quarrel among them as to who was superior to others, it was decided that he was the best of all, after whose departure the body would become worst and fall; how afterwards, the senses departed one after another from the body, and yet the life in the body survived; but how, when the chief prāṇa was about to depart, the senses became dried up, and the body was about to perish. This shows that it is the chief prāṇa by means of which the body and the senses, i.e. the lower prāṇas subsist. The same truth is clearly stated in another passage, according to which the chief prāṇa asked the senses ‘not to become infatuated’; for it is ‘he who dividing himself fivefold, supports the body’ (Pr. 2, 3). The jīvātmā ‘protects the insignificant rest by means of prāṇa’ (Br. 4, 3, 12) while the other senses are asleep. The nourishment of the body also depends on prāṇa, for ‘from whatever limb prāṇa departs, that limb withers’ (Br. 1, 3, 19). The senses are supported by what we eat and drink, on account of the help of this prāṇa (Chā. 1, 2, 9). Nay, even the staying of the soul in the body and its departure from it occur on account of the staying or departure of this chief prāṇa (Pr. 6, 3, 4).
It is shown that like mind it has five modifications. 12

Just as the mind has five modifications or functions such as hearing, seeing, etc., on account of the eye and the ear, even so the prāṇa has got five modifications. Prāṇa is that which inhales the air and supports the body; apāṇa, which causes exhaling; vyāṇa which resides at the juncture of the two and causes works of strength; udāṇa, which leads the soul out to other worlds and back from them; and samāṇa, which carries the juice of the food equally to all the parts of the body.

If the mind has only five modifications and does not include those mentioned in the Brhadāraṇyaka (1, 5, 3), viz. kāma, samkalpa etc., one may ask if the mind's capacity to remember the past or imagine the future, without any aid of the senses, is not another modification altogether over and above the five already mentioned, and if it also need not be taken into consideration. In view of this objection, we may as well adopt the view of the Yogāśāstra and say that the five modifications of the mind are, 'right knowledge, false apprehension, imagination, sleep, and memory' (Pā. Yoga-Sū. 1, 1, 6). What is important to remember is the plurality of the modifications which the mind has; and it is in this respect that the prāṇa is compared with the mind, and is said to have functions.

And further, the chief prāṇa is not atomic in size, for it pervades the body by its five functions. It is, on the
other hand, subtle, because it is imperceivable while it goes out of the body. It is also limited because, it passes out; goes to a destination, and returns from it. When, however, we read about its all-pervading character, that it is equal to an ant, or a goat, or an elephant, or equal to these three worlds (Br. 1, 3, 22), what it means, in the first place, is that it refers to Hiranyagarbha, the cosmic soul, and not to the individual soul; and secondly, it means that the prāṇa which resides in every living being is limited in size. In short, the subtle nature of prāṇa makes it both all-pervading and limited in size without any contradiction.

1 ज्योतिराद्विधिकरणम् (१४-१६)

ज्योतिराद्विधियां तु तदास्मनाद् । १४

[ Jyotih-ādī—fire and others; adhiṣṭhānam—support; tu—but; tad—that; āmananat—because it is told by Sruti. ]

But (the prāṇas) are supported by fire etc; for Sruti tells the same. 14.

Here a question arises as to whether the prāṇas are capable of functioning on account of their own inherent power, or on account of the power of their presiding deities. The pūrvapakṣin accepts the former view, and says that if the latter view be accepted as correct, the individual soul will no longer be the en joyer. We reply that the statement regarding the fire and wind (Ait. Ār. 2, 4, 2, 4) that, after having become speech and breath, they entered the mouth and nostrils, shows us that the fire and wind do not mean the elements, but the divinities which rule over these elements, and are therefore responsible for the functions of the mouth and nostrils. Speech, breath, seeing, and hearing are said to constitute four feet of Brahman in the form of mind, 2 and are

---

1. Let it be noted that the mouth, the nostrils etc. are the sense-organs or the prāṇas.
2. Mind and ākāśa are the two forms of Brahman which are recommended for meditation.
related as effects to the four feet respectively of Brahman in the form of ākāśa, viz., the fire, the wind, the sun, and the directions (Chā. 3, 18, 3, ). Another passage tells us that it was the ‘prāṇa which saved the organ of speech from the death of sin arising out of telling a lie’, and that ‘speech forthwith became fire’ (Br. 1, 3, 12), which is its own cause. We read in the Sāntiparva of the Mahābhārata that ‘the act of speaking, the speech itself, and the fire are the physical, the elemental and the divine aspects’ of a complex whole. All these things therefore go to show that speech and other functions of the sense-organs or prāṇas are due to the divinities presiding over the elements and the prāṇas, and are not at all due to the prāṇas themselves, just as the motion of the carts is not due to themselves but is due to the bulls that drag them.

The next Sūtra will show that the individual soul will not cease to be the enjoyer, if the prāṇas are understood to function under divine guidance.

श्राणवता शब्दाः १५

[Prāṇavatā—with the possessor of the prāṇas; Sabdāt—from Śruti.]

(Because the prāṇas are connected) with the possessor of the prāṇas (i.e. the soul, the latter cannot cease to be the bhoktā; we learn this) from Śruti. 15

Notwithstanding the divinities which guide the prāṇas, the individual soul with which the prāṇas are connected remains the bhoktā; he is the possessor of the instruments of actions. ‘There is the person in the eye for whose sake the eye exists and makes an effort to see’; ‘He is the Ātman who knows that he has to smell, and it is for his sake that the nose exists’ (Chā. 8, 12, 4). Besides, the presiding deities being many and their experiences different from each other; how can all of them be the enjoyers? The one soul, on the other hand, can be the enjoyer, because he alone can possess the different experiences of different senses; they all meet in him and belong to him alone.
And on account of the permanent nature of this soul. 16

And the jīvātman is permanent in this body as the enjoyer. Merit and demerit, and the consequent pleasure and pain affect him alone, and not the divinities. For the divinities live with power and in glory, and not as enjoyers in this wretched body. So, 'only the merit goes unto them; evil does not' (Br. 1, 5, 20). It is 'when the jīva departs from this body that the chief prāṇa also departs after him; and then the lower prāṇas depart after the chief prāṇa' (Br. 4, 4, 2). This shows that the prāṇas follow the jīva and not the divinities. Besides, inasmuch as they are useful in guiding the prāṇas, the divinities belong to the class of the prāṇas or instruments, and not to that of the souls or enjoyers. The embodied soul therefore does not cease to be the enjoyer.

Excepting the best (prāṇa), the others are senses; because it is so declared. 17

There arises a new question as to whether the other prāṇas are functions of the chief prāṇa or altogether different things. The pūrvapakṣin holds that they are only different functions, because, in the first place, we are told that the other prāṇas got their prayer for 'having the form of the chief prāṇa' fulfilled (Br. 1, 5, 21). Secondly, the word that is used for all of them as also for the chief prāṇa is 'prāṇa' itself. Or else, we shall have different meanings on different occasions, some of which may be primary and some secondary. It will be appropriate...
therefore to hold that just as prāṇa, apāna, etc. are different functions of one prāṇa, even so the eleven prāṇas such as speech and others are nothing but the different functions of the same.

In the we reply. Speech and other prāṇas are altogether different from the chief prāṇa, for they are separately mentioned as the senses in the passage, from Hira is born, the prāṇa, mind and all the organs of sense. p. 2, 1, 5.) Some one may hereupon suggest that the mind also may not be included in the class of the senses, as it is mentioned separately in this very passage. But we should note that whereas the prāṇa is nowhere mentioned as a sense-organ, mind is so mentioned by the Śrutiś, and is therefore spoken of as the eleventh or inner sense. So, if we are not to consider that prāṇa is different from the senses, it will be difficult to understand why the senses are separately mentioned at all. Besides, it will be arbitrary that sometimes prāṇa may mean the senses and sometimes not.

अन्वेषण १२

[ Bheda—difference; Sruteh—from Śruti ]

Besides, it is everywhere mentioned that prāṇa is different from speech and other senses. A passage in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka (1, 3, 2) tells us that gods in the form of good impulses requested the speech to sing songs of praise, so that the demons in the form of evil and natural impulses may be overcome. But, in the meantime, the demons tempted the speech to commit the sin of telling lies, and so conquered it and all the other sense-organs. Thereupon being requested by the gods, the chief prāṇa in the mouth destroyed the demons. Here is a clear statement that the chief prāṇa is different from the senses. We get the same thing in another passage, 'The Brahmadeva created the mind, speech, and prāṇa' as three sources of enjoyment for him (Br. 1, 5, 3).
And on account of heterogeneous characteristics. 19

There is again a great difference between the characteristics of the chief prāṇa and those of the lower prāṇas. In the first place, when speech and other prāṇas go to sleep, the chief prāṇa keeps awake. Secondly, it is the chief prāṇa which does not die. Thirdly, it is the staying and the departure of the chief prāṇa and not of others that are responsible for the preservation or destruction of the body. Fourthly, it is due to the organs of sense and not due to the chief prāṇa that perception of objects takes place.

Even the Upaniṣadic passage (Br. 1, 5, 21) which was cited by the pūrvapakṣin to show that the sense-organs and prāṇa are identical in nature, shows, that they are different. We are told in the passage how speech and other senses vied with each other and determined to continue to speak, hear, and so on, but how all of them soon become exhausted and as if dead; how the chief prāṇa, on the other hand, did not meet with such a fate and was therefore declared to be the best of all. So, what is meant by saying that the senses derived the nature of the chief prāṇa is that they derived all their energy for speaking and doing other functions from it. The senses being thus absolutely dependent on prāṇa, are known in a secondary way by the same name, viz., prāṇa. The passage under discussion itself shows us that it is on account of this dependence of the senses on the prāṇa, that they are called after it. In being, however, they are different in nature from prāṇa.
But because it is told that the arrangement of names and forms is due to him who makes (the elements) tripartite. 20

In a chapter of the Chāndogyopanisad dealing with the nature of Brahman we read after an account of the creation of the three elements of fire, water, and earth, that the 'Divinity itself thought of entering into the three beings in the form of the jīvātman, and of making each one of them tripartite, so as to evolve thereby names and forms' (Chā. 6, 3, 2; 3). Here arises a question as to who must be the author of the names and forms, the individual soul or the highest Ātman? It is the former according to the pūrvapakṣin; for as the passage itself shows, what enters in the three beings is the form of the jīvātman. To say that it is the highest Ātman is to falsely attribute what is really done by the individual soul to the Ātman; just as the counting of an enemy's army by a spy is attributed to the king who employs the spy. Our ordinary experience also supports this. Names like Dīththa and Dāviththa, and the forms of jars and dishes are all due to the individual souls.

To this we reply that the entire evolution of the names and forms, of the individuals and species in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and of the sun, the moon, and so on, must be the work of the highest lord. It is he who after creating the three elements of fire, water, and earth, mixed them and endowed them with a tripartite nature. The use of the first personal pronoun in the sentence, 'let me create', refers to the Brahman as the creator, and not to jīva which is said merely to enter into the beings. Besides, it is obvious that the jīva is incapable of producing the various forms and names, such as the rivers, the seas, and the mountains. Even the things over which the jīva is said to have control, viz., the shaping of things like jars and dishes and the naming of persons, are ultimately dependent on God. The evolution of names and forms is an action which is mentioned to be subsequent to the action of 'entering' in the beings.
Naturally the two actions, especially in view of the grammatical form of the sentence, viz., 'having entered, let me evolve', will be seen to belong to one and the same subject, viz., the Brahman. A spy may be different from the king; but the jīva is not altogether different from the Brahman. It appears different on account of upādhis, and that is why the word 'Ātman' is applied to the jīva also. So, as said above, even the names and forms introduced by the jīva are in reality due to the highest God who is also the author of the tripartite arrangement. As the Upaniṣad says, 'He who is known as Ākāśa is the evolver of all names and forms' (Chā. 8, 14).

That the highest God is the author of the evolution of names and forms can be best seen in view of their relation with the tripartite arrangement of the three elements of fire, water, and earth. 'The red, the white, and the black colours of the burning fire are due to the three elements of fire, water, and earth' (Chā. 6, 4, 1). This means that the name 'fire' and the forms of fire (e.g., that in the hearth,) are themselves due to tripartition of the three elements. Similar is the case with water and earth, or with the sun, the moon, and the lightning. Looking to the beginning and the end of this subject-matter in the Upaniṣad, we come only to this conclusion regarding the three elements. It is stated in the beginning that each of these three divinities becomes tripartite (Chā. 6, 3, 4); a little further we get the information that the red, the white, and the black colours are due to fire, water, and earth (Chā. 6, 4, 6); and in the end, we find that the indeterminate colour is due to the combination of the three beings (Chā. 6, 4, 7).

The tripartite combination which is first effected with reference to the three elements for the purpose of the evolution of names and forms in the explanation of the external world, undergoes further a similar tripartite combination inside the body of man. This is told in the following Sūtra.
(As) flesh and other things come from earth, even so from the other two (elements) as told by Sruti. 21

When a man eats this tripartite earth in the form of rice or barley, the gross part of it is discharged as faeces, the semi-gross becomes the flesh, and the subtle becomes the mind (Chā. 6, 5, 1). In a like manner, we have to understand the urine, the blood, and the breath as coming out of water; and bones, marrow, and speech as effects of fire. One may however ask as to why we should say that food and so on are due to the specific element of earth and so on, when as a matter of fact, all things including the names and forms of the three elements are due to the mixture of the three original, non-tripartite elements?

To this the next Śūtra is the reply.

But (they derive) the names due to (their) distinctive features. 22

Notwithstanding the tripartite nature of all things and the consequent indistinguishable character of the elements from each other, we have to make room for the distinctions in our ordinary life by recognizing the preponderance of heat, water, and food respectively in the three elements of fire, water, and earth.

---

1. The three subtle elements are imperceivable by the senses. To perceive them through their effects requires them to be turned into gross elements by being mixed into each other, in different degrees and proportions.
In the second adhyāya, we first refuted the objections that came from the side of Śmrṭi and reasoning against our Vedic doctrine of Brahman; we then showed that the opinions of our opponents were fit to be disregarded; and then, after reconciling the contradictions of the Śruti passages, we pointed out that the various entities like prāṇa and the senses, which are all subservient to the individual soul, also originate from the Brahman.

Now, in this third adhyāya, we shall discuss, in the first pāda, the ways in which the soul comes into samsāra along with its paraphernalia; in the second pāda, the different states of the soul and the nature of Brahman; in the third, we shall see whether the several vidyās are to be understood as constituting one or many, and whether all the qualities of Brahman are equally important on all occasions; and, lastly, in the fourth pāda, we shall see the nature of māyā or the summum bonum of life and the limitations thereof, as also the means of the right kind of knowledge.

At the outset, in the first pāda, following the chapter of the Chāndogyopanisad (5, 10, 8) which deals with devotion to the five fires, the Śūtrakāra intends to point out the way in which the soul comes to samsāra, so that one may have vairāgya or disgust for the mere worldly existence. Now, it is from passages,
such as, 'the prānas gather around him at the time of death' (Br. 4, 4, 1), 'the jiva produces a more beautiful and novel body for itself to live in' (Br. 4, 4, 4), that we come to know that the jiva leaves its body and comes to reside in a new body, along with the chief prāṇa, the senses, and the mind, as also with the impressions and results of its previous good or bad actions, and with avidyā which is the cause of this all. It looks reasonable also that the soul must assume a new body in order to reap the good and bad results of what it has previously done.

A question arises in this connection as to whether the jiva is also accompanied by the subtle five elements or not, during its journey from one body to another; for it is these subtle elements which may be said to constitute the physical body. The pūrvapakṣin says that it does not; for the Śruti makes mention only of the 'tejomātras', which according to the context, mean the eye and the other senses only. These, says Śruti, the soul takes away with him. The subtle elements, on the other hand, being available anywhere, can be utilized at any time when a new body is to be produced. The soul therefore need not take the elements with it.

To this the Śūtrakārā replies that the jiva does take the subtle elements along with it. For the question and the answer, which are the beginning and the end of the lore of the five fires,¹ (Chā. 5, 3, 3; 5, 9, 1) make it plain that it is the water, which when given as libation for the fifth time, becomes the man. The water which is offered in the five forms of śraddhā (faith), soma-juice, rain, food, and semen, in the five fires called respectively

¹ This is how the king Pravahana tells Śvetaketu and his father Uddālaka, when they became unable to answer how the water becomes the body of the person.
as heaven, rain, earth, man, and woman, is the water which encompasses the jiva in its journey to another body. Some one may cite, at this point, another Sruti which tells us that the soul does not, like a caterpillar, leave the old body before it assumes a new one (Br. 4, 4, 3). But what is compared here with the action of the caterpillar is not, we must remember, the non-leaving of the old body, but merely the effort of the soul in acquiring a new body, even when the old body is living.

In view of this mode of obtaining a new body as accepted by Sruti, all those opinions, which go contrary to this and are purely imaginary, must be given up. The senses, for example, being the immediate effects of ahamkāra and being all-pervading, according to the Śāmkhyas, begin to function in a new body along with the soul which is also all-pervading, on account of the force of kārman. Or, as the Baudhās think, the body and the senses are both produced anew in their respective abodes in a new birth, while the soul or the stream of self-consciousness with its different modifications of sense-knowledge continues in the next birth. Or, as the Vaiśeṣikas say, it is the mind alone that travels to the

1. Śraddhā stands for the thing put in fire with śraddhā or faith. Now what is put in fire by the sacrificer is mostly liquid, viz., curds, ghee or milk. Therefore that which leads a man to swarga or heaven is the liquid or watery substance or water. Consequently, water can be said to be the first libation put not only in the actual sacrificial fire on earth but also in the fire in the form of heaven itself. For it is by this sacrifice that man becomes, for the time being, a god in heaven. When the merit is exhausted, the body of that god is mixed in rain. This liquid known as soma is the second libation in the fire in the form of rain. Next, the jiva being mixed with rain falls as libation for the third time in the fire of earth. Then, for the fourth time, the same water is utilized for the nourishment of some corn or vegetable, which when eaten by some man enters along with jiva as libation in (the fire of) the body of that man. And finally, for the fifth time, the same water turns into semen and enters along with jiva as libation in (the fire of) the womb of a woman. In other words, the water becomes a living body when it is offered as libation for the fifth time.
new abode of enjoyment; or, again, as the Digambaras think, it is the jīva alone which jumps from one body to another like a parrot which jumps from one tree to another. All these opinions deserve to be rejected, because they are opposed to the teachings of Śrutī.

All this however may only prove that the jīva departs from the body being enveloped with water. But how can it be said, one may ask, that it goes enveloped by all the subtle elements? To this the next Sūtra comes as a reply.

\[ \text{Jyātmakatvā tu bhūyatvāt} \]

\[ \text{[Tri-ātmakatvā—as it consists of three; tu—but; bhūyastvāt—on account of excess.]} \]

But as (water) consists of three (elements, the jīva is not surrounded by water only; it is mentioned exclusively) on account of overwhelming quantity.

As we have seen, water is a mixture of the three elements, and so we have to understand that the mention of water means the mention of fire and earth also. The body consists of these three elements, as is obvious from the effects thereof, viz., the sweat, the digestion, and the smell. The word 'water' then in the sentence 'water becomes the embodied soul when the fifth libation is given', is put not for the element of water alone, but also for the other two elements of fire and earth. It is mentioned as water simply because there is a larger quantity of water in the body than that of either fire or earth, as can be seen from the quantity of blood and other juices or watery substances in the body, or from the quantity of ghee, curds, etc. relating with the sacrificial actions which becomes the first libation known as śraddhā in the fire in the form of heaven.

1. What Śaṅkara has obviously in his mind is the Cārvāka opinion that it is the body that constitutes the soul, and that therefore there can be no talk of the coming and going of the soul, once the body is reduced to ashes.
[Prāṇa; gateh—on account of departure; ca—and.]

And on account of the departure of the prāṇa. 

Besides, the departure of the prāṇas including the chief prāṇa after the departure of the soul from one body to another (Br. 4, 4, 2) will not be possible, unless we suppose that water, in which the prāṇas have their being, departs from the body to another along with the other two elements. It is impossible for the prāṇas to reside in the body or move to another body without its own shelter, viz., the element of water.

Agni-ādi—fire and others; gati—departure; Śrutih—because of Śruti; iti cet—if it be said; na—not; bhāktatvāḥ—because of secondary meaning.

If it be said (that the prāṇas do not accompany the jīva) because it is told in Śruti that (they) go unto the fire and other (elements, then we say that it is) not so; for that is a statement of secondary importance.

If it be said that Śruti tells us that the ‘speech of a dead man enters into fire, and prāṇa into air’, etc. (Br. 3, 2, 13) we say in reply that the statement is not to be taken as literally true. For when we are further told that the hairs of the body and head enter into shrubs and trees after the death of a man, we do not find that this actually happens. The hairs do not fly away from the body and enter into the trees. If the prāṇas, on the other hand, are supposed not to accompany the jīva, there will, as a matter of fact, be no sense in saying that the jīva goes out from one body to another, or that the jīva experiences the pleasures and pains in a new body. For it is on account of the upādhis of the prāṇas and the

---

1. We have already seen in Adhyāya second, Pāda, 3, Sūtra 15, that the indriyas (i.e. prāṇas) are the effects of the elements: ‘The mind, of food or earth; prāṇa, of water; and speech of fire’ (Chā. 6, 5, 4).
mind, that the jīva, which is really the all-pervading immutable Ātman, is said to move at all. Besides, there are distinct references that the prānas go with the jīva (Br. 4, 4, 2). The passage quoted by the pūrvapakṣin may at best be interpreted as meaning that the divinities of fire, air, etc. who guide the prānas in their functioning, cease to guide at the time of death.

[Pradhame—in the first; a- śravanāt—not being mentioned; iti cet—if it be said; na—not, tāḥ—they; eva—alone; hi—for; upapattēḥ—becomes consistent.]

If it be said that (water) is not mentioned at the time of the first (oblation, we say it is) not so; it alone (is meant); for, that will make (the passage) consistent. 5

The pūrvapakṣin wants to take us back again to the question whether water could really be called man on the occasion of the fifth oblation. He argues that the first oblation which the gods offer in the fire known as heaven is known as śraddhā and not as water. The remaining four oblations, such as soma and others, may be called water, on account of their containing within them more watery substance; but he does not allow that the word ‘śraddhā’ should mean water instead of its obvious original meaning, viz., faith.

Our reply to this is that the word ‘śraddhā’ must be taken to mean water; for, in the first place, it is then only that the entire passage of the five fires will be read as one whole. The question which we get at the beginning of the passage regarding the transformation of water into man on the fifth occasion, the reply at the end of the passage telling us how this is correct, and the explanation in the middle of the passage regarding the process of transformation and the number of fires and oblations, make one whole unity of ideas. But if ‘śraddhā’ were to mean faith, as the pūrvapakṣin suggests, the three parts of the Sruti-passage would be inconsistent with each other. The reply at the end, for instance, would take note of water only in the fourth oblation and not in the
fifth, and so will not be a proper reply at all. But this is impossible so far as Sruti is concerned. Therefore ‘śraddhā’ must mean water. Secondly, the effects of śraddhā, such as soma, rain, etc. which are mentioned as the next four oblations, contain predominantly the watery element, and so suggest to us that their cause also, viz., śraddhā, though subtle, must be of the same watery substances. Thirdly, if we suppose śraddhā as faith or as some quality of the mind, it can hardly be taken away from the being who possesses it and sacrificed in the manner in which the heart of an animal can be taken away and sacrificed. But if śraddhā means water it can be so offered as oblation. There is, in the fourth place, the Vedic usage of śraddhā as water ( Tai, Satn. 1, 6, 8, 1). Besides, water in the form of the seed of man and śraddhā can be said to compare so well with each other in points of subtlety and invisibility, that the word ‘śraddhā’ may be put for water, just as a person who is brave as a lion may be called a lion. In another way, still, śraddhā may be called water, because they are both closely associated with sacrifice; just as when persons sitting on a raised platform speak loudly, we may poetically say that the platform itself speaks loudly. That water is so connected with śraddhā can be seen from the Sruti passage, which tells us that water in a holy place produces the desire in man to have a bath and to perform holy actions.

अश्वत्तावदिति चेष्टेकारिकारिणां प्रतयते: 6

[A—not; srutatvāt—being told in Sruti; iti cet—if it is said; na—not; iṣṭa-ādi-kārīnām—of those who perform iṣṭa and others; pratiteh—due to experience.]

If it be said that (the word ‘soul’) not being mentioned by Sruti, (the soul is not enveloped by water), it is not so; for this can be verified by what happens in the case of those who do iṣṭa and other things. 6

It may however be contended that though, in view of the question and the answer, water may be said to change its form into that of a man as it passes from the
first to the fifth oblation, it can hardly be said that
the individual soul becomes surrounded by water before
passing from one body to another. For, it may be
pointed out that whereas water is explicitly mention-
ed by Sruti, there is no such mention of the word ‘jīva’
in the context.

To this we reply. The objection does not stand; for
in the two passages, one dealing with the five fires,
and the other with those who perform sacrifices etc., we
come across with the same type of persons who reach the
region of the moon, after being enveloped by water.
The persons who keep fire or perform the fortnightly
sacrifices, 1 can be said to possess water, because curds,
milk, etc. are mostly watery substances. When these
are thrown as oblations in the sacrificial fire known as
Āhāvaniya’, the subtle parts of the water in them come
to reside back in those very persons in the form of
apūrva’ or the invisible merit. It is this merit which
leads the jivas of these persons after their death to hea-
ven; for even when the body is cremated in fire, the
invisible water or merit accumulated by doing the deeds
of faith, surrounds the jīva and leads him through
smoke, 2 etc. to heaven, as directed by the priests, in order
to receive the fruits of deeds. From heaven they go
further to the region of the moon (Chā. 5, 10, 3-4).

Similar is the story given to us in the passage about
the five fires (Chā. 5, 4, 2) of those who put the oblations
of śraddhā in the fire, and who are described as reaching
the soma or the moon. It is to emphasize this truth

1. The persons who do some social work such as the dig-
ging of wells or building public inns, etc., or who give away
wealth in charity also belong to the same category.

2. The Pitryāna or the way of the Fathers is described thus:
First the jīva goes to the region of the smoke; from there to the
region of the night; then to that of the dark fortnight; then to
that of the six months during which the sun declines south-
ward; then to the region of the Fathers; then to ākāśa, and from
there to the region of the moon. At every stage, it is the deity
of one region that leads and hands over the jīva to the deity of
the next region.
that in the chapter dealing with agnihotra, the king Janaka asks Yājñavalkya six questions regarding the two oblations that are offered in the morning and evening, every day, and himself answers that they go up to heaven in order to originate the fruit of sacrifice (Sat. Brā. 6, 2, 6). Hence it follows that the jivas being surrounded by water in the form of oblations go to other worlds in order to reap the fruit of their deeds.

How is this reaping of the harvest of fruit possible at all, it may be asked, if the jivas who go to the region of the moon are devoured along with the moon by gods as food (Chā. 5, 10, 4), just as the priests engaged in a sacrifice feed on soma juice, by drinking cups of it in close succession' (Br. 6, 2, 16)?

To this the reply comes in the next Śūtra.

भाक्तम वानात्मविच्छालथा हि दश्ययति ७

[ Bhāktam — secondary; vā—or; an-ātmavitvāt—an account of the lack of knowledge of the Ātman; tathā—like that; hi—for; darśayati—Śrutis declares.]

Or (the description as ‘food of gods’) is (only) metaphorical; for those (who perform the sacrifices) do not have the knowledge of the Ātman. Śruti also declares thus. 7

The description of the souls as ‘food of gods’ must be taken in a metaphorical and not in a literal sense. Otherwise, Śrutis which recommend the performance of sacrifices for the purpose of going to heaven, etc., will have no purpose. And why at all will persons undertake great troubles in performing such sacrifices, if the regions of the moon and other deities are not meant for enjoying the good fruits? We must note that the word ‘food’ is

1. What these six questions are can be inferred from the six answers which are: i.—The two oblations go up; ii.—Then they go from ākāśa to heaven; iii.—They reside there for some time; iv.—They cause delight to some inmates of the heaven; v.—They return to earth after the merit is exhausted; and vi.—They assume the forms of rain, food, etc., and ultimately are transformed as ‘human beings’.
applied even to that which is merely a means of enjoyment or which is useful in general. For instance, ‘the animals are said to be the food of the subjects’, and the subjects, in their turn, are said to be the food of the king. In the same way when it is said that those who perform the sacrifices become the food of gods, it only means that they become useful to gods in a subordinate manner as the wife, the children, and the friends become to an ordinary man. It hardly means that they are chewed and swallowed by gods as sweetmeats. For we are told that ‘the gods do not eat or drink, but that they become satisfied by the mere sight of the Immortal’ (Chā. 3, 6, 1). Neither does it mean that the performers of sacrifices are merely subservient to gods; they too actively enjoy the fruits of their deeds in the new regions. As for the reason why they become subservient to gods, it is their lack of knowledge of the Ātman. As the Upaniṣad says, ‘whoever worships a deity thinking that it is different from himself, does not know the truth; he is like the beast of gods’ (Br. 1, 4, 10). Not only does he behave like a beast in this world by his acts of propitiation, but behaves so in the other world also; that is depending on gods he enjoys the fruits of his works.

Or, we may say that this absence of Ātma-jñāna refers metaphorically to the knowledge of the five fires, if we wish to keep ourselves close to the context in hand. So, when it is said that the performers of sacrifices are the food of gods, what we should understand is that they are the doers of works only, and that they do combine knowledge and works together. Naturally these people ascend to the region of the moon, but come back to earth after the fruits of their merits are exhausted by enjoyment (Pra. 5, 4). They may live and enjoy in the regions of the fathers, or may rise above by their actions to the region of the gods where the joy of the former region may be increased a hundred-fold (Br. 4, 3, 33), all the same, we say in conclusion that the jivās go to other regions only after being surrounded by water.
According to Sruti and Smṛti, when the works are exhausted, (the soul descends) in the (same) manner in which it ascended; and (sometimes) not thus (exactly). 8

The Chāndogyopaniṣad tells us (5, 10, 5-7) that the souls that rise to the region of the moon return again after their enjoyment of fruits is over, and are born as a Brahmin, or as a dog, or as somebody else, in accordance with their conduct. The question that arises in this connection is whether, when they descend, a part of their works remains to be enjoyed or not. The pūrvapakṣin says that there is no such remainder. For in the Sruti passage referred to above, as also in another passage (Br. 6, 2, 16), the dwelling in the region of the moon is said to last till the entire collection of works is enjoyed. He tells us further that this entire collection of works is not to be understood as meaning only so much portion, the fruits of which are fit to be enjoyed in a particular region. For according to another Sruti the fruits of all kinds of action without any qualification, are to be experienced before the descent (Br. 4, 4, 6). Just as a lamp can manifest a jar and a piece of cloth simultaneously, even so the event of death indicates the beginning of not merely the effects of a few deeds, but of all the deeds done in this life, so that they must all be enjoyed in the new regions. The effects or fruits of some of the deeds are not perceptible before death, because the effects of some other deeds are then being experienced. Naturally all other deeds, excepting those that have begun their career (prārabdha), will have to wait as if in a storehouse (sancita) till the death of man. It is this sancita which will keep the soul in the new region till it exhausts itself completely without any remainder by affording the soul...
ample time to enjoy all its fruits. Therefore it is that the jīva descends without any remainder of works.

To this we reply. Even when a particular set of deeds is exhausted, the soul descends with a remainder of some other deeds. When a soul ascends the region of the moon, it acquires a body which is made of water and is fitted to enjoy the fruits of its deeds on earth. But when the soul comes to know that the enjoyment would soon be exhausted, it falls in burning grief; and with this the watery body is destroyed as surely as snow or solid ghee is melted by contact with the sun or fire. The soul then returns to earth, but with a remainder still. As the Upaniṣad says, 'those persons whose conduct, or the remainder of works is good, attain the good birth of either a Brāhmaṇa or Kṣatriya or Vaiśya, while those whose conduct is bad attain the birth of a dog or a hog' (Chā. 5, 10, 7). It is the difference between good and evil deeds that must be responsible for the difference between the affluent and the wretched condition of man. And unless we assume that the souls descend with a remainder, this difference between man and man even at the time of birth, when no kind of karma can be attributed to anyone, will not be explained. To say that it is accidental is no explanation. Smṛti also tells us that the difference between man and man in points of place, caste, family, complexion, duration of life, knowledge, conduct, wealth, pleasure, and intelligence arises on account of the difference between the remainders of works with which different people descend after enjoying the fruits of their deeds which they might have done according to their castes and stages in life.

What then is this so-called 'anusaya' or remainder? Some say that it is the remainder of the fruits of works which are done for the sake of heavenly enjoyment, but which have not been completely enjoyed. Just as some ghee sticks to the inside of a vessel, even though it is emptied, similarly some portion of works does stick to the
souls even though they are exhausted by enjoyment. As a matter of fact, these people do not admit that all the deeds are enjoyed in their effects completely without a remainder. No doubt the souls ascend to the moon with the hope of enjoying all the fruits of their deeds; but when a very small portion of their deeds is left to be its effects, the souls become unable to stay on there like the servant of a king, who having lost all the means of serving the king, except his shoes and umbrella, is unable to stay at the king’s court.

This however is thoroughly unsound. It is true that a little of ghee is seen sticking to the inside of the vessel from which ghee is taken out; it is also true that a servant may continue to possess some of the means he originally possessed in order to serve the king; but it can neither be seen nor inferred that some part of the works done for the sake of heavenly enjoyment continues to exist beyond the soul’s stay in heaven and bears fruit after the soul’s return to the earth. To suppose so is to contradict the teaching of the Sruti, which enjoins the doing of certain deeds for the sole purpose of enjoying in heaven, and not for the purpose of enjoying after the descent. Besides, we shall be constrained to admit that the part which remains must be always of good deeds only, for it is such acts which lead the soul to heaven. But this will again be contradictory to the teaching of the Sruti according to which the remainder may be of good or bad works, so that it may be responsible for the difference between man and man regarding the various conditions in which he is born. Hence, the word ‘anusaya’ suggests only that group of deeds which have not begun to fructify while the soul is in heaven, and not the group of those deeds which have borne fruit in heaven and so have been completely exhausted by enjoyment. It is with the former kind of remainder that the soul descends again in this world. The pūrvapakṣin’s argument therefore that all kinds of works are enjoyed in the other world without a remainder is wrong.
And if we have now proved that there is a remainder, it goes also to refute the pūrvapakśin’s other assertion that beyond death we need not make the distinction between works which will bear fruit in heaven, and works which will bear fruit again in this world after the fruits in heaven are enjoyed. (1) If the group of works (good and bad) known as sancita is prevented from being fructified till, as the pūrvapakśin says, the other group of works, viz., the prārabdha comes to an end at the time of death, it is equally plausible, in the first place, to hold that the less powerful of the works, which are to be experienced in this world after the descent, do not begin to fructify till the more powerful of the group, viz., those that are meant for the heavenly life, are first enjoyed and exhausted before the descent. (2) Secondly, works bearing good fruits to be experienced in heaven, and works bearing bad fruits to be experienced in this world being of opposite nature, cannot be experienced at once, in one region only. (3) Nor can it be maintained, in the third place, that works which are thus capable of bearing fruits in successive lives of the soul can be experienced simultaneously in one life only, simply because all these several fruits of the successive lives are equally unmanifest till the moment of death. The law that specific works are attended by specific fruits in specific lives will be violated thereby. (4) Fourthly, it is impossible to hold that some of the works do not fructify at all after death; for thereby we shall be violating the law of Karma itself, viz., that every work must have its fruit. Or to put it negatively, no work is extinguished except by means of expiatory actions. Smṛti also tells us that a good work may sometimes remain waiting to fructify for a very long time, while the doer of it may pass through a series of miseries as the result of his bad actions. But sooner or later, every work must fructify. (5) And if, in the next place, all the works

1. Works are no doubt extinguished on the Vedānta theory by the knowledge of the Brahman. They also come to an end, when their fruits are completely enjoyed.
were to come to fruition after death simultaneously, souls which are transformed as either gods in heaven, or are born as worms in hell, or as animals, would not be entitled as men are, to do works and acquire religious merit or its opposite, and as a consequence, would not have any new birth at all. And because they have no knowledge of the Ātman, they will never have the final release. Besides, this view of several works causing one birth only goes contrary to the teaching of Smṛti that the sin of killing a Brahmin causes the soul to transmigrate through several lives.' (6) As for the works whose effects are observable here only, for instance, the sacrifice known as Kārīrī for the purpose of bringing down rain, death is not required to make them manifest. The pūrva-pakṣin is therefore wrong in holding that all works which have not begun to manifest their effects will do so at the time of death. (7) The instance of the lamp too is inadequate as we have already seen. Works differ in their relative strength, and the weaker of them have to wait till the others fructify and are enjoyed. Or, just as the lamp manifests the bigger objects first and the smaller afterwards, though it is at an equal distance from the two, even so if death is the common opportunity for the manifestation of all works, the stronger among them will come to fruition first. Hence we conclude that neither does death manifest all works, nor do all works cause one birth alone. (8) Finally, the doctrine, that the soul’s descent with a remainder of works, need not be considered as a barrier to final release. For, as the Śruti tells us, all works whatever are destroyed by the knowledge of the Real.

The souls are said to descend in the way in which they have gone up, because in both the ways the ‘smoke’ and the ‘ākāśa’ are mentioned. They are said

1. The sin of killing a Brahmin is considered as the cause of the soul’s assuming in succession the bodies of a dog, a pig, an ass, a camel, an ox, a goat, a ram, a deer, a bird, a cāndāla (the untouchable), and a niṣāda (i.e., a person born of a Śūdra and a Kṣatriya-woman).
to descend in a somewhat different way also because the words, 'night', 'the dark fortnight', etc., which are used in the way up are not used in the way down, and the words 'mist', 'clouds', etc., which are not used in the way up are used in the way down.'

1 An objector may point out that the passage referred to above (Chā. 5, 10, 7) states that a new birth depends not on the remainder, but on the 'carana' or conduct, and that the conduct and the remainder are two different things is seen from the following passages from Sruti: 'He becomes as he acts only and according to his conduct' (Br. 4, 4, 5); 'Imitate our good acts only and not others, and imitate our good conduct and not otherwise' (Tai, 1, 11, 2).

The objection is futile, we reply. For, as Kārsṇājini holds, the word 'conduct' indicates the remainder of works.

1. The stages in the way down from the moon are: ākāśa, wind, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, herb, corn, food, semen, and the human being. The stages in the way up have been shown in a footnote under Sūtra 6.
One may object again and say that to call caraṇa as only indicative of actions is to abandon its direct meaning and accept only the secondary one. The goodness or badness of actions is as independently or essentially the cause of a new birth as the remainder of work. Otherwise the Sruti reference to ‘caraṇa’ will have to be declared as without any purpose.

To this we say in reply that conduct is involved in all actions, including sacrifices, and is therefore not useless. On the contrary, Smṛti tells us that one who lacks good conduct has no claim to perform sacrifices, and that he would not be purified by the Vedas. This means that conduct which is said to belong to a person must also be said to be involved in actions, though it may produce its own additional result along with the effects of actions. So there is no harm if the word ‘caraṇa’ or ‘conduct’, is said to be indicative of the remainder of works, which according to Kārṇājīnī is the cause of a new birth. Caraṇa by itself, as a quality of mind and without reference to works, will not be the cause of birth. To hold that this is so when the causal connection between works and birth is obvious, is to crawl on knees, when one can afford to run with the legs.

**Sukṛta-duṣṭrte eveti tu Badarī:** 11

[Sukṛta-duṣṭrte—good deeds and evil deeds; eva—only; iti—thus; tu—but; Badariḥ.]

Badarī says that (caraṇa) means good and evil deeds only. 11

The word ‘caraṇa’, which comes from the root ‘car’, indicating action, means, in general, the same thing as performance or deeds, according to Badarī. This very word is used in ordinary language also to denote a person who performs holy deeds such as sacrifices. If, in spite of this, a distinction is sometimes made between caraṇa and works, it is simply analogous to the distinction between a Brahmin and a Parivṛjaka or a sannyāsin, who is a Brahmin still. We therefore say in conclusion
that good or bad 'carana' means the praiseworthy or blameworthy character of works.

2 अनिष्ठादिकार्यिधिकरणम् (१२-२१)
अनिष्ठादिकार्यिधिकरणायि च शुतम् । १२

[ An—not; istādi—the īṣṭi sacrifice and others; kāriniṁ—of those who perform; api—also; ca—and; śrutam—is said by śrutam. ]

Śrutam says that those who do not perform sacrifices also (ascend to the moon). 12

A passage in the Kauśitaki Upaniṣad (1, 2) states that all those who depart from this world go to the moon. Besides, we have already seen under Sūtra 1 of Pāda 1 of this Adhyāya that it is the fifth oblation that becomes the body. And as the first oblation consists of going to the moon, the pūrvapakṣin concludes that not only those who perform the sacrifices, but those also who do not perform them ascend to the moon. The possible objection that it is futile to perform holy deeds, the pūrvapakṣin tries to remove by saying that the people who do not perform the sacrifices go to the moon, but have no experience of pleasure or pain there.

संयमने त्वभूयेत्रेपामारोहोत्वाहिः तद्विद्विन्नाति । १३

[ Samyamane—in the region of the god of death; tu—but; anubhūya—having experienced; itaresāṁ—of others; aroha-
avarohau—ascent and descent; tad—that; gati-dārīndat—the course being declared by śrutam. ]

The others however (descend) after experiencing (misery) in the region of Death; such is their ascent and descent, as declared by Śrutam. 13

- It is not however true that all people go to the moon. Those only go there who have to enjoy the fruits of their actions. Who else will go there, if there is nothing to be done except to return? Does any one climb on a tree only for the purpose of coming down? He climbs it because he wants either to collect some fruit
or blossom. The pūrvapakṣin also admits that there is no enjoyment in the moon for those who do not perform the sacrifices. As a matter of fact, instead of going to the moon, such people go to the region of Yama, the god of death, in order to suffer the torments which would arise as the result of their evil deeds. And then they come back again to this world. Yama himself tells Naciketa that those who are careless and deluded by wealth and those who think that this is the only world, fall under his sway again and again, and that there would arise no other world before their eyes (Ka. 1, 2, 6). As said elsewhere, the region of ‘Yama is the gathering-place of such people’ (Rg. Sam. 10, 14, 1).

स्मरणी  च  १४

[Smaranti—Śmṛtis say this; ca—also.]
The Smṛtis also say this. 14

Authorities like Manu, Vyāsa and others tell us, in the legends of Naciketa and others that people suffer for their evil deeds after going to the abode of Yama.

अपि च सप्त । १५

[Api—even; ca—and; sapta—seven.]

And (we are told that there are) also seven (hells). 15

Writers of Purāṇas tell us further that there are seven hells, Raurava etc. by name, where the evil-doers suffer for their deeds. How can such people ascend to the moon? Now, one may ask if the seven hells are under the supervision of Yama or under officers such as Citragupta and others. To this the next Śūtra comes as a reply.

तत्रापि  च  तद्भवापारादिविरोधः । १६

[Tatra—there; api—even; ca—and; tad—that; vyāpāra—activity; avirodhaḥ—lack of contradiction.]

Due to his activity there also there is no contradiction. 16.
Citragupta and others being in the service of Yama, there is no contradiction.

\[ \text{Vidyā-karmanoḥ—of knowledge and works; iti—so; tu—}
\text{but; prakṛtavat—on account of the topic under discussion.} \]

But (by neither of the two ways, viz.,) of knowledge and works which are under discussion, (do those who do not perform the sacrifices go to heaven.) 17

In a chapter of the Chāndogyopaniṣad (5, 3, 3), a question is asked as to why the region of the moon is not peopled fully; and the answer that is given (5, 10, 8) is that the wretched creatures who do not perform the sacrifices do not go over there either by the way of knowledge or by that of works. Theirs is the third way of being born and dead again and again. By way of explanation we are told in subsequent passages (5, 10, 1 and 5, 10, 3) that knowledge leads us there by the way of the gods, and that works of public utility, alms, and sacrifices lead us by the way of the fathers, but that those who have neither knowledge nor works are denied entrance on either of these paths, and are therefore constrained to go round the third path of perpetual births and deaths.

It may be said that these people of the third category also must first be mounting to the region of the moon and then descending to become the small wretched creatures. But there is no purpose to be served thus; for they cannot enjoy in the sphere of the moon. Besides if all men, irrespective of their good or bad deeds, were to reach the moon after death, all the space there would soon be filled up. But this would entail contrary answer to the question referred to above. The question is not whether the region of the moon becomes full or not; it is as to why it does not become full. Naturally, the appropriate answer would be to say that people having neither knowledge nor works of merit or utility to their credit, do not go to the region of the moon. No doubt, to a certain extent it would be true to say that the region does not become full because there is descending
even in the case of persons who perform sacrifices. But what Sruti emphasizes in telling us (5, 10, 8) is that there are people who can never ascend to the moon, for there is the third place reserved for them.

As for the word 'all' in the Kauśitaki Upaniṣad, we must understand it as qualifying those people who have got a claim to ascend. Whether all must go to the moon in order to have a new body in accordance with the statement regarding the five oblations, will be discussed in the next Śūtra.

न नृत्यिते तत्योपलब्धे: । १८

[Na—not; trītye—in the third; tathā—like that; upalabh-dheḥ—being obtained.]

Not in regard to the third (place, the rule should apply); for this is what is available. 18

The rule that water assumes the form of body at the time of the fifth oblation applies to the body of man, and not to that of an insect or moth. The bodies of these small creatures are obtained in a third manner, without going to the moon by either of the two ways referred to above. Sruti only mentions that waters become man in the fifth oblation; it does not state that in the case where there is no fifth oblation they do not become so. But it intends to convey the meaning that the body of persons who have got the capacity to ascend and descend is made up of waters in the fifth oblation; while in the case of those who have no such capacity, the body may be formed out of the combination of waters and any other element without reference to the fifth oblation.

स्मर्यातपि च लोके । १९

[Smarte—is remembered; api—also; ca—and; loke—in the world.]

And among people also it is known from (tradition). 19

We hear that Droṇa was born from a cup without mother, that Dhṛṣṭadyumna was born of fire, and that
Draupadi and Sītā were born out of earth. This shows that the fifth oblation referring to woman is not required in the case of Droṇa, and that the fourth and the fifth oblations referring to man and woman are not required in the case of Sītā and others, for the formation of the human body. So, we may expect that in other cases also, the body may be formed without reference to the number of oblations. The female crane, for instance, is supposed to conceive, without a male.

दर्शनाति | २०
[Daṁsanāt—because it is observed; ca—and.]
And because it is observed. 20

It is known that bodies of organic beings arise in four different ways, viz., from an egg, from a living being, from sweat, or from something which germinates. Bodies arising out of sweat and bodies which break through germination are obviously not due to sexual intercourse; and so it can be said that they arise without reference to the number of oblations. Now, whether the number of classes of beings is three or four according to Sruti (Chā. 6, 3, 1), will be seen in the next Sūtra.

तृतीयशब्दावरोधः संशोकञ्जस्य | २१
[Trtiya—third; sabda—word; avarodhah—inclusion; samśokajasya—of that which springs from the heat of great grief.]
The third word includes that which springs from heat. 21

The Chāndogyopanishad makes no mention of the class of beings which arise from sweat, because it is included under that which comes from germination. The word ‘udbhija’ which means ‘to come out by breaking open’ indicates the process of coming into existence which is common to both the classes. Either they come into being by breaking open water, i. e., sweat, or by

1. Samśoka or great grief produces heat; and heat produces sweat. Therefore samśoka means sweat.
breaking open the earth. In the Aitareyopanisad, however, the sweat-born beings and the beings born out of germination are mentioned as different, because the former have got locomotion and the latter have not. So there is no contradiction between Sruti passages.

\[ Sābhāvyā—similarity; āpattih—acquisition; upapatteh—as it is possible. \]

( The descending soul ) becomes similar ( to ākāśa etc. ); for this is possible. 22

We now know that the souls of those who perform the sacrifices and other useful deeds go to the moon after death, live there to enjoy till their works last, and come back with some remainder of their works. As for their mode of descending, Sruti tells us (Chā. 5, 10, 5) that they descend by the way they went up, viz., from the moon to ākāśa, and from ākāśa to air. Then, they first become smoke, then mist, then cloud, and then rain down. The question to be answered in this connection is whether in their descent, the souls become identical with ākāśa and other things, or become only similar to them. The pūrvapakṣin maintains that they become identical, for Sruti directly mentions it as the passing over of something into something else. The passage ‘having become air, he becomes smoke’, clearly states that the soul first becomes air and then becomes smoke.

To this we reply. It is impossible to hold that one thing becomes identical with another in the literal sense of the word. And supposing the soul becomes identical with ākāśa, it will be impossible for it to descend to air; for we do not conceive that the ākāśa will perish. So, in the absence of identity which is the direct meaning of Sruti, we have to understand the Sruti passage as conveying to us the secondary idea that the soul becomes similar to ākāśa, air, and other things. We must remember, however, that excepting the
relation of similarity, we should not think of any other relation, such as samyoga, as existing between the soul and ākāśa. For ākāśa which is all-pervading is eternally conjoined with all things. So the only relation which the soul can establish with ākāśa in its descent is that of similarity. In conclusion, therefore, we say that the watery body of the soul becomes exhausted, in its sojourn on the moon, and the remainder of it becomes as subtle as ākāśa. It then becomes like air, mist, and so on.

5 nātiratirāṅgikaranaḥ (23)

nātiratireṇa viśeṣāt 23

[Na—not; ati-cireṇa—for a long time; viśeṣāt—on account of something special.]

(The similarity of the soul with ākāśa, etc.) does not (last) for a long time; for a special (reason is mentioned). 23

What may be the length of time during which the soul stops at every stage in its descent and during which it becomes similar to ākāśa, air, and other things? As there is no definite Śruti statement on this point, the pūrvapakṣin leaves it as an open question. We however think that it must be staying at every stage for a very short time, till it falls to the earth in raindrops. We make this inference because, after having said that the soul enters into rice or barley, the Upaniṣad says, 'From here onwards the escape is fraught with pain' (Cha. 5, 10, 6). This clearly implies that all the earlier stages of the soul where the body is not formed were rather pleasant and easy, and therefore the descent must have been effected in a very short time.

6 anvātiratirāṅgikaranaḥ (24-27)

anvātiratireṇaḥ pūrvavadbhilayaḥ 24

[Anya—other; adhiṣṭhitesu—inhabited by; pūrvavat—like before; abhilāpāt—on account of being told.]
As before, (the descending souls stop at rice, barley, etc., which) are inhabited by other (souls already); because this is what is told. 24

Another question regarding the descending souls awaits our solution. Are we to suppose that after their descent in drops of rain, the souls themselves become the immovable things such as rice, barley, herbs, etc., and enjoy their pleasures and pains, or that they simply come to rest for a while in these different shelters which have already been inhabited by different souls?

The pūrvapakṣin says that if the souls can be born as dogs or hogs, in accordance with the effects of their works, there is no reason why they should not be born as plants as the result of the harm and killing done in sacrifices. Besides, Sruti and Smṛti support this view.

In reply to this we say that just as the souls do not become ākāśa and air, but are endowed with similarity to these, even so the souls in their descent do not become the rice and barley plants, but merely come in contact with them. And just as, in their descent through ākāśa, air, mist, cloud, and rain, the souls do not enjoy the pleasures and pains, even so in their coming in contact with rice, barley, and so on, they cannot be said to have these experiences. For there is no reference to their good and evil deeds due to which we may say that they may be having pleasures and pains. Such an explicit reference to good or bad conduct as responsible for the kind of new birth, for instance, of a Brahmin, or of a dog, is made where it is necessary (Chā. 5, 10, 7). In spite of this; however, we may say that the soul's coming in contact with rice or barley, means its undergoing pleasure and pain of some sort.

Besides, if we take the literal meaning of the words 'being born as rice', it would mean that the souls which are so born will be destroyed when the corn is reaped, pounded, cooked, and eaten. How, then is the transmission of these souls possible, (Chā. 5, 10, 6) through food and semen? Hence what is meant by
saying ‘becoming rice and barley,’ is that the souls become connected with these, even though the latter are already inhabited by other souls.

We do not wish to deny therefore that the immovable mode of life’s existence is a way of experiencing misery. Sinful persons may come to suffer this mode of life. What we maintain now, in the context before us, is that the souls which return from the moon with a remainder of their works do not experience any pleasure or pains; for, they have a temporary contact with rice, barley, and other plants.

अशुद्धमि चेत शन्दात। २५

[ A-suddham—unholy; iti cet—if it be said; na—not; sabdāt—on account of Sruti. ]

If it be said that (sacrifice is) unholy, it is not so on account of Sruti. 25

Let us turn now to the remark of the purvapaksin that the killing of animals in sacrifices might be responsible for the soul’s being born as a plant. We must note at the outset that our knowledge of duty and of the conceptions of right and wrong depends entirely on Sruti, because it lies beyond the capacity of the senses. What is considered right in one place or time may be considered wrong in another place or time. Certainty of knowledge in the sphere of Dharma arises from Sruti alone. The offering of an animal to Agni and Soma is sanctioned by Sruti, though it may be an exception to the general rule of non-killing. It is therefore free from being unholy. The sacrificial killing of animals is moreover favoured by men of authority and so can hardly be held as responsible for the soul’s being born as a plant. Besides, to be born thus is not like being born as a dog or a hog. For the latter kind of birth is specially meant for those whose conduct is bad. No such mention is made with reference to being born as rice or barley plant. We therefore once again come to the same conclusion that the souls which descend from the moon do not literally
become plants, but come for a while to reside in the already inhabited plants.

रेत:सिग्योगोऽथ । २६

[ Retah—semen;  sig—sprinkling;  yogah—conjunction;  atha—then. ]

Then (occurs) the conjunction (of the soul) with him who does the act of generation. ²⁶

The soul is afterwards stated to become that person who eats the food, viz., the rice or the barley, and who does the act of generation (Chā. 5, 10, 6). The person eating the food may take a long time after his birth to do the act of generation. Can we therefore literally hold that the soul contained in the food becomes such a man after several years? What we must mean is that the soul comes in conjunction with such a man, as it did come in conjunction with a plant before.

योनेः शरीरम् । २७

[ Yoneḥ—from yoni;  śarīram—body. ]

From yoni, a body (comes into being). ²⁷

Then there comes into being for the first time in the womb of the mother a body for the soul, so that according to the deserts, it should enjoy the pleasures and pains. This also shows that the bodiless soul had till now only contacts with plants and other things.
In the intermediate place there is creation; for (Sruti) has said (so).

In the preceding pada we have described the various stages of the soul's journey through this samsāra. We shall now deal with the different states of the soul. In a passage of the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (4, 3, 10) we read that, 'in sleep there are no chariots, no horses and no roads; but that he creates them all'. Now the question arises whether this creation in a dream is as real as the world of the waking life, or is merely illusory. The pūrvapakṣin says that it is real, because Sruti says that the soul is the creator of it.

The state of dream, as the Upaniṣad says (Br. 4, 3, 9) is said to be intermediate between this world and the next, because it gives neither the experience of this world nor that of the next. Or, it may be said to be intermediate between the conditions of wakefulness and deep sleep.

And some say that (the Ātman is) the creator (of things dear like) sons and others.
The word 'kāma' in this passage does not mean any object of desire, so that the Ātman should be thought of as capable of desiring only. It means lovely objects of desire such as sons and others, so that with reference to earlier passages where the granting of the boon for sons and other things is promised (Ka. I, 1, 23 and 24), the Ātman should be thought of as creating the lovely objects. That the creator is no other than the Prājña or the highest Ātman, can be very easily seen from both the context and the ending portion of the same section of the Upaniṣad. The description of the Ātman begins with the statement, 'He whom thou seest as neither this nor that' (1, 2, 14), and ends with the statement 'That indeed is the bright, immortal Brahman, in which all the worlds are contained, and beyond which no one goes' (2, 2, 8). The creation in the dream is like the creation of the waking life, because the Ātman is the creator of both. The Bṛhadāranyaka-paniṣad goes a step further in identifying the two states, when it says 'This is the same as the waking; for what he sees while awake, he sees the same in sleep' (4, 3, 14). Hence, the creation in dreams is real. To this the next Sūtra comes as a reply.

मायामात्रं तु कालस्वर्यनामरत्न्या कर्मस्वरूपतः तव ॥ ३ ॥

[ Māyā-mātram—illusion only; tu—but; Kārtṣṇyena—completely; an—not; abhivyakta—manifest; svarūpatvaḥ—on account of its nature. ]

(The dream) however (is) only an illusion; for (its) nature is not completely manifest. 3

The world of dreams has not the slightest reality in it; it is merely an illusion. The conditions of place, time, causation, and circumstance do not apply to it, as they apply to real things. That is why a dream is contradicted, while a real thing is not. In the first place, there cannot possibly be any room within the body of a dreamer for chariots and horses. One may explain that the soul of the dreamer wanders beyond the body; and so,
he sees himself as walking and standing, as also the various objects as separated in space and as distinct from him. One may even cite in his favour the Sruti passage which states that the 'dream occurs outside the body; away from the nest, the Immortal moves and goes wherever it likes' (Br. 4, 3, 12). But is it ever possible that a person who is sleeping should cover a distance of hundreds of miles in going to and in returning from a far-off place? A person may tell about his dream that he slept in the land of the Kurus, and awoke in the land of the Pancalas. But, as a matter of fact, he awakes in the land of the Kurus. The dreamer may imagine that he is going to a different place; but the waking by-standers would say that his body is lying in the bed. At best, the things which appear real to the dreamer are like real things which he sees in the waking state, but are never the real things themselves. Sruti also declares that 'the dreamer moves about as he likes within his own body' (Br. 2, 1, 18). And so, the Sruti-passage cited by the pürvapaksin (Br. 4, 3, 12) in order to show that the dreamer moves away from the nest must be taken in a metaphorical sense.' He who makes no changes in the body is supposed to make them outside. The knowledge of the spatial relations which arises in a dream is, therefore, mere illusion.

In the second place, the temporal relations also do not hold good in a dream. A person sleeping during night may dream that it is day-time. Another lives through many years in his dream, though it lasts for a short time. Thirdly, in the absence of the organs of sense there cannot be an adequate motive for any thought or action in a dream; nor can the dreamer be conceived to have any power to produce out of nothing chariots and horses in the twinkling of an eye. And, fourthly, what is created in a dream does not exist when

1. As a matter of fact, no movement need be attributed to the Immortal Being in order that something should be known or created.
the dream is over. Not only does the waking life cancel the dream, but one event in a dream is also cancelled by another. What appears as a chariot turns suddenly into a man, and the man again turns into a tree. This is what is meant by the Sruti-passage that there are no chariots, no horses, no roads in a dream. Hence what appears in a dream is mere illusion.

**Sruti**

[Sūcakah—that which indicates; ca; hi—for; Sruteh—from Sruti; ācaksate—tells; ca; tad-vidah—those who know that.]

And (the dream) is indicative (of future events) according to Sruti; those well-versed in (the science of dreams) declare so. 4

Notwithstanding the illusory nature of the dreams, they may be indicative of future events. The sight of a woman in a dream is considered as a sign of success in the work that is undertaken. (Chā. 5, 2, 8). But the sight of a black man with black teeth indicates speedy death for the dreamer. Similarly, to see oneself as riding on an elephant is lucky, while to see as riding on a donkey is unlucky, in the opinion of the experts. Certain other dreams which are caused by the power of mantras, deities, and so on, are also considered as having an element of truth, so far as the indication of the future is concerned. But what we hold in all such cases, apart from the fact of the indication of the future, is that what appears in a dream is unreal, inasmuch as it is contradicted by the experience of the waking life.

In the light of this, the Upaniṣadic passage cited under Sūtra 1 of this pāda must be understood in a metaphorical sense. When we say that the plough is the support of the bullocks, what we mean is that the plough needs the bullocks for the purpose of tilling the land. Similarly, the creation in the dream, though supported sometimes by the objects in the waking life, is for the purpose of causing joy and fear to the dreamer in accordance with his good or bad deeds. So, in a way,
it is the dreamer who is the cause of the creation in the dream; and it is this fact which the Upaniṣad describes (Br. 4, 3, 9) by calling him the creator of chariots and other things.

Another purpose which Sruti wants to achieve by the description of the dreaming state is to indicate the self-luminous nature of the Ātman. It is difficult to understand this in the wakeful condition, because the knowledge acquired in the waking life depends upon the contact of the objects with the senses, and upon the light of the Sun and so on. In dreams, on the other hand, no such conditions are required to make us feel that the Ātman is dependent upon them for the sake of having knowledge. If, in the dreaming state, the creation of chariots and horses is taken to be literally true, and if the contact of the objects and the senses also remains the same, there would be no difference between the dream and the waking life, and the problem of the self-luminosity of the Ātman would be as difficult for apprehension as before. Hence, we conclude that the statement that 'there are no chariots and horses in a dream' is a real and direct description of the dreaming state; while the statement 'he creates the chariots etc.' or the statement 'he creates all the objects of desire' (Ka. 2, 2, 8), is a metaphorical description of the same.

As for the contention of the pūrvapakṣin that the highest Ātman alone is the maker of things in dreams, we say that it is untrue. For we hold in accordance with another Sruti-passage (Br. 4, 3, 9), that it is the individual soul who, after the cessation in sleep of the activities of the senses, creates a subtle body of desires, and shapes the dreams according to the light of his buddhi and of his own Caitanya or consciousness. Nay, in the Kathopaniṣad itself, the so-called reference to the highest Ātman as the creator of objects in dreams is, as a matter of fact, a reference to the individual soul; for he is described as 'keeping awake when the senses go to sleep' (2, 2, 8). No doubt, we admit that in the passage
which immediately comes after as a continuation of the passage just quoted, the same being is described as the ‘bright, immortal Brahman’. But this, we say, is in keeping with the fundamental Vedantic teaching that there is no distinction between the individual soul and the Brahman. It only voices forth the teaching contained in the Chāndogyopaniṣad (6, 9, 4), viz., ‘Thou art that’, and, therefore, it can still be said, as the pūrva-pāksin has said, that the general subject-matter of the passages referred to in the Kaṭha is Brahman only. We too may side with the pūrva-pāksin and say with him that the highest Atman is active in dreams; for, as the lord of all, the Atman is the support of the soul in all its states. What we maintain is that the creation in dreams is not real as the creation which consists of ākāśa and other elements is. The latter also, as seen in Sūtra 2, 1, 14, is not real. But the difference between the world of our waking life and the world of dreams is that, whereas the former lasts till the knowledge of Brahman as the soul of all does not dawn on us, the latter is sublated daily by the waking life. The dream therefore is a mere illusion.

पराभिध्यानातु तिरोहितं ततो हस्य वर्गविपर्ययः | ५ |

[Para—the Atman; abhidhyānāt—on account of meditation; tu—but; tirohitam—hidden; tatah—from that; hi—for; asya—of this; bandha-viparyayau—bondage and freedom.]

But (it is) by meditation on the Atman (that the qualities of the Atman which) are hidden, become manifest; for it is from him (the Atman) that it (viz., the jīva, has got) bondage and release. 5

The pūrva-pāksin may bring forward the argument, in a modified form. Just as both the spark and the fire possess in common the power to burn and to give light, even so he may say that the jīva and the Lord possess in common the power to create and to know all the things in the world. So, it is likely that the individual soul may create from his mere wishes real things like chariots and horses.
In reply to this we say that the jīva has obviously not got omniscience or omnipotence, even though it may be related to God, as a part is related to the whole. The divine attributes, although existing potentially, are hidden in the individual soul on account of avidyā. And just as the sight of a blind man may be restored by means of a medicine, even so if a man wins the grace of God by constant meditation on Him, the divine qualities in him may become manifest and enable him to dispel his ignorance. In the absence of devotion and grace, on the other hand, the qualities do not manifest themselves. It is on account of this reason that the bondage and freedom of a man are said to be dependent on God. In other words, bondage means the ignorance of the real nature of God, while release means the knowledge of it. Sruti means exactly this when it declares that ‘with the knowledge of God, all fetters fall off; sufferings and the rounds of births and deaths come to an end; and by meditation on God the devotee acquires a unique glory which makes him completely satisfied’ (Sve. 1, 11).

[Deha—body; yogāt—on account of connection; vā—or; saḥ—that; api—also.]

Or that also (viz., the hidden condition of the qualities arises) owing to its connection with the body. 6

Or, it may be said that just as a spark of fire manifests its power of burning and light, even so the jīva may manifest its qualities. We must however remember that the qualities are hidden, because the soul is connected with the upādhis of body, mind, senses etc. These are the names and forms arising out of avidyā, and so create the erroneous notion in the soul that it is not distinct from them. Naturally, the divine qualities of the soul are hidden also by these, in the manner in which fire is hidden by the wood in which it exists, or by the ashes it produces.
In view of this, one may again say that it would be better to hold that the jiva and the Lord are separate. We shall at least be saved on this view from giving the additional explanation that they appear separate because the soul is connected with the limiting adjuncts. But it is impossible to hold, we say in reply, that the soul and God are separate. Sruti tells us that the highest ‘Divinity entered into those beings, in the form of the jīvātman’ (Chā. 6, 3, 2); and then again, Svetaketu is told, ‘It is the truth, the Ātman; thou art that’ (Chā. 6, 9, 4). The soul is not different from God, and yet its knowledge and glory being hidden on account of its connection with body, it will not be able to create out of its wishes such things as chariots and horses. And if the soul possessed this power, who would ever have an unpleasant dream?

As for the Sruti-passage (Br. 4, 3, 14) which, according to the pūrvapaksin teaches us that the dreaming state is as real as the waking state, because the dreamer sees in a dream exactly the same things as he sees in the waking state, we have to remark that the dream is like the waking state because the mental impressions in the dream resemble the actual things. If dreams were as real as the waking life, the problem of self-luminosity of the Ātman would be as difficult for apprehension as it is in the waking life; but we have already referred to the Sruti which definitely says that chariots and horses in a dream have no real existence. Dreams therefore are illusory only.

２
tadbhāvābhiṣkaraṇam | (७—८)
tadbhāvā naḍīśu tadāntratamani ca | ७

[Tat—that; abhāvah—absence; naḍīsu—in the veins; tat-Sruteh—on account of Sruti regarding that; Ātmani—in the Ātman; ca—and.]

(Sleep, i. e., ) the absence of dream (occurs) in the naḍīs and the Ātman; Sruti declares like that. ७
After having discussed so far about the state of dream, let us now deal with the state of sleep with reference to the passage, 'When the jīva is resting in sound and dreamless sleep, then it means that it has entered into the nādis' (Chā. 8, 6, 3). 'Through the nādis the soul moves into the pericardium and takes rest' (Br. 2, 1, 19). 'In dreamless sleep, the soul is in nādis; he then becomes one with prāna' (Kau. 4, 19). 'He rests in the ākāsa which is within the heart' (Br. 2, 1, 17). 'He becomes one with the Sat; he becomes absorbed within himself' (Chā. 6, 8, 1). And, 'Embraced by the highest Ātman, he knows nothing which is inside or outside' (Br. 4, 3, 21).

Reading these several passages, there arises the doubt whether the soul resides during the condition of dreamless sleep in one of the three independent places, viz., the nādis, the pericardium, and the Brahman, or whether it resides in only one place which is constituted by all the three taken together. The pūrvapakṣin holds that there are three different places for the souls to sleep. And though all of them serve one and the same purpose, they are independent of each other; just as rice and barley which can be used severally for preparing the 'purodāsa' or the sacrificial cake, are separate from each other. That the purpose is the same is again indicated by the locative case in which all the three places have been used. No doubt, strictly speaking, from the point of view of grammar, the locative is not used in all the passages quoted above. For instance, the word 'Sat' in the passage, 'He becomes united with the Sat', is used in the instrumental case and not in the locative. But this is immaterial; for the sense we have out of it is that of the locative, on account of the subsequent sentence, 'finding no rest anywhere else, he takes rest in prāna,' (Chā. 6, 8, 2) where prāna means Sat. Nay, we find that the word 'Sat' also is directly used in the locative a little further in the same context; 'Being absorbed in the Sat, they do not know that they are so absorbed' (Chā. 6, 9, 2). In short, the same
state of deep sleep in which all cognition is suspended being mentioned in the three places, the soul can be said to resort to any one of them.

As against this, we hold that Śruti intends to mean that the soul resorts in deep sleep to all the three places taken together. For if it were to resort to one, it means it does not resort to the remaining two places; but this is to contradict the Śruti. The unity of purpose is no consequence of the use of the same case; nor is the freedom of choice on the part of the soul to sleep in any one of the three places, a consequence of the unity of purpose. On the contrary, one and the same case may be employed with reference to different things having different purposes, and yet the several things may be used simultaneously and without any option. For example, a man who is sleeping on the couch can certainly be said to sleep in the palace at the same time, if the couch is placed in the palace. Similarly, it is possible for the soul to sleep at the same time in the nādis, in the pericardium and in the Brahman. This is what the Śruti (Kau. 4, 19) says by combining the nādis and the prāṇa in one sentence. That prāṇa means Brahman, we have already seen in Brahma-Sūtra 1, 1, 28. So, if we are not to contradict the Śruti which speaks of Brahman as the place of deep sleep, all references in other passages to the nādis (Chā. 8, 6, 3) must be construed as meaning that the soul resorts to Brahman through the nādis. We can still use the word 'nādis' in the locative, but mean by it not an independent place of sleep, but as one leading the soul into the Brahman; just as a man going into the sea may do so through the water of the Gangā.

Now the purpose of the passage is not to describe the state of deep sleep, but to eulogise the path which leads the soul from the nādis to the Brahman. We are told that the soul becomes free from all evil as soon as it becomes united with the light contained in the nādis (Chā. 8, 6, 3). Now, this light may be the light
of the bile in the nādīs, on account of which the sense-organs become overpowered, and the soul becomes unable to see the objects of sense. Naturally, he is free from pleasure and pain, as also from merit and demerit. Or, better still, the word 'light' means the Brahman, as the Brhadāraṇyaka says (4, 4, 7). And then the passage would mean, as another passage from the Chāndogya means (8, 4, 1), that the soul will be free from all evil on account of its union with Brahman through the nādīs. So it is not the nādīs themselves taken independently, but the Brahman taken along with nādīs, which is the place of deep sleep.

The pericardium also, in a similar way, along with, but in subordination to Brahman, becomes the place of sleep. To start with, the ākāśa within the heart is said to be the place of sleep (Br. 2, 1, 17); but a little further, the pericardium (puritat), that is the membrane which covers the heart, is said to be the resting place (Br. 2, 1, 19). So, just as a man living in a town can be said to live within the walls of the town, even so the jīva sleeping within the ākāśa of the heart is said to sleep in the heart or the pericardium itself. And when we note in this connection what we have already proved, (Brahma Sūtra 1, 3, 14) that the 'dahara' or the ākāśa within the heart is Brahman, it will be clear that the place of sleep is once again the Brahman, which is however mentioned this time with the pericardium. That the nādīs and the pericardium are again, in their turn, to be taken together, is directly mentioned in the passage, 'he moves through the nādīs and rests in the puritat' (Br. 2, 1, 19). All this means that the nādīs, the pericardium and the Brahman are to be taken together as constituting the place of sleep. And among these three, Brahman being the innermost and the only intelligent reality, as is clear from the words 'Sat', 'prāṇa' and 'prājña' used in the Sruti-passages quoted in the beginning of the discussion of this Sūtra, Brahman alone
is the abiding place of deep sleep, while the nādis and the pericardium are only gates leading to the Brahman.¹

The nādis and the puritāt are further distinguished from Brahman by the fact that they are, strictly speaking, the places where the upādhis of the jīva, such as the sense-organs and others, find their rest in sleep. As for the upādhiless jīva, Brahman too can hardly be said to be its resting place;² for being not different from Brahman, the jīva abides in its own real glory. To say that it abides in Brahman is not to suppose, as the language suggests, that the abode and that which abides are two different things, but that the two are absolutely identical. As the Sruti says, 'The jīva becomes one with the Sat, merged in himself', that is, merged in his own real form (Chā. 6, 8, 1). As a matter of fact, at no time and during no state, can the individual soul cease to be identical with the Sat or Brahman. But it is described as abiding in Brahman, and as being in its real nature when it goes into deep sleep, because it is then free from its limiting adjuncts; whereas during the waking and the dreaming states, it appears as if the jīva is different from the Brahman, because its real nature is clouded by the limiting adjuncts.

Now, even if we suppose that the three places are severally and optionally resorted to by the soul, the cessation of specific cognitions must be the common feature of deep sleep in all of them. But so far as the nādis and the puritāt are concerned the presence of upādhis in them means necessarily the presence of the knowledge of the objects of sense. 'Where there is duality', as the Sruti says, 'one sees the other' (Br. 4, 3, 31). There is no reason

---

¹ Thus we have shown that all the six Sruti-passages quoted at the beginning of this Sūtra point out unanimously that Brahman alone is the resting place in deep sleep.

² If the jīva and Brahman are identical, it is a metaphor to say that Brahman is the support of the jīva. The nādis and the puritāt, on the other hand, being the support of the upādhis only, it is impossible even to say metaphorically that they are the support of the jīva.
why there should be the cessation of knowledge. On the other hand, when the soul becomes united with Brahman in deep sleep, and there reigns oneness, 'How should he see another?' (Br. 4, 5, 15). It may be suggested that the absence of cognition may result even when the soul is resting in the nādis and the purītāt, if the objects to be cognized or the upādhis themselves remain far removed from the soul. But this is possible if the soul is believed to be limited. Viśnūmītra, for example, will not be able to see his home when he is staying in foreign land. But the limits of the soul are the limits of the adjuncts. Otherwise, the soul is unlimited; and it is only when the soul becomes one with Brahman and free from adjuncts, that it does not cognize anything other than itself.

So, finally, when we say that Brahman along with nādis and purītāt is the place of deep sleep, we do not say that a summation of the three places is necessary. We achieve nothing, as a matter of fact, by mentioning that the nādis and the purītāt are places of sleep, beyond knowing that they are only the gates of Brahman. To know, on the other hand, that Brahman is the abiding resting place of the soul in deep sleep, is to know that the soul is identical with Brahman, and that it is therefore unconnected with the waking and the dreaming states of life. The Ātman only is therefore the place of deep sleep.

अतः प्रव्योजनस्मात्।

[Atah—hence; prabodhah—awakening; asmāt—from this.]

Hence the awakening (of the soul) from this (i.e. Brahman).

That the Ātman only is the place of deep sleep is also proved by the Sruti-passages which tell us that the awakening of the soul takes place from the Ātman again. To the question 'Whence do they come back?', we get the answer, 'Like sparks from fire, the pānas come forth from the Ātman' (Br. 2, 1, 16 & 20). Or, as another Sruti says, 'They come back from the Truth, and yet
know not that they do so' (Chā. 6, 10, 2). Nowhere do we read that the soul awakes sometimes from the nādis, sometimes from the pericardium, and sometimes from the Ātman. The place of sleep therefore is the Ātman.

2 कर्मानुस्मृतिश्वर्न्द्विभवाचिक्रणम् ! (९)
स एव तु कर्मानुस्मृतिश्रव्द्विभविभयः ! ९

[Sāh—he; eva—only; tu—but; karma—action; anusmṛti—
memory; śabda-vidhibhyah—on account of word and precept.]

But the same (soul is awakened); because of action, remembrance, Sruti and precept. 9

The Ātman may be the place of deep sleep. But the soul which is awakened from sleep may not be the same, as the pūrvapakṣin maintains. Just as the same drop of water can hardly be picked up after it has been once mixed up with a large quantity of water, even so the pūrvapakṣin thinks that the soul which returns from Brahman may be Īśvara or some other soul, and not necessarily the same soul which became merged in the bliss of Brahman during deep sleep.

Against this we reply that it must be the same person who goes to sleep and awakes. Otherwise, in the first place, if work left unfinished by one person before sleep, is to be taken up and finished by different persons after sleep, who should enjoy the fruit of sacrifice, as told in the Veda? Secondly, it is impossible that one should remember what another man has seen before. Besides, the person who awakes from sleep would not have the usual sense of personal identity, and so would not be able to express it in words, 'I am the same person I was before'. Sruti also declares that the same person who goes to sleep rises again (Br. 4, 3, 16); 'All these beings visit the world of Brahman every day, and yet do not know that they are doing so' (Chā. 8, 3, 2); 'Whatever these creatures are, whether a lion, a wolf and so on, before sleep, they are exactly the same when they awake' (Chā. 6, 9, 2). Fourthly, injunctions regarding works and knowledge convince us that the same persons
who go to sleep after doing work must wake up for enjoying the fruit; otherwise the injunctions will have no purpose to serve, and people may get final release by merely sleeping. Fifthly, if the person who awakes is some other than the person who sleeps, then he must be coming into a new body after leaving his former body. But this would mean that his former body will be useless for activity on account of the absence of soul in it. It is idle to suppose that the souls of two persons who go to sleep will arise in each other’s body. To hold again that a being, whether man or God, who has got his release from body and from avidyā, comes back in a body, is to hold the release itself as short-lived. And finally, the belief that the person who awakes is different from the person who sleeps, is doubly disastrous. It makes one responsible for what he has not done, and allows another to go free even though he ought to have been held responsible for what he has done. From all this it follows that the person who awakes is the same who goes to sleep.

Now it is true no doubt that the same drop of water cannot be taken out of a large quantity of water in which it is mixed. But this does not apply in the case of the souls. For one soul is distinguished from others in point of specific works and knowledge. Perhaps man will not be able to make this distinction between soul and soul, but God is; just as the flamingo is reported to be able to separate milk from water when the two are mixed together. Besides, the comparison of the soul with a drop of water is not apt at all; because we have repeatedly pointed out that the soul is not different from the highest Atman; and that it is the latter which, on account of its connection with upādhis, is only metaphorically known as the soul. And it is the difference in upādhis again which accounts for the difference between

1. But it cannot be said that there is a similar difference of upādhi between the sleeping and the waking conditions of man, so that it will leave us free to expect that another soul will arise when one has gone to sleep.
one soul and another. So far as the two states of sleep and wakeful life are concerned, it is the same upādhi which is present in different forms. We can call them as the earlier and the later stages of the same life, or as related to each other as cause and effect, or as seed and plant. We are therefore prevented from saying that the soul which rises is different from the soul which sleeps.

1. The gross and the subtle bodies in the waking and the sleeping conditions are causally connected as seed and plant. Whichever of them is the cause and whichever the effect, the relation between effect and cause is that of identity. So, it follows that there must be the same soul in both the waking and sleeping conditions.

V. E. 9
Besides, however intense the concentration may be on a particular object the waking man keeps his body erect; the body of a man in swoon falls flat to the ground. Hence a person in swoon is never awake.

Being completely unconscious, the person in swoon cannot also be said to be dreaming. Nor is he a dead person; for he breathes and remains warm—a fact which is ascertained by people by placing their hand on his chest, and by holding it at his nostrils; and it is likely he may regain consciousness if cold water is sprinkled over him. It is likely he may even die. But once he goes to the region of Death, he will never return.

Nor can we say that a man in swoon is in deep sleep. For though the former may not breathe sometimes or a long time, his body trembles, his face gives a ghastly appearance, and his eyes may remain wide open. The latter, on the other hand, appears to be lying in peace; the breathing occurs at regular intervals; his eyes are closed, and his body does not tremble. A gentle touch of the hand may awaken a sleeping person; strokes of a stick may be insufficient to bring back a swooning person to consciousness. A blow on the head may be the cause of swoon; while the cause of sleep is simple fatigue. Besides, people, in general, do not hold that sleep is the same as swoon.

The only conclusion we can therefore arrive at is that swoon and sleep are in partial agreement with each other, so far as absence of consciousness is concerned. Otherwise they are different from each other, as shown above. Upon this, someone may contend that there is not only partial but perfect agreement in both the states, and may cite in his support passages from Sruti, which, he thinks, will show us that the individual soul is no less identical with Brahman in swoon than in sleep. Neither in sleep nor in swoon, he will tell us, does the soul become aware of itself as being happy or otherwise. The Sruti-passages cited are: 'During sleep, he becomes one with Brahman' (Châ. 6, 8, 1); 'A thief is not called a
thief, then’ (Br. 4, 3, 22); ‘Day and night, old age, death, grief, good or evil deeds do not pass that bridge of Brahman’ (Chā. 8, 4, 1).

To this we reply. Swoon has no agreement with the Brahmanic condition; for it is the opposite of consciousness. As shown above, it has got only partial agreement with sleep; and we may now say that it has got a partial agreement with death also, inasmuch as swoon may prove to be the gate-way to death. If a portion of the Karma remains to be enjoyed, speech and mind return to the swooning man; otherwise the breath and warmth leave him altogether. That is why people who know the Brahman call the swoon as partial sleep. We may call it as the fifth state in life, though it does not occur very often. Yet, it is known to people and especially known to medical men.

Not even because of upādhis also, Brahman can have both the characters; for everywhere (Sruti means this). 11

Let us now ascertain the nature of Brahman with which the individual soul becomes united in sleep, on account of its being bereft of the limiting adjuncts. Brahman is sometimes described as possessing ‘all actions, all desires, all tastes, and all odours’ (Chā. 3, 14, 2); it is also described as ‘neither large nor small, neither short nor long etc.’ (Br. 3, 8, 8). In view of this, shall we say that Brahman has a double nature, or that it is saguna or nirguna? The pūrvapakṣin says that in view of the Sruti-passages, Brahman has got a double nature.
To this we reply. It is impossible to admit that Brahman possesses the double nature. For it is a contradiction to say that one and the same thing has and has not certain qualities. It is impossible again that the connection of a thing with certain adjuncts should endow that thing with an altogether different quality. The white crystal does not become red, even though a red thing is placed by its side. That the crystal appears as red is however an illusion only. In the case of Brahman, the adjuncts themselves are unreal; and so the saguna aspect of it is doubly erroneous. Brahman therefore is absolutely devoid of any difference and quality. 'It is without form, sound, touch, and decay' (Ka. 1, 3, 15).

न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमत्तद्वचनात् । १२

[Na; bhedāt—on account of difference; ite cet; na; pratyaekam—regarding each; a-tad—not that; vacanāt—being told.]

If it be said that it (Brahman) is not so, (i.e. nirguna only) on account of difference (mentioned in Sruti), we reply that (the objection) is not (correct) because every time (the difference is pointed out), it is not so (i.e. saguna). 12

It may again be contended that madhu-vidyā and others have described Brahman as having different forms. It is said to have four feet (Chā. 3, 18, 2); sixteen parts (Pra. 6, 1); attributes like 'Vāmanītva' and others (Chā. 4, 15, 2); the three worlds are its body (Br. 1, 3, 22); and Vaiśvānara is its name (Chā. 5, 11, 2). So notwithstanding its nirguna character, we must say that Brahman is qualified by differences or is saguna also, on account of its limiting adjuncts. Otherwise all these Sruti-passages which attribute various forms to Brahman will have no meaning.

The reasoning is wrong, we say. For every time the difference is told, Sruti is careful to tell us that difference of form does not affect the nature of nirguna Brahman. This is illustrated by the passage, 'This bright

1. The quality of yielding the fruits of good desires.
immortal person in this earth, and this bright immortal person in the body, is the very Atman (Br. 2, 5, 1). The difference of form is for the sake of devotion only.

अष्टशत्सौंभेवः | १३

[ Api ca—besides; evam—thus; eke—some. ]

Besides some (read their text) thus. 13

Besides those who follow the Kaṭhopaniṣad express their view that Brahman has got only the nirguṇa characteristic after first censoring the view which ascribes difference to Brahman, ‘This is to be achieved by mind alone; there is no difference here. He who will perceive any difference will move from death to death’ (Ka. 2; 1, 11; cp. Br. 4, 4, 19). We find the same thing in another Śruti-passage: ‘The enjoyers, the objects of enjoyment and the ruler, constitute this Brahman in three-fold ways’ (Śve. 1, 12).

But why is it, it may be asked, that Brahman is asserted as having no form when there are Śruti-passages which describe Brahman as having forms also? To this the next Sūtra comes as a reply.

अष्टपदेव सि तस्मात्वान्तवात् | १४

[ Arūpa—without form; vat—like; eva—indeed; hi—because; tat—that; pradhānātvāt—on account of being the primary. ]

(Brahman) is without form indeed; for this alone is the primary meaning (of Śruti). 14

Under Brahma-Sūtra 1, 1, 4, we have already proved that Brahman is not connected with Samsāra. It is this same truth, viz., that Brahman is devoid of all form, colour etc., that we learn from the following passages. ‘It is neither large nor small, neither short nor long’ (Br. 3, 8, 8); ‘That which is without sound, touch, colour and decay’ (Ka. 1, 3, 15); ‘Ākāśa is that which manifests names and forms; that within which these are is the Brahman’ (Chā. 8, 14, 1); ‘That immaculate, celestial, unborn person is both inside and outside’ (Mu. 2, 1, 2); ‘It is that Brahman which
is without cause and effect, which has no inside or outside, which is the self of all, and which is omniscient and omnipresent' (Br. 2, 5, 19). As for the other passages which describe Brahman as endowed with form, we should note that they do not aim at describing the nature of Brahman, but are only useful for the purpose of devotion to it. We may accept them for what they mean, so long as they do not contradict passages as are cited above, but when there occurs a contradiction, the passages which aim at pointing out the Brahman as nirguna, must be accepted as having greater force than those whose aim is to recommend the worship of Brahman under some form or another.

**Prakāśacāriya-vyānti | 15**

[Prakāśa—light; vat—like; ca—and; a-vaiyarthyaḥ—being not without meaning.]

And like light (Brahman assumes forms as if), because (Sruti) is not without meaning. 15

Sruti is not wrong when it speaks of the forms of Brahman for the sake of devotion. Brahman may be said to assume these forms as if they are due to its contact with the upādhis of earth and others, just as the light of the sun or the moon which pervades the space is said to become straight or curved when it comes in contact with straight or curved things. But this does not mean that the character, which appears to belong to Brahman on account of the upādhis, belongs to it on account of its real nature. Hence so long as avidyā exists, there exist the upādhis and the various forms as if ascribed to Brahman, as also the whole of the practical and Vedic life which allows room for the worship of saguṇa Brahman.

**आह च तन्मात्रम् | 16**

[Aha—has told; ca; tanmātram—consisting of that.]

And (Sruti) has declared (the Brahman) as consisting of that (i.e., intelligence). 16
Just as a lump of salt has inside or outside one saltish taste only and no other taste, even so Brahman is, inside or outside, nothing but a homogeneous, non-differentiated intelligence. It has no other character except intelligence (Br. 4, 5, 13).

And Śruti shows so; and it is stated in Smṛti. 17

The following Śruti-passages expressly deny that Brahman has got any other characteristic. 'Then comes the teaching by no, no' (Br. 2, 3, 6) which means that Brahman is neither with body nor without body; 'It is different from the known effect and different from unknown cause' (Ke. 1, 3); 'From whence both speech and mind turn away, being unable to reach it' (Tai. 2, 9). We learn the same truth from the story that when Bāṣkala asked Bāhva thrice about the nature of Brahman, Bāhva remained silent all the while, but said at last that Bāṣkala was not understanding it though he got the answer thrice from him through his silence only. Calm and composed is the Ātman; and it is this uncommunicable experience of Brahman which was the meaning of Bāhva's silence. The Bhagawadgītā proclaims the Brahman as the only 'object of knowledge knowing which one attains immortality; it has neither beginning nor end, neither existence nor non-existence' (13, 12). In the Mahābhārata too, God Nārāyaṇa warns Nārada not to believe that God is endowed with qualities, for they are nothing but his Māyā.

Hence only the comparisons of the reflection of the sun and the like (are given to describe the Brahman). 18
It is because the Ātman is pure intelligence, without any difference, transcending speech and mind, and is described negatively, that all the characteristics or the apparent differences in it are said to be due to upādhis. Just as the self-luminous sun or the moon appears as many because it is reflected in many waters, even so the unborn, intelligent Ātman appears as many after he enters into different bodies and upādhis.

The next Sūtra will consider an objection to this.

अम्बु-वत्तृत्तु न तथात्वम्। १९

[ Ambu-vat—like water; a-grahaṇat—not known; tu—but; na—not; tathātvaṁ—like that.]

But there being no knowledge (of the existence of some tangible substance) like water (Brahman) is not like that (i.e. the sun). 19

Brahman cannot be compared with the sun. The latter may have a number of images reflected in water, because water, as such, exists as a separate material substance in a different place. The Ātman, on the other hand, is not a material thing, and we cannot say that it resides in one place, and its adjuncts in some other place. On the contrary, the Ātman is everywhere and all its upādhis are identical with it.

The next Sūtra is a reply to this objection.

व्रद्धिहासमाक्त्वमेतत्स्मोंभवाद्भवयसामवस्यादेवम्। २०

[ Vṛddhi—increase; ṛhaśa—decrease; bhāktvam—participation; antar-bhāvāt—on account of being inside; ubhaya—both; saṁanjaśyāt—being adequate; evaṁ—thus.]

Being inside (of the upādhis, Brahman can be said) to participate in their increase and decrease; as the two are (mutually) agreeable (there is nothing inadequate). 20

We must remember that comparison between two things is never intended to show that they are identical with each other; it is used only to point out some common features of the two things. Besides, the
Sūtrakāra is not introducing a comparison of his own invention; he is merely expounding a comparison which he finds in Sruti. And the special point on which the comparison rests is the 'participation' on the part of Brahman in the increase and decrease of the upādhis. Just as the reflected image of the sun expands or contracts or trembles or divides itself as the water expands or contracts or trembles or divides itself, though the sun in the heaven remains the same and unaffected, even so the Brahman, in spite of its unchanging character, appears to participate in the changing attributes and conditions of the bodies and other upādhis, on account of its being within them. It grows or decreases, as it were, along with them. So there is nothing wrong in this view.

[Darśanāt—on account of declaration of Śruti; ca—and.]

And because Śruti declares (in the same manner, the comparison is correct). 21

Besides, we read in the Śruti that Brahman first created beings with two feet, and beings with four feet and entered into them in the form of the bird i.e. the jīva' (Br. 2, 5, 18; Chā. 6, 3, 2). Therefore the comparison mentioned in Sūtra 18 is without any objection. And hence, the conclusion we reach is that Brahman is nirguṇa only; it is neither saguṇa, nor nirguṇa and saguṇa both.

Now, according to some people Sūtras 11 to 21 form two adhikaraṇas' and not one. The first is from

1. The Sūtras in the first adhikaraṇa (from 11 to 14) will stand as they are. Sūtra 15 of the second adhikaraṇa will, however, then, represent the viewpoint of the pūrvapakṣa. It will then mean that Brahman has not only existence, but intelligence also. Sūtra 16 will then be the reply of the siddhāntin. It will read as meaning that Brahman has existence only; and the attribute of intelligence, according to Śruti, is not incompatible with existence; neither is it different from existence. Sūtras 17 to 21 will remain as they are.
Sūtras 11 to 14, and the second from Sūtras 15 to 21. The first deals with the discussion whether Brahman is without any form or is endowed with diverse forms. And after deciding that Brahman is devoid of any form, the second adhikarana deals with the question whether Brahman is mere existence or is mere intelligence or has both existence and intelligence.

Against this we maintain that there is no necessity to have the second adhikarana at all. (1) If the motive be to refute the view that Brahman has both the aspects of saguna and nirguna, we say that it has already been achieved by the first adhikarana or by the Sūtras 11 to 14. (2) Neither can it be said that the motive is to prove that Brahman has existence only, and not the character of intelligence. For in that case the teaching of the Sruti that Brahman is full of intelligence (Br. 2, 4, 12) will have no meaning. How can the supposed non-intelligent Brahman be the internal Ātman of the intelligent individual soul? (3) Nor, can it be said that the motive is to prove that Brahman is intelligent only, and that it has no existence. For this will contradict the Sruti which tells us that the ‘Ātman is to be understood by the character of mere isness’ (Ka. 2, 3, 13). If Brahman has no existence, can any meaning be attached to the proposition ‘Brahman is intelligent’? (4) If again the motive be to prove that Brahman has both the characters of existence and intelligence which are exclusive of each other, then it would mean that we are now contradicting what we have already proved in the first adhikarana (Sūtras 11 to 14), viz., that Brahman has no difference in it. Nothing can possess two contradictory attributes. (5) And finally, if existence and thought are taken to mean one and the same thing, and not as two things, exclusive of each other, then the question, whether Brahman possesses one or the other, or both, does not arise at all, and hence there would be no necessity of a separate adhikarana. For all these reasons, it will be appropriate, as we have done, to show that all the Sūtras from 11 to 21 form one adhikarana only, and to explain further,
as we have done, that while Sūtras 11 to 14 represent the Brahman as devoid of form, Sūtras 15 to 21 are useful in telling us the same thing by pointing out that the Śruti-passages which speak of Brahman as endowed with forms on account of its connection with upādhis, are not, as a matter of fact, contradicting the Śruti-passages which speak of Brahman as devoid of form.

Now, it may be argued that the only purpose of the Śruti-passages which proclaim that Brahman is endowed with forms is to teach us indirectly that Brahman is in reality devoid of forms. But this too is not correct in our opinion. No doubt this may be true in some cases. For instance, in a section of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka which deals with the knowledge of Brahman, the indriyas are mentioned as the several horses that are being yoked for the purpose of providing knowledge for the self. Taking into consideration all the animals, the senses can be said to be not only ten in number, but hundreds or thousands or endless. The passage reads: 'The Atman alone is all these ten, thousand, many and endless'; but the passage is immediately followed by words, 'This is the Brahman without anything inside or outside' (2, 5, 19). Obviously, in a passage like this, the differences are mentioned only for the purpose of cancelling them. But in the passages where the subject-matter is devout meditation, it will be wrong to say that the diverse forms are mentioned only for being rejected afterwards. On the contrary, they are directly useful for meditation. For instance, after we are told that a man must first 'resolve to meditate' (Chā. 3, 14, 1), Śruti declares immediately afterwards that 'He consists of mind; prāṇa is his body, and light his form' (Chā. 3, 14, 2; Mai. 2, 6). This means that the determinations of Brahman as mind, prāṇa and light are to be utilized for the purpose of meditation. Besides, if all the Śruti-passages, without exception, were to aim at showing that Brahman is without any form, then there being no occasion even to doubt that there may be certain passages which ascribe forms or differences to Brahman, there would be no necessity to
prove, as we have done in Sūtra 14, that the real nature of Brahman is devoid of form. But we do find that passages recommending meditation on one or other form of Brahman, also speak about the result of such meditation. It is either the removal of sins, or the acquisition of power or glory, or liberation by successive stages. From all this, it is appropriate to hold that passages concerning meditation and passages concerning the nature of Brahman form two different groups altogether.

But what, after all, must be the reason of our opponent to hold that these two classes of passages must have one import only? If it be said that the desire to know the reality is the injunction which they have in common, and which determines their common purpose, just as the sacrifice known as dārṣapūrṇamāśa and the prayāja oblations are said to form one whole on account of common injunction. But as we have proved under 1, 1, 4, passages regarding the nature of Brahman are statements about substance, and not injunctions regarding the performance of some acts. This also may be replied by our opponent by saying that destruction of duality constitutes the object of injunction. For unless this is done, no one will understand the true nature of Brahman. Just as the performance of certain sacrifices is prescribed to a person who desires to go to heaven, even so the destruction of this apparent world of names and forms is prescribed to him who wishes to have mokṣa. To put it in other words, just as whoever wishes to know the nature of an object kept in darkness must first remove the darkness, even so whoever wishes to know the true nature of Brahman must dissolve the appearance of plurality. The phenomenal world may have its basis in Brahman, but Brahman is independent of the phenomenal world. That is why the destruction of this phenomenal world of duality will enable one to have the cognition of Brahman.

To this we reply. Let us know first of all the nature of the destruction of the world of duality itself. Is it similar to the destruction of solid ghee into liquid
form of it due to fire? Or is it the removal of the world of names and forms superimposed on Brahman through avidyā by means of knowledge? Are we up to destroy an actual existing world or a fictitious one? If the former, we are asked to do the impossible; for no one can destroy this actually existing world consisting of the five elements and beings. And if it could be done, the first person who got his release would have done it once for all, and there would have been left nothing of it for us to destroy. If it is the world of phenomena of names and forms which is to be destroyed, then the only way to destroy it is the knowledge of Brahman which is conveyed to us by such passages as, 'Brahman is one, without a second'; 'It is truth; it is the Atman; thou art that' (Chā. 6, 2, 1; 6, 8, 7). The moment Brahman is taught in this manner, the knowledge that arises itself is able to remove the avidyā and along with it the entire phenomenal world of names and forms, just as a medicine should remove the disease of the eyes which causes the appearance of two moons. But so long as the knowledge of Brahman does not arise as the result of its being taught, you will be unable to destroy the world or to know the Brahman, even if you say a hundred times 'Know the Brahman, destroy the world'.

The objector may still ask if there would be any room for injunction, after the imparting of the knowledge of Brahman though not before it, so that there should be a complete knowledge of the nature of Brahman or the destruction of the world. No, there is no necessity of any injunction at all, we reply. For the moment the jīva realizes the knowledge of Brahman, destruction of the world comes to be accomplished. The manifestation or the seeing of the rope means to have at once the knowledge of the rope and the dissolution of the appearance of the serpent on it. There is no necessity of an injunction for doing something so far as the knowledge of Brahman is concerned, not only because there is no object other than Brahman with reference to which action is to be directed, but also because there is no doer of the
action other than Brahman. The individual soul who appears to belong to the phenomenal world does not remain as a separate entity when there occurs the realization of the Brahman, so that some kind of injunction regarding the dissolution of the world or the knowledge of Brahman should be directed unto him. If the soul is a part of the phenomenal world, it is dissolved along with it during the realization of the Brahman; if it is Brahman which is incapable of being the subject of injunctions, it realizes itself. In no case, therefore there is the possibility of any injunction with reference to the realization of Brahman.

Now, expressions such as 'The Ātman should be seen, heard or thought about' may lead one to think that some actions are enjoined to be done with reference to the Ātman. But this is wrong. For they do not show that these actions are necessary in the formation of Ātma-jñāna, they only direct our attention to it. We see this illustrated even in our ordinary life, when we use such phrases as 'Look here', 'Listen to this', we only wish thereby to direct the attention of some one to some object; we do not ask him to create knowledge of the object, or do something which will amount to or result in the cognition of it. That is why a person may not know an object even when he is face to face with it. All that a person who wishes to impart the knowledge of some thing, is required to do, is to show that thing itself to another. The knowledge about the thing will then arise of itself in that person, in proportion to the importance and nature of the object and to the means of knowing it. Besides, the knowledge of a thing is not altered by the introduction of an injunction in connection with it. To suppose one thing as another will either

1. This is especially true in the case of Ātma-jñāna. Some sort of activity, such as employment of the senses or reasoning may be necessary in having a full knowledge of the sensuous object. But no such thing is required for the Ātma-jñāna; for the Ātman alone can know itself, and there is no difference between the knower and the known, and no need of any prāmāṇyas.
be a deliberately induced mental state or an illusion. 1
As the knowledge of a thing depends on the thing itself and on the pramāṇas relevant to it, it is impossible that hundreds of injunctions will ever produce it or that hundreds of prohibitions will prevent it from being manifested. The knowledge depends upon the nature of the object and not upon the liking of a man. Hence there is no room for injunctions regarding Brahmanic knowledge.

If again the sole end of the Veda is to recommend the doing or the non-doing of actions, then it would mean that Brahmaśāstra has got two opposite meanings. On the one hand, it will recognize the individual soul as being the subject of receiving injunctions and prohibitions, and on the other, it will accept the contradictory position that Brahman which is incapable of being subject to any injunction, is the internal self of the individual soul. How can the soul which is subject to injunction will at the same time be the same as Brahman which is not subject to injunctions? Moreover, the theory will involve many other inevitable defects. It will compel us to reject what is directly told, and accept what is not. We may cease to believe in the identity of the jīva and the Brahman which is taught definitely and directly, and believe without any reason that final release is the fruit of the accumulation of the unseen merits, just as the attainment of heaven is of the performance of sacrifice, and that therefore the final release is only short-lived in character. Hence, we hold that the Sruti-passages concerning Brahman aim at the knowledge of it and not at injunctions, and that passages in which there are injunctions and prohibitions form a different portion of the Veda.

1. If some one were to give suggestions to his mind that the shell he sees is silver and come to form a belief accordingly, he will have nothing but a mental state. But without such inducement if he sees the shell as silver, it will be a case of illusion. In no case, the shell will be turned into silver.
And finally, even if we take for granted that passages concerning Brahman aim at injunctions, it does not follow that passages giving the description of nirguṇa Brahman and passages giving the description of Saguna Brahman have one and the same kind of injunction. For the use of different words in the two passages indicates that the injunctions too are different. E.g., the ‘seeing of the Ātman’ in the context of the description of the nirguṇa Brahman has mokṣa as its fruit; while ‘the resolution to meditate’ in the context of the description of saguna Brahman has mundane prosperity as its fruit. There is no doubt the same injunction with reference to prayāja and darśapūrṇamāsa; but this is because the prayāja offerings are a part of the other, and because the performer of the two is also one. But statements regarding the nirguṇa and saguna Brahman have no such common element. That is why it is not possible for one and the same person to meditate on the Saguna Brahman in some form (‘light’, for instance,) and at the same time to realize the nirguṇa Brahman and thereby to dissolve the entire world. Hence we conclude that there are two kinds of passages, one giving us the description of Brahman which is bereft of form, and the other of Brahman which is endowed with form.

6 प्रकृतितःवक्तव्याधिकरणम् | ( २२–३० )
प्रकृतितःवक्तव्य हि प्रतिकृतिततो ब्रह्मिति च भूयः | २२

[ Prakṛti—existing in a particular context; etavattvam—being of this nature; hi—for; pratiṣedhati—denies; tataḥ—after that; braviti—speaks; ca—and; bhūyah—again. ]

(The Sruti-words ‘Not so, not so’) deny (of Brahman) its being of the nature under discussion; for (Sruti) again declared thus afterwards. 22

In the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (2, 3, 1), we are told that Brahman has got two forms, visible and invisible. Earth, water, and fire go to make the visible form, whether with reference to the human body or with reference to the cosmos; wind and ākāśa on the other hand, constitute
the invisible form in them. We are further told that the essence of the invisible form of Brahman appears as the immaculate Puruṣa on the Sun, which, in its turn, is called the essence of the three elements or the essence of the visible form. Corresponding with this cosmic immaculate Puruṣa, the Upaniṣad speaks about the immaculate Puruṣa in the pupil of the human eye, or of the essence of the invisible form of Brahman appearing in the essence of the visible form. The Puruṣa, or the Hiraṇyagarbha as he is known, is then described as variegated in colour on account of the desires in man, and as being the truth. Brahman being beyond these forms, the Upaniṣad tells us further that it cannot be described, and hence uses the words 'not so, not so'.

Now here arises the question as to what it must be which is negated. The word 'so' in 'not so' suggests to us that what is proximate to it in the context, viz., either the two forms of Brahman alone, or Brahman alone, or both of them, must have been negativied. The pūrvapakṣin thinks that as the negative particle 'not' has been used twice, it first negatives the two forms of the Brahman, and then the Brahman itself which possesses these forms. Or, Brahman being beyond mind and speech, so he thinks, is alone capable of being doubted and negativied; while the two cosmic forms being the objects of perception etc., are incapable of being negativied. The repetition of 'not' in this case is for the sake of bringing conviction to the mind.

To this we reply. In the first place, the denial of something unreal is possible only with reference to something real. It is with reference to a real rope that the unreal snake on it is denied. This means that after eliminating that which is unreal there remains something which is real. But if we deny both Brahman and its two forms, there will be a total void; and in the absence of any entity left as real the very possibility of denying even an unreal thing will not be there. This will then mean that even an unreal thing may be accepted as real. In the second place, there cannot be any negation of
Brahman because it will go against what is intended to be told in the beginning of the chapter, 'Shall I tell you about Brahman?' (Br. 2, 1, 1); it will go against the censure which is made of those who think of 'Brahman as non-existent, as becoming themselves non-existing' (Tai. 2, 6); and it will go against the entire Vedānta which speaks of the Ātman and of the possibility of its knowledge from the fact of its existence (Ka. 2, 3, 13). That Brahman transcends speech and mind does not mean that it has no existence. When after very great toil, the Vedānta comes to the conclusion that 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite'; and that 'The knower of Brahman becomes the Brahman' (Tai. 2, 1), it sounds strange that it should all of a sudden expound the non-existence of Brahman. To believe this is to believe in the wisdom of spraying the dirt on one's own body and then to wash it away. It is better, on the contrary, to avoid the dirt than to take a bath afterwards. The passage, 'From whence all speech and mind turn away being unable to reach it' (Tai. 2, 4) must therefore be construed as implying the existence of Brahman. This means that Brahman exists but transcends the distinctions of speech and mind, and that it is eternal, pure, intelligent, free, and the internal self of all. Hence the passage under discussion also (Br. 2, 3, 1) must be interpreted as admitting the existence of Brahman, but as denying the existence of the two forms of Brahman.

It is exactly this which we have seen at the outset of our discussion of this Sūtra. The word 'so' (iti) in 'not so, not so' refers to the two forms which are proximate to it and not to Brahman which is remote from it, inasmuch as it is mentioned in the genitive case prior to the two forms. The proposition 'These are the two forms of Brahman' indicates that the main

1. Though the nature of Brahman is the most important topic of all, here in this context, it occupies not the main but a subordinate position. And this is clear from the adjectival sense of the word Brahmapāh i.e. 'of Brahman', as also from the substantive sense of the two forms.
topic of the discussion is the forms of Brahman and not the Brahman itself. But once the two forms are mentioned, and there arises the desire to know the nature of Brahman thus endowed with the two forms, Sruti feels the necessity of making the distinction between the reality of Brahman on the one hand, and the unreality of the two forms on the other, by saying that the forms are negatived by the phrase 'not so, not so'. We have already seen while discussing Sūtra 14 of adhyāya second, pāda first, that the effects as such have no real existence apart from their cause; and so by negativing them we can never negative the Brahman, because it is required as the substratum even for all the false superimpositions upon it.

Now, if we admit that the fact of not touching the dirt is better than washing it away, some one may ask as to why it is that Sruti mentions first the two forms of Brahman and then intend to negative them. We reply that they are negatived because they are false, and that it is through this negation that the reality of Brahman is established.

As regards the reason for using the negation twice, we may say that it is because both the visible and the invisible forms are to be negatived. Or, we may say that while the first negation is with reference to the five elements, the other is with reference to the desires in man. Or again, better still, the repetition of the negation is useful to exclude each and every thing that may be thought of to exist apart from Brahman as fictitious, and to convey thereby the knowledge that Brahman is the inner self of all. This would not have been achieved by a limited number of denials with reference to a limited number of objects; for this leaves the possibility of there being some object other than Brahman, which may not be so negatived. In order therefore to exclude even this possibility of an exception the repetition of negation is useful. It negatives
everything else except the Brahman; for the Brahman alone remains as it is with every negation.

That this is the only conclusion can be seen by what follows in the Sūti-passage after the negation is made, viz., the reference to Brahman which is 'beyond' (Br. 2, 3, 6). If the negation itself is to land us in complete void, what is meant by this reference to something beyond? It means that after pointing out the existence of Brahman by negation, the Sūti explains the meaning of the negation as, 'There is nothing else which is beyond Brahman'. In other words, the Sūti points out that Brahman which is beyond negation ever remains non-negatived. Or, to have another interpretation, the negation of the phenomenal world of plurality may be said to constitute the highest possible teaching of Brahman. In view of this, the words in the present Sūtra, 'And then Sūti again says so', have reference to the name which has been subsequently given by Sūti to Brahman, viz., 'the Truth of truths', e.g. in 'the prāṇas are true, but He is the truth of them' (Br. 2, 3, 6). This interpretation too is possible, if the previous negation refers to everything else but Brahman; so that there will not be absolute non-existence. We therefore conclude that the negation 'Not so, not so', after it has negatived everything else but Brahman, ends in establishing the Brahman itself and not in void.

तद्व्यक्तमाह हि । २३

[Tad—that; avyaktam—unmanifest; āha—has said; hi—for.] That (Brahman) is unmanifest; for (so does Sūti) declare. 23

If apart from the world of forms which is negatived, there exists the transcendental Brahman, why then, one may ask, is it not known? The reply is that it exists as a permanent, unmanifest witness or subject in all that is apprehended. The following Sūti-passages say: 'It is neither apprehended by the eye, nor by the senses,
nor by speech, nor by penance and good works' (Mu: 3, 1, 8; 1, 1, 6); ‘Unknowable is this Atman, who is described negatively as ‘Not this, not this’' (Br. 3, 9, 26); ‘Then the soul returns to the fearless condition of Brahman which is unmanifest, incorporeal, indescribable, and supportless' (Tai. 2, 7); ‘He is called unmanifest, unknowable by thought, and one without any change' (B. G. 2, 25).

अपि च संराघने प्रत्यक्षातुमानाभ्याम् ॥ २४॥

[ Api—also; ca—and; saṁmrādhane—intense meditation; pratyakṣa-anumānāḥhyāṁ—on account of Sruti and Smṛti, or perception, and inference.]

And also because Sruti and Smṛti (declare that the yogins see the Brahman) in deep meditation. 24

We are however told that the yogins get a vision of this transcendental, unmanifest Atman during deep meditation which is achieved by various modes of worship. As the Sruti says, ‘The senses were so fashioned by the self-caused God that they opened outside; it is on this account, man looks outside and not within. It is, however, given to some rare person who, wishing to be immortal, sees the Atman face to face even after closing his eyes' (Ka. 2, 1, 1); ‘Being graced by the knowledge itself, and being purified to the core, the meditator sees the partless Atman' (Mu. 3, 1, 8). Smṛti too adds, ‘Bow to Him, the yoga incarnate, who is seen as light by those who have controlled their breath, subdued their senses, conquered their sleep, and are contented in mind; He is the eternal God in their meditation.'

If now the process of meditation is said to involve the distinction between the meditator and the object meditated upon, the Sūtrakāra makes the following reply.

प्रकाशादित्वचैवकृत्येष्य प्रकाशाः कर्मण्यभयासात् ॥ २५॥

[Prakāśa-ādi-vat—like light and others; ca—and; a-vai-śeṣyam—absence of specific distinction; prakāśah—Atman (as light); ca—and; karmanī—in action; abhyāsāt—repeated mention.]
And as light and other things (appear to have distinctions), the Light too (i.e., the Atman appears to have distinctions) on account of actions, (but is) non-distinct. (This is so) on account of repeated mention. 25

Just as light, ākāśa, and the sun appear to be many on account of the different upādhis of fingers, vessels, and portions of water respectively, but just as every one of them is really undifferentiated, even so the jīva, the prājñā, and the different souls are, as is repeatedly told in the Vedānta, different in appearance only on account of the distinctions in upādhis. In reality they are the one Atman alone.

अलोकनन्तनेन तथा हि लिङ्गम् । २६

[ Atāh—hence; anantena—with the infinite; tathā—like this; hi—for; lingam—sign. ]

Hence (the finite soul becomes one) with the Infinite; for a similar indication (is shown by Śruti). 26

It is because the non-difference is real, and the difference apparent and due to upādhis, the soul removes the avidyā by vidyā and attains unity with the infinite Prājñā. We get this indication of the original unity in the Śruti which says, ‘He who knows the highest Brahman becomes the Brahman’ (Mu. 3, 2, 9); ‘Already being Brahman he merges in Brahman’ (Br. 4, 4, 6; Tai. 2, 1).

उभयन्यपदेशात्वहि कुंडलवत् । २७

[ Ubbaya—both; vyapadesāt—owing to indication; tu—but; ahi—serpent; Kundala—coil; vat—like. ]

But as there is the double indication, (the relation of the Brahman with the individual soul should be thought of) like that of a serpent with its coil. 27

The Śūtrakāra now refers to another view and points out its inadequacy only with the intention of

1. This shows that Śaṅkara is a believer in Jīvanmukti and not Videhamukti.
strengthening his own view. There are Sruti-passages which mention the jīva and the Brahman as two distinct entities, and the relation between them as that of the meditator or the seer to the object of meditation or sight, or as that of a person bound for a destination to the destination itself, or again as that of the ruled and the ruler. For example, ‘Then he meditates and sees the partless Ātman’ (Mu. 3, 1, 8); ‘Then he approaches the transcendental divine Puruṣa’ (Mu. 3, 2, 8); ‘One who resides within as the Ātman and controls all’ (Br. 3, 7, 15). As against these, other Sruti-passages mention that the jīva and the Brahman are identical. For example, ‘Thou art that’ (Chā. 6, 8, 7); ‘I am the Brahman’ (Br. 1, 4, 10); ‘The soul in you is the very Ātman who resides within all’ (Br. 3, 4, 1); ‘The Ātman in you is the immortal Ātman within all and controlling all’ (Br. 3, 7, 3). As there is equal authority to believe in the difference as well as in the non-difference of the jīva and the Brahman, how can non-difference be accepted arbitrarily and the difference rejected? We may therefore look upon the relation as similar to the relation of the snake with its coils. The snake which is one and undivided may be viewed as presenting differences with reference to its coils, hood, and posture.

Prakāśa—light; āśraya—substratum; vat—like; vā—or; tejastvāt—on account of light.

Or like light and its substratum, on account of (both) being of the nature of fire. 28

Or just as the light and the sun which is the substratum of light are both of the nature of fire, and yet are spoken of as two separate entities, similarly the jīva and the Brahman are one and yet spoken of as different from each other: 2

1. The jīva, on this view, will appear as a mode of Brahman.
2. The jīva, on this view, will appear as a part in a whole.
Or, in the manner mentioned above. 29

As explained under Sūtra 25, it will be appropriate however to conclude that the soul is not different from Brahman. For whichever of the two views we may have about the soul, whether it is a mode of Brahman or a part of Brahman, we shall not at all be able to do away with the bondage of jīva, unless we hold that the bondage is caused by avidyā. Another point we must note is that Sruti does not expound the two views with equal weight. What it aims at proving is non-difference only. Difference is already known even in the condition of avidyā; but Sruti refers to it only with the view of proving something else, viz., the non-difference of the jīva and the Brahman as established in Sūtra 25. Had the bondage of the jīva, and the difference between the jīva and the Brahman been real, the Vedānta doctrine of final release would cease to have any meaning.

And on account of sublation (of everything else, the same conclusion follows). 30

The Sruti-passage, 'There is no other seer but he' (Br. 3, 7, 23) prevents us from believing in any other intelligent being except the Brahman. Similarly, the passages, 'Not so, not so' (Br. 2, 3, 6), 'Brahman is without cause or effect, without anything inside or outside' (Br. 2, 5, 19), deny the existence of the non-intelligent world apart from Brahman. So once again the conclusion is what remains is Brahman only.

1. As a matter of fact, the soul is not really bound, but it appears to be so on account of the upādhis of avidyā, or, on account of its being treated as separate and distinct from Brahman.
Beyond this (Brahman there must be something), on account of the indication of (its having) the bank, measure, connection, and difference. 31

We have so far ascertained that Brahman is free from plurality. And yet in view of certain passages in Sruti, there may arise the doubt whether there is something beyond Brahman or not. Let us therefore now find out the true meaning of these passages.

According to the pûrvapaksin there must be something beyond Brahman; for, in the first place, the Ātman is spoken of as 'The bank or bridge which supports the entire world' (Chā. 8, 4, 1). The word 'setu' or 'bank', which means in ordinary language a structure of wood and earth erected to prevent the flow of water, indicates the existence of certain things other than the water on the far side of it. Or, even when it is used in the sense of bridge, it implies that there is some place like a forest or other thing beyond the bridge. So, there must be something beyond the Ātman. In the second place, Brahman is spoken of as having 'four feet, eight hoofs and sixteen parts' (Chā. 4, 5). Now all things which like a coin of gold, for instance, have size are limited and finite, and are therefore indicative of some other things beyond them. Similarly, Brahman which is spoken of as having a size must also indicate the existence of

1. The four directions form the foot (quarter) of light; the earth, the sky, the intervening space, and the ocean form the endless foot; the fire, the sun, the moon, and the lightning form the illuminatory foot; and the eye, the ear, the speech, and the mind form the foot of lodgement. These sixteen parts go to form eight hoofs; the east and the south, for instance, form one hoof; and so on.
something else beyond it. Thirdly, if the jīva has the contact with the Brahman during sleep (Chā. 6, 8, 1), or which is the same thing, if Brahman is said to ‘embrace’ the jīva (Br. 4, 3, 21), then Brahman also must be limited like the jīva. And because the limited and the unlimited are correlative of each other, Brahman which is limited points to something unlimited beyond it. And finally, the same conclusion can be drawn from the difference between the golden Īśvara in the sun and the Īśvara in the eye (Chā. 1, 6, 6 to 1, 7, 5), though the two persons are reported to possess the same form and name. One governs and supports the regions of gods above the sun, and the other over the regions of men below, just as the kings of Magadha and Videha should rule separately. All this goes to show that there exist something beyond Brahman.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies.

सामान्यासु | ६२

[Sāmānyāt—on account of resemblance; tu—but.]

But (Brahman is called a bank or bridge) because of (general) resemblance. 32

We do not however find any proof to say that there exists something beyond Brahman. On the contrary, we have already shown (Bra. Sū. 1, 1, 2) that all existing things in the world have their origin, subsistence, and dissolution in Brahman. And inasmuch as the effect is identical with the cause, there cannot be any other thing beyond Brahman. Nor is it possible to believe that there may be something different from Brahman and yet have no origin; for Sruti affirms that ‘Being alone was in the beginning, one, without a second’ (Chā. 6, 2, 1). And further, if there be something other than Brahman, the knowledge of Brahman may not lead to the knowledge of that other thing; but this will contradict the assertion of the Sruti that to know Brahman is to know everything else in the world.
Again, when Sruti says that Brahman is the bank, it does not mean that it tells us that there exists something beyond Brahman. To argue from the use of a word to the existence of something unknown is merely arbitrary. And if this is allowed, are we to suppose that the Ātman is made of earth and stone, because it is called a bank? But the Ātman is not something produced. So the only reasonable explanation as to why the Ātman is called a bank is that it is, like a bank, the support of the world and its boundaries. As for the action of crossing or going beyond, we have to understand thereby the attainment of Brahmanic condition, just as a student who goes through the field of grammar may be said simply to know the subject fully.

बुद्धचर्यः पादवत्। ३३

[Buddhi—mind; arthah—for the sake of; pādavat—like feet.]

( The reference to Brahman’s size ) is useful to mind; ( this is ) after the manner of the feet. 33

But the attribution of parts to Brahman is made with reference to its effects or modifications so that men of mediocre intelligence, who are unable to fix their mind on nirguna Brahman, may be able to do so on some aspect of saguna Brahman for the purpose of devotion. It is to achieve this purpose that the Chandogypapaniṣad recommends contemplation on mind or on ākāśa as the ādhyātmika and the ādhidaiivika representations of Brahman; or to make it easier still, on one or more of the four parts of mind or of ākāśa. The speech, the breath, the eye, and the ear are the four parts or the feet of the mind; while the fire, the wind, the sun, and the quarters are the four parts of the ākāśa (3, 18). Or, one may think that the word ‘pāda’ or foot in the Sūtra stands for a fractional value of a coin, a Kārṣāpana or a rupee, for instance. And just as coins having fractional value of a rupee are often used for the purposes of transaction instead of the rupee itself, similarly for the purpose of meditation, the
less intelligent people use the various aspects or forms of saguna Brahman, and not the nirguna Brahman itself.

क्षणिकायोऽपृथकतःसाधारितयः ३४

[Sthāna—place; viśeṣāt—on account of specific difference; prakāśādī—light and others; vat—like.]

(Reference regarding connection and difference) is due to difference in place; (this is) in the manner of light and other things. 34

The Sūtrakāra wants now to prove that it is not correct to say that reference to connection and difference indicates the existence of something different from Brahman. As a matter of fact, even with reference to one thing we can establish these two relations of connection and difference, on account of its appearing to occupy different places. For instance, the connection can be established thus: The highest Ātman, though one, appears to be many on account of the various upādhis of buddhi etc.; but the knowledge that I am so and so, which arises falsely on account of these upādhis, is destroyed when the upādhis themselves are destroyed. And then it can be said metaphorically of the individual soul that it is connected or united with one Brahman. As a matter of fact the individual soul being already one with Brahman, and the Brahman being not limited in character, there cannot be any such connection at all. In the same way, statements regarding difference are there on account of the upādhis and not because Brahman has different forms. We see this illustrated in the case of light or ākāśa. The light or the ākāśa is one and the same; but we find that there are different portions or forms of them on account of the upādhis of jars and other things. And yet when these upādhis themselves are destroyed, we feel that the different portions of light or ākāśa are as if united together with one light or with one ākāśa.1

1. Be it noted that the connection here means the union which was already there, and not the conjunction of two or more things. The difference therefore is necessarily due to upādhis only.
And because (only such relations) are possible (they have metaphorical significance). 35

The union which the soul has in deep sleep with the highest Ātman (Chā. 6, 8, 1) indicates only the essential, imperishable, real nature of the soul itself; and not the conjunction of two separate things, as occurs between the inhabitants of a town and the town itself. For the soul appears to be different from the Ātman on account of the upādhis of avidyā. Just as the ākāśa within the heart is the same as that which is outside (Chā. 3, 12, 7-9), the Ātman is one everywhere, though there appear many souls on account of upādhis.

Besides on account of the denial of other (things, Brahman is without a second). 36

The following Śrutī-passages, moreover emphatically assert that there exists nothing apart from Brahman: 'He is below and above, behind and before etc.'; 'I am below and above'; and the 'Ātman is below and above etc.' (Chā. 7, 25, 2); 'One who knows anything else but Ātman is abandoned by that' (Bṛ. 2, 4, 6); 'All this is Brahman alone' (Mu. 2, 2, 12); 'All this is the Ātman alone' (Chā. 7, 25, 2); 'In it there is no diversity' (Bṛ. 4, 4, 19); 'Besides Him there is nothing superior or inferior' (Sve. 3, 9); 'This is the Brahman which is without cause or without effect, without anything inside or outside' (Bṛ. 2, 5, 19). Nor is there anything within Brahman, inasmuch as 'Brahman is within everything' (Bṛ. 2, 5, 19).
Thus (is established) the omnipresence (of Brahman); from words showing extent and others (the same is known).

Our arguments so far are also useful to establish the omnipresence of Brahman. For if the reference to Brahman as a bank were to be understood literally, then like the bank or bridge Brahman also would be limited in extent. Similarly, if the plurality is accepted as real, the Ātman, like any other thing would be exclusive of them and limited in character. The Ātman, however, is said to be the ākāśa within the heart, and is declared by Sruti and Smṛti to be ‘as large as the ākāśa outside’ (Chā. 8, 1, 3); ‘He is omnipresent and eternal like the ākāśa; he is greater than the heaven’ (Chā. 3, 14, 3); ‘He is greater than the ākāśa’ (Sat. Brā. 10, 6, 3, 2,); ‘He is eternal, omnipresent, steady, and immovable’ (B. G. 2, 24). This is in keeping with reasoning also; for Brahman which supports the world must be all-pervading.

The fruit (of actions is derived) from Him (i.e. God); for this (only) is possible.

The Sūtrakāra now begins the description of another aspect of Brahman which is connected with this world of every-day life under the form of the relation of the ruler and the ruled between God, on the one hand, and the jīva, on the other. There arises now the question whether the results of the actions which men experience as pleasure and pain are derived from the actions themselves or from God. The Sūtrakāra holds that the fruits
are due to God alone. For God is the governor of all, and the author of the origin, the subsistence, and the dissolution of the world; He has got complete knowledge about time and place; and so he alone is capable of providing proper fruits to all men in accordance with their merits and demerits. Actions, on the other hand, pass away after they are done, and so cannot be said to produce the fruits at some future time. Nor can they be conceived as passing away after they have produced the fruits. For then we have to hold that either the fruits come out of nothing or have to wait till they get the specific agents to enjoy them. As a matter of fact, the pleasant or the painful result of an action is known as fruit only when it comes to be connected with some agent. To meet this difficulty, if it be said that it is the merit and demerit which first arise from actions that are responsible for producing the fruits afterwards, we say in reply that this so-called principle of apūrva or unseen merit is non-intelligent like a piece of wood or earth, and as such has no capacity to act unless it is moved by an intelligent being. Besides, there is no proof for the existence of apūrva. One may say that this has to be assumed; for otherwise there will be no principle to account for the equitable distribution of fruits. But to the Vedāntin there is no need of such an assumption; for he believes in the existence of God who alone is responsible for the distribution of fruits.

śrutattvāt—because śruti declares; ca—and.
And because śruti also declares (so). 39
Sruti also declares that it is ‘This great, unborn Ātman who is the giver of food and of wealth’ (Br. 4, 4, 24), which are no doubt the fruits of actions.

धर्मम् जैमिनिक एव । ४०
[ Dharma; Jáminih; atah—hence; eva—only. ]
For the same reason, Jaimini (thinks that) Dharma (is the giver of fruits). 40
On the same grounds of what is reasonably possible and what is told in Śruti, Jaimini holds that actions or Dharma is the giver of fruits. The Śruti injunction, for instance, that one who desires to attain heaven should perform a sacrifice, itself implies that the action of performing a sacrifice brings about the attainment of heaven. And if this be not a sound view, no one would perform a sacrifice and attach any importance to Śruti. Now instead of saying that an action passes away as soon as it is done, and that therefore there cannot be any sort of relation which can be established between the action and the future fruit of it, we must so construe the relation between the two as will be conformable to Śruti. And this is possible by holding the view that actions do not die unless they first produce the āpūrva or the unseen merit on account of which the fruits come into being at some future time. It is just the same thing, if we call this āpūrva as an imperceptible, subtle continuation of the deed itself till the fruit is obtained, or as the subtle prior condition of the fruit. The theory of āpūrva, then, not only explains the relation of actions to their fruits, but is also conformable to Śruti. As opposed to this, the theory that God is the giver of fruits suffers from the following defects. In the first place, a variety of effects cannot be produced out of a homogeneous cause. Secondly, as explained in Brahma Sū. 2, 1, 34, God will be subject to emotions like love and hate, and show his partiality or cruelty to men while distributing the fruits. And thirdly, if the action does not bring about its own fruit, no one may perform it at all. From all this it follows that actions alone, whether good or bad, cause their results.

 пу́рвам ту́ дда́ра́я́на́ह हेतुव्यपादेशात् | ४१ |

[Pūrvam—what comes before; tu—but; Bādarāyānah; hetu—cause; vyapadesāt—on account of being shown.]

Bādarāyaṇa, however, (holds) the former (view, viz., God as the cause of the fruits of actions); for he (i.e. God) is shown as the cause (of the actions themselves). 41
Bādarāyaṇa however holds that God is the giver of fruits, though according to Jaimini they are connected with apūrva or with actions. For, in Sruti, God is said to be the giver of fruits, and the cause of dharma and adharma. It is ‘He who makes a man do good deeds if the man is to be lifted up from this world, or a bad deed, if he is to be led down’ (Kau. 3, 8). It is God ‘who makes steady the faith of a man who worships him in some form’; for it is through this faith that the devotee obtains all his objects of desire from that deity, as they are sanctioned by God’ (B. G. 7, 21, 22). Moreover, all the Sruti-passages point to God alone as the cause of the entire creation. And so, when we say that he is the cause of fruits, it means that he is the cause also of the creatures as enjoyers of the various fruits. At the same time, we must remember that when God distributes the fruits, he does take into consideration the merits and demerits of the various souls. We thus see that God is neither partial nor cruel in his distribution of fruits and that he alone, is the cause of all.
After having explained so far the nature of Brahman, let us now consider whether the different accounts we read about it in the Vedānta are or are not different kinds of knowledge regarding the Brahman. At the outset, one may say that there should be no room even for a question of this sort, inasmuch as Brahman has been ascertained by us to be absolutely one and homogeneous in character as a piece of salt is. It is impossible that Brahman being of one and the same nature may allow different cognitions of itself unless they are mistaken; and if along with the description of the real nature of Brahman, all the mistaken notions also are to find support in Vedānta, it means a complete distrust of the Vedānta itself. Besides, it has been already proved in Sūtra 1, 1, 4, that the knowledge of Brahman is not at all amenable to injunctions as the knowledge of Dharma is. The argument therefore that different injunctions may give rise to different natures of Brahman is of no avail. If Brahman is already an

1. It is possible to have different kinds of knowledge with reference to things of this world, on account of some change which the things may have in their nature in course of time. But Brahman ever remains unmodifiable.
accomplished fact and is not dependent for its nature on injunctions where then is the necessity at all to discuss whether there is one or more kinds of knowledge regarding it?

The reply to this would however be that a discussion of this sort may not be possible with reference to nirguna Brahman, but that it is certainly possible with reference to saguna Brahman, inasmuch as different ways and acts of devotional worship are possible with reference to it. Besides, of the various visible and invisible results of these devotional acts, one necessary feature, as we are told, is that they all lead to the gradual release of man. Hence, it is with reference to these different ways of meditations as recommended in the Vedānta-passages, that we can raise the question whether the several accounts of (saguna) Brahman give us different kinds of knowledge or only one knowledge.

Let us first understand the position of the pūrvapakṣin and the arguments which may be favourable to him. He holds, in the first place, that the difference in names indicates the performance of different actions. The names ‘jyoti’ and ‘jyotiṣṭoma’, for instance, being different, they suggest, we are told (Pū. Mi. 2, 4, 8), two different sacrifices. Even so in the Vedānta, the names Taittirīyaka, Vājasaneya, Kauthūma, Sātyāyanaka, etc. are, he holds, indicative of different kinds of knowledge. Secondly, it is the rūpa-bheda or the difference in form, characteristics, and the accessory things in a sacrifice such as the deities and the offerings made to them, that accounts for the difference in actions. The mention of the two different deities of Viśvedeva and Vājin and the offerings of āmikṣa and vājina,¹ to them respectively, indicates that there are two sacrifices to be performed and not one. Similarly, we find in the

1. Vājin (horse) is the name of a deity; and Vājina means the offering of the liquid which is known as ‘whey’ and which is formed by mixing curds with boiling milk. The solid portion of the milk then is known as āmikṣa.
Vedānta two kinds of knowledge namely, that of the 'five fires', and that of the number of prāṇas or organs of the body. Thirdly, actions are said to differ from each other on account of the difference of some qualifying words. For instance, the performance of the sacrifice known as Kārīra appears to be two-fold on this account. In the Vedānta also, the followers of the Atharvāṇa Veda only are required to perform the rite of carrying fire on the head before the knowledge of Brahman is imparted to them, implying thereby that the Brahma-vidyā of this Veda is different from that of the other Vedas. In the same way, the other reasons which prove the difference of actions are the repetition, the censure, and the ability to perform the act. So one may apply these, if possible, to the Vedānta-passages also to prove that there are different kinds of knowledge regarding Brahman.

To this pūrvapakṣa we reply. The knowledge of Brahman is one and the same on account of the identity of the reasons, viz., injunction, connection, form, and

1. The Chāndogyopaniṣad mentions five fires, viz. the heaven, the rain, the earth, the man, and the woman (5, 4), and four prāṇas, viz. the speech, the eye, the ear, and the mind (5). The Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, on the other hand, adds the funeral fire as the sixth fire (6, 2, 9), and the generative organ as the fifth prāṇa (6).

2. The Taittiriyakas are required to dine on the ground; not so with others. Some worshippers of fire take away a pot of water from their teacher's house; others do not.

3. If Brahma-vidyā is one only, why is there the repetition in several Upaniṣads of the same thing? Besides, the several modes of worship recommended in different Upaniṣads can never be undertaken by one person. Censure however is inapplicable as a reason so far as Vedānta is concerned for there is no censure of any vidyā there, just as the act of sacrificing before sunrise or afterwards in censured by one or the other school in the Karma-Kāṇḍa.

4. The other reasons are: Word indicating end of a topic, Prāyaścitta; indication of another meaning; the use of another word, number, and process.
name (codanā, sambandha rūpa, and ākhya). In what is known as Śākhāntarādhikaraṇa (the topic concerning different schools of thought) Jaimini has proved that action is one on account of the identity of the reasons mentioned above (Pū. Mī. 2, 4, 9). Agnihotra or keeping the fire, for instance, is one act, though there are different schools of thought; for they all contain the common injunction to offer oblations which indicate one human effort. Similarly, both the Upaniṣads of the Vājasaneyins and the Chāndogas speak only of one human activity with reference to the common knowledge of ‘the Prāṇa which is the oldest and the best’ (Br. 6, 1, 1; Chā. 5, 1, 1).

So also, the nature or form of knowledge being the same in both the Upaniṣads, the knowledge itself is one. Just as when the deity and the material of offering remain the same, the sacrifice also remains the same, even so when the object of knowledge which is qualified as being ‘the oldest and the best’, remains the same, the knowledge of Brahman itself also remains the same. And, further, the name ‘Prāṇa-vidyā’ being the same in the two Upaniṣads, the knowledge of the Prāṇa is also the same. All this reasoning can be made equally applicable to Pañcāgni-vidyā (Br. 6, 2, 9; Chā. 5, 4, 1), Vaiśvānara-vidyā (Br. 5, 9, 1; Chā. 5, 18, 1), and Śaṅḍilya-vidyā (Chā. 3, 14; Br. 5, 6, 1), and we shall find that each of the three vidyās is one and the same in both the Upaniṣads. As for the arguments which the pūrvapakṣin has advanced to show that there arise different kinds of knowledge, Jaimini himself has refuted1 them in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in Sūtras 2, 4, 10 and others.

1. In the first place, Jaimini holds that the difference in names does not mean difference in actions; it indicates only the difference of one authoritative book from another. Even so in the Vedānta, names like Taittirīyaka etc. indicate authoritative works of sages like Tittiri etc., and not the Brahma-vidyā which is common to all such authoritative works. Secondly, difference in minor or subordinate points such as the use of ten or
There still arises a doubt in spite of the above reasoning; and it is this which the Sutrakāra meets in the next Śūtra.

There still arises a doubt in spite of the above reasoning; and it is this which the Sutrakāra meets in the next Śūtra.

\begin{quote}
\textit{\textbf{Bhedāt---on account of difference; na---not; iti cet---if it be said; na; ekasyāṁ---in one; api---even.}}
\end{quote}

If it be said that (vidyās may be different) on account of difference (of minor things, we reply that it is) not so; (for, there may occur minor differences) even in one vidyā.

It may be argued by the pūrvapakṣin that Brahma-vidyā may not be the same for all; as there are different opinions. The Vājasaneyaḥs, for instance, mention the funeral fire as the sixth fire along with the five fires which are already recognized (Br. 6, 2, 14); while the Chandogas mention them as five only (Chā. 5, 10, 10). How can it be said that the two Upaniṣads speak of one vidyā, even though the difference between the two versions is a minor one? It cannot be said that the Chandogya has implicitly recognized the existence of the sixth fire, for there is explicit reference to number five in the statement, "One who knows the nature of the five fires does not become sinful like one who kills a Brahman etc." Similarly, to take another instance, while the Chandogya tells us that there are four prānas, viz. the speech, the eye, the ear, and the mind, besides the one which is eleven pots does not make any difference in the chief act of the Agniṣṭomaṇya sacrifice. Similarly, the question of the number of fires whether it is five or six, does not alter the nature of Agni-vidyā. Thirdly, the act or the vidyā is not altered by what is merely accidental or optional in character, such as 'dining on the ground' or 'carrying fire on head'. Fourthly, repetition will be a fault if it can be attributed to one man, but not when several men speak about one and the same thing. The same action or vidyā may be referred to by several schools of thought. And finally, the want of capacity to perform is a defect in man and not in the action or the vidyā.
known as the chief Prāna, the Vājasaneyins add a fifth prāna to the four which have been already recognized, viz., the semen which is really responsible for production, and which must therefore be called as the generative organ. One who knows this, we are told, becomes rich with progeny and cattle (Br. 6, 1, 6). So it is obvious that the acceptance of one thing in one Upaniṣad and the rejection of it in another should make the object to be known as two and not one, just as the difference between the deities and between the materials to be offered as oblations makes us aware of two sacrifices and not of one only.

To this we reply. A minor difference does not alter the knowledge of a particular vidyā. The mention of the sixth fire in one Upaniṣad and the non-mention of it in the other do not make the vidyā of the five fires as two, just as the mere acceptance or the rejection of a minor thing like the śodāsi cup does not alter the character of the atirātra-sacrifice. When the Vājasaneyins mention the sixth fire, it is not with the view to inform us that like the five fires it also is an object of meditation, but, on the contrary, with the view to inform us that whereas the five fires are to be imagined, the sixth is an actual fire and is therefore not to be imagined. This is made plain by them by describing the five imaginary fires with their respective imaginary fuel, imaginary smoke, and so on. For instance, one of the five fires, viz., the heaven is said to be replenished by the fuel of the sun, and attended by the smoke of the sun's rays. But with reference to the sixth fire which is actual, the Vājasaneyins are careful enough to point out that the fire is the funeral fire and that the fuel is the dead body itself. In spite of this, if we suppose that the sixth fire is also imagined by the Vājasaneyins for the purpose of meditation, there seems no reason why the Chāndogas too may not include it in their list of fires. It need not be supposed that this would go contrary to the explicit statement of the Chāndogas that the fires are five. For the number five refers to the number of
imagined fires and not to the number of fires which may
be used for the purpose of meditation.

In the same way, the additional fifth prāna, viz., the
organ of generation, which is mentioned by the Vājasana-
neyins, can be said to be implicitly mentioned by the
Chāndogas. Hence, we conclude that the object of
knowledge or the knowledge itself does not become
different simply because a minor qualification has been
omitted or added. For, in spite of this, the two objects
agree in substance, and so the vidyā with reference to
these remains the same.

स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्रेव हि समाचारेणविकारार्च सततच- तन्त्रियमः । ३

[ Sva-adhyāyasya—study of one's own branch of the Vedas;
tathātvena—because of its being such; hi—for; samācāre—in
the book named Samācāra; adhikārāt—on account of the subject-
matter; ca—and; savā-vat—like Sava-sacrifice; ca; tad-niyama-
mah—a rule to them. ]

(To carry fire on the head is in accordance) with
the study of one's own Vedic branch; for in the Samācāra
(it is mentioned) as being such. (This is also known)
from the subject-matter; and like oblations the rule
(applies to Ātharvanikas). 3

As for the contention of the pūrvapakṣin that the
rite of carrying fire on the head, being peculiar with the
Ātharvanikas, enables one to distinguish their vidyā from
those of others, we remark that it refers to the study of the
Mundaka Upaniṣad which belongs to their branch of the
Vedas, and not to the Brahma-vidyā which is contained
in it. This is what is written also in the Samācāra, a
book devoted to narrate the Vedic rites and observances.
The Mundaka Upaniṣad too contains the statement that
it is not studied by those who do not perform the rite
(Mu. 3, 2, 11), meaning thereby that this qualification
for studying the Upaniṣad has nothing to do with
the Brahma-vidyā contained in it. No doubt in the
immediately preceding passage (Mu. 3, 2, 10) we are told that ‘This Brahma-vidyā should be imparted only to those who have properly performed the rite of carrying fire on the head’; and though it is true that Brahma-vidyā as such is one only, and cannot be distinguished as this or that, the word ‘this’ coming before the Brahma-vidyā has reference to the Upaniṣad in which it is told and not to the vidyā itself. Naturally, the rite has a reference to the study of the particular Munḍaka Upaniṣad only and not to Brahma-vidyā. Just as the seven libations from Saurya to Satandana, which are connected with the one fire as recommended by the Atharvāṇa, and not with the three fires of the other Vedas, are to be performed exclusively by the followers of the Atharvāṇa itself, even so is the rite of carrying the fire on the head meant to be observed by them only. The Brahma-vidyā therefore remains one only.

दर्शयति च । ४

[Dārsayati—declares; ca—and.]

(Sruti) also declares (thus). 4

Brahman being the only object of knowledge, it is spoken of as ‘the abode about which all the Vedas speak’ (Ka. 1, 2, 15); it is that which is praised by the hotā in the various hymns, as that which is contemplated as fire by the chief among the priests, and as that which is involved in the mahāvrata performed with reference to the god Indra (Ait. Ār. 3, 2, 3, 12). That same Brahman which is described by one Upaniṣad as ‘The great thunder-bolt which is raised in order to strike terror’ so that the sun and the moon and all the worlds may not go astray (Ka. 2, 3, 2) is described by another Upaniṣad as causing fear for him who sees difference in it (Tai. 2, 7). This is true not only of nirguṇa Brahman, but saṃguṇa Brahman also. For the Vaiśvānara who is described by the Vājasaneyakas as being of the measure of a span for the purpose of meditation has been described to be actually so by the Chāndogas (Chā. 5, 18, 1).
Similarly, the sāmans or the songs such as uktha and others indicate that the upāsanās also as recommended in the various Vedānta-passages are not different but identical; for they are described in the same manner in various places.

2 उपसंहाराधिकरणम् I (५)  
उपसंहारोर्थमेदायाधिकारेष्यपद्निः समाने । ५  
[Upasamāhārah—combination; artha—object; abhedāt—on account of absence of difference; vidhi—injunction; śesā—a complimentary thing; vat—like; samāne—in what is common; ca—and.]

Just as things which are accessory to a main thing to be done (go together, even so) there being no difference of the object (of knowledge) in the case of the common (upāsanās of the different branches of the Veda, things which are subservient to these upāsanās also) go together. 5

To re-state the result of the first four Sūtras. If Brahman as the object of knowledge is one, then all the things which are subservient to this knowledge are to be understood as existing in all the places where Brahman is mentioned, even though these things may be explicitly mentioned in one place and not mentioned in another place; just as actions subservient to agnihotra, though mentioned in several places, are combined to form one whole. Of course, what is true of actions, according to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, may not be true of knowledge in all cases. For instance, if there are two actions, one principal and the other derivative, then all the accessory actions that come under the principal action may be said to apply to the derivative action also. But if the objects of knowledge are different, things subordinate to one kind of knowledge will be restricted in their application to that kind of knowledge only and
will not apply to another kind of knowledge. But, as said above, the knowledge of Brahman being one only, all things subservient to this are combined to form one whole. This topic under discussion will be explained in Sūtra 10 and onwards.

2 अन्यथात्वाविकरणम् (६–८)
अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति चेत्ताविशेषात् ६

[ Anyathātvam—the fact of being different; śabdāt—on account of words; iti cet—if it is said; na—not; a-viśeṣāt—on account of absence of difference.]

If it be said that (Udgītha vidyās) are different on account of (difference) of Śruti-passages, (we say it is) not so; because there is (substantial) non-difference. 6

In the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, we get an account of how the several gods, viz., the speech, the prāṇa, the eye, the ear, and the mind, once decided among themselves to defeat the demons by means of their devotion to Udgītha at the time of a sacrifice meant for that purpose; how speech thereupon sang the sāman for them all; but how they themselves committed sins and were defeated by the demons; and how ultimately they approached the chief Prāṇa in the mouth, who thereupon sang for them and defeated the demons (1, 3, 1-7). In the Chāndogyopaniṣad also, we get a similar story which tells us of the defeat of the prāṇas except the chief among them by the demons, and of the ultimate resort which the gods found in the chief Prāṇa and of their meditation on it, due to which the demons were finally vanquished (1, 2, 1-7). It is clear from both these passages that it is the chief prāṇa which is recommended as the object of meditation; and if we take into

1. Āgneya and Saurya are different sacrifices; and yet the latter being a modification of the former, all things which are accessory in the first are also considered to be so in the second. In the sphere of knowledge about Brahman, on the other hand, there is no such thing as original knowledge and knowledge which is its modified form.
consideration the argument of the first Sūtra of this páda, says the pūrvapakṣin, the two Upaniṣads do not give us two different vidyās but one only, because the name of the vidyā is one and the same.

An objection may be raised against this. It may be pointed out that the vidyās are two and not one, inasmuch as while the Vājasaneyins consider prāṇa as the producer of the Udgīthā as is clear from the request of the gods to the prāṇa, ‘Sing for us’ (Br. 1, 3, 2), the Chāndogas meditate upon it, that is, upon Om which is a part of it, in the form of the chief prāṇa (Chā. 1, 2, 7). How then in spite of this difference, can it be said that the vidyās are one?

The pūrvapakṣin replies that the vidyās are not two, because whereas the difference is small, the points of agreement are too many. The occasion of fight between the gods and the demons, the planning of the gods to defeat the demons, the invitation to speech and other prāṇas to come for help and to sing the sāmans, the discovery afterwards that they all are defeated on account of their sins, the consequent approach to the chief prāṇa for shelter, and finally, the defeat of the demons on account of the valour of the chief prāṇa—all these are the points of agreement between the two narrations. Besides, like the Chāndogas, the Vājasaneyins also ultimately hold that the chief prāṇa is the Udgīthā itself (Br. 1, 3, 23). This means that just as the Vājasaneyikas hold that prāṇavidyā and Udgīthavidyā are one and not two, even so the Chāndogas may be said to hold in a secondary sense that Udgīthā means the prāṇa which produces the Udgīthā. Thus the vidyā in both the Upaniṣads is one and the same.

न वा प्रकारणमेदात्यपरोवरीयस्वादिविन्त् । ७

[Na—not; vā-rather; prakaraṇa—context; bhedāt—owing to difference; para-variyastva—being greater than the great; ādi; vat—like.]

But owing to difference of subject-matter (the vidyās are) not (the same); this is like (the difference
of devotion to) something higher than the great (from devotion to the person in the eye and the sun). 7

Now, as against the pūrvapakṣin, we hold that the vidyās are two, because the subject-matter is different in the two Upaniṣads. And we say that the subject-matter is different because the way in which it is introduced is different. The Chāndogya, for example, begins the subject with the statement that the syllable Om should be meditated upon as the Udgītha of which it is a part; it is then narrated as ‘the essence of essences’ and further as being meditated upon by gods as prāṇa in their fight against the demons (1, 1, 1; and 1, 1, 3). Notwithstanding this, if we suppose that Om stands not for a part of it but for the whole worship, and that the prāṇa which sings it is the Udgātā or the priest, in order to make the udgītha-vidyā of the Chāndogya identical with that of Brhadāraṇyaka we shall not only not take into consideration the way in which the Chāndogya opens the subject, but also be obliged not to accept Om as the direct meaning of udgītha, but to accept its indirect meaning, viz., the prāṇa or the udgātā. This however is against the generally accepted rule that the conclusion must fit in with the statement made in the beginning of any subject-matter. So the conclusion we arrive at is that so far as the udgītha-vidyā of the Chāndogya is concerned, it amounts to the meditation on the Om which is a part of udgītha, and considered as if it is prāṇa.

In the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad of the Vājasaneyakas, on the other hand, there seems to be no reason, in the first place, why udgītha should be understood as standing for the syllable Om; as a matter of fact it means the whole of the worship. Secondly, prāṇa is said to

1. The earth is first said to be the essence of all things because it is the support of all; then water is told as the essence of earth; and, so, in this manner, the food, the person, the speech, the hymns to be sung, the sāman among them, and the Om are each said to be the essence of what precedes.
be the performer of the worship, i.e., the priest or the udgāta. No doubt, prāṇa is also identified with udgīthā in the context; but that is for the purpose of showing that the same prāṇa who is the udgātā is also the Ātman of all. Thus the two vidyās are not one but separate. Now, nobody should raise the objection that prāṇa cannot be considered as the udgātā in order to give up the interpretation we have put on the Brhadāraṇyaka version of the vidyā. For just as the non-sentient prāṇa is also identified with udgīthā in the context; but that is for the purpose of showing that the same prāṇa who is the udgātā is also the Atman of all. Thus the two vidyās are not one but separate. And does not the priest himself require the power of prāṇa in order to sing the udgīthā? The Upaniṣad itself tells us that the 'Udgātā sang it only by the means of speech and prāṇa' (Br. 1, 3, 24). It is only to bring out this meaning that the prāṇa is called as the udgātā. Besides, similarity in language only is by no means a sufficient reason to say that the meaning also is identical. For instance, the injunctions regarding the grouping of the grains of rice according to their size, and the preparation of a loaf of middle-sized grains for the purpose of offering it to Agni, the giver of boons, and the cutting of the loaf into eight portions and placing them on eight pot-sherds, are identical with reference to a dārśa-sacrifice which is to be performed if the sacrificer unexpectedly sees the moon rising on the no-moon day, as also with reference to the sacrifice which is to be performed for possessing cattle. And yet, the introductory contexts of the two sacrifices being different, the offerings to be made on account of the abhyudaya or the rising of the moon as constituting an act necessary to wipe out the sin, have no connection with the divinities of the dārśa-sacrifice, though the act itself forms part of the sacrifice. In the case of the paṣu-kāma (desire for cattle) sacrifice, on the other hand, the act of offering is to be made after the dārśa-sacrifice is performed, and so constitutes a separate
sacrifice altogether' (Pū. Mī. 6, 5, 1). Even so, the introductory portions of the two Upaniṣads being different, the udgītha vidyās also are different from each other.

We may find the difference of vidyās even in one and the same Upaniṣad. For instance, in the Chāndogyopaniṣad (1, 9, 1-2), we are told that the 'Ākāśa alone is greater than all these beings, that it alone is their support, and that it is the Udgītha which is greater than the great and without end'. And again, (1, 6, 6) we are told that the same Udgītha is to be worshipped as residing either in the eye or in the sun, and as possessing the bright golden beard. Now, it is true that both these upāsanās or acts of meditation are with reference to the highest Ātman, in the form of Udgītha. But they are two different upāsanās, inasmuch as in one of them the Udgītha is described as being 'greater than the great'; and in the other as possessing a 'golden beard'. If this is the case with one and the same Upaniṣad, how much more must it be with different Upaniṣads? The vidyās therefore in the Chāndogya and the Bhādarāṇyaka are different.

1. Darśa is to be performed on the no-moon day, and the īśti on the new-moon day. The resolution (sankalpa) to sacrifice particular quantity of rice, milk, curds, etc. is to be made on the no-moon day, and the actual sacrifice the next day. If someone by mistake makes the resolution on the day previous to the no-moon day and sees the rising in the east after his resolution is formed, he is to undergo an act of penance to wipe out the sin, which otherwise would destroy his wealth and progeny. This act consists of dividing the grains of rice into three groups according to size. That portion which consists of very small particles of rice is to be used for preparing boiled rice, which is then to be mixed with milk and offered to Viṣṇu; the middle-sized grains are utilized for preparing a loaf for Agni; and the large-sized grains are to be boiled into rice and then mixed with curds for being offered to Indra. Now it is to be noted that this additional act of penance becomes a part of the darśeṣṭi, though the divinities connected with the act are different. The Paśu-kāma sacrifice also, involves the performance of exactly the same act; but here the act is altogether different from the darśeṣṭi and is to be performed after the latter is performed.
If it be said that on account of there being one name the vidyās are one, we reply that it has been spoken already; even that however is possible, when there is no special reason for believing that vidyās are separate.

As seen under Sūtra 7, it is not reasonable to hold that when the name is the same, it must indicate that the vidyā also is one and the same. Not knowing that the vidyās of the Chāndogya and the Brhadāranyaka are two, the common men consider them as one simply because he finds the word ‘Udgītha’ in both the Upaniṣads. But even in the same Upaniṣad, viz., the Chāndogya as we saw in the preceding Sūtra, both the upāsanās, viz., the meditation on the Person in the eye or in the sun, and the meditation on the Udgītha which is greater than the great, are known by the same name, viz., the Udgītha. Similarly, sacrifices different from each other, such as agniḥotra, darṣapūrṇamāsa and others, are all known by the same name Kāṭhaka, because all of them are described in the same book known as Kāṭhaka. Where, however, there is no special reason for supposing that two different vidyās are meant, they may be supposed as one only on account of their being designated by the same name, e.g., the Sāṁvarga-vidyā, the Paṅcāgni-vidyā, or the Vaiśvānara-vidyā.

And on account of the presence (of Om in all the Vedas), it is proper (to hold that Udgītha is an adjective of Om).
In the beginning of the Chāndogypaṇiṣad, the syllable Om, the Udgītha, is recommended for meditation (1, 1, 1). But as the two words Om and Udgītha are in the same case, the relation between them becomes a matter of doubt. It may be adhyāsa (superimposition), or apavāda (sublation), or ēkatva (identity), or viśeṣaṇa (qualification). In the first place, adhyāsa occurs when the idea of one thing is superimposed on the idea of another thing without cancelling the other idea. When the idea of Brahman, for instance, is superimposed on some name, the idea of the name also continues to remain in the mind. The idol continues to strike the mind as an idol, even though the god Viṣṇu is superimposed on it. Even so it may happen with the ideas of Om and Udgītha when they are superimposed on each other. Secondly, the apavāda or sublation occurs when some false idea regarding a thing is removed by a true idea about it. When there arises, for instance, the true idea of the Ātman, expressed generally by the proposition 'That thou art', the false idea that the Ātman is the body or the senses, is removed. Or a man may have a wrong notion about a particular direction, east or west; but it is removed when he knows the correct direction. So it is possible that out of the two ideas of Om and Udgītha, one may be removed as false. Thirdly, it is possible that the two ideas may be co-extensive in meaning, and so they may be synonyms of each other; just as the epithets, 'the best among the twice-born',2 'the god among men', and 'Brahmin' are synonyms of each other. Or finally, the word 'Udgītha' may be said to be an

1. Just as in the sentence, 'the silver which appears is only the shell', the idea of silver is rejected and that of the shell is retained, even so in the sentence, 'Udgītha is Om' the idea of the Udgītha is rejected and that of the Om is retained. Similarly, again, in the sentence, 'Om is Udgītha', the idea of the Om is rejected, but that of the Udgītha is retained.

2. A Brahmin is said to be twice-born, because of his one birth which is natural, and of the second which is said to occur at the time of his upanayana or thread ceremony.

V. E. 12
adjective of Om, inasmuch as Om is said to pervade all the Vedas including the Udgītha. Just as in the sentence ‘Bring the blue lotus’, blue is an adjective of lotus, similarly the sentence, ‘Meditate on Om, the Udgītha’, means meditate on Om in the form of Udgītha. Now as all these alternatives are equally possible, the question as to which one of them should be accepted remains unsettled.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies. (1) The theory of adhyāsa suffers from two defects. In the first place, if the Udgītha is superimposed on Om, we shall have to consider Om as having only an implied meaning of Udgītha. Similarly, if Om is superimposed on Udgītha, we shall have to consider Udgītha as having only an implied meaning of Om. Secondly, as there is no utility of this superimposition, one has only to imagine that it has got some. The Sruti-passage, ‘He fulfils the desires indeed’ (Chā. 1, 1, 7), is not, we must note, an indication of the result of the superimposition of the Udgītha on the Om, or of Om on Udgītha, but of the meditation on Om, the Udgītha. (2) The theory of apavāda or sublation also shall have to be imagined as having a use of its own. For we do not find that there is any advantage of the cancellation of the idea of Om or Udgītha by that of the Udgītha or Om respectively, just as we find that there is the advantage of the emergence of bliss, freedom and so on, when the false knowledge of the Atman as the doer or enjoyer is cancelled by its true knowledge. As a matter of fact, the ideas of Om and Udgītha are impossible to be removed inasmuch as there is no falsity attached to them as is to the snake on the rope. Hence, there would be no sublation at all. Besides, sublation of some idea becomes possible only when a thing is shown as having a particular true nature instead of its previous false nature; but the passage under discussion aims at recommending a kind of meditation. (3) Neither can the theory of synonymous use of words be considered as adequate. For when one of the words is sufficient to convey the required meaning, to use the second
word also is superfluous. In fact, the two words Om and Udghītha cannot be said to have one meaning. The word Om is met with in Rigveda and Yajurveda; but it is not known as Udghītha there. Similarly, the whole of the second chapter of the Sāmaveda is known as Udghītha and not as Om. (4) So, when the three alternatives are thus eliminated, there remains the fourth, according to which the Udghītha is the adjective of Om. In order that Om, which is found equally in all the Vedas and which is merely a part of Udghītha, should not appear as the only object of meditation, but that it should so appear along with Udghītha, we have the qualifying word Udghītha in the passage under discussion.

Some one may say that on this view also, as on the view of adhyāṣa, the word Udghītha suggests only a part of it, and does not denote the whole of the Udghītha. The objection is true, indeed, to a certain extent. But we must remember that whereas in adhyāṣa, the laksanā or the implied meaning is too remote from the real meaning, in the case of the relation of the qualified and the qualification, the implied meaning is not so remote. The meaning implied, viz., the Om, is only a part of the real meaning, viz., the Udghītha. But the use of a word denoting the whole, in place of the word denoting the parts is not uncommon. We say that the whole of the cloth, or the whole of the village, is on fire, even when a part of it is burning. So, the only appropriate view is to hold that the word ‘Udghītha’ is the qualification of the word ‘Om’.

5 sarva-bhédayikarṇam  | (10)
sarva-bhédayapakṣe  | 10

[Sarva-abhedāt—on account of non-difference everywhere; anyatra—elsewhere; ime—these.]

Because (the vidyās are) everywhere the same, those (qualities which refer to one vidyā, in one place, are also to be applied) in other places. 10
The Vājasaneyins and the Chāndogas describe the prāṇa as the best of all and as the object of meditation. The lower prāṇas or the senses also are described as being endowed with the qualities of happiness, richness etc.; but these qualities are in the end acknowledged by the lower prāṇas as really belonging to the chief prāṇa (Br. 6, 1, 14). The Kauśitaki Upaniṣad, on the other hand, though it mentions that the chief prāṇa is proved to be the best of all, does not mention that the prāṇa is also endowed with the other qualities of happiness and others. Are we therefore to believe that for the purposes of meditation these qualities are supposed to exist even where they are not mentioned?

The pūrvapakṣin holds that the qualities are not to be supposed to exist where they are not mentioned; for he says that the word ‘thus’ in the passage, ‘One who thus knows that prāṇa is the best of all, himself becomes the best’ (Kau. 2, 14), will naturally restrict the qualities to a particular context in one branch of the Veda, and will not be able to refer to qualities mentioned in other branches.

To this we reply. It is true that the word ‘thus’ in the Kauśitaki-brāhmaṇa does not directly point out the qualities mentioned in the Vājaśaneya-brāhmaṇa. But inasmuch as that word is connected directly with the qualities of prāṇa mentioned in the Vājaśaneya-brāhmaṇa itself, and inasmuch as the prāṇa-vidyā and the conversation of the prāṇas are common to both the brāhmaṇas, it stands to reason to hold that the word ‘thus’ in the Kauśitaki refers to the same qualities even though they are not mentioned in it. To do so is not to disregard the Śruti and accept something which is not favoured by it; for the prāṇa which has these

---
1. The speech is said to possess the quality of being vāsiṣṭha or being happy; for those who are eloquent become happy. Similarly, the eye, the ear, and the mind are said to be endowed with pratiṣṭhā, sampat, and āyatana, i.e., position, richness of learning etc., and support respectively.
qualities is one and the same. Devadatta who is known to be brave in his own land may not be so known outside; but as he remains the same person whether he is inside or outside his own country, it is very likely that his qualities would gradually be known to the outsiders also. Hence we conclude that qualities which belong to one and the same thing along with some other qualities of that thing must be presumed to exist, even though they are not explicitly mentioned in a particular place along with the existence of that thing.

6 आनन्दाधिविकरणम् (11-12)

आनन्दादय: प्रधानस्य: 11

[Anandādayaḥ—bliss and others; pradhānasya—of the principal.]

Bliss and other (qualities) of the principal substance (viz., Brahman, must be supposed to belong to it everywhere). 11

Now regarding the Brahman, we find that qualities like bliss, knowledge, omnipresence, etc. are mentioned in some places only. Are we to conclude in view of this that Brahman has only those qualities which are mentioned in a particular place or has all the qualities mentioned in all the places? The pūrṇaṅkṣin holds the former view, while the Sūtrakāra holds the latter. The reason why the Sūtrakāra wishes to combine the several qualities in all the places is that the Brahman to which they belong is one and the same substance.

If this is so, one may ask whether qualities such as joy, satisfaction, and bliss, which are described as the head, the arm, and the trunk of Brahman (Tai. 2, 5), are also to be ascribed to Brahman? We shall deal with this question in the next Sūtra.

प्रियिगिरस्तवादाध्यात्मक्यर्मचार्यापि हि सेदे। 12

[Priya—joy; śirāstva-ādi—being the head and others; a-prāpta—not available; upacaya-apacayau—increase and decrease; hi—for; bhede—in difference.]
Qualities like joy as its head etc. are not applicable (elsewhere); for increase or decrease (apply to things which) are different. 12

Qualities however like 'having joy as its head' and having greater degrees of joy known as 'moda' and 'pramoda' as its right and left arms, should not be considered as applicable to Brahman in other passages where they are not mentioned, even though they are mentioned in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (2, 5). For being dependent upon persons, these qualities and their different degrees are possible only when there is plurality. But Brahman is without plurality, one and without a second. (Chā. 6, 2, 1). Moreover we have already seen in Sūtra 1, 1, 12, that joy and other qualities refer to the innermost sheath of the jīva known as the anandamaya-kośa. Not only they do not belong to the nirguna Brahman, but they do not also belong to the saguna Brahman which is mentioned for the purpose of meditation, just as the saṁyadvāma and the satyakāma qualities of Brahman are so mentioned (Chā. 4, 15, 2; 8, 7, 1). And yet they are mentioned because they are only useful as means of directing the mind to the Brahman. It is on this account that the Sūtrakāra assumes that they are as if on a par with the qualities of saṁyadvāma and satyakāma, and so, are not, like the latter which serve the purpose of a particular meditation, available in other places where they are not mentioned. In other words, just as a king is differently served by two wives, one with an umbrella, and the other with a fly-flap, even so, though Brahman is one and the same it is worshipped under different upāsanās which have no validity except in their own proper spheres.

1. Saṁyadvāma means the quality of giving the fruits of actions; and satyakāma means to possess desires which become fulfilled the moment they are entertained.
It is—others; tu—but; artha—meaning; sāmānyāt—on account of being the same.

But other (qualities are acceptable in all places) on account of the object (viz., the Brahman) being the same. 13

Qualities such as, being endowed with bliss, knowledge, pervasiveness and of being the self of all, are however valid in all the passages which refer to Brahman; for the purpose which they serve is to describe the nature of Brahman which is one and the same in all the passages. Besides these attributes are mentioned for the purpose of knowledge and not for upāsanā.

7 अध्यानाधिकरणम् । (१४–१५)

आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् । १५

[Adhyānāya—for a full understanding; prayojana—purpose; abhāvāt—due to absence.]

(What is told is) for a full understanding (of the Puruṣa); because there is no gain (by telling it about other things). 14

We are first told in the Kāṭhakopaniṣad that ‘beyond the senses are the objects of sense, beyond the objects is the mind, beyond the mind, the intellect’ (1, 3, 10), and then, in the end, we are again told that ‘Beyond Puruṣa there is nothing; he is the end, the best abode’ (1, 3, 11). Here, a doubt arises whether it is intended to intimate that each of the several things is higher than the preceding one, or that only the Puruṣa is the highest of them all. According to the pūrvapakṣin, the passage under discussion contains a number of sentences, the purpose of each one of which is to convey the idea that something is higher than something else.

In reply to this we say that the aim of the passage is to intimate that the Puruṣa alone is the highest among
other things. For we do not gain by being told that all other members of the series form a hierarchy, if they are not brought in relation with the Puruṣa. There is, on the other hand, a purpose in being told that the Puruṣa is above the senses and other things. It is the achieving of mokṣa, of the freedom from the jaws of death, the moment one knows the Brahman' (Ka. 1, 3, 15). Besides, the passage under discussion states both positively and negatively that the Puruṣa alone is the highest goal and abode, and that there is nothing else which is higher than the Puruṣa. It is to strengthen this conviction regarding the knowledge of Puruṣa that the preceding series of the objects of sense and other things is enumerated, and not for the purpose of making it an object of meditation by itself.

अत्मशब्दाच्छ 15

And on account of the word 'Ātman'. 15

Besides, the same Puruṣa is spoken of as the Ātman in the immediately subsequent passage of the Upaniṣad. 'Being hidden in all beings, the Ātman does not manifest itself; but wise men see it by means of their keen and subtle intellect' (Ka. 1, 3, 12). From this it becomes clear that the senses and the other things enumerated before are all un-Ātmanic in character, and that the aim of the Śruti passages therefore is to make us aware of the nature of the Ātman' and not of the un-ātman. It is to achieve this purpose that we are further told in the same Upaniṣad (1, 3, 13) to 'restrain the speech in the mind'. We have also seen this already while discussing the Śūtra 1, 4, 1. Moreover the passage which comes before the passage under discussion tells us about the 'highest abode of Viṣṇu to which the wise man goes at the end of his journey' (Ka., 1, 3, 9); and it

1. Just as the objects of sense lead us to the consideration of the senses beyond them, even so everything in the world which is being controlled by the Ātman leads us to the consideration of the Ātman itself.
is with reference to the desire to know what this place of Viṣṇu is that we are told about the senses and other things and about the Puruṣa. So it is clear in view of this also that the enumeration of the objects of the senses etc., has the only aim of informing us with the knowledge of the highest place of Viṣṇu or of the Puruṣa and of nothing else.

8 आत्मगृहीत्यविकरणम् | (ि०-ि७)  
अत्मगृहीततिरितिर्वदुत्तरात् | ि७

[Atma-grhitih—the Atman as the object meant; itara-vat—like others; uttarat—on account of what follows.]

The Atman (is the object) to be understood (here) as in other places, on account of what follows. 16

The Aitareya Upaniṣad tells us that 'All this was in the beginning, verily, the one Atman alone; there was nothing else moving (or non-moving); he thought of creating the worlds and created them',--the watery worlds beyond the heavens, the worlds between the earth and the heavens as illuminated by the Sun, the mortal worlds, viz., the earth, and the watery worlds below (1, 1, 1-2). There arises now the doubt whether the word 'Ātman' here means the highest Brahman or some other person.

The pūrvapakṣin holds that the word 'Ātman' is used for the Sūtrātmā or the Hiranyagarbha, also known as Prajāpati or Brahmadeva. The word is not used for Brahman; for the passage refers to the creation of the worlds and not to the elements which give rise to the worlds. In another Śruti-passage, it is also said that 'Ātman was, in the beginning, in the shape of a person' (Br. 1, 4, 1); or, as we read in a Smṛti-passage, 'He is the first embodied person known as the Puruṣa; and he, as the first creator of the beings, was in the beginning'.

In a passage of the Aranyaka previous to the passage under discussion of the Aitareyopaniṣad the gods are said to be born from the seed of Prajāpati, and that this
wonderful creation is also due to him. The word ‘Atman’, therefore, refers to Prajāpati (Br. 1, 4, 1). That he alone was in the beginning can also be said about him, inasmuch as, so far as his creation of the worlds at least is concerned, he was before its origin, though not before the creation of the elements by the Brahman. The īkṣaṇā or the thought about the worlds also can be ascribed to him, since he too is an intelligent being. And further the fact that he brought in succession a cow, a horse, and a man in order that the various deities like fire and others (Ait. 1, 2, 2-3), whom he produced along with the senses and the worlds, should find a shelter so that they can well govern the latter, shows that the activity of bringing etc., being analogous to that of the jīvātman, the word ‘Atman’ in the passage under discussion is the name of a similar being.

To this we reply. Just as in the Taittiriyopaniṣad (2, 1, 1) the word ‘Ātman’ in the passage, ‘From the Ātman, came into being the ākāśa etc.’, means the highest Ātman, or just as this is so in the other accounts of creation, or just as it is used with reference to the principal inner Ātman of all, even so it means the highest Ātman in the passage under discussion. No doubt, in the passage where it is described as having a particular ‘shape of a person’, (Br. 1, 4, 1), it is to be understood as a particular person only. But in the passage of the Aitareyaka, the thought and the desire of producing the worlds, as also the actual production of them, indicate that the being is no other than the highest Ātman.

अन्वयादिति चेत्त्यादवधावनाद् | १७

[ Anvayāt—on account of connection; iti cet—if it be said; syād—must be; avadhāraṇāt—on account of assertion. ]

If it be said that in view of the connected meaning (the highest Ātman is not meant, we say that) it is so because of the ascertained statement. 17
Taking into consideration even the connected meaning of the sentences in the passage, we have to say, as against the pūrvapakṣin, that they refer to the highest Atman alone. For, in the first place, just as on a previous occasion (in Sūtra II. 3, 6), we interpreted the Sruti-passage ‘He created fire’ (Chā. 6, 2, 3) as meaning what is told in another Sruti-passage (Tai. 2, 1), viz., ‘He created fire after having first created ākāśa and vāyu, even so, here, in view of the ascertained fact of the one Ātman alone before creation, the statement ‘The Ātman created the worlds’ must be interpreted as meaning that ‘The same Ātman created the worlds after having created first the elements’. As we have already seen, the particular details in one place can be combined with those mentioned in other places, if the main subject treated in all these places is one and the same. Naturally, therefore, in the second place, the particular activity of bringing a cow or a horse by the Ātman and presenting it to the senses, being only a detail, must be subordinated to the main purpose of the Sruti-passage, viz., the truth that Brahman is the internal self of all. But for their being connected with this main thing, the knowledge of the mere details will bring no good to man. It is to impress this central fact of the innermost reality of Brahman, that we are told in the Aitareya Upaniṣad that the Brahman or the Ātman as the creator of all, after having first created the worlds and the guardians of the worlds, as well as the organs and the shelter of the organs, viz., the body, thought to itself that they might not at all live without its presence in them, and so entered into them all by cutting a hole at the top of the head (1, 3, 12). It is with the same view that Sruti tells us, in the third place, that it was this Person inside the body who then thought to himself thus: ‘May it be that it is not I but the tongue which makes the speech; not I but the prāṇa which breathes? Who then am I?’ But when he saw himself, so we are further told, he saw the widely spread-out Brahman alone (1, 3, 13). Similarly,
further still, after having first mentioned the entire world along with the elements and the governing deities like Indra and Prajapati, we are told that intelligence or prajñā is the mover, the controller and the shelter of all this world, and that it alone is the Brahman (3, 3). Hence it follows that what the Upaniṣad wants to teach us is that Brahman alone is the internal self of all, and that it alone must be taken as the meaning of the word ‘Ātman’.

We may have another interpretation of these two Sūtras. Sūtra 16: To the question ‘Who is the Ātman?’ the Vaijasaneyins first give the reply that it is ‘He who is within the heart, is surrounded by the prāṇas and is the Puruṣa consisting of knowledge and light’ (Br. 4, 1, 7). But they soon make this Ātman identical with the unattached Brahman in a passage which concludes the discussion thus: ‘This great unborn Ātman, which is free from old age, death, and decay, and is fearless, is verily the Brahman’ (Br. 4, 4, 25). As opposed to this, the Chāndogas begin with the statement of ‘the Sat which alone was in the beginning without a second’ (Chā. 6, 2, 1); they do not use the word ‘Ātman’ in the beginning, and they conclude their discussion of the Sat by identifying it with the Ātman by saying ‘That thou art; that is the Ātman’ (Chā. 6, 8, 7). Now, there arises the doubt whether the two Sruti-passages deal with the same topic or with different topics.

The pūrvapākṣin holds that the topics are different, because the passages differ in their construction. In the one, the introductory statement and the conclusion

1. It strikes strange that all of a sudden after Sūtra 15, we have left the question whether Vidyās are one or more and have engaged ourselves in interpreting the word ‘Ātman’. But now that it has been decided that ‘Ātman’ means Brahman, Saṅkara brings us back to consider whether the Brahmapidvā of the Vaijasaneyins is just the same as that of the Chāndogas or not. And hence the new interpretation of the two Sūtras.
refer to the nature of the Ātman; in the other, the initial statement is about the Sat and not about the Ātman; and though the conclusion must always be in conformity with what is introduced in the beginning, we can only say that the identity of the Ātman and the Sat is only recommended for meditation.

To this we reply that this identity itself is enough to make us aware that the Chāndogas too, like the Vājasaneyins, are having a discussion of the Ātman only. (Sūtra 17). The connection between the introduction and the conclusion will be better understood if we take into consideration a passage prior to the passage in which the Sat is introduced. That passage (Chā. 6, 1, 3) makes us aware first of all that 'with the knowledge of the one thing, we know all things; we hear what is not heard, think about what is not thought, and know what is not known'. And after ascertaining this first, the Upaniṣad tells us, in what we have called the introductory passage, about the existence of the same one thing as Sat. This means that unless we identify that one thing or Sat as the Ātman, the knowledge of the Ātman itself not being there, all things will not be said to be known even after knowing that one thing. Besides, it is only after identifying the individual self with the one Sat, and not by simply imagining the identity for the sake of meditation, that we can see the truth of the statements, that in the beginning the Ātman alone is, the individual soul is itself the Ātman, the soul becomes united with the Sat in deep sleep, and the truth of the repeated statement, viz., 'that thou art'.

1. If the identity between the jiva and Brahman is only imaginary and not real, the jiva would be as eternal as Brahman, and so there would be two beings before creation, and not one only. Besides, there would be no sense either in saying that Brahman entered in all things as the jivātman, or in saying that the jiva becomes one with Brahman during sleep, or again in repeatedly telling Śvetaketu the proposition 'Thou art that'.
As for the contention of the pūrvapakṣin that the conclusion must be in conformity with what is told in the beginning, we have to observe that in the present case neither the Ātman nor the un-ātman is specifically mentioned in the beginning. It is a general statement of Sat, which is not only not contradicted by a specific conclusion, but on the contrary requires such a conclusion in order to satisfy the inquisitive mind which wants to know more about the Sat. Moreover, the meaning of the word ’Sat’ cannot be anything else than the Ātman; for we have already seen under Sūtra 2, 1, 14, that the whole of the un-ātmic world of things is unreal on account of its origin in speech. Nor again can we say that a difference in the mode of expression makes a difference in meaning. ’Bring that vessel here’, means the same as ’That vessel, bring it here’. Hence we conclude that the subject-matter of the passages under discussion is one and the same, even though the manner in which the two Upaniṣads have expressed it is different.

9 कार्येख्यानार्थानुभाषिकरणम् । (१८) कार्येख्यानार्थपूर्वम् । १८

[ Kārya—action; ākhyaṇāt—on account of being mentioned; apūrvaṃ—unknown before. ]

On account of the act (of sipping water) being mentioned, a new (thing, viz., to cover the prāṇa is mentioned for meditation). 18

The Chāndogas and Vājasaneyins hold that the food which all the animals eat is the food of prāṇa alone, and that water is the piece of cloth which covers the prāṇa. The Chāndogas express this by saying that the wise Brahmins ’therefore cover the prāṇa by water, both before and after their dinner’ (Chā. 5, 2, 2). The Vājasaneyins, on the other hand, express it by saying that ‘the wise persons who study the Vedas, sip the water before and after dinner, and think that they do
not thereby allow the prāṇa to remain naked; therefore one who knows this should sip the water accordingly’ (Br. 6, 1, 14). Now there arises the doubt whether the sipping of water and the imagining of prāṇa as dressed by water are both enjoined, or whether only one of them is enjoined in these passages.

The pūrapakṣin holds that either both the things are enjoined, because both the things are new, or only the sipping of water is enjoined as is clear from the verbal form in, ‘water should be sipped’. The reference to the imagining of the prāṇa as dressed by water, he holds, is to glorify the act of sipping.

To this we reply. It cannot be said that the sipping of water is recommended here by the passages under discussion; the reference to it is merely to an act which is already recommended by Smṛti. Nor can it be said that these very Śruti-passages are the source of the Smṛti instruction. For while the Smṛtis recommend the sipping of water as a general act of purification for all men, the Śruti-passages may, if at all, be doing so for the special purpose of having the knowledge of prāṇa. But, as a matter of fact, there is also no new act of sipping which is thus recommended; for one can immediately see that it is the ordinarily known sipping of water which has been merely referred to in the Śruti-passage under discussion. Now, if the act of sipping water is not recommended even once in these passages, much less can it be said that it is recommended twice. Besides, to suppose that there are two distinct and separate acts, viz., the sipping of water, and the imagining of the clothing of prāṇa, is to suppose wrongly that one and the same passage has two meanings to convey. So, the only conclusion we arrive at is that the sipping of water, which is to be performed as an act recommended by Smṛti before and after dinner, is to be simply believed—so do the Śruti-passages tell us in a novel manner—as constituting the clothing of the prāṇa.
From this it follows that to imagine that the water which is sipped becomes the dress of the prāṇa is not to glorify the act of sipping the water. For, as said above, Sruti has not, in the first place, recommended it. Secondly, the passage itself clearly recommends us to imagine that the sipping of water is the dress of the prāṇa. It need not now be said on this account that the sipping of water has two uses, one of purification and the other of providing the clothing for prāṇa. For there may be two different acts which a man may perform with reference to the same water; the one, to sip the water for purification, and the other, to make-believe that to sip the water is to provide the clothing for prāṇa. Nor again can it be said that the food of dogs and of all other animals is to be eaten without discrimination simply because all the food in the world is said to be the food of prāṇa (Br. 6, 1, 14). As a matter of fact this is impossible. So what it means is that we are advised to form the belief that all the food belongs to prāṇa. Similarly, the sentence which immediately follows, viz., ‘water is the dress’ does not recommend us to sip the water, but recommends us to believe that the water we usually sip for purification is the dress of prāṇa. To hold that there is no injunction with reference to the food which is mentioned, but that there is some injunction with reference to water, in the same passage is to hold contradictory views at the same time.

It is true, no doubt, that the verbs in both the sentences, ‘They sip the water’, and ‘They think they dress the prāṇa thereby’ are used in the present tense, and that therefore the two sentences do not indicate any injunction. But this is to treat the sentences as mere assertions without any meaning, or as arthavādās indicating praise or censure regarding some injunction. So, as seen above, the sentence regarding the sipping of water is a mere statement of a fact which already exists and which is recognized by Smṛti. The other sentence however contains a new thing with reference to the
same water, viz., that it is to be imagined as the dress of prāṇa. So, in spite of the present tense in the second sentence, what the verb 'think' conveys is that on the occasion of the sipping of the water, one 'should think' that the water is the dress of prāṇa.

As for the pūrvapākṣin's contention that the sipping of water also is used in the injunctive form in the Brhadāraṇyaka, we have already refuted it. The sipping of water has already been recognized by Smṛti, and it is to this only that the Śruti refers. It is for this reason that the Kāṇvas do not have, as the Mādhyandinas have, in the recension of the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad the sentence, viz., 'Those who know that water is the dress of prāṇa should sip the water before and after dinner'. They conclude the topic with the sentence, 'Thereby they think they dress the prāṇa'. From this we conclude that what is enjoined for the Mādhyandinas also is the imagination of water as dress and not the sipping of water which is usually done. And, finally we exclude the suggestions that so far as the Mādhyandinas are concerned, the sipping of water may be considered as enjoined, and that so far as the Kāṇvas are concerned, the covering by water as the dress of prāṇa is enjoined. For, as the statement, 'water is the dress', is the beginning of the topic in all the passages, we must hold that the conclusion also must be that water should be conceived as the dress of prāṇa and not that water should be sipped.

10 समानाविकरणम् । (१९)
समान एवं चामेदात् । १९

[ Samāne—in the same; evam—thus; ca—and; a-bhedat—due to non-difference. ]

It is thus (i.e., the vidyā is one) in the same (branch of study also) on account of the non-difference (of the object of meditation). 19

In the Vājāsaneyi branch of the Veda, there is a chapter known as Agnirahasya (the secret of fire-viṣyā),

V. E. 13
containing therein what is known as the Sândilya-vidyā. It tells us to meditate on the Ātman as consisting of the mind and as having prāṇa as its body, and as light as its form. We are also told in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, the Upaniṣad of the Vājasaneyins, that ‘The person consisting of mind and light and residing within the heart is small like a grain of rice or barley, and yet is the ruler and lord of all that exists’ (5, 6, 1). Now, we have to consider whether the Vidyās in the two places are one or two, and whether the particulars mentioned are to be taken together or separately.

The pūrva-pākṣin says that the Vidyās must be taken separately with the particulars mentioned along with them. For, otherwise there will be the defect of repetition. No doubt, the two places in which the Vidyās are mentioned are removed from each other, and, therefore, one may say that there is repetition. Yet the branch of study being one only, those who resort to it in order to meditate are the same persons as those who study it. So, there is no need of anything being told twice. But as there is such a repetition of particulars, it clearly means that the Vidyās mentioned in the two places must be different from each other. Nor can it be said that, in one place, Śrutī intends to describe the Vidyā, and that, in another place, it intends to enjoin the particulars, inasmuch as there is no distinction between the two sets of particulars in the two places. Had there been such a distinction between the description of the Vidyā in one place, and its being enjoined with some particulars for the sake of meditation in another place, the two sets of particulars such as being endowed with mind, prāṇa, etc., would not have been mentioned as the same. Hence in order to avoid the defect of repetition, we must hold that the Vidyās are separate, and that because they are

1. The word ‘juhoti’, e.g., in ‘Agnihotraṁ juhoti’ merely describes the performance of the sacrifice, but in ‘Dadhnā juhoti’ it tells us how to perform it, viz., by using the curds as the material for offering in the sacrifice.
separate the particular attributes mentioned in one place cannot be combined with those mentioned in the other place. That this conclusion is sound can be seen with reference to a contrary instance. In the prāṇa-vidyā which is one, there can be no defect of repetition, because those who study it and those who resort to it for meditation may be different persons belonging to different branches of study; and so it is that the qualities mentioned in one Sākhā can be combined with those mentioned in another Sākhā.

To this we reply. Just as the vidyā can be one, and the particulars connected with it can be grouped together when the Sākhās or branches of study are different, even so it may happen when the Sākhā is one only, since the object of meditation is also one. Brahman, for instance, possessing the characteristics of mind, prāṇa, and light, is recognized to be the same object of meditation in the two passages which belong to the same Vājasaneyi branch of study. Naturally, we can say that it is the same vidyā in the two passages, and that the particulars connected with it therefore cannot be said to be incapable of being taken together. Mere repetition need not make us believe that the vidyās are different; for the two passages are useful to convey to us two different meanings connected with the same vidyā. One will mainly give us the knowledge of the vidyā, and the other that of the qualities or particulars.

Now it may be pointed out that, if there is such a distinction between the principal and the subordinate parts of a vidyā, it will be proper to mention in some place something which was not mentioned already. For instance, the qualities of 'being the Lord of all etc.,' which are not mentioned in Agnirahasya, ought to have been mentioned in the Brhadāranyaka, while the qualities of 'being endowed with mind etc.,' which have been mentioned in the former ought not to have been again mentioned in the latter. To this we say in reply that it is no defect to do so. For it is by means of this
repertition of particulars that we can know that the 
vidyā is one and the same in the two places. And even 
if we learn about a new thing in one place, a reference 
to the principal thing endowed with other qualities 
though already known in another place cannot be 
neglected. The quality of ‘being: the Lord of all’, 
though narrated newly in the Brhadāraṇyaka, refers to 
the Śaṇḍilya-vidyā which is mentioned therein, and 
which is already recognized by us as the same which is 
mentioned along with some other qualities in the 
Agnirahasya, on account of the common characteristics 
mentioned in both the places. Hence, the vidyā of the 
Vājasaneyins is only one, in spite of its being mentioned 
in two places, and so the qualities mentioned in the 
two places can be taken together.

196 VEDĀNTA EXPLAINED

19. संबंधाविचिकरणम् (२०-२२) 

संबंधदिव्यमन्यत्रापि २०

[Sambandhāt—on account of connection; evam—thus; 
anyatras—elsewhere; api—also.]

The same (may happen) in other cases also, on 
account of the connection (of qualities with vidyā). 20

The Brhadāraṇyaka tells us (5, 5, 1-2) that the 
Satya or the Hiranyagarbha, which came forth from the 
original water, is the Brahman, and that it is this 
Brahman which is the person residing in the disc of the 
sun, as also the person in the right eye.

We are further told that this person has Bhūḥ etc. 
as his head and hands, and is endowed with the two 
secret names, viz., ‘ahar’ and ‘aham’ (5, 5, 3). 
There arises now the doubt whether the two secret

1. (i) The ādhdaiivika and the ādhyātmika abodes of the 
sun and the eye refer respectively to gods and the human body. 
(ii) The two persons are said to be one, because they are mutually 
dependent for their being on each other. The eye and the 
person in it are dependent on the rays of the sun, while the 
sun and the person in it are dependent on the eye for being 
perceived. (iii) The earth, the space between the earth
names are both indicative of both the abodes of the person, or of one of them only.

This Sūtra mentions only the view of the pūrva-pakṣin thus. Just as the particulars of the one Śārdīlyā-vidyā, which is mentioned in the two places, can be incorporated together, even so it may happen in the Satya-vidyā under discussion. The āchīdaivika and the ādhyātmika aspects of it being introduced in the Upaniṣad in the same way, and the two persons in the sun and in the eye being mutually dependent on each other, it is inevitable that the particulars of the vīciyā will be taken together. The rules regarding the behaviour of a disciple with reference to his teacher remain the same, whether in the town or in the forest. Hence it follows that both the secret names are indicative of both the persons in the sun and in the eye.

The reply of the Sutrakāra is given in the next Sūtra.

न वा विशेषात् । २१

[Na—not; vā—or; viśeṣāt—on account of difference.]

Or, not (so), on account of difference (of place). 21

It is not possible that the two names should refer to both the persons. For while the name ‘ahāḥ’ is definitely stated to be of the person in the sun (Br. 5, 5, 3), the name ‘ahāṁ’ is stated to be of the person in the eye (Br. 5, 5, 4). True it is that the two names are of the one Brahmān only, but they are of the two and the heaven, and the heaven are known as ‘Vyāhritis’ which are bhūḥ, bhūvaḥ, and svāḥ respectively and constitute the head, the hands, and feet inasmuch as bhūḥ is monosyllabic and the remaining two consist of two syllables each. (iv) The Upaniṣads are secret names of these two persons, because they make us aware of the deities to which they point. The deity of the one is the sun, and that of the other is the Ātman. So the name of the person in the sun is ‘ahār’ which means the ‘day’ while the name of the person in the eye is ‘ahāṁ’ which means the ‘I’.
specific aspects of it, one the ādhidaivika, and the other, the ādhyātmika. The teacher may be one, and may have a uniform nature in the town or in the forest, but rules regarding the behaviour of the disciple may be different, in relation to the different ways of behaving of the teacher. Hence it is impossible that the two secret names should be indicative of both the persons.

दश्यति च । २२

[Darśayati—shows; ca—and.]

Sruti also indicates (so). 22

That there is an express teaching of the Sruti (Chā. 1, 7, 5) that the form and the name of the person in the sun are also the form and the name of the person in the eye, itself shows that Sruti is aware that the qualities of the two persons are different, inasmuch as the two persons belong to two different abodes. Had there been no real difference, there was no necessity of expressly transferring the qualities of the person in the sun to the person in the eye. Hence the two secret names indicate two different persons.

२२ संभृत्यविनिकरणम् । (२३)

संभृतियुप्यांत्यपि चातः । २३

[Sambhṛti—hold together; dyu—heaven; vyāpti—pervasion; api—even; ca—and; atah—for the same reason.]

And for the same reason, (the glories of Brahman, such as) the holding together (of power) and the pervading of the heaven (cannot be incorporated in other Vidyās). 23

In the Vedic portion known as the Khila² of the Rāṇāyanīyas, the followers of the Sāmaveda, we get an

---

1. E.g., the disciple is to sit after the teacher has taken his seat, and to stand immediately after the teacher stands.

2. The 'Khila' is that portion in which there is neither any injunction nor any prohibition to do an act.
account of how Brahman is the cause of its Vibhūtis or its glorious deeds, such as the creation of the heaven, and of holding together its own independent and unimpeded powers. And, again, in their own Upaniṣad, namely, the Chāndogya, we get an account of the different Brahma-vidyās, such as the Sāndilya-vidyā and so on. The question that arises here is whether the Vibhūtis of Brahman mentioned in Khila are to be incorporated in these Brahma-vidyās or not. The pūrvapakṣin holds that they can be so included because they all are connected with the same Brahman.

To this the Sātrakāra replies that they cannot be so included because Brahman is referred to be in different abodes in these vidyās. In the Sāndilya-vidyā, e. g., Brahman is said to be residing ‘within the heart’ (Chā. 3, 14, 3); in the Dahara-vidyā, it is said to be located in the form of ‘the small ākāśa in the lotus-like place of the heart’ (Chā. 8, 1, 1); and in the Upakosala-vidyā, again, it is said to be ‘the person who resides in the eye’ (Chā. 4, 15, 1). So, these being the different ādhyātmika abodes of the Brahman, it is impossible that the ādidaivika vibhūtis of Brahman should be incorporated in them. No doubt, we admit that the ādidaivika vibhūtis of Brahman are mentioned in these vidyās also; e. g., in the Sāndilya-vidyā, Brahman is declared to be ‘greater than heaven and the worlds’ (Chā. 3, 14, 3); in the Upakosala-vidyā, Brahman is said to be the ‘Light shining all the worlds’ (Chā. 4, 15, 4); and in the Dahara-vidyā, ‘both the heaven and the earth are said to be located in the ākāśa within the heart’ (Chā. 8, 1, 3’).

Besides these, we know that there are other Brahma-vidyās in the Chāndogya, where we have no reference to the ādidaivika or the ādhyātmika abodes of Brahman. For instance, in Chā. 6, 7, 1, we are told that Brahman consists of sixteen parts.¹ But, notwithstanding this, there is a special reason why the glorious powers or vibhūtis of Brahman mentioned in the Khila cannot be

¹ Vide footnote on P. 153.
included in the other vidyās. The qualities such as ‘holding the heaven’ etc. are so heterogeneous from the qualities mentioned in the Sāndilya and the other vidyās, that we can have no recognition of them as being the same, just as we may have in the case of even those which are mentioned quite apart from each other, if only their qualities are the same.

So the mere fact of their being connected with Brahman does not make the vidyās one and the same; for it is a fact that Brahman can be meditated upon in its various aspects, just as the Udgītha as we have already seen under Sūtra 7, can be meditated upon in its different aspects. Hence, we conclude that the vibhūtis of Brahman cannot be included in the Sāndilya and the other vidyās.

13 पुरुषविद्याधिकारणम् । (२४)
पुरुषविद्यायित्व ैतरेयामनामनानात् ॥ २४

Puruṣa-vidyāyām; iva—like; ca; itaresāṁ—of others; an-āmnānāt—not being mentioned.

And as it is not mentioned in the case of others (i.e., in the Taittirīyaka, as it has been) in the puruṣa-vidyā (of the Chāndogya, the two vidyās cannot be combined). 24

In the Chāndogypaṇiṣad, or the Rahasya-brāhmaṇa of the Tāṇḍis and the Paingis who are the followers of the Sāmaveda, the human life is considered as a kind of sacrifice; the three portions of the life are the three

1. The human life is compared with a sacrifice thus; (i) Reciting of hymns composed in the Gāyatri metre of twenty-four letters constitutes what is known as the morning savana in a sacrifice; to recite those which are composed in the Tristup metre of forty-four letters constitutes the noon savana; and to recite those composed in the Jagati metre of forty-eight letters constitutes the evening savana. The human span of life, which is supposed to consist of 116 years, is also correspondingly divided in three portions to resemble the letters of the three savanas, the first consisting of 24 years, the second of 44, and the third of 48.
savanas; hunger, thirst etc., go to form the discipline necessary for the performing of the sacrifice; and prayers and mantras also find their proper place. In the Taittiriya Šāraṇyaka also, we get an account of a sacrifice performed by a person who has realized the Ātman; and we are told that in such a sacrifice the Ātman is the Yajamāna or the performer of the sacrifice, Śraddhā or faith is his wife, etc. 2

Now, there arises the doubt whether the particulars of the sacrifice mentioned in the Chāndogya are to be accepted or not in connection with the sacrifice mentioned in the Taittiriya. According to the pūrvapakṣin, as both the sacrifices are connected with the human life, the particulars of one can be taken with the other.

(ii) The 'dīkṣā' or the ceremonial undertaking to perform a sacrifice involves certain restrictions on the gratification of hunger, thirst and other worldly desires. Similarly, it is expected of a man who wishes to treat his entire life as a sacrifice to exercise caution and control over his appetites and desires. (iii) A sacrifice ends with a bath which is known as the 'Avabhṛta-snāna'; naturally, death being the end of life, it is spoken of as being such a bath of this sacrifice in the form of human life.

1. If anyone while performing this sacrifice in the form of human life is overcome by disease or suffers from distress, he should thus pray: 'Oh Prānas, oh Rudras, bless me by uniting this morning savana of my life to the noon savana' etc.; and if he feels that he is about to die, he should meditate on the mantra addressed to the person in the sun thus: 'You are imperishable, you are without decay, you are the subtle essence of the prānas'. One who does this and knows the life as a sacrifice lives for 116 years (Chā. 3, 16).

2. The body is the bundle of sticks known as samidhās; the chest is the vedi or the place of fire; hair are the darbhagrass; crest-hair on the head are a handful of kuśa-grass; the heart is the sacrificial post to which the animal to be sacrificed is tied; desires are the ghee to be offered in the fire; anger is the animal to be sacrificed; penance is the fire; control on the senses is the coins to be paid in charity; speech, eye, ear, mind, and prānas are priests; and the morning, the noon, and the evening are the three savanas; and death is the final bath.
To this we reply that this is not possible, because the two sacrifices are not the same. The Taittiriyakā, for instance, speaks of a sacrifice in the case of those who have realized the Ātman, and gives us besides the yajamāna and his wife, a long list of particulars such as Vedi, veda, yūpa, etc. and explains what they mean. The Chāndogya, on the other hand, makes no mention of these. Similarly, the conception of the three savanas in the two places is different from each other. No doubt, there are a few points in which there is agreement; e. g., death is considered by both as the final bath in the sacrifice. But the points in which the two Upaniṣads differ are so many, that it becomes impossible to say that the two vidyās are one and the same.

Besides, the Taittiriyaka does not speak of the human life itself as the sacrifice, as the Chāndogya does. For the words 'tasya evam viduṣāh yajnasya' (तस्येवम् विदुषो यज्ञस्य) give us without any difficulty the primary meaning, viz., 'of a sacrifice which belongs to one who knows', and not the secondary meaning, viz., 'of the sacrifice in the form of the person himself who knows'. And as the rule is, wherever we can have the primary meaning readily and easily, we need not take the secondary meaning. If the words 'viduṣāh' and 'yajnasya' are both taken as substantives, the whole phrase should mean for us the sacrifice itself in the form of the person who knows. On the contrary, if we take the word 'viduṣāh' as a substantive, and the word 'yajnasya' as an adjective the whole phrase will mean for us, as for the Taittiriyaka, the sacrifice which belongs to a person who knows or has realized the Ātman. Thus we need not take the two genitives as co-ordinates between two substantives and understand that a man himself or his life is a sacrifice, as is done in the Chāndogya. On the other hand, if we take one of them as an adjective and the other as a substantive, we shall have the real connection of the sacrifice with the man who knows, as in the Taittiriyaka. Besides, the description that the 'self of him who knows is the yajamāna etc.', clearly shows that
the man himself is not the sacrifice, but that, on the contrary, the man and the sacrifice are different from each other. To say that man himself is the sacrifice, and to say again that the self of the man is the sacrificer is to endow one and the same sentence with two different meanings. But what the Taittirīyaka wants to convey to us in the passage regarding the sacrifice, which the person who has realized the Ātman performs, is not something new, but is the continuation of the knowledge of the Ātman and of the samnyāsa referred to in the previous passage. The single conclusion we therefore get from both the passages is that such a man is raised to the dignity of the Brahman. As opposed to this, the puruṣa-vidyā of the Chāndogya is an independent one, inasmuch as it results into an independent fruit of it, viz., that the life of the man continues up to one hundred and sixteen years. In short, the vidyās of the Chāndogya and of the Taittirīyaka being different from each other, the particulars regarding prayer, mantra and so on, mentioned in the Chāndogya, cannot be combined with the vidyā mentioned in the Taittirīyaka.

14 वेदायाधिकरणम्। (२५) 
वेदायाधयंभेदात्। २५

[Vedha-adi—piercing and other things; artha—meaning; bhedat—on account of difference.]

Piercing and other things being different (mantras etc. are not included in the vidyās). 25

The Ātharvanikas have at the beginning of their Upaniṣad the following mantra: 'Pierce the entire (body of my enemy), pierce his heart; break his veins, and crush his head; in these three ways, (let my enemy be crushed).' The Tāndins have the mantra addressed to the sun with the prayer to enable them to perform the sacrifice. The mantra in the Upaniṣad of the Śātyāyanins praises Indra as 'being azure in complexion like the sapphire, and as having a white horse'. The Kaṭha
and the Taittirīyaka implore the Sun and the Varuṇa to bring in prosperity (Tai. 1, 1); the Vājasaneyins mention the pravargya-ceremony after describing the assembling of gods for the purpose of a sacrifice; and praising the agniṣṭoma and the day on which it is performed as Brahman themselves, the Kauṣitaki praises the Brahmins also as passing unto Brahman, and as being immortal thereby. Now, the question to be solved is whether the mantras and the sacrifices mentioned in the Brāhmaṇa-passages should be combined with the Vidyās in the Upaniṣads or not.

The pūrvapakṣin maintains that they can be so combined, even though they are not subordinate because they are mentioned in close proximity of the vidyās in the Upaniṣads. It may be that actions like pravargya and the mantras which are connected with the sacrifices may not appear as connected with the vidyās; and yet we can imagine some meaning on account of which they may be so connected. The Ātharvāṇika mantra, for example, may be considered as glorifying the heart and connected therefore with the vidyās which consider the heart as the abode of Brahman for the sake of meditation. There are again some mantras which are directly enjoined as being subordinate to certain vidyās. For instance, the mantra, which enjoins the father to surrender unto the Bhūloka for the sake of long life to his son, is subordinate to the vidyā which consists in imagining the three worlds of Bhūh, Bhuvah, and Svah, as sheaths or bodies of the soul (Chā. 3, 15, 3). Sacrificial acts like pravargya are no doubt enjoined for some special occasions; but they too may be seen to be connected with the vidyās. Bṛhaspatisava, for instance, is a sacrifice which is to be performed by one who wishes to be an Ācārya; but it is also enjoined to be performed as a subordinate part of the Vājapeya sacrifice.

To this we reply. The mantras and the ceremonies like pravargya cannot be combined with the vidyās, because the subject-matter of the two is different from
each other. It is by no means true that the Ātharvanika mantra has glorification of the heart as its only motive. It clearly indicates some hurt to the enemy, and so cannot be combined with the vidyās of the Upaniṣads which are concerned with meditations. The mantra of the Tāṇḍins, in a similar way, refers to some sacrifice and not to any vidyā; and we know by other means of proof that it refers to Vājapeya-sacrifice.¹ So when on account of sign (liṅga), or syntactical connection (vākya), or some other cause, the mantras are proved to be subordinate to sacrificial actions, they cannot also be said to be connected with the Upaniṣadic vidyās, simply because the two are described in close proximity. For as the Pūrva-Miṁāṁsā tells us (3, 3, 14), proximity is a much weaker proof than Sruti and other proofs.² Naturally,

1. For it is in the Vājapeya-sacrifice that one is enjoined to give offerings to the Sun-god, three times in a day.

2. Sruti is that word which does not require any other word to support its meaning; Liṅga or sign is that word which has the power of conveying the meaning of the word of Sruti; Vākya or sentence is a collection of words which together mean one complete sense, on account of their mutual relations; Prakaraṇa or the subject-matter is made up of one principal sentence, and of other expository subordinate sentences; Sthāna is the order to be determined with reference to the place of the word; and Samākhya or the name is that which indicates the meaning of the word as determined by its connection with what is proximately told.

Now, (1) if there is a conflict between Sruti and liṅga, Jaimini tells us that we should be guided by Sruti and not liṅga; for whereas Sruti gives us direct evidence, the liṅga gives us only indirect or mediate one. Ṛṣiṣya ēśvāpiṣṭhitāh कहते तत्र कहते ['Indra'] directly tells us that the hymn addressed to Indrā should also be used in praying to the Fire known as Gārhapatya, and not to Indra only though there is the suggestion made by the word ‘Indra’ in it that the hymn is to be addressed to the latter. (2) When there is a conflict between Vākya and liṅga, we should rely on the former and not on the latter. Now, the mantra, स्त्रोल्ये संध्व समस्य धृतस्य पाखया हुसैन्कं कल्याणं तिस्त्रित सांद्र, अमृते प्रतितिभिष्म व्रीष्टिणा नेम तुस्मनस्मानाः, is no doubt made of two sentences, one ending with the word कल्याणम्, and the other by the words following it. The
it will be wrong to hold on an evidence of lesser value that ceremonies like pravargya can be connected with the vidyās, when on the strength of stronger evidence first sentence informs us that a beautiful house is being made out of the continuous pouring of ghee; and the second is the request to the cake of rice to reside peacefully in that immortal house. As the two sentences refer to the same purodāsa of rice, it may be said that the whole of the mantra or the compound vākya must be recited on both the occasions of giving expression to the intention of making a house, as well as on the occasion of making the request to reside. But we must remember that the purpose of making the house is indicated fully by the first part of the sentence, and the request to lodge in it by the second part of it. In other words, neither the making of the house nor the request to lodge, requires the whole of the compound sentence for its being indicated. So, instead of superfluously reciting the two parts of the mantra as a whole twice, we should recite them separately and exclusively as sufficient indications or signs of the two purposes. (3) When there is a conflict between prakarana and vākya, we should rely on the latter as being more powerful in evidence than the former. In the topic dealing with sacrifices known as daršeṣṭi and paurnama-seṣṭi, there is the mantra, ‘Let Indra and Fire take away the offering’. The context therefore shows that the mantra is to be used in both the sacrifices. But as both the deities are available only in daršeṣṭi, and Indra only in the other, it is clear that the mantra-vākya refers to daršeṣṭi only. If we apply it to Paurnamāseṣṭi also, we shall have to imagine the presence of a new deity, viz., Fire. (4) Similarly, the context is more reliable than the order or position of words. The story how Śunahṣepa, the son of a sage, was saved from being sacrificed by the god Varuṇa, as well as the playing at dice are narrated in close proximity to somayāga which is a part of the larger context of a sacrifice known as Rājasūya. Naturally, not proximity but context is the factor which determines the connection and the meaning. (5) And finally, proximity is more reliable than a suggestive name. शंद्रव्यं दैव्याय कर्मेः is a mantra which tells us to cleanse the pots to be used in a sacrifice. It is stated in close proximity to Sānnayya sacrifice, mentioned in Paurodāsika-kānda, i.e. a section dealing with actions referring to purodāsa. So one may think that the cleansing of pots refers to the pots in connection with the purodāsa (a rice-cake); but the real meaning is that the pots relating to Sānnayya are to be cleansed. (Vide Bapat, B. S. Bhā. Vol. III, Pp. 337–39.)
they can be shown as having the force of injunctions for certain occasions only. No doubt the matter would have remained undecided if there was no means of distinguishing between strong and weak means of proof or evidence. But Jaimini has supplied us with all the criteria for making this distinction. So we conclude that the mere fact that certain mantras and ceremonies are mentioned in close proximity to the Upaniṣadic vidyās, does not establish their connection with the latter. That all of them were studied in the forests is simply an accident, and is perhaps the reason why the mantras and the ceremonies are mentioned in close proximity to the vidyās.

15 हान्यतिकरणम् । २६
हानौ द्वायनशब्देशत्वातुकुशाट्यदस्तुत्युपगानवचदुक्तम् । २६

[ Hānau—in abandoning; tu—as to; upāyana—taking; śabda—word; śeṣatvāt—on account of what remains; kuśā—a very small stick made of a tree known as ‘audumbar’; chandas—metre; stuti—a praise; upagāna—singing; vat—like; tād; uktam—is stated. ]

When the abandoning (of merits and demerits is mentioned, their acceptance by others is also implied) on account of acceptance being supplementary (to abandoning). This is stated by Jaimini, and is like Kuśās, metres, praise and singing. 26

In the Upaniṣad of the Tāṇḍins we read the following passage: ‘Just as a horse shakes his body and thereby removes his old hair and dust, or just as the moon which is eclipsed comes out of the mouth of Rāhu and shines, even so do I leave away the sinful body, and being pure, I attain the eternal Brahman’ (Chā. 8, 13, 1). The Ātharvāṇikas, in a like manner, say: ‘The wise man shakes off the good and the evil and reaches the highest Brahman’ (Mu. 3, 1, 3). The Sātyāyanins tell us that ‘When the wise man dies, his sons take away his wealth, and his friends and enemies take away his merits and—
demerits respectively'. And, similarly, the Kauśītakins tell us that 'The wise man shakes off his good and evil deeds; but those of his relatives who love him take away the good, and those who do not, the evil' (Kau. 1, 4). Out of these four Sruti-passages, the first two state that the good and the evil are both shaken off; the third states that the good and the evil are inherited by his friends and enemies respectively; and the fourth mentions both these facts of the wise person, viz., the shedding of the good and the evil, and the acceptance of these by his friends and enemies. Now, in the fourth passage, where both the facts of 'abandoning' and 'taking' are mentioned, there occurs no question to be solved; nor in the third passage, where 'taking' alone is mentioned, and 'abandoning' is not mentioned; for the taking away of a thing by any one is not possible without its first being abandoned by some other. But in the first two passages which mention the 'hāna' or the shaking off the evil and the good, we have the problem to solve, viz., whether the 'hāna' implies a corresponding 'grahāṇa' or inheritance to the good and evil, afterwards. The pūrvapakṣin holds that we cannot infer the 'grahāṇa', because, in the first place, it is not explicitly stated in the Sruti-passages. Secondly, the grahaṇa mentioned in the Kauśītaki refers to another vidyā; and thirdly since the abandoning of the good and evil deeds is to be achieved by one person, and the obtaining of them by others, there is no necessary connection between the two. One may abandon the good and evil; but this does not necessarily mean that another person must catch hold of them.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies that, since there is an explicit statement in the Kauśītaki about the relation of grahaṇa and hāna, we have to suppose that 'grahaṇa' is necessarily connected with the 'hāna', and that therefore the existence of the former is implied even though it is not separately mentioned after the latter, in the Chāndogya and other Sruti. If it were a question of

1. The vidyā is known as Paryaṇka-vidyā.
deciding whether what is enjoined in one place is or is not to be included in another place, we could have done so by referring the question to the identity or difference of the vidyās. But so far as the topic under discussion is concerned, neither the giving up nor the sharing of the good and evil deeds is an act which is enjoined to be performed. They are mentioned, on the contrary, only to serve the purpose of eulogising the very great glory of the vidyā, possessing which the wise men wash off the merits and the demerits which are responsible for this samsāra, and which, after his death, pass on to his friends and enemies. It may now be pointed out that statements regarding the abandoning or transfer of the merits and demerits, may both be subservient to the vidyā, inasmuch as, being only statements of praise, they are known as ‘arthavāda’ sentences. But how can an ‘arthavāda’ sentence itself be subservient to another of the same type? We reply that there is nothing wrong in it. In the Čāndogya also (2, 10, 5) we get an example of this; the statement that the sphere of the Sun is the twenty-first is an arthavāda, but we get the proof of this only when we make it dependent on another arthavāda which tells us that the first twenty are the twelve months, the five seasons (Hemanta and Sīśira being counted as one

1. The vidyā here spoken of is the Paryaṅka-vidyā, or ultimately the Atma-vidyā, or the Brahma-vidyā itself. It may appear strange how, in the first place, the merits and demerits of a man who has realized the Brahma pass on to others, and how, secondly, this adds to the glory of the vidyā. It cannot be said of one, who realizes the Brahma, that he must be wishing that his sins especially should pass on after his death to his enemies, just as it can be said that the spirits of the dead get the satisfaction of having tasted the food which his relatives distribute on earth with a desire to please them. This however can be explained thus: The friends and enemies of the person, who has realized Brahma-jñāna, cannot be said, even during the lifetime of the latter, to have literally a share in his punya and pāpa. What is meant is that they get in return for their good services or hatred done unto the man, a result similar in character to the punya and pāpa of the man.

V. E. 14
season) and the three worlds. Similarly, we find that the sentence in the Bārṣa-brāhmaṇa, that the two hymns in triṣṭup metre serve the purpose of the sense-organs in a sacrifice which is imagined as a person, cannot have any meaning unless it is connected with another sentence of the Vājasaneyika, viz., 'triṣṭup indeed is the sense-organ'. Besides, if the motive of the Sūtrakāra were simply to show that the passing on of the merits and demerits is to be combined with the giving up of them, he would have remained satisfied by saying that the former is implied in the latter, as he has done on the previous occasion while dealing with the qualities of the vidyās. But, here, the motive is also to show that the vidyā is extolled more by being told about the passing on of the merits and demerits to others than by being told about the abandoning of them merely.

This is analogous to the following. The wooden matches, known as Kuṣas and used to count the hymns recited by the priest, are prepared from trees in general, as the Bhāllavins tell us in their mantra, 'Oh Kuṣas, children of the trees, protect us'. But the mantra of the Sātyāyanins, on the other hand, tells us that Kuṣas are made out of the Audumbara tree. Similarly, when the Paiṅgis mention it explicitly that the metre of the gods has got a priority over the nine lettered metre of the demons, we have got as if a general rule to decide the order of succession. Similarly, the question regarding the proper time of singing the praise of the Śoḍaśi-cup is said to be settled by what the Rgvedins have said, viz., that it is to be sung when the sun has risen half, even though the question remains unsettled elsewhere. Similarly, again, even if other Śrutis mention that the priests sing, the explicit statement of the Bhāllavins is that the chief priest does not sing. Now, if we are to avoid contradiction and bring out a meaning which is conformable to all the Śrutis, we must follow as far as possible the guidance of a particular Śruti which is definitely explicit on the point of dispute. If, however, this is not possible,
we have to adopt alternative meanings as we like and resolve the contradiction, as is made clear in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, 10, 8, 15.

Or the Sūtra can be explained in a different way. What do we mean by ‘vidhūnāna’ or ‘shaking’ in the passage? The pūrvapāksin may hold that it means the trembling, as occurs in the case of the flags on account of the wind, and so the passage may mean that on account of their tremor, the good and the evil deeds are unable to produce the results for a certain period of time. To this, however, we reply that ‘vidhūnāna’ must be taken in the sense of abandoning, since it is further connected with the act of accepting the good and evil deeds by others. And there would be no transfer of anything unless it is first abandoned by some one, even though it does not follow that a thing abandoned must be necessarily taken by another. Besides, the fact of ‘grahana’, which is explicitly mentioned in close proximity to ‘hāna’ by one Sruti, is sufficient to guide us, as a general rule, that it is likewise mentioned by other Srutis. Again, the good and the evil deeds can hardly be said to tremble, as if they are substantial things like flags. One and the same root may have different meanings; the word ‘vidhūnāna’ can, therefore, mean, without contradicting any Smṛti, the abandoning of something, and so the Brāhmaṇa-passage will accordingly mean the abandoning of the evil, after the manner of the horse which first shakes its hair and then abandons its old hair and dust thereby.

16 सांपरायांविकरणम् | (२७–२८)
सांपराये तर्तवायामावात्वा हन्ये | २७

[Sāṃparāye—while departing; tartavya—what is fit to be obtained; abhāvat—on account of absence; tathā—like it; hi—also; anye—others.].

1. One Śruti enjoins the drinking of the ṣoḍaśi-cup; another prohibits it. In a rare case like this where no reconciliation is possible, we have the option of doing one way or the other.
Since there is nothing to be achieved (on the way beyond, he abandons the good and the evil) even while departing (from the body); others also (tell!) the same. 27

In the Kauśitaki Upaniṣad we get an account of Paryaṅka-vidyā, where we are told how the wise man travels by the road of the gods and comes to the region of the Fire, and how on arriving at the river Viraja (dispassion) he crosses it mentally and abandons his good and evil deeds (Kau. 1, 3-4). The question which arises here is whether he gives up the good and the evil on his way to Brahman, or even at the time of his departure from the body.

The pūrvapakṣin relies on the letter of the Sruti and says that the former alternative is correct. The Śūtrākāra, however, replies that there remains nothing to be achieved on the way after death for one who has got true knowledge, and so there remains no purpose for which the good and the evil should remain beyond death as means to achieve an end. As a matter of fact, the results of good and evil deeds are contrary to the result of knowledge; for it is by the power of knowledge that they are destroyed. And this freedom from works is obtained by a person in the very moment in which he comes to have the knowledge of Brahman; and this moment may come far before the crossing of the river, Viraja. This is borne out to be true by what the Tāṇḍins and the Sātyāyanins have said, as we have already seen, regarding the shaking off the good and the evil deeds even before the time of death.

1. The Hiranyagarbha or Saguṇa Brahman is conceived as sitting along with Prakṛti on the couch of Prāṇa. And then we get the description of how the wise man who travels by the road of the gods gets in succession the smell, the taste, and the lustre of Brahman as he approaches, a pippal tree, a beautiful region, and a palace known as ‘aparājita’, respectively. Indra and Prajāpati praise his glory and pass away from him. While ascending the couch in order to sit by the side of Brahman, he is to say to the Brahman, if he is asked as to who he is, that he is the same as Brahman (Kau. 1, 3-5).
Because (the effort is possible) according to liking, (and) because both (the cause and effect) do not contradict (there occurs freedom from good and evil deeds at the time of death).

Freedom from good and evil deeds cannot take place after death and after one has entered on the path of the gods. For, in the first place, there will be after death no possibility of efforts such as, control, penance, and study, which are necessary for obtaining the freedom; and secondly, in the absence of efforts there will be no such freedom. But, on the contrary, we can very well assume that both the efforts and the freedom that may result therefrom, are possible while the man is still living. So, in keeping with what the Tāṇḍins and Sātyāyanins have said, we hold that the wise man leaves his good and evil deeds at the time of his departure from the body.

The meaning of the path (of the gods can be had) in two ways; since, otherwise there will be contradiction.

In certain Śruti-passages which deal with saguna-Brahma-vidyās, we find that the devayāra-mārga or the path of gods is mentioned in close proximity to the abandoning of good and evil deeds, referred to in the preceding Sūtra, while in the Śruti passages which deal with nirguna Brahman we find no such mention. In view of this, are we to hold that the path of the gods is available for the wise man in all the cases, or only in
some cases? The pūrvapākṣin says that just as the freedom from the good and the evil deeds is always assumed to be followed by the transfer of these to the friends and enemies of the wise man, even so the path of the gods must be assumed to follow the abandoning of the deeds in all cases.

To this we reply that it is impossible to hold that the path is available in all cases. For we shall have then to admit what is contrary to reason, that even those persons, who ‘freeing themselves from good and evil, and from passions, reach the highest unity’ (Mu. 3, 1, 3), are going as it were by the path to some other place. The highest kind of unity can never be reached by locomotion, but by freedom from all desires, and so, in this case, the path of the gods has no meaning at all.

उपपन्नस्तहक्कणार्थोपलब्धेऽलोकवात् | २०

[Upapannah—appropriate; tat-laksanā—indication of that; arthah—meaning; upalabdheh—being available; lokavat—like ordinary experience.]

As there are things, for which (utility of) that (path) is indicated, it is appropriate (to hold both the views about the path; this is) like ordinary experience. 30

We are justified in holding that the devayāna has, or has not a purpose according to the nature of a particular case. It has a purpose to serve where meditation on the saguna Brahman is concerned. The various results, such as the mounting on the couch of the Brahman and having a conversation with it, and the obtaining of the odour and taste of Brahman, as mentioned in the paryanka-vidyā are possible by going only to other places. But the path has no purpose to serve in the case of the right knowledge. For those who realize the knowledge of the unity of the Ātman, find all their desires fulfilled, and the seed of all suffering completely burnt here only in their life on earth. They have to wait for nothing else except the falling away of the body, with which they have been endowed
for enjoying the fruits of their past deeds, and thereby exhaust them in the same life. This is like saying that a road to a village is useful for one who has to go to that village, but is useless for the man who wishes to have freedom from illness. We shall deal however with this topic again in the fourth adhyāya.

18 अनियमाधिकारणम्। (३१)
अनियमः सर्वायामविरोधः शब्दानुमानामस्याम्। ३१

[A-niyamah—no rule; sarvāsām—of all; a-virodhaḥ—no contradiction; śabda-anumānābhyaṁ—on account of Sruti and inference.]

(The path) cannot (be connected) as a rule to all (the vidyās; for in this way, there will be) no contradiction; (this is known) from Sruti and inference (i.e. Smṛti). 31

We have seen that the path of the gods has some meaning with reference to saguṇa vidyās, but has no meaning with reference to the nirguṇa Atma-vidyā. It is to be further noted that it is mentioned in some vidyās only, such as the paryaṅka-vidyā, the paṅcāgni-vidyā, the upakosal-vidyā, and the dahara-vidyā; but it is not mentioned in the madhu-vidyā, the Sāndilya-vidyā, the śoḍaśakāla-vidyā, and the vaiśvānara-vidyā. Are we now to say, in view of this, that the path is to be connected with only those vidyās where it is mentioned, and not with those where it is not mentioned?

The pūrvapakṣin holds the former view; for, in the first place, it is the particular context which compels us to restrict the connection of the path to the vidyās in which it is mentioned. Secondly, we shall not only be going beyond the authority of the Sruti, but shall be inserting anything in any place, if we consider that the path is connected with all the vidyās, even though it is not mentioned. Thirdly, the same description of the path as made up of light and so on, in the upakosal and
the pañcāgni-vidyās would amount to a useless repetition, if the path is to be presumed as being equally applicable in all the vidyās.

It is quite appropriate, we say in reply, that the path of the gods should have a place in all those vidyās which aim at achieving 'abhyaḍāya' that is, the place of high eminence or the Brahmāloka'. When we have Sruti and Smṛti in favour of this conclusion, the objection that the context is contradicted thereby does not stand; for as we have already seen while discussing Sūtra 25, Sruti is more reliable than context. And, therefore, the reference in the Chāndogyaopaniṣad to 'others also who have faith and practise penance', immediately after the statement, 'Those who worship the worlds like heaven and others in the form of fire obtain the path of the gods' (5, 10, 1), is sufficient to indicate to us that the word 'others' mean the persons who are devoted to other forms of saṇganna-vidyās. It need not be said that we have here a reference only to faith and penance, and not to vidyās; for the path of the gods can never be attained by mere faith and penance unless they have the support of the knowledge of some saṇganna-vidyā or other. The Satapatha-brāhmaṇa is explicit on this point: 'the place from which all the desires return is attained by knowledge; those who go by the southern path, (i.e., those who are devoted to mere works) and those who practise austerities without any knowledge do not reach that place.' (10, 5, 4, 14). So it is clear that the words 'faith and penance' stand for other vidyās.

Similar is the view of the Vājasaneyins also. The reference to 'persons who know', and 'to persons in

1. The word 'abhyaḍāya' here excludes those vidyās which abound in mere activity and mundane prosperity.

2. The original word in Sanskrit is 'anumāna', meaning inference. But as both inference and Smṛti are dependent upon pratyakṣa, and have therefore the same value, anumāna is taken in the sense of Smṛti.
forests who faithfully worship the Satya or Brahman, is a two-fold reference to pañcāgni-vidyā and to other vidyās (Br. 6, 2, 15). As opposed to this, the Upaniṣad tells us that those who do not know either of the two paths, the devayāna and the pitryāna, are reduced to the miserable condition of being born as worms, flies, etc. (Br. 6, 2, 16). This tells us, in the first place, by way of implication, that those who know the vidyās go by one of the two paths; and it tells us, secondly, that those who know the pañcāgni-vidyā or other forms of worshipping the Satya go by the path of the gods only. The Bhagavadgītā too mentions the two paths as being eternal: but one of them, viz., the bright path of the gods leads us to a place from which there is no return; while the other, viz., the dark path of the fathers compels us to return to samsāra (8, 26).

Finally, we have to remember that the repetition regarding the details of the path of the gods in the pañcāgni-vidyā and in the upakosala-vidyā is meant for the purpose of bringing strength to our meditation. So the conclusion we reach is that the scope of the path of the gods should not be restricted only to those vidyās in which it is mentioned.

19 यावद्धिकाराधिकरणम् (32)
यावद्धिकारमतस्तितिराधिकारिकारणाम् | 32

[ Yāvad—so long; adhikāram—office; avasthitih—duration of life; ādhikārikānām—of those who hold some office. ]

Those who hold some office live as long as the office lasts. 32

Let us now look into the question whether the person who has realized the true knowledge obtains or not a new body after the fall of the old one. It may be said that there need not arise any such question; for when

1. The word 'Satya' is used for Brahman in Tai. 2, 1; Chā. 6, 8, 7, Br. 5, 4, 1:- It is 'knowledge, the infinite Brahman', 'The Atman'; and 'the Truth'. 
the knowledge is there it must result in mokṣa, i. e., in the final release of the soul, just as inevitably as there will be the cooked rice when all that is necessary for it is being done, or the satisfaction of having dined after one has begun eating. But there arises such a question, we hold, because we learn from itihāsa and purāṇas that some persons have obtained new bodies even though they had realized the Brahman. For example, we are told that the ancient teacher of the Vedas, the sage Apāntaratama, was born again as Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana by the order of Viṣṇu, in the intervening period between the two yugas of the Dwāpara and the Kali. Vaśiṣṭha, born of the mind of Brahmadeva, was again created by Mitra and Varuṇa, after he had lost his former body by the curse of Nimi. Similarly, Bhṛgu and others born of the mind of Brahmadeva were born again at the sacrifice of Varuṇa. Sanatkumāra too who was one of the sons born of the mind of Brahmadeva, was again born as Skanda, as a consequence of his own boon to Rudra. We hear in the same way that Nārada, Dakṣa and others had to assume new bodies again and again. Even in the mantras and arthavādas1 of Śruti we find similar stories narrated. It is said that out of such persons, some have assumed a new body after the old one had perished; while the others, like a juggler, assumed new bodies even when they retained their old ones, on account of their yogic powers. And yet it is said that all of them possessed the entire knowledge of the Vedas. Taking all this into consideration, the pūrvapakṣin holds that Brahma-vidyā may or may not result in mokṣa.2

1. In view of the description of Indra as ‘the ram of Medhātithi’, it appears that Indra was born as a ram. Similarly, the arthavāda sentence, ‘Vaśiṣṭha was born as son to Urvaśī’, shows that he had a second birth.

2. What the pūrvapakṣin suggests is that if the knowledge of nirguṇa Brahman does not lead to mokṣa, it must be like other saguṇa Brahma-vidyās which have prosperity etc. as their end, and hence, the path of the gods may be equally available in the case of nirguṇa Brahma-vidyā. To Śaṅkara, mokṣa is possible only on account of the knowledge of nirguṇa Brahman.
We deny this. For we hold Apāntaratama and others are assigned with the duties of seeing that the worlds subsist and that the Vedas continue to exist. Naturally, their bodily existence will last so long as their offices will last. Just as the Sun-deity, after having ruled the universe for thousands of yugas, ceases to rise and set; but going high up beyond the sphere of the sun it rises there in its own glory and remains alone, and being one with Brahman enjoys the bliss of mokṣa (Chā. 3, 11, 1); or just as those who have realized the Brahman even in the present time, continue to exist in body only so long as the fruits of the actions which have commenced to operate are not completely exhausted (Chā. 6, 14, 2); even so do these office-bearers of the highest God remain in bodies inspite of their knowledge of Brahman so long as their works are not exhausted; but the moment their offices and duties are over, and they cast off their bodies, they become finally released.

So, whether it is in the case of men who have realized the Brahman, or in the case of these divine office-bearers who regulate the course of the universe, we have to remember that they live in the body only so long as it is not exhausted on account of the force of such Karmas as have commenced 1 to operate by yielding their

1. There are three kinds of Karmas, prārabdha, saṅcita, and kriyamāṇa i. e., (1) those which have commenced to give their fruit and so are responsible for all the good and bad experiences in life from birth to death; (2) those which constitute a big store, as if, and are therefore waiting for coming to fruition at some appropriate time in lives to come; and (3) those which are being done anew by the jīva in its present life, so that the fruits thereof are being added on to the big store of the past. Now, the distinction between those who know the Brahman and those who do not know it is this: The former cease to assume new bodies the moment their prārabdha karma which is also a cause of their body is exhausted; they are not bound by their sancita and kriyamāṇa; for they are for him as burnt seeds which do not grow. In the case of the latter, however, there being no such fire of Brahmanic knowledge the seeds of karmas are not burnt; they remain potent for all time, and the
or as we have it elsewhere, the Ātman never again appears to be affected by the afflictions which have been burnt by knowledge, just as the seeds burned by fire do not sprout again. Nor again can it be supposed that a portion of the store of saṅcita and of kriyamāṇa will be burnt, so that another portion of it may fructify in course of time; for we do not find even in ordinary experience that seeds are partly burned and are partly capable of sprouting again. But so far as the prārabdha is concerned, it continues to exist till death, just as an arrow which leaves the bow continues to move so long as its initial motion is not exhausted. The end of the body is the end of the prārabdha also. Or, as the Upanisad says, the little delay for the complete destruction of the prārabdha also is on account of the existence of the body (Chā. 6, 14, 2). In view of this all, we conclude that the higher beings like Vaśiṣṭha and others, endowed if they are with the knowledge of Brahman, live in body till their offices last, and that the knowledge of Brahman is not non-eternal.

As for the fruit of this knowledge, finally, Sruti tells us that whosoever among gods or sages gets the knowledge of the Ātman gets the final release (Br. 1, 4, 10). But if there be any even among the great sages who become attached to such knowledge as leads to prosperity, the knowledge of the Ātman and the final release cannot be had unless they divert their mind from the shortlived prosperity to the eternal Ātman. They have first to turn away with disgust from prosperity and to purify their mind, so that at the time of dissolution, when everything in the universe along with the Hiranyagarbha comes to an end, they enter into the highest abode, the Ātman. Another characteristic of the fruit of this knowledge is that it is directly experienced at the very moment of the experience of the knowledge, so that the knowledge and the fruit of it, namely, the mokṣa are one and the same.

1. The whole of the saṅcita as well as the whole of the kriyamāṇa are burnt. Prārabdha continues till death.
We have not to wait for it with an attitude of doubt as we do when we expect heaven and other rewards for our sacrifices and other activities. The knowledge of Brahman means 'Brahman which is directly realized' (Br. 3, 4, 1). The statement, 'Thou art that', (Chā. 6, 8, 7) has a direct reference to a fact which is already existing and can be experienced while living, and not to something which is going to be fructified after death. It is on this account that the sage Vāmadeva, 'realizing himself to be the Brahman, realized further that he was himself the Manu and the Sun' (Br. 1, 4, 10). This clearly indicates that the fruit of Brahmanic knowledge is to realize also the identity of one's self with all. This constitutes, therefore, we say in conclusion, the mokṣa of all who know.

\[20\] अक्षरव्यविधिकरणम् । (२३)
अक्षरियां त्वञ्जरोधः सामान्यतःवायाभयामोपदवन्तज्ञकम् । २३

[Akṣara—the imperishable; dhiyām—of knowledge; tu—but; avarodhaḥ—acceptance; sāmānyā-tadbhāvā-bhyām—on account of what is common and its nature; aupasada; vat—like; tad—that; uktam—said.]

But the (negative) conceptions of the imperishable (Brahman) should be applicable (in all passages), since (the manner of describing) is uniform, and since the object is the same; this is like aupasada, and has been explained by Jaimini. 33

The Vājasaneyins describe the Brahman as the Imperishable or the 'Aksara; it is neither gross, nor minute, nor short, nor long' etc. (Br. 3, 8, 8). The Atharvaṇa says, 'It is para-vidyā by which we know the Aksara, which is invisible, which cannot be seized, which is without cause or without quality' (Mu. 1, 1, 5-6). Similarly, in other places also, the highest Brahman or the Aksara is described in a negative manner, as bereft of all qualities. But we find that some qualities are denied in some places, and some others in other places. This raises the doubt whether we are to deny of Brahman all the
qualities in all the places, or some only in some places. According to the pūrvapakṣin, as Srutis are different, we must adopt the latter course.

To this we reply that all the negations apply in all places, inasmuch as everywhere Brahman is the only object which is described, and the way in which this is done is always by negation of qualities. We have already seen under Sūtra 3, 3, 11, that the positive attributes of Brahman can be taken together; even so the negative attributes can be predicated of Brahman at all places. Just as, following Jaimini, the subordinate thing of reciting the mantras depends upon the principal thing of offering the purodāsa in the Jāmadagnya sacrifice which lasts for more than one day; and therefore just as the mantras, which are mentioned in the Sāmaveda as being sung by the Udgātā, are actually sung in the Jāmadagnya sacrifice by the priest who follows the Yajurveda, even so the qualities of Aksara being dependent on Aksara only must be taken as being predicated of Aksara alone, even though they may not be mentioned in some places.

२१ इयद्विकरणम् | (२४)
ियद्वामननात् | २४

[ Iyat—limit; āmananāt—being told. ]

Limit being told (the vidyā is one only). 34

The Ātharvanikas and Svetāsvatarakas speak of "two birds as dwelling on the same tree; one of them eats the sweet fruits; the other looks on without eating" (Mu. 3, 1, 1; Sve. 4, 6). As for the Kāṭhakas, they say that these two, viz., the jīva and the Īśvara, 'who taste

1. The Sāmans are to be sung loudly; but when the chief priest happens to be a yajurvedin, they must be sung in a low tone as the latter is required to do according to his Veda (Pu. Mi. 3, 3, 9). Similarly, Brahman is the only chief object mentioned in all Srutis; to accept the combination of all the negative descriptions about it will therefore be consistent.
the fruits of their actions in this world and who have entered the cave of the heart, the excellent seat of the Brahman, are like shade and light. This is what those who know the Brahman say, as 'so those who keep the five fires and those who are trīnāciketas,' (Ka. 1, 3, 1). Now there arises the doubt whether the two mantras speak of two different vidyās or of one only. The pūrvapakṣin says that the vidyās are two, since the objects of knowledge in the two mantras are different. In the first, one of the two birds only eats the fruits, while in the second, both the beings do so.

To this we reply. The vidyā is one and the same, because in both the mantras, the object of knowledge is one and the same, as being characterized by the number 'two'. It is the highest God taken along with the individual soul. It is clear that the above-mentioned mantra whether of the Munḍaka or the Svetāsvatara refers to the highest Ātman because he is described as being beyond hunger and other desires. And, we are told about God alone in what comes immediately after the mantra, viz., 'The jiva becomes bereft of sorrow, when, on account of self-control and other yogic penances and devotion, he sees the other, viz., the God as himself, and everything else as the manifestation of himself' (Mu. 3, 1, 2; Sve. 4, 7). The Kāthaka mantra also refers to the highest Ātman, though he is mentioned in a poetic manner as tasting the fruits of actions like the individual soul; just as, in ordinary language, men who are not carrying umbrellas are said to carry them when they are mixed up with others who carry the umbrellas. And, if we take into consideration the preceding and the subsequent passages, we shall be convinced that the mantra which comes between the two is concerned with the same subject-matter of the Ātman. The topic begins with the description of 'that which is seen,' as being beyond

1. They are those who repeat the mantras told by Naciketas, understand their meaning, and keep the fire. These three things are known as three 'cayanas'.
dharma and adharma’, etc. (Ka. 1, 2, 14), and ends with the passage, subsequent to the mantra (Ka. 1, 3, 1), that the same object of sight ‘is the bridge for the sacrifices, and is the imperishable Brahman’ (Ka. 1, 3, 2). All this, as also what we have explained fully while dealing with Sūtra 1, 2, 11, points out that inasmuch as the object of knowledge is one and the same, viz., the Brahman, the vidyā is one. The object of the two mantras in the three Upaniṣads, then, is not to tell us that the individual soul is a new and separate entity, but to show that it is identical with Brahman. So, as we have already shown under the first Sūtra of the pāda, the Brahma-vidyā is one, and, therefore, the positive and the negative ways of describing it must be taken together in all places as pointing towards it only.

As in the collection of elements, the Ātman being inside (of all, the vidyā is one only). 35

We are told in the two successive Brāhmaṇas of the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, that Usāsta and Kahola ask of Yajñavalkya the same thing, viz., to expound unto them the Brahman which is directly perceivable, and is the inner self of all (Br. 3, 4, 1; 3, 5, 1). Now the doubt which arises here is whether the vidyā suggested by the two questions is one or two. The pūrvapakṣin thinks that they are two; for if the repetition of the word ‘yajati’, which means ‘performs a sacrifice’, shows that separate actions are done, even so the repetition of the same question, which adds or subtracts nothing from the earlier question, but which is not meant to be useless, must mean something new and separate.

To this we reply that the vidyā is one and not two, because the question and the answer in both the
Brāhmaṇa-passages refer to the same Atman within all. For it is impossible to imagine how one body can have within it more than one innermost Atman. We can say with regard to the five elements that water is inside the earth, that fire is inside water, and so on, relatively; but how can it be maintained in a literal sense that any one of the elements is inside all other elements? Or, we may understand the reference to the elements in the Sūtra as pointing to another Śruti-passage, ‘He is the one God, who is all-pervading, hidden and the internal self of all being’ (Sve. 6, 11). It is in keeping with this mantra that the Sūtrakāra wishes us to understand that the object of knowledge, and so, of the vidyā constituting it, is one and the same, viz., the Brahma-vidyā.

अन्यथा भेदाउपपत्तिचिन्ति केन्द्रोपदेशान्तरवत् | ३६

[ Anyathā—in another way; bheda—distinction; an-upāpattih—cannot be explained; iti cet—if it be said; na—not; upadesāntara—other statements; vat—like. ]

If it be said that otherwise there will be no explanation (of the repetition in the two Brāhmaṇa-passages), we reply (that this is) like other statements (elsewhere). 36

To refute now the contention of the pūrvapakṣin that the repetition of the question can be accounted for if the vidyās are admitted to be two, we maintain that the vidyā is one in spite of the repetition. In the sixth prapāṭhaka of the Upaniṣad of the Taṇḍins, Svetaketu is told nine times, ‘That is the Atman; thou art that’ (Chā. 6, 8, 7); and yet the vidyā is one. Again and again did Svetaketu ask for more explanation on the same point, and again and again he was told, with fresh explanations and removal of doubts, the same reply ‘Thou art that’. In the same way, in the present case also, the two questions have the same form, and the answers to them end with the same sentence, ‘Everything else is perishable’ (Br. 3, 4, 2; 3, 5). This shows that the two
Brāhmaṇa-passages refer to one and the same subject-matter. Besides, the additional word ‘eva’ (only) used in the second question, necessarily refers us back to the same question asked before. One and the same Ātman is therefore described in the first Brāhmaṇa as being without cause and effect; and one and the same Ātman as being unaffected by the samsāric qualities of hunger, thirst, and others, is described in the second.

23 व्यतिहाराविचिकरणम् । (37)
व्यतिहारो विशिष्टति हीतरवत् । 37

[Vyatihāraḥ—reciprocity; viśimśanti—mention the peculiar feature; hi—because; itara-vat—like others.]

Like other (qualities), there is the reciprocity (of the forms of meditation); for (both) mention their peculiarity. 37

The Aitareyins say about the person in the sun, ‘I am he, and he is I’ (Ait. Ār. 2, 2, 4, 6). The Jābālas say in a like manner, ‘Verily, oh divinity, thou art I, and I am thou’. The doubt which arises here is whether the form of meditation is reciprocal or not. The pūrvapāksa says that the form of meditation is of one kind only, since the sole purpose of it is to show the unity of the individual soul with God. Besides, he argues, that the devotee would indeed be exalted if he is to be considered as the essence of God; but to consider God as the essence of the devotee is to lower the dignity of God. The manner of stating the meditation in a reciprocal form, is, he says, only to strengthen the belief ¹ that the soul and God are one.

¹. The belief about the unity of man and God can be achieved even by the single statement, ‘I am God’; and so, it may be said that the other statement ‘God is I’ need not be mentioned at all. It is to prevent this argument that the pūrvapāksa says that the belief produced by one of the statements is only confirmed by the second.
To this we reply. The reciprocal manner of stating the unity is only for the purpose of meditation in both ways, just as other qualities of God, such as ‘being the soul of all’ are mentioned for the same purpose. For if the meditation is to be of one kind only, one of the two statements would have been sufficient. But inasmuch as both the Aitareyins and the Jābālas make an explicit statement of the two reciprocal forms of propositions, corresponding to them there must be two forms of meditations. This does not however imply, as the pūrvapakṣin supposes, the lowering of the status of God, since it is God alone who remains the object of devotion.¹ Nor does this amount to mere confirmation of our belief in the identity of God and man. For over and above the strengthening of our belief in the unity of the soul and God, what we hold is that the two Sruti-passages under discussion recommend to us the two forms of meditation, of the God as the devotee, and the devotee as God. This is like expressing the truth that to meditate on God whose wishes become facts is to believe in a God who is endowed with this nature.² From this it also follows that the reciprocal forms of meditation are available in other places where the subject-matter is the same.

1. Just as the nirguṇa Brahman does not suffer in its status, even though it is worshipped in the form of saguṇ Brahman, God too will remain God, even though he is identified with the devotee.

2. So the relation between God and the devotee is that of unity; and such a God exists in a double manner, as a fact and as an object for meditation.
Satya-vidyā being the same (in both the places) truth and other (qualities must be combined in both the places). 38

In the Vājasaneyaka Upaniṣad we have two sentences, the first of which recommends us to have knowledge of the Satya and to meditate on the three syllables1 of श, र, and य which go to form the word सत्य (satya). That sentence is, ‘One who knows this great, first-born, glorious Brahman as Truth’ etc. (Br. 5, 4, 1). The second sentence is, ‘That same truth is the Aditya, the person in the disc of the sun, and the person in the right eye’ (Br. 5, 5, 2). Now there arises the doubt whether the recommended satya-vidyā is one or two.

The pūrvapakṣin holds that the vidyās are two, for there are two different fruits to be connected with them. The fruit of ‘conquering the worlds’ is connected with the first vidyā of knowing the truth; and the fruit of ‘destroying evil’ is connected with the second vidyā of knowing the two persons in the sun and in the eye. Now, the connection of the two vidyās themselves which we find in the words, ‘that same truth’, also mentioned above, is due to the fact that the object of devotion in both the vidyās is one and the same.

To this we reply that the Satya-vidyā is one only on account of the connection of the second sentence with the first. There is no clear and sufficient reason to suppose that the vidyās are two. Can we then leave the question as undecided, and say that there may be

1. The syllable र is a constituent of the word अनुत which means falsehood. Therefore it is taken as standing symbolically for अनुत. But the other two syllables of the word सत्य; viz., श and य are not to be found in the word अनुत. Therefore they are taken to stand for Truth. But these being on both the sides of र, it is supposed that there is truth on both the sides of falsehood. Therefore it is supposed that a person who meditates on श, र, and य or सत्य is not affected by अनुत or falsehood, which is, as if, overcome by the two forces of truth.—Abhyankar Śāstrī, Vedānta Sūtras, Marāṭhī trans. p. 1231.
one or two vidyās? But we have not only the connection between the two sentences, but also the certain indication that the object of devotion is one and the same, viz., the truth. We therefore hold that the vidyā dealing with it is also one. As for the two different results, we reply that the second result of the vidyā is mentioned in connection with the arthavāda portion of the passage which tells us the secret names of ‘ahar’ and ‘aham’ of the two persons in the sun and the eye, respectively. It is stated, in other words, to glorify a new aspect of the vidyā, viz., that the two persons have secret names. We could have admitted that the vidyās are two, if the results referred to were mentioned as different in a vidhi-vākya; but if the results are to be inferred from arthavādas, then all of them must necessarily be connected with the one chief vidyā. So the conclusion we reach is that the vidyā referred to in both the places is one and the same, in spite of the difference in details, and that all the qualities therefore mentioned about it, such as, truth, and others, are to be understood as useful for a single act of meditation.

According to some commentators the present Sūtra does not refer to the two passages of the Brhadāraṇyaka, but refers to one of them which deals with the two persons in the sun and the eye (5, 5, 2), and to an exactly similar passage from the Chāndogya (1, 6, 6); and the conclusion arrived at is that the two passages of the two

---

1. As an arthavāda sentence is subservient to a vidhi-vākya, the fruits connected with the former are necessarily connected with the latter. It is possible, of course, that the fruit of a vidhi-vākya is known from an arthavāda. For instance, the obtaining of heaven as the fruit of the jyotiṣṭoma-sacrifice is known either directly from the vidhi-vākya, ‘One who intends to have heaven should perform a jyotiṣṭoma-sacrifice’, or indirectly from the arthavāda, ‘One who performs the jyotiṣṭoma gets heaven’. But, in other cases, where this is not possible, that is, where other fruits are mentioned in arthavāda, they all become subservient along with the arthavāda to the vidhi-vākya and its main fruit, and so, become connected with the latter.
Upanisads contain the same vidyā. But this is not correct. For the Chandogya-vidyā throughout refers to udgītha and other sacrificial acts. In the beginning, we are told that the 'Rk is the earth, and the Sāman is fire'; in the middle, 'Rk and Sāman are the joints of the udgītha'; and in the end, 'He who knows this sings a sāman' (1, 6, 1; 1, 6, 8; 1, 7, 9). But there is no such mark to show us that the Brhadāraṇyaka-vidyā is connected with sacrificial acts. Therefore, the vidyā of the two Upanisads are quite different from each other; and hence, the qualities of one cannot be connected with those of the other.

On account of (similarity of) abode and other things, (qualities) such as (possessing true) wishes (must be made applicable) in other places, and (qualities obtaining in other places, be made applicable) there (i. e., where wishes etc. are present). 39

The Chandogas tell us that 'There is in the city of the body a small lotus-like palace and within it a small ākāśa, i. e., the Ātman which is free from sin, old age, death, grief, hunger, and thirst, and whose desires and wishes become true' (Chā. 8, 1, 1; 8, 1, 5). The Vājasaneyins also tell us, 'It is this Ātman who is great, unborn, full of knowledge, surrounded by prānas, and is the ākāśa within the heart; he takes his rest in it and is the ruler of all' (Br. 4, 4, 22). Now a doubt arises whether the qualities mentioned in one place are available in another place, irrespective of the fact whether the vidyā is one or different. The pūrvapakṣin holds that they are available because the vidyā is one.

To this we reply. It is to be noted before we proceed that the word 'kāma' stands for 'satyakāma', just
as the words ‘Datta’ and ‘Bhāma’ are ordinarily used for Devadatta and Satyabhāma, respectively. The attributes, like ‘possessing true wishes’, or ‘being the ruler of all’, in the two passages, are mutually available where they are not mentioned. This is because the two passages exhibit a number of common features, such as the heart as the abode, the God as the object of knowledge and as the bridge to save the worlds from being confounded. The seeming difference between the two sets of qualities, viz., between the one belonging to the ‘ākāśa within the heart’, and the other to the Brahman which ‘resides in the ākāśa’, is no difference at all, if we remember that the word ‘ākāśa’ in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad also indicates Brahman, as was already shown under 1, 3, 14.

And yet we say that there is some difference between the two vidyās. The vidyā of the Chāndogya is that of saguna Brahman, because in the description of those ‘who depart from the body, after knowing the Ātman and its qualities, such as satyakāma, and others’ (Chā. 8, 1, 6), we get the clear indication that not only the Ātman but the qualities of the Ātman also become the objects of knowledge. The Vājasaneyaka Upaniṣad, on the other hand, speaks of nirguna Brahman, as is clear from the question of Janaka and the reply of Yājñavalkya to him. To the question, ‘What is it that is necessary for achieving mokṣa’, the reply is ‘the Puruṣa is not attached to anything’ (Br. 4, 3, 14–15). Therefore it is that we hold that even qualities such as ‘being the ruler of all’ mentioned in this Upaniṣadic passage do not point to any saguna Brahman, but are used for the purpose of glorifying the Ātman. It is with reference to the nirguna Brahman, on the other hand, that the same Upaniṣad speaks, further on, of the Ātman as ‘not this, not this’ (Br. 4, 5, 15). But, as said above, the qualities mentioned in one Upaniṣadic passage are available in the other, and vice versa, because, whether saguna or nirguna, Brahman being one, the qualities are intended for the glorification of Brahman rather than for the purpose of devotion.
26 आदराणिकरणम् । (४०-४१)
आदरालोपः । ४०

[Adarāt—due to respect; a-lopah—non-omission.]

No omission (of prāṇagnihotra); for (Sruti has) respect (for it). 40

In the Vaiśvānara-vidyā of the Chāndogyopaniṣad we are asked to offer to the prāṇas' five oblations out of the 'food which comes first' at the time of dinner. He who does this agnihotra gives satisfaction to all the beings in the several worlds and to the divinities such as the sun and the moon, in the same way in which a mother satisfies her hungry children (Chā. 5, 19, 1; 5, 24, 2; 5, 24, 5). There arises now the doubt whether this agnihotra is to be dropped when the eating itself is to be dropped. The pūrvapakṣin holds that it cannot be dropped, and the reason he gives for his view is the respect which Sruti shows for agnihotra in the following way.

In the Vaiśvānara-vidyā itself, the Jābālas allow the host to dine before the guest, for thereby the host will be able to perform the agnihotra for his own prāṇas, though not for the prāṇas of others. Now, how can the Sruti which, out of respect for agnihotra, does not allow the omission of its priority by allowing the host to dine before the guest, allow the omission of it altogether? The argument that absence of food implies the absence of agnihotra is not correct. For the words, 'the food which comes first', in the passage under discussion, serve the purpose of informing us that any food which the host can eat can be used as offering to the prāṇas, though the word 'agnihotra', here as well as in the

1. The five oblations are to the five-fold winds in the body, viz., prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, and samāna. These are given at the beginning of a dinner, and are known as prāṇagnihotra, i.e., a sacrifice of the food which comes first in the Vaiśvānara, i.e., in the abdominal fire, by means of the five prāṇas.

2. This is an arthavāda sentence in praise of the agnihotra.
ayana of the Kaundapāyins, suggests that the usual materials of milk and curds should be used. Hence, following Jaimini’s principle (Pu. Mi. Sū. 10, 2, 61), that the omission of a particular does not involve the omission of the principal thing, we conclude that even when there occurs the omission of a dinner, and the omission of food, we must observe the agnihotra, by substituting for it some other suitable material, such as water, as offering to the prānas.

In reply to this view of the pūrvapakṣin, the Sūtrakāra says.

उपस्थितेत्तस्तदवचनात् । ४१

[Upasthitē—when available; atah—from this; tad-vacanāt—on account of this being told.]

When (dinner) is available, (the agnihotra is to be performed) from that (food); for this is told (by Sruti). 41

When the offering to the prānas are to be made out of the ‘first food that comes in’, it is clear that the food is prepared for the purpose of being eaten independently of its being used afterwards for oblations, since it happens to be the first food. If the oblations are not the motive of preparing the food, how can they be supposed to induce us to use some other material for the food, when food is not available even for dinner? The use of any other material as offering in place of food, as also the other details of an agnihotra, in general, cannot be assumed to be applicable in the prāṅagnihotra just as they are in the agnihotra of the Kuṇḍapāyins. For

1. The Kaundapāyins are those who drink the soma-juice in a vessel known as Kuṇḍa. One of their sacrifices lasts for the whole of the ayana or year; and in this, they have to observe the agnihotra for one month. Now, though this is a peculiar agnihotra, the material used for offering in it need not also be peculiar; the same milk, curds, and so on, are used as in the ordinary agnihotra.
whereas in the latter case, we get the word 'agnihotra' in a statement which enjoins the Kundapāyins to perform their month-long sacrifice, in the former we get the word connected with an arthavākyā which is used for praising the act of making the five offerings to the five prānas, and which, therefore, is not an injunction at all. If, in spite of this, we say that all the details of an agnihotra in general, ought to be available in the prānāgnihotra also, we have to suppose the impossible. For we shall have then to make a place for fire, as also to keep fire in it; but we have to remember that the offerings are not to be made in the fire, but in the mouth. Otherwise, there would be no talk of the dinner and of the guests about whom the Jābālas speak. Besides, it is in view of this difference between the two that we have to imagine the other details of an agnihotra in the case of the prānāgnihotra. 'The chest is the altar; the hairs, the sacrificial grass; and the heart, the mind, and the mouth are the three fires known as, the Gārhapatiya, Anvāharyapacana, and the Āhavaniya respectively. Similarly, the two morning and evening timings of the agnihotra, as also the prayers and other things associated with it cannot be reconciled with the details of the prānāgnihotra.

From all this, as also from the mantras, the materials and the divinities connected with the prānāgni-hotra, we conclude that the five oblations are to be offered only when the food is available for dinner. As for the Jābāla-Sruti which is cited by the pūrvapakṣin in order to show its respect for prānāgnihotra, we have to remark that it only allows the host to dine before the guest, so that the host may be able to perform his prānāgnihotra. But it will be too much to expect this Sruti-passage to tell us that the prānāgnihotra is to be performed in all cases, even when there is no food, and no

1. 'Prānāya svāhā', 'apānāya svāhā', etc. are the mantras to be uttered at the time of offering oblations; the food is the material; and the five winds, prāna, apāna, vyāna, udāna, and samāna are the divinities to which the offerings are made.
occasion for dinner. We therefore conclude that with the omission of the food there will be the omission of the prāṇāgniḥotra.

27 तन्निकरणाविक्रणम् । (४२)

tanāṅkārāṇānidhāmyastadūḍḍaté: pūthaprabhātvibh: falam । ४२

[Tad—that; nirdhāraṇa—devotional act; a-niyamah—not certain; tad-drśteh—that being told by Šruti; prthag—separately; hi—for; apratibandhah—absence of hindrance; phalam—fruit.]

Meditations, mentioned with them (i.e. sacrificial acts) are not necessarily connected (with them), as is seen from Śruti; besides, (they have) separate fruits (such as, success in undertaking) with no hindrance. 42

Let us now inquire whether certain vidyās in the Vedānta, such as the meditation on Om as Udgītha (Chā. 1, 1, 1) which are mentioned in connection with some subordinate sacrificial acts, are, or are not necessarily connected with them, just as the ladle or the Juhū made of a leaf, and the pot known as ‘godohana’ are connected because they are used, respectively, on all occasions, or on some only. The pūrvapakṣin holds that the connection of the vidyā with the acts is a permanent one, since they are mentioned in what is narrated regarding the performance of these sacrificial acts. No doubt, the vidyās are not mentioned in certain specific topics dealing with sacrifices; but because they are connected with udgītha and others which are mentioned in sacrifices, it can be said that they, too, like the subordinate parts of a sacrifice such as the ladle, are connected with

1. The ‘Juhū’ is used to pour the offering of ghee in the fire. It is always made of a leaf, and is always used in a sacrifice, because one who uses it is said not to have an occasion of hearing evil words or news. The ‘godohana’, on the other hand, which is used as a pot for milking the cow is recommended for bringing water for a sacrifice, if one wishes to have cattle. So, the godohana is used sometimes only when there is the desire to possess cattle.
them, at all times. It may be said against this that the vidyās are independent of sacrifices, inasmuch as special results are mentioned to accrue from them. The ‘fulfilment of desires’, (Chā. 1, 1, 7), as the result of a vidyā indicates, for instance, that it is to be resorted to by one who wants his desires to be fulfilled, and not by one who does not. In other words, the vidyā is shown to be independent of the sacrifice. But, it is said in reply, by the pūrṇapakṣin that the statements indicating the results are arthavākyas like the arthavākya, which praises the jhū made of leaf by saying that ‘one who uses it does not hear any evil news’. None of these arthavākyas is intended to tell us what the fruit of the vidyā would be. And yet, just as the leafy nature of jhū becomes connected with the sacrifice through the jhū itself, even so the vidyās become constantly connected with the sacrifices.

To this we reply. Statements regarding the Udgītha such as, ‘It is the best essence, the fullfiller of desires, the prāṇa, the āditya, etc.’ (Chā. 1,1,3; 1,1,7), are shown by Sruti itself as not necessarily connecting the vidyās with the sacrificial acts. ‘Both, the persons who know and who do not know perform the sacrifice’ (Chā. 1, 1, 10). This is evident from what the sage Uṣāstī Cākrāyaṇa says to the three ignorant priests, the Prastota, the Udgātā, and the Pratihartā, viz., that their ‘heads would fall to the ground’ if they did their respective duties without knowing the deities which are connected with them (Chā. 1, 10, 9-11).

Another reason why the vidyās are not to be considered as a permanent feature of the sacrificial acts is that the devotion to the vidyās is said to have its peculiar, additional fruit over and above the different fruits of the sacrificial acts. It consists in having the fruits of sacrifices more easily than before, and without any obstacles. But this means that there is a difference between those who perform the sacrifices without reference to the knowledge of the vidyās, and those who perform
them along with the knowledge and the devotion to the vidyās. No doubt the former class of ignorant men get the fruits of their sacrifices, but the fruits which the latter class of learned men get is far superior in respect of quality to those of the former. But what all this means is that the vidyās and the sacrifices are not necessarily or permanently connected; on the contrary, the vidyās are dependent on men who have the option to employ them for the sake of deriving the fruits of the sacrifices in an unobstructed and easy manner. It therefore the learned class of sacrificers who, we are told, get the fruits of meditations on the different parts of the sāman. 'The worlds above and the worlds below bear their fruits for the sake of him' who knows the vidyās (Cha. 2, 2, 3).

Besides, it is not correct to say that these statements regarding the results of vidyās are mere arthavādas intended to glorify what is enjoined for being done. For over and above their being useful in the adjectival sense, they have also a substantive sense of their own. In the case of a prayāja, for instance, the fruits that are mentioned have got only an adjectival value; for prayāja is a necessary, permanent feature of a sacrifice known as darśapūṇamāsa. This is also true of the leafy juhū which is only a subordinate part of the sacrifice. It, too, like the prayāja, has no independent fruit of its own; but, as an arthavāda used to praise juhū, it comes to possess the fruit of 'freeing the person who uses it from

1. Every rāca of the Sāmaveda is sung with the prefix of the syllable of 'hum', which is known as himkāra. The rāca itself is divided in three parts. The first of it, known as Prastāva together with 'hum', is to be repeated by Prastotā. The second, known as Udgitha with the prefix Om, is to be repeated by Udgātā. The third part is known as 'pratihāra', and is to be repeated by Pratihartā. The word 'aṁ', or 'sāṁ', etc., which is affixed at the end of the rāca, is known as 'nīdhana', and is to be repeated by all. The five lokas known as heaven, sun, ākāśa, fire, and earth are contemplated on the above-mentioned five parts of the rāca, such as himkāra and so on.
hearing a bad news’. Godohana or the milking pot, on the other hand, has its independent use of bringing water in a sacrifice, though to use it so depends upon the particular desire to possess cattle. Similarly, the bilwa-wood, which comes as a subordinate part in a sacrifice, has its own independent fruit of providing the sacrificer with ample food, if he uses it for making a sacrificial post. But, as said above, the leafy juhū has no substantive meaning of its own; we cannot, therefore say, at the same time, that the juhū possess the leafy character, and that it aims to have its fruit also of saving persons from evil news, unless we hold that one and the same sentence has two meanings. As opposed to this, the meditations are capable of being enjoined, because they are, in the first place, themselves acts; and secondly, though involved in a sacrifice, they have their independent fruits. The conclusion, therefore, is that like the godohana the meditations are not the necessary and permanent parts of a sacrifice, inasmuch as they have their independent fruits. It is for this reason that the authors of the Kalpa-Sūtras have not included the meditations as necessary parts of the sacrifice which they have explained in their works.

28 प्रदानाधिकरणम् । (४३)

प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तः । ४३

[ Pradāna—offering; vat—like; eva—even; tad—that; uktam—is said. ]

This is as said (by Jaimini) exactly like offerings (on account of which Vāyu and Prāṇa are separate). 43

The Upanishad of the Vājasaneyins tells us that prāṇa was proved to be the best of all the senses such as speech and others, because all others except prāṇa became exhausted by fatigue in their endeavour to speak and do other things. It also tells us that Vāyu was proved to be the best of all the deities such as fire and others (Br. 1, 5, 22). In a similar way, the Chāndogyopaniṣad
tells us that vāyu and prāṇa are indeed the absorbers of the deities and the sense-organs respectively (4, 3, 1 and 3). Now, there arises the question whether prāṇa and vāyu are separate from each other or not.

The pūrvapakṣin holds that vāyu and prāṇa are to be meditated upon as one and not as separate, since they are said to be non-different from each other. The Aitareya Āraṇyaka tells us that ‘Vāyu became the prāṇa and entered into the nostrils’ (2, 4), in the same way in which the fire and the sun became the speech and the eye. The ādhyātmika organs and the ādhidaivika deities are thus ‘all alike’, as another Sruti says (Br. 1, 5, 13). The two are further explicitly stated to be identical with each other; for the rising and the setting of the sun which is due to the wind is ultimately said to be occurring in prāṇa alone. And that is why, instead of recommending us two upāsanās by means of two acts, the Upaniṣad recommends us only one upāsanā by means of one act only, viz., the breathing in and breathing out (Br. 1, 5, 23). Similarly, the Chāndogya also mentions one God only and not two as absorbing the four great ones (Chā. 4, 3, 6). From all this it follows that vāyu and prāṇa are one only.

To this we reply. The meditations of vāyu and prāṇa are separate; otherwise the distinct references to the organs and the deities would be meaningless. No doubt, vāyu and prāṇa are spoken of as non-different from each other; but this is not enough to cancel the distinction between the two meditative forms mentioned above, viz., the ādhidaivika and the ādhyātmika. Besides, the very fact that vāyu and prāṇa are compared

1. Water is absorbed into fire; and fire, sun, and moon are absorbed into vāyu. Similarly, during sleep, all the indriyas are absorbed in prāṇa which alone fuctions without taking any rest.

2. The one God who may be called now either as Vāyu or as Prāṇa is said to devour the four deities of fire, sun, moon, and water, as also the four organs of speech, eye, ear, and mind.
to each other shows that they are different; 'The chief prāṇa is among the prāṇas like the vāyu among the deities' (Br. 1, 5, 22). Similarly, the single act of breathing in and out does not mean an exclusive reference to the upāsanā of prāṇa, even though we should understand thereby that vāyu is identified with prāṇa. On the contrary, the word 'only' used in connection with the one act of breathing refers exclusively to the chief prāṇa, which is proved to be superior to all the lower prāṇas or indriyas like speech and others, in not being overtaken by fatigue. In other words, it is the chief prāṇa only, and not the other prāṇas, which is to be meditated upon by the in-going and the out-going of the breath. The word 'only', then excludes the lower prāṇas and not the vāyu from being meditated upon. This is made distinctly clear in the same context, immediately afterwards (Br. 1, 5, 23); we are told that equally unbroken are the meditative acts with reference to both vāyu and prāṇa. Like prāṇa, the vāyu also is never overcome by fatigue; and the fruit of meditation is that the devotee becomes one with vāyu by getting a body similar to that of the deity of vāyu, and by getting its very abode. And just as the word 'only' excludes the lower prāṇas from being meditated upon, but not the chief prāṇa, even so the word 'deity' must be made applicable to the unlimited vāyu and not to the limited entities of fire, sun, moon, and water, because what the devotee is expected to get is the unlimited nature of vāyu which 'never sets' (Br. 1, 5, 22).

Another reason why meditations on vāyu and prāṇa are separate from each other is that in the Chāndogya also they have been shown as distinct from each other; 'These two are verily the absorbers,—vāyu of the other deities and prāṇa of the lower prāṇas' (4, 3, 4). 'The five prāṇas and the five elements make together what is known as Kṛtā' (Cha. 4, 3, 8). Here also we are told

1. An oblong dice has on its four equal sides dots from one to four. The sides are known as Kṛta, tretā, dwāpara, and kali on
that vāyu and prāṇa are separate, and so it follows that the meditations on them also must be separate.

This is analogous to the case in which the offering of the purodāsas is done. There is a sacrifice in which rice-cakes known as purodāsas are given as offerings on eleven potsherds to the king Indra; another offering consisting of such eleven parts to Indra, the king of kings; and a third such offering to Indra, the king of heavens. Fearing that he might offer the remnant of these purodāsas to Soma, one of the three deities, the priest takes them all at once in his hand (Tai. Saṃ. 2, 3, 6). Now there may arise the doubt in this case whether on account of the simultaneous lifting of the three purodāsas, and on account of the deity being named as Indra only, the three purodāsas are offered together or not. But if we remember that the attributes of Indra, viz., being a king, being the king of kings, and being the king of heavens, are different, and that the hymns known as yājya and anuvākyā are to be uttered alternatively at the time of each of the offerings, we can conclude that there are three separate deities and three separate offerings.

account of the number of dots on them being either four, three, two or one respectively. As the number four implies in it all the smaller numbers of three, two, and one, the Krta (yuga) is said to be represented by number ten, i.e., 4, plus 3, 2 and 1.

1. If he were to take one of the three offerings and leave the other two on the ground, it would mean that the two offerings left are as if the remnants of the offering which is given first to a particular deity; but to do so is to dishonour the remaining two deities.

2. Yājya is that mantra which the hotā says as soon as the chief priest intimates him to do so by saying the word ‘yaja’ (sacrifice); and anuvākyā is that mantra which follows the yājya as soon as the chief priest says ‘anubrūhi’ (say after this). What is anuvākyā in the first offering becomes the yājya in the second offering, and so on again with the third offering. This clearly shows that the offerings are separate. And the fear that some of them may be construed as remnant shows that the deities too are separate.
Thus, vāyu and prāṇa also, though essentially non-different, are separate from each other, so far as they are objects of meditation. And this is quite in accordance with what Jaimini has told us in Saṅkarṣaṇa-Kāṇḍa, an appendix to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, that one and the same deity becomes known differently on account of different qualities. But we have to remember that whereas in the context of Karma-Kāṇḍa we have different oblations or sacrifices on account of different material or different deities, in the context of knowledge, we may have one vidyā, as is clear in the present case, on account of what is introduced in the beginning and what is said in the conclusion of the topic under discussion. And yet, just as the agnihotra in the morning differs from the agnihotra in the evening on account of the deities on the two occasions being different, even so in the present case, although the vidyā is one, the meditations are separate, because the difference between prāṇa and vāyu is the difference between the ādhyātmika and the ādhidaivika aspects of that vidyā.

29. लिङ्गभूयस्तवाचिकरणम् | (४४—५२)
लिङ्गभूयस्तवाचिद्र वलीयस्तदपि | ४४

[ Liṅga—sign; bhūyastvāt—on account of being many in number; tat—that; hi—for; baliyāh—more powerful; tat; api—even.]

There being a number of signs (the fires are of the nature of vidyā and not subservient to Karma); for it (i.e. the sign) is stronger than (context); this too (has been told by Jaimini). 44

In the Agnirahasya chapter of the Brhadāraṇyaka, the Vājasaneyins tell us that there was nothing in the beginning, but that the mind which came into being afterwards saw within itself thirty-six thousand fires, whose

1. Fire and Prajāpati are the evening deities, while the Sun and Prajāpati are the morning deities.

2. The thirty-six thousand mental states or fires stand symbolically for the days of one hundred years, the span of human life.
contents were the states of the mind, and whose altars were built by these mental bricks, or by the activities of the five organs of sense or by those of the abdominal fire. Now the doubt arises whether these fires themselves are also connected with sacrificial activities or not. The pūrvapakṣin holds that they are so connected. The Sūtrakāra, on the other hand, says that they are not so connected, and that they constitute a vidyā, because there are many indications about this. For example, the passage which tells us that ideas are the fire-altar, and that other beings in the world do, as a matter of fact, ‘build such altars even while one is asleep’, cannot but mean that the fires are imaginary and subservient to any sacrificial acts. That the sign has greater evidential value than the context according to Jaimini, we have already seen under Sūtra, 3, 3, 14.

पूर्विकल्प: प्रकरणात्स्थायितः मानसचत् । ४५

[ Pūrva—before; viṅkapāḥ—modification; prakaraṇāt—due to context; syāt—may be; kriyā—act; mānasā-vat—like the mental one.]

(The mental fire) may be a modification of the preceding (fire, the altar of which is built of bricks), on account of context; (and so) it is (connected with) an act; (this is) like the mental (soma-vessel). 45

The pūrvapakṣin comes forward with the argument that the fire made of mind appears from the context to be a modification of the fire already described in the preceding section, and is not therefore an independent one. Like ordinary fire the mental fire also being a modification of the former, may be subservient to action. No doubt, the liṅga or the indicatory sign is, in a general way, more valuable than context; but if it occurs, says he, in a passage which is a mere statement of praise of the mental

1. The sacrificial acts being connected with actual fire are to be performed in the manner in which they are prescribed, and at a particular time. Besides, no actual sacrifice requires such a vast number of fires. So the fires referred to are only mental, and consequently are independent of any action.
fire, and which therefore has an adjectival value only, it can never weaken the strength of the context. So, it is proved that the fires, though mental in character, are yet, like the actual fire, related to the sacrificial acts.

The pūrvapakṣin further says that this is analogous to the mental soma-cup, which is offered to Prajāpati on the tenth day of a sacrifice which lasts for twelve days. The earth itself is conceived as the cup, and the sea as the soma-juice. Naturally, all rites connected with them, such as placing the cup in its proper place, inviting the priests to drink it after the offering is made, are also mental in character. And yet, just as all these mental things are connected as parts of an actual sacrificial activity, even so all the mental fires are, like real fire, connected with the actions of a sacrifice.

अतिदेयाचरः | ४६

And on account of the extended application (of certain particulars). 46

We are further told, says the pūrvapakṣin, that every one of the thirty-six thousand worthy fires is as large as the fire which was mentioned previously. Now, as a rule, the extension of the application of one thing to another is possible where there is similarity between the two things. So if the actual and the mental fires are said to be equal in dimension, it means that just as the fire whose altar is built by bricks has a necessary connection with the sacrificial activity, even so are the mental fires necessarily connected with it.

विद्या तु निर्धारणानां | ४७

[Vidyā; eva—only; tu—but; nirdhāranāt—on account of considered assertion.]

But on account of the considered assertion (of Śruti, the fires constitute) a vidyā only. 47

1. This tenth day is known as 'āvivākya' because everything to be done on that day being mental, no mantra is to be uttered; (a-not; vi=vividha—many; and vākya—sentence or mantra).

2. Tāṇḍya Br. 4, 9; Tai. Ṣam. 7, 3, 1.
But we maintain against the pūrvapakṣin that Sruti states it explicitly that all these fires built by mind etc., are not only independent of any sacrificial activity, but also 'constitute a vidyā' of their own. 'They are built of knowledge for him who knows this'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>दर्शनाच्च</th>
<th>४८</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>And because (the sign) is seen. 48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And we reach the above conclusion by looking to the presence of linga in Sruti, as we have already done in Sūtra 44. As for the objection taken in Sūtra 45, that mere linga may not weaken the context, the next Sūtra comes as a reply.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>श्रुत्यादिवलीयस्तवाच्च न वाधः</th>
<th>४९</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ Sruti-ādi; baliyastvat—on account of being powerful; ca; na; bādhaḥ—refutation. ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And on account of Sruti (linga and vākya) being more powerful, there is no refutation (on account of context.). 49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have already noted under Sūtra 25 of this pāda, how Sruti, linga and vākya have got, according to Jaimini, more evidential value than mere context. We shall find them illustrated again in the present case to prove our view that the fires in question are all independent. In the first place, we have the Sruti, 'verily, these fires are built by knowledge only'. This clearly shows that the fires do not form part of the sacrificial action. It need not be said that this Sruti-passage aims at only showing that the fires are not built by external means such as bricks; for the very statement of their nature that they are mental in character shows that they are independent of such means. But the words, 'built by knowledge only', serve the additional purpose of showing that they are independent of action also. Nay, they are also useful in excluding the possible doubt that the fires though mental may be connected with sacrificial actions like the mental soma-vessel, referred to in Sūtra 45 by the pūrvapakṣin.
Secondly, we have linga or the indicatory mark thus: 'All the beings build for him these fires, even while he is asleep'. This clearly shows that the continuity of building during sleep or waking life is possible only for thought-construction, and not for sacrificial activity which can last only for a short time. This is analogous to what happens in the case of the continuous agnihotra of breath and speech. 'Whether one is sleeping or waking, these two immortal oblations of breath and speech are being endlessly offered' in speech and breath respectively' (Kau. 2, 5). Nor can it be supposed that the passage containing the linga is a mere arthavāda. For when there is one sentence which, on account of the optative or imperative use of the verb in it, clearly shows that it is intended to convey some injunction, we can suppose that another sentence which may accompany it, in an assertive, simple form, is intended as an arthavāda to eulogise the injunction. But, in the present case, there being no other optative or imperative sentence which should be considered as an injunction, we have to interpret the ordinary, assertive sentence, 'whatever all these beings think or imagine goes to build the fires', as itself meaning an injunction, viz., whoever knows thus should imagine that all these other beings are building the fires for his sake even though he is sleeping. In other words, the assertive sentence itself is to be construed not as an arthavāda containing in it the linga, but as giving an injunction. The injunction meant must then also be the same as contained in the one assertive sentence, viz., the continuous mental building of the fires. It is proved therefore that this mental construction of the fires

1. Speaking involves a control over breath; this means that while a man is speaking he is, as it were, making an oblation of breath in speech. But ceaseless speaking too is impossible; some rest must intervene. And it is here that man sacrifices the speech in breath; for breath alone continues to exist in rest also. These oblations are being endlessly offered from the cradle to the grave in the life of a man, and are therefore called immortal and infinite.
constitutes an independent vidyā, and that it is no part of any sacrificial activity connected with some actual fire.

Finally, the sentence, ‘For him who knows thus, the fires are being verily built by vidyā alone’, shows that the mental fires are connected neither with any actual sacrifice nor with all the people connected with it, but with only such people who know this vidyā of the fires. From all this it follows that these mental fires constitute an independent vidyā of their own.

अनुवन्तिदिकः प्रज्ञातर्पृथक्कर्मचतुष्ठयं तदुक्तम् | ५०

[ Anubandha—connection; ādibhyah—from this and others; prajñā-antara—other vidyās; prthaktva—the fact of being separate; vat—like; drṣṭaḥ—seen; ca—and; tad—that; uktam—is told. ]

Just as other vidyās are separate (the mental fires are independent) on account of their being connected and so on; (and, as Jaimini has explained, it is seen (that certain facts can be true even if they are detached from the context). 50

Another reason why the fires built by mind constitute an independent vidyā, in spite of the context in which they are mentioned, is that the things subservient to sacrificial acts are, all of them, connected by Sruti with the activity of the mind. For instance, sacrificial acts such as to install the fire in a place, to build the altar by bricks, to collect the different vessels, to sing the praises and prayers, to recite the mantras, and so on, are to be performed only mentally. These sacrificial acts being originally actual and connected with the actual fire, are in the case of the mental fire to be performed mentally only, and it is for this purpose that Sruti connects them with the activities of the mind. It may be pointed out that the meditation on the udgītha, though mental, is not only connected with sacrificial actions but becomes a part of the latter, and so it may be suggested that the mental construction of the fire and the several sacrificial acts may, in a similar way, be an integral part
of an actual sacrifice. But we must remember that whereas the udgitha is a part of the sacrificial act, the fire created by mind is not; and consequently, whereas the meditation on the udgitha becomes also connected with the sacrifice, as a part is connected with the whole, the meditation on the fire as sacrifice does not. In the case of the meditation on fire, we are not asked first to take an act of sacrifice, and then to suppose that it is such and such an activity of the mind; rather, as in the case of the Puruṣa-yajña the man himself is considered as the sacrifice, the thirty-six thousand states of the mind are to be thought of as the fires and as the various actions connected with a sacrifice. Nay, the huge number of the modifications of the mind are, before they are so construed, observed as the actual 'days and nights that go to form the hundred years' span of human life. In short, connected as they are imaginatively with the various sacrificial actions, the fires imagined by the mind are to be understood as being independent and as forming no part of any actual sacrifice.

Another reason which is suggested by the words 'so on' in the Śūtra, and by which we arrive at the same conclusion of the independence of the fires constructed by the mind, is the extended application of the great power of the actual sacrificial fire to everyone of the imagined fires of knowledge. Sruti achieves this by saying that 'everyone of these mental fires is as great as the previously mentioned actual fire', which is built by bricks; but it expresses thereby its regard for vidyā and its disregard for works. Even supposing that the mental fires are connected with action, it cannot be said that, instead of expressing its regard or disregard, what Sruti wants to express is that we have an option whether we should use an altar made of bricks or an altar made of thought. For the work done by the former altar in

1. The modifications of the mind are therefore doubly removed from being connected as parts of an actual fire and actual sacrificial acts.
providing place for the Āhavaṇīya-fire in an actual sacrifice cannot be done by the latter.1

As for the argument of the pūrvapakṣin in Sūtra 46, that it is the similarity of the extent and greatness of the two kinds of fires that lead to extension of meaning from one to the other, viz., their being equally connected with action, we reply that on our view also the extension of meaning2 is possible on account of the fact that the two fire-altars agree in having the fire in them. Besides, we have already shown in Sūtra 49, that Śruti, līṅga, and vākya, are favourable to our view. So it is proved by means of ‘connection’ and ‘atideśa’ that fires built by mind, etc., form an independent vidyā.

This is analogous to the following cases. Śāndilya-vidyā, for instance, in spite of its apparent connection, is in reality independent of works and other vidyās. Similarly, the offering known as ‘aveṣṭi’ has to be recognized as having a separate existence of its own, in spite of the fact that it is mentioned in the context of the sacrifice known as ‘Rājasūya’. For, whereas, as explained in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (11, 4, 11), the latter is to be performed only by the Kṣatriyas, the former can be performed by anyone, whether he is a Brāhmaṇa, a Kṣatriya, or a Vaiśya.

न सामान्याद्युपलब्दधेऽपि दुयुक्त हि लोकापति: । ५.१

[Na—not; sāmānyāt—on account of similarity; api—even; upalabdheḥ—being-available; mṛtyu-vat—like death; na; hi—for; loka—world; āpattih—happening. ]

Not even on account of similarity (the fires are the parts of actions); for it is seen (that they refer to

1. And hence there cannot be the ‘atideśa’ or the extension of meaning from the one to the other.

2. But the view of the siddhāntin is that the meaning extended is not the equality of the two fires in being connected with works, but the equality in the power and extent of the two kinds of fire. The mental and the actual fires are equally powerful, but whereas the latter is connected with works, the former is not.
persons). (This is) like death (in āditya is death); for the heaven does not become (fire, though it may resemble it slightly). 51

As for the argument of the pūrvapakṣin, in Sūtra 45, that like the mental soma-vessel, the mental fires also must form parts of sacrificial action, we have seen that this is wrong, because Sruti, liṅga, and vākyā point out to us that these fires are useful to the persons who imagine them and not to any sacrifice. Not that a thing does not resemble any other thing in some one point at least. But this does not wipe out the individuality and the dissimilarity of that thing from others. The fire and the person in the disc of the sun are both of them called as death (Br. 3, 2, 10; Sat. Brā. 10, 5, 2, 3); but this does not mean that fire or the sun is just the same as Yama, the god of death. Similarly, the sun is called the fuel, and the heaven, the fire (Chā. 5, 4, 1); but this is not what is in reality. Even so, we cannot say that the imaginary fires must form a part of actions, because they resemble the imaginary soma-vessel which is considered as a part of the sacrificial action.

परेण च शब्दस्य तादिध्यं भृगस्वात्तुवंधः । ५२

[ Pareṇa—on account of the other; ca—and; śabdasya—of Sruti; tādvidhyam—being of that kind; bhūyastvāt—on account of plurality; tu—but; anubandhah—connection. ]

And on account of the subsequent (and preceding Brāhmaṇas, it follows that the fire’s) being of the nature (of vidyā, is the aim) of Sruti. The vidyā is connected (with fire) on account of plurality (of many things as parts of the latter). 52

In the Brāhmaṇa which comes immediately after the description of the fires as being built by mind etc., we get the verse, ‘It is by means of Vidyā that they reach the place from which all desires return. Those who travel by the southern way, do not reach that

1. This is another way of telling about those who do mere work only.
place; nor those who lack wisdom and do penance'. This is clearly both the praise of the vidyā and the censure of mere works. Similarly, in the Brāhmaṇa which comes before the description of the fires, we are told about the importance of vidyā, the fruit of which is immortality (Sat. Brā. 10, 5, 2, 23). This means that according to this Brāhmaṇa also, works are not as important as the vidyā is. Naturally, in the intervening Brāhmaṇa also, the vidyā is more important than works. But the vidyā of the mental fires is described in the context of work i.e., of the fire built by bricks for the purpose of sacrifice, only because the several things connected with the real sacrificial fire are to be imagined in the case of the vidyā of the mental fire.

From all this we conclude that fires built by mind or the mental states constitute a vidyā.

20 एकात्म्याधिकरणम् | (५३—५४)
एक आत्मनः शरीरे मातवः | ५३

[Eke—some; ātmanah—of the Ātman; śarīre—in the body; bhāvāt—on account of existence.]

Some (hold that) the self (has no separate existence), on account of the existence (of the self, only) in a body. 53

We shall now undertake to prove the existence of the self as different from the body, so that we may be able to speak of the bondage and the release with reference to it. In the absence of the self, there can be no talk either about the heaven or about the mokṣa, about injunctions for doing something or about the instruction that the self is Brahman. No doubt, Sabarāswāmī has referred to the existence of the self in the very beginning of his commentary on the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (1, 1, 5), but there is no separate Sūtra of Jaimini regarding it, as we have it here in order to prove its existence. It appears that Sabarāswāmī too must have borrowed this point for discussion in the first adhyāya, known as Pramāṇalakṣaṇa, from the Vedānta-Sūtras, inasmuch as the revered Upāvarṣa himself says that he would discuss the problem of
the existence of the self while dealing with the Sārīraka Mīmāṃsā, and leaves the matter there, even when there was an occasion to discuss it. Here, on the other hand, as we have seen, the vidyās being all concerned with actual persons and not with sacrifice, the Śūtrakāra thinks it necessary to go into the problem of the existence of the self or the puruṣa and to assert that the self is separate from the body.

According to certain materialists known as Lokāyatikas, the self has no existence apart from the body. Consciousness, they say, is neither observed in any one of the five elements, nor in all of them taken together; but, no sooner do these combine to produce a body than it is seen in it, just as the intoxicating quality which is absent in gur is produced as soon as it is turned into liquor. Puruṣa therefore means the body combined with consciousness. And yet there is nothing like self which is apart from the body and which has the capacity of going to heaven or obtaining release. The body itself is what is conscious though it is not said so, on account of its proximity with consciousness. That consciousness itself is a quality of the body, they prove by saying that it is present when the body is present, and absent when the body is absent; just as light and heat are the qualities of fire because they are present when the fire is present and absent when the fire is absent. The so-called qualities therefore of an independent self, such as life, motion, consciousness, memory, and so on, are observed within and not outside the body. And as nothing outside the body can be shown to be the shelter of these qualities it follows that they are all the qualities of the body only. The self therefore is not different from the body. To this the next Śūtra comes as a reply.

Vyatirekarābhāvābhāvitvān tūpakṣaṅgat | ५४ |
[Vyatirekah—separateness; tad-bhāva—its existence; abhāvītvāt—owing to non-existence; na—not; tu—but; upalabdhi—perception; vat—like.]

But (the above view) is not (correct. The self) is different (from the body); for (consciousness) does not
exist even when the (body) exists (after death; this is) like (what happens in) perception. 54

The self is different from the body, we hold. For if it can be said that the qualities of the self are the qualities of the body, simply because they are present when the body is present, it can equally be said that they do not belong to the body, inasmuch as they do not exist even when the body exists as a corpse. Besides, the qualities of the self are different in nature from those of the body. The feature and shape of the body, in the first place, continue to exist so long as the body lasts; but life, consciousness, memory, etc., are not found in the body after death. Secondly, the form and the features of the body are perceivable by others; not so the qualities of the self. And, thirdly, though the qualities of the self can be seen to exist in the body so long as there is life, they cannot be definitely proved to be non-existent when there is no body. On the contrary, it is likely they may continue to exist in some other body, even after the first body in which they existed ceases to exist. So long as there is then the possibility of the continuation of the qualities of the self even after the body has ceased to exist, and so long as the Lokāyatika has not disproved it, he has lost his case.

Now, what after all does the Lokāyatika mean by consciousness when he says that it is the product of the elements, if he does not believe in anything else except the four elements? If, in reply, he would say that it is the perception of the elements and their products, then how can the consciousness or the perception, whose objects the elements are, be itself the property of those very elements? This is like admitting an absurdity that fire is burnt by its own quality, namely, heat, or like saying that an acrobat is mounting on his own shoulders. If, then, consciousness is a property of the elements, it cannot make the latter its own objects, just as the form or any other quality of the jar cannot become aware of itself or of the form and qualities of other
objects. On the other hand, if consciousness is taken as standing by itself, as we hold it, it will embrace all the objects of the external world of elements as also those of the internal world of the mind as its own objects of cognitions.

Hence, if we are to admit the cognitional awareness which has the elements and their products as its objects, we have to admit that it is separate from its objects. And further, as this cognitional awareness constitutes our very self or the Ātman, we have to admit it as being separate from the body. Nay, we have also to admit the existence of the other characteristics of this consciousness or Ātman, viz., that it is permanent in spite of the changing objects, and that it is one and homogeneous in spite of the objects being many and different in nature. We come to the same conclusion when we find that one is able to recognize oneself in the waking condition as the same person who has had a particular experience in a dream before. Besides, it is only on the hypothesis that the one homogeneous and permanent Ātman is different from the body, that the fact of remembering that which was experienced before can be satisfactorily explained.

The Lokāyatika view, then, that the body itself is the self does not follow from the fact that consciousness is present when the body is present, and that it is

---

1. The awareness that the self is many and changing from one state to another is due to its being wrongly identified with the many and the changing objects. To one who is not conscious of the difference of objects, there exists no difference in the consciousness also.

2. On the view that the self is the body, the bodies in the dreaming and the waking conditions will be altogether different; in the one we have the subtle body, in the other, the gross. Naturally, in the absence of a particular body, there will be no recognition, and hence no consciousness or self in either of the two conditions.

3. On the view of the Lokāyatika, memory will not be explained; for the body of an adult will be different from the body which he had when he was a boy.
absent when the body is absent. The body is only one of the means which may be used for the manifestation of consciousness, just as the lamp is used for the perception of an object. But even as a means, the body is not necessary for being conscious, for in dreams we do have experience of many things even when the body lies motionless without doing any helpful activity to make the experience possible. Hence the view that the Ātman is separate from the body is free from any defect.

21. अंगावद्भाविक्षिकरणम् | (५५—५६)
अंगावद्भावलुऽ शास्त्राम हि प्रतिवेदम् | ५५

[Anga—member; avabaddhāh—tied to; tu—but; na—not; śākhāsu—in the branches of study; hi—only; prativedam—in each Veda.]

But (the meditative vidyās) connected with the members (of the sacrificial acts) are not (restricted) only to (some) branches of study of each of the Vedas. 55

After having discussed that the self is separate from the body, as the occasion demanded it, let us return to the topic in hand. In the different branches of the Vedas, we find that there are some vidyās such as the udgītha and others which are connected with different sacrificial acts. For example, we have the meditation on Om as udgītha (Chā, 1, 1, 1); on the five parts of the sāman as the five worlds (Chā. 2, 2, 1), on certain mantras known as Uktha, as the earth (Ait. Ār. 2, 1, 2, 1); and on the fire-altar built of bricks, as this world of beings (Sat. Brā. 10, 5, 4, 1). Now, are we to say that the several vidyās which are enjoined with reference to udgītha and others, are so enjoined according to only one Sākhā or branch of study, or according to all, in spite of the difference in accent which is peculiar to the śākhās? The pūrvapakṣin holds that the former is the correct view, because the general reference to the udgītha is specified by certain peculiar characteristics which are enjoined in a particular śākhā in close proximity to it.

1. See footnote on p. 238
And there appears no particular reason why a determining factor like this should be omitted, and the vidyā be said to be available in other śākhās also.

To this the Śūtrakāra replies that the injunctions regarding the vidyās are valid for all the śākhās, because there is no specification in the statement regarding the udgīthā; and that there is no reason why this general statement of Sruti be assumed to have a limited reference. We have already seen that a direct statement of Sruti has more weight than proximity. Besides, it is not impossible to meditate on the udgīthā, because it is mentioned in a general way. So we conclude that the vidyās refer to all the śākhās.

मंत्रादिवद्धास्विरोषः I ५६

[ Mantra-ādi; vat—like; vā—or; avirodhaḥ—absence of contradiction. ]

Or, as in (the case of) mantras and others, (there is) no contradiction. 56.

Or, let us explain the same thing analogously with reference to mantras, actions, and qualities which, though mentioned in one śākhā, are employed in other śākhās also. The yajurvedins, for instance, utter the mantra ‘Thou art Kuṭaru’ or ‘Thou art the Kukkuṭa’ while lifting a stone for grinding rice in a sacrifice, even though the mantra is not mentioned in their śākhā. Similarly, the action in the form of offerings of the samidhā-fuel and others, known as prayājas, though not mentioned in the Maitrāyaṇi-śākhā,² is resorted to by its adherents, because they get the reference to the number ‘five’ of the prayājas and to the place of offering as being ‘one and the same’ in the passage, ‘The seasons’ indeed are the prayājas, and they are to be offered in

1. Both the words, Kuṭaru and Kukkuṭa mean a cock.
2. Maitrāyaṇi-Samhitā, 1, 1, 6.
3. The ā́tras are six: vasanta, griśma, varṣā, śarad, hemanta, and śīśira. If the last two are counted as one, then there are five seasons. So the word ā́tra (season) means ‘five’.

V. E. 17
one and the same place'. Similarly, again, though the Yajurvedins do not mention the kind of animal to be sacrificed to Agni and Soma, the mantra which the hotā is asked to recite refers to 'the fat of the serus sae (the omentum) of the he-goat'. It is this reference to the quality of the fat that makes us aware that the animal which is sacrificed by the Yajurvedins is the goat itself. The prayer to Agni to protect the sacrifice etc. which is found in Samaveda, has been accepted by the Yajurveda also. And, similarly, the Sajaniya-sūkta from Rgveda (2, 12) which refers to Indra who showed his intelligence as soon as he was born, appears to have been accepted by the Yajurvedins from the mantra (Tai. Sam. 7, 5, 5, 2) which recommends the recitation of the Sajaniya-sūkta. In short, just as certain members of the sacrificial actions are available in all the sākhās, even so are the vidyās which depend on these members.

32 भूमम्। कतुर्व्यायायस्त्वं तथा हि दर्शयति। ५७

[Bhūmnaḥ—of the collection; kṛatu—sacrifice; vat—like; jyāystvām—eminence; tathā—thus; hi—for; darsāyati—Sruti says.]

(The meditation) on the entire collection (of the members of the Vaiśvānara) is eminent, as in the (darśa) sacrifice; for Sruti (also) says so. 57

In the Vaiśvānara-vidyā of the Chandogypa-
niṣad (5, 11 to 18), the replies given, turn by turn, by Pracīnaśāla Aupamanyava and five other Brahmins to the king, Aśvapati Kaikeya, that the beings they wor-
shiped were the heaven, the sun, the wind, the ākāśa, the water, and the earth respectively, constitute, one may say, the various upāsanās on the Vaiśvānara. On the other hand, the king’s reply that these beings con-
stitute respectively the head (sutejas), the eye, (Vīśva-
rūpa); the prāṇa, the mid-portion of the body, the bladder

and the feet of the Vaiśvānara, appears to suggest that the Vaiśvānara is to be contemplated, not in parts severally, but in entirety. Now, the question arises which of these two views is the correct one? The pūrvapakṣin maintains that the former view is correct, because the mentioning of each of the several upāsanās is a reply to the question, 'whom do you worship?', and because every upāsanā is said to have its special fruit, such as the material for somayāga being available, and so on.

To this we reply. Just as in the case of the dārśa-sacrifice or the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice, the performance of the entire sacrifice including the several parts is enjoined, and not the performance of the parts separately, or of a group of some of them only, even so the Vaiśvānara is to be meditated upon with all his aspects taken together, and not separately with reference to each one of them or some of them. For, in the first place, if we take into consideration all the parts of the Śrutipassage, we shall find that they all deal with the single topic of the Vaśvānara-vidyā. The statements of the six Brahmins with reference to their own individual upāsanās, and the reply of the king to them all that these constitute the single upāsanā of Vaiśvānara, are clear evidence of what we say. In the second place, the censure of the upāsanās on the several parts of Vaiśvānara implied in the king's statement that their heads would have fallen if they had not gone to him for learning the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, leads to the same conclusion in a negative manner. And thirdly, there is mentioned the special fruit of the upāsanā on Vaiśvānara as a whole, viz., 'One who so meditates eats the food, by residing in all the worlds, beings and selves' (Chā. 5, 18, 1). It is this fruit which must be said to comprise within it the special fruits of the several upāsanās. And, so, the repeated question of the king to the Brahmins, 'Whom do you worship?', need not be taken to mean as pointing to the several upāsanās as being ultimate, but to the single upāsanā of the Vaiśvānara as a whole, in
whom all the six partial upāsanaś will necessarily be included.

Some people interpret the word ‘jyāyastvam’ in the Sūtra as meaning ‘principally’, and so think that all the partial upāsanās of the Vaiśvānara are also acceptable to the Sūtrakāra, because they are only subordinate to the one principal upāsana on the Vaiśvānara as a whole. But this is not correct; for it is not proper to assume that the entire section has at once a double meaning, so long as it can be proved that it has only one meaning, viz., that the Vaiśvānara is to be worshipped only as a whole. The original doubt is not whether one only or both the kinds of worship are acceptable; it is whether one or the other is acceptable. For if both the forms of worship are to be accepted from the siddhāntin’s point of view, there is no sense in censuring the pūrva-pakṣin’s viewpoint by saying that the heads of the Brahmmins would have fallen in case they had not approached the king. Nor would the siddhāntin be able to assume that the pūrva-pakṣin holds the negation of the worship on the Vaiśvānara as a whole, when the conclusion of the section is clearly emphatic on the point. So, the word ‘jyāyastvam’ in the Sūtra must be taken in the sense of indicating ‘exclusiveness’ between two alternatives, and not in the sense of showing the difference between the principal and the subordinate.

On account of (the use of) different words, etc. (the vidyās) are separate. 58

In view of what we have decided in the preceding adhikarana, viz., that the Vaiśvānara as a whole is to be meditated upon, in spite of the fact that special results are mentioned to follow from the meditations on the several parts of the Vaiśvānara, it may be thought that
different upāsanās mentioned in different places are to be combined in one upāsanā only. Just as the material used for offering, and the deity to which it is offered, determine the nature of a single sacrifice, similarly, the object of cognition determines the nature of the cognition itself. In other words, if the object is one the cognition or the vidyā is one. For instance, though the following Sruti-passages appear to mention three vidyās, viz., the Sāṃdilya-vidyā, the Upakosala-vidyā and the Dahara-vidyā, Brahman being the common object of them all, the three vidyās must be construed as forming one vidyā only. The three passages are: ‘He whose mind is the essence, and prāṇā is the body’ (Chā. 3, 14; 2); ‘Ka (bliss) is Brahman, Kha (ākāsā) is Brahman’ (Chā. 4, 10, 5); ‘His desires and thoughts are such as must be fulfilled and turn out to be facts’ (Chā. 8, 7, 3). Another instance is of Prāṇa, which is one though spoken of differently as the ‘end of all’ (Chā. 4, 3, 3), as ‘the oldest: and the best’ (Chā. 5, 1, 1), and as ‘the father and the mother’ (Chā. 7, 15, 1). The three samvarga-vidyās, therefore, narrated in three different places go to form one vidyā only. So, it follows that if the object of knowledge is one, whether in one’s own sākhā or in the sākhās of others, the vidyā also must be construed as one, even though it is mentioned as having different qualities or aspects in different places.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies that though the object of knowledge is one the vidyās are different. For as stated by Jaimini (Pū. Mi. 2, 2, 1), words having difference in meaning indicate corresponding difference in actions; and we have, so far as the vidyās are concerned, words which mean ‘he who knows’, ‘meditates’ or ‘resolves’ (Chā. 3, 14, 1). The same is the case when we have difference in points of qualities such as sāmyoga, rūpa, samākhyā (name), and phala (fruit). It may be pointed out against us that whereas in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā the words, such as ‘yajati’, (sacrifices), ‘juhoti’ (offers as oblations in fire), and ‘dadāti’ (gives) indicate a difference of meaning, the words ‘knows’ etc., do not
show such a difference of meaning, but, on the contrary, they all are indicative of one and the same mental activity, viz., the process of meditation, and not of the object of knowledge. But the objection has no point in it. For though the object of devotion is one, differences in its qualities turn that object into many, and consequently, with reference to them the vidyās also become many. God, i.e. the Brahman, is the one object of devotion in the passages of the Chāndogya quoted above; and, yet, in different places, we have the knowledge of the different qualities of the same Brahman. The same is the case with prāṇa which is to be meditated upon under different aspects corresponding to different qualities. Thus, the difference in qualities, context, fruits, and so on, makes a difference in vidyās.

Nor can we say with the pūrvapakṣin that one of the above mentioned Upaniṣadic passages refers to the vidyā, and that the others refer to its qualities; for there is nothing which will guide us in this matter, and enable us to say which one refers to vidyā and which one does not. The same passages which mention the qualities cannot be said to point out the vidyā which is mentioned somewhere else; for this will amount to having two meanings of one sentence. If the view of the pūrvapakṣin is correct, there is no necessity of repeating characteristics like ‘satyakāmā’ etc., which are common to the several passages. Besides, if the upāsanās described in the several sections are separate from each other, as is clear from the different fruits attached to them, it cannot be said that all these sections can be combined together. And, moreover, so far as the present case is concerned, there is nothing in it, as there is in the case of the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, on account of which it can be said that all the partial upāsanās are to be combined into one larger whole. If, in spite of this all, we were to admit universally that vidyā is one if

1. Sentences or sections are combined into one whole if they are not complete in themselves.
the object of knowledge is one, we shall have to admit what is impossible, viz., the combination of all the qualities which are mentioned in all the Upaniṣads. The separateness of the vidyās therefore is correct, though we may say that this truth ought to have been stated first of all in the beginning of this pāda, so that the identity of the knowledge of Brahman in all the Vedānta-passages might have been better exhibited than it was in the first Sūtra of this pāda.

34 विकल्पाधिकरणम् (५९)
विकल्पोपविशिष्टपर्यायान् । ५९

[Vikalpah—option; avaistiṣṭa—without any specification; phalatvāt—on account of there being fruit.]

On account of the results being not different, there is option (regarding the choice of vidyās). 59

Having decided that the vidyās are separate, let us now decide whether it is possible for us to meditate on all of them taken as a group, or on some one of them as we like, or whether we are constrained to adopt one of them only and not more than one at a time. In the first place, according to the pūrva-pākṣin, if the vidyās are separate, they cannot be combined at all. No doubt, the sacrifices like agniḥotra, darśapūrṇamāsa, etc. can be combined together, but this is because it is obligatory that they must be performed as a routine. The vidyās, on the other hand, leave a man entirely free to adopt them or not, or to adopt one or more than one as he likes. Nor does it follow, in the second place, says the pūrva-pākṣin, that if the result is one and the same, the means adopted to achieve must be only one and not more than one. No doubt, it may be argued that the realization of God or Brahman can be achieved by means of meditating in one of the ways as pointed out in the passages.

1. That such a combination is possible in the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, the pūrva-pākṣin may explain as due to the fact that the several vidyās are meditations on the parts of Vaiśvānara.
of Chāndogyopaniṣad referred to in Śūtra 58, and that, therefore, if one of the ways makes us successful in our undertaking there remains nothing to be achieved by resorting to other ways. But, says the pūrvapakṣin, as a person wishing to attain heaven may resort to more than one sacrifice if he chooses to do so, even so in the case of vidyās one may do as he likes.

To this we reply. If the realization of God is the common end to be achieved, any one of the vidyās may be chosen, and not all of them. For, in the first place, if the end is once achieved by resorting to one vidyā, the others are useless. Secondly, to resort to all of them also is not desirable; for the mind will only be distracted thereby. That the realization is the end of the vidyās is declared by the following Śruti-passages: ‘A person who has firm faith and has no doubt regarding his being one with Brahman after death, will become one with God, one with Brahman’ says Śāṇḍilya, (Chā. 3, 14, 4); ‘Realizing God, he becomes one with God’ (Br. 4, 1, 2). The Bhagavadgītā tells us that ‘one who always contemplates on something becomes that thing’ (8, 6). So we reach the conclusion that one has to choose only one of the vidyās, and that he has to remain devoted to it, so that it will ultimately yield the realization of God, which is the common result of all the vidyās. There is no other way to mokṣa.

35 काम्याविकरणस् | (६०)
काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चियलम् वा पूर्वेऽहेतुभावात् | ६०

[Kāmyāḥ—things done with a view to fulfil desires; tu—but; yathākāmam—as one likes; samucciyarām—may be combined; na—not; vā—or; pūrva—preceding; hetu—reason; abhāvāt—due to absence.]

(Vidyās resorted to) for fulfilling desires may, however, be combined or not, as one likes; because there is absence of the reason (mentioned) before (in Śūtra 59). 60.
There are however certain vidyās, or meditations which fulfil the desires of the devotees. For instance, there is the vidyā according to which a person who considers 'wind as the child of the directions will never have the occasion of mourning for the loss of his son' (Chā. 3, 15, 2). Similarly, 'One who meditates on names such as Rgveda, Yajurveda, etc., as Brahman goes wherever he likes' (Chā. 7, 1, 4). These wish-fulfilling vidyās yield their own special fruits as the unseen merit accumulates. Besides, they do not aim at having the realization of God, which according to Sūtra 59, is the common fruit of certain other vidyās. Naturally with reference to such vidyās one is free either to meditate on all of them, or on some one or more of them, as one likes. In other words, there is no reason why one must select one vidyā only and not others.

36 यथायथमात्रात्मिकाकरणम् | (६१-६६)
अंगेशु यथायथमात्रः | ६१

[Angesu—on limbs; yathā—like; āśraya—shelter; bhāvaḥ—condition.]

(As for the meditations) on members (of sacrificial acts), their nature is like the shelter (on which they rest). 61

The pūrvapakṣin holds that vidyās which are connected with the parts of a sacrifice, such as udgītha and others are to be combined in the same way in which the hymns of praise which act as shelter to the vidyās are to be combined for the purpose of performing the sacrifice as a whole.

1. A distinction can therefore be drawn between vidyās or upāsanās in which the meditator himself is to identify with the object of meditation, from those others where an object other than the self is to be meditated as a deity. The first kind is known as 'ahamgraha-upāsanā', and the second as 'pratikā-upāsanā'. As opposed to these two, the third kind of upāsanā is that which is dependent on another main upāsanā, just as a limb is dependent on the body, known as 'āṅgopāsanā'.

As for the meditations on members (of sacrificial acts), their nature is like the shelter (on which they rest).
 vedanta explained

62

And because (the vidyās) are mentioned (in the same way in which things on which they rest are mentioned).

And just as the stotras or the hymns of praise which constitute the parts of a sacrifice are mentioned in all the three Vedas, even so are mentioned the vidyās which rest upon the stotras. In other words, there being no difference in the manner in which the stotras and the vidyās are mentioned, the rule that applies to the former applies to the latter also. In short, vidyās like stotras, are to be combined, as the parts of a sacrifice are combined.

63

(And) because (the defect) is rectified (vidyās are to be combined).

The Chāndogyopaniṣad tells us (1, 5, 5) that the udgātā or the ŚāmaVEDin should consider that Oṁ or the udgītha of his Veda is identical in power with the Oṁ or the pranava of the Rgveda. For the hotā who is a Rgvedin is said to correct the mistakes in the singing of the udgātā, by means of his own work which is said to be correct on account of the use of pranava.¹ This goes to suggest that the vidyās also as members of sacrificial acts are to be combined, even though they may be mentioned in different Vedas.

64

[Guna—quality; sādhāranya—the fact of being common; Śrutēḥ—on account of Śruti; ca—and.]

And on account of Śruti and common quality. Further, the characteristic or the shelter of the

¹. If pranava and udgītha are identical because they are representations of Oṁ, the actions too of the hotā and the udgātā become identical. And if the hotā is correct because of the use of Oṁ, or pranava, the udgātā who knows the power of pranava is also said to be correct.
vidyās, viz., the Ōṁ is declared by Sruti to be common to all the three Vedas. 'It is Ōṁ with which commences all the actions of the three Vedas. The adhvaryu (a Yajurvedin) utters it first and then gives orders; the hotā (a Rgvedin) utters it and then recites the hymns; and the udgātā, (a Sāmavedin) utters it and then sings (Chā. 1, 1, 9). This means that just as the Omkāra is common, the vidyās depending on it are also common.

To explain the Sūtra in another way. Had the udgīthā not been common to sacrifices, the vidyās also could have been taken separately. But as members of sacrifices, udgīthā and other things have been mentioned as common. Therefore, the vidyās which abide in them must also be combined.

न वा तत्सहभावाःश्रुते: | ६५

[Na—not; vā—or; tat-sahabhāva—their mutual connection; a-Sruteḥ—not being mentioned by Sruti.]

Or, there being no statement of Sruti, regarding their mutual existence (the vidyās) cannot (be so combined). 65

As against the pūrvapāksin, we hold that these vidyās cannot be so combined because there is no statement of Sruti to this effect, just as there is regarding the combination of the stotras and other subordinate members of a sacrifice. The adhvaryu, for instance, takes the cup or lifts the spoon and after repeating the stotra asks the hotā to recite the yājya-mantra and the prāstotā to sing the sāman. But the upāsanās are not intended to be so combined. For whereas the udgīthā and the like are subservient to a sacrifice, the upāsanās, although connected with the udgīthā, etc., are subservient to the purposes of man, and not to any sacrifice. We have already explained this in Sūtra 42 of this pāda, with reference to the ‘godohana’ vessel etc., which are subservient to the purposes of a man. It is exactly this difference between the members of sacrificial action and the meditations resting on them, that refutes the
argument of the pūrvapāksin in Śūtra 62. As for the arguments of the pūrvapakṣin in Śūtras 63 and 64, viz., the rectifying of the error of the udgātā, and the presence of common characteristics in all the three Vedas, as indications of the combination of the vidyās, we remark that they have neither the support of Sruti nor of reasoning. Besides, the upāsanās and the things on which they rest are not causally connected. Therefore, even though the things on which they rest may be combined for the purposes of sacrifices, the upāsanās need not be so combined. We may even grant that there may not be such upāsanās, if there are no such things on which they rest. But from this it does not follow that because the things (udgītha, etc.) on which the upāsanās rest are found to be combined for the sake of sacrifices, therefore the upāsanās also must combine. Sruti does not support this. The conclusion therefore is that such meditations or upāsanās may be adopted, if one desires to do so.

And because Sruti declares (thus). 66

Sruti declares, on the contrary, that the upāsanās do not combine. If Sruti had meant the combination, all the priests would have known all the vidyās, and could have saved themselves and their sacrifices by doing appropriate penances to wash away sins and errors. But the Sruti-passage which speaks about someone who knows the appropriate means of washing away the sins and errors as alone being able to protect the sacrifice, the sacrificer and the priests, (Chā. 4, 17, 10), shows that such a combination of wish-fulfilling vidyās is not possible, and that, therefore, all the priests will not be able to know all the vidyās and all the means of averting sins and dangers. Such vidyās therefore are either to be combined or not, according to one’s preference.
ADHYĀYA THIRD
PĀDA FOURTH

1 पुरुषार्थविचिन्तनम् | (1–17)

[ Puruṣa—man; artha—purpose; atah—from this; sabdāt—on account of Śruti; iti—thus; Bādarāyanaḥ. ]

From this (knowledge of Brahman, follows) the purpose of man (i.e. mokṣa); thus says Bādarāyana. 1

The Sūtrakāra now goes into the inquiry whether the Upaniṣadic knowledge of the Ātman is connected with sacrificial action or constitutes an independent means of attaining the final end of human life, namely, the mokṣa. Bādarāyana holds the latter view on account of the following Srutis: ‘He who knows the Ātman overcomes the grief’ (Chā. 7, 1, 3); ‘He who knows the Brahman becomes the Brahman’ (Mu. 3, 2, 9); ‘He who realizes the Brahman attains the highest abode’ (Tāi. 2, 1, 1); ‘He alone who has got a spiritual teacher knows the Brahman; he has to wait for liberation till the fall of his body; but no sooner does it fall than he becomes one with Sat’ (Chā. 6, 14, 2). Similarly, the Sruti-passages like, ‘He who searches out and knows the sinless Ātman, obtains all the worlds, and has all his desires fulfilled’ (Chā. 8, 7, 1); ‘The Ātman must verily be seen, for this alone constitutes immortality’ (Br. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 15), tell us that the supreme end of man is achieved by the knowledge of the Ātman alone.

The opponent however argues as follows.

शेषसंवातपुरुषार्थवादो यथायेविचिन्ति जैमिनिः | २

[ Šeṣāvatā—on account of a part left behind; puruṣa—man; arthavāda—a sentence which has the purpose to praise or censure; yathā—as; anyesu—in others; iti—thus; Jaiminiḥ. ]

Because (man, as an agent) is connected as a part (of action), Jaimini thinks that (Sruti-passages which aim at telling us the end of human life) are, as in other
cases, sentences which give expression to the praise (of Ātma-jñāna). 2

Jaimini holds that just as the sprinkling of water on the rice-grains makes them fit for sacrifice, and so makes them connected with the sacrificial action, even so the self being the agent of action, the knowledge of the self becomes connected with action. Naturally, just as the fruit of the act of sprinkling water on the rice-grains is not an independent one, but is a part of the sacrifice, even so the fruit of the knowledge of the self is not seen to be independent of the fruit of the sacrificial action. The Śruti-passages therefore which are supposed to tell us about the fruits of Ātma-jñāna are nothing but arthavāda-statements, which tell us indirectly of the fruits of sacrificial actions. They are like the other following arthavāda statements which also point to the fruits of the sacrifices and not to the fruits of the things themselves referred to in the statements: ‘He whose sacrificial ladle is made of palāśa-wood, gets no occasion to hear about any bad news’; ‘By putting the ointment in the eye, he keeps away the evil eye of the enemy’; ‘In order to defeat his enemy, he prepares, as if, an armour for the sacrifice and the sacrificer by performing the prayāja and the anuyāja’. The different fruits which are mentioned in these sentences, viz., ‘Not to hear the bad news’, ‘keeping away the enemies’, and the ‘defeat of the enemy and the protection of the sacrifice’, are not so much the results of the material (dravya) of the ladle, the purification (samskāra) of the eye, and the work (karma) of offerings, as are of the entire sacrifices.

A Vedāntin may contend that it can hardly be asserted that the knowledge of the Ātman which is narrated in the Vedānta-passages without any reference to any sacrificial context, is, in any way, connected with sacrificial actions. It is wrong to say that because the Ātman is the agent of actions like crossing the grief and so on, the knowledge of the Ātman is connected
with actions. A sentence or vākya cannot establish by itself and without any context any connection between knowledge and sacrifice, unless we know that the particular thing whose knowledge we have is invariably associated with some sacrifice or other. For instance, the knowledge of the quality of the ladle, viz., its being made of palāśa-wood, is connected with sacrifice because the ladle itself is invariably connected with sacrifice. But the Ātman as the agent is not necessarily connected with sacrificial actions only; it is also connected with ordinary, routine actions of everyday life which are not sacrificial in nature. The knowledge of the Ātman therefore cannot be connected with sacrifice through the agency of the Ātman.

The pūrvapakṣin will find fault with this argument of the Vedāntin, and say that the knowledge of the Ātman as distinct from the body is of no use in our worldly activities, since these are concerned with the body and with the perceptible fruits connected with the body. On the other hand, he will point out that it is of utmost use so far as the Vedic or the sacrificial actions are concerned, because the fruits of these are available in a life beyond death. To say from the view-point of the Vedāntin, again, that the Ātman is not at all connected with any sort of activity, Vedic or otherwise, that the Ātman is not saṁsāric at all, inasmuch as Śruti declares it as ‘sinless’, is also not correct from the view point of the pūrvapakṣin. For what the Upaniṣads teach us is, as he points out, the knowledge of the same saṁsāric soul which is described as being ‘dear’ for its own sake and not for the other (Br. 2, 4, 5), and that the attributes of ‘being sinless’ etc., which are ascribed to the Ātman, are nothing but the glorification of it. Similarly, although it may be pointed out by the Vedāntin that the real nature of the soul is Brahman which being the cause of this world transcends this saṁsāra, the pūrvapakṣin maintains that before this is firmly established, we must thoroughly settle the point whether the knowledge of the Ātman is subservient to sacrifice,
or, is, independently of this, able to achieve the end of the human life.

अचाराद्वैनात् ॥ ३ ॥

[ Acāra—conduct; darśanāt—on account of Sruti. ]

Because Sruti (tells us about) the conduct (of certain great wise persons, knowledge alone does not lead us to human end). ॥ ३ ॥

The Upaniṣads tell us in the very sections in which the discussion of Brahman is carried on, that certain great persons who had realized the Brahman were also busy in doing actions. For instance, we are told that Janaka, the king of Videha, performed a sacrifice in which he gave away abundant wealth to the priests (Br. 3, 1, 1). Another king, known as Aśvapati Kaikeya, who also had realized the Brahman, told the Brāhmīns that he was soon going to perform a sacrifice (Chā. 5, 11, 5). The sage Uddālaka preached his sons; while Yājñavalkya initiated his wife into the Brahma-vidyā. This means that such great persons also were taking interest in worldly life for the good of the householders. If knowledge alone could bring about the human end, why should have these persons involved themselves in performing troublesome sacrifices? If honey is found in one’s own house, who would go to the forest in search of it?

तथा ॥ ४ ॥

There being Sruti to that effect. ॥ ४ ॥

Besides, the Sruti-passage, ‘What is done with knowledge, faith and devotion possesses greater strength’ (Chā. 1, 1, 10), tells us directly that knowledge is sub-servient to action, and is not therefore capable of achieving by itself the end of human life.

समन्वारमभाषात् ॥ ५ ॥

Because (it is told that they) go together. ॥ ५ ॥

Moreover, the Sruti-passage, ‘Both his knowledge and work go with him’ after his death (Br. 4, 4, 2),
shows that the soul gets the combined fruits of both, and that knowledge therefore is not independent of action.


Tadvataḥ—vaiśāna

On account of the statement that those who have (knowledge of the Vedas are entitled to do actions). 6

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad tells us (8, 15, 1) that one who ‘serves his Guru and receives from him the knowledge of the Vedas, and who then, getting himself married, settles down in some calm and holy place and recites the Vedas, realizes the Brahman’. Naturally, such a person is not expected merely to read or recite the Vedas verbally, but to understand them thoroughly. It is men of this type who are, according to the Upaniṣadic passage, qualified to do actions. Hence, the conclusion, is that knowledge alone is not able to achieve the purpose of human life.

And because of rules. 7

That knowledge of the Brahman is merely subservient to action follows again from certain guiding principles laid down by Sruti. For example, ‘Let every man wish to live for hundred years and do actions; work will not cling even while it is being done; there is no other way than this’ (Īśā. 2); ‘The agnihotra lasts upto old age and death’; for one becomes free from it only through old age and death’ (Sat. Brā. 12, 4, 1, 1).

To all these arguments of the pūrvapakṣin the Sūtra-kāra replies.

1. If karma is to last till death, there is, according to the pūrvapakṣin, no scope for vidyā to liberate the man independently of the karma, and prior to death.

V. E. 18
the eye, that is thy Ātman’ (Chā. 8, 7, 4); and further in continuation with this, the passage, ‘I shall explain to you again about this Ātman’ (Chā. 8, 9, 3). But in view of the passages which are supplementary to the above mentioned one, it will be clear that the reference to the individual soul is not with a view to posit it as opposed to the highest Ātman; it is, on the contrary, to indicate the real nature of the Ātman and to indicate that the jīva is identical with it. These passages are: ‘The Rgveda, the Yajurveda, etc. are the breaths of this great Being’ (Br. 2, 4, 10); ‘He who goes beyond hunger, thirst, infatuation, sorrow, old age, and death’ (Br. 3, 5, 1); ‘Approaching the highest light, he appears in his own form; this is the highest Person’ (Chā. 8, 12, 3). In short, as we have repeatedly shown on several occasions, and as has been indicated by Śruti-passages, ‘Thou art that’ (Chā. 6, 8, 7), ‘There is no other seer than the highest Ātman’ (Br. 3, 8, 11), the embodied state of the soul is due to the upādhi of the body; while really speaking, the nature of the highest God is the nature of the embodied soul.

तुल्यं तु दर्शनम् । ९

[Tulyaṁ—equal; tu—but; darśanaṁ—Śruti.] But equal is (the evidence of) Śruti (regarding the conduct of those who have realized God). 9

If the pūrvapakṣin has cited Śruti-passages in favour of his view that knowledge is subservient to action (Sūtra 3), we too can show that Śruti is equally powerful in favour of our view that knowledge is independent of action. The descendants of Kavaśā, for instance, declare that like the ancient sages they had, after having realized the Brahman, no need of studying the Vedas any longer, nor of performing agnihotra and other sacrifices (Kau. 2, 5). ‘As the result of having realized the Ātman, the Brahmins become free from the desires for sons, wealth, and honour, and so, wander as mendicants ’ (Br. 3, 5). Yājñavalkya and others did not attach any importance to action, because they had realized
the Brahman. ‘This alone,’ Yājñavalkya says to his wife, Gārgī, ‘constitutes immortality;’ and saying this, he renounced all things (Br. 4, 5, 15). The pūrva-pakṣin’s allusion to Kaikeya’s promise to perform a sacrifice has no bearing on the point; the king utters these words in the context of the Vaiśvānara-vidyā. No doubt there may be certain vidyās which are related to saguṇa Brahman, and may therefore be combined with action. But this does not mean that the vidyā becomes subservient to action; for the context may not have anything to do with action.

असार्वत्रिकी । १०

(The Sruti-passage in question) has no universal application. 10

The Sruti-passage (Chā. 1, 1, 10) cited by the pūrva-pakṣin in Sūtra 4, has reference to the udgītha-vidyā, and has no application 1 to other vidyās.

विभागः शतवत् । ११

[ Vibhāga—division; sata—hundred; vat—like. ]

As in the case of a hundred (things, application of the Sruti-passages to vidyā and karma is taken) in a distributive sense. 11

If there are a hundred things to be divided and given to two persons, we cannot take the term ‘hundred’ in the collective sense. We shall have to take it in the distributive sense, and divide the hundred things into two groups of fifty each. Similarly, the Sruti-passage, referred to in Sūtra 5, viz., ‘Vidyā and karma go with him after his death’ (Br. 4, 4, 2), is to be split into two parts, so that vidyā will follow the adherent of vidyā, and karma the adherent of karma respectively 2.

And even if we give up the distributive sense regarding knowledge and action, and hold that the two

1. It will not be possible therefore to disprove by means of that Sruti-passage the claim of the Vedāntin that knowledge is independent of the works.

2. This means that vidyā is independent of karma.
are taken together, we can have another interpretation of the passage. The Upaniṣadic context has two types of men in view; one, of men who are engrossed with saṃsāra and have no knowledge of the Ātman, and the other, of those who have no saṃsārika desires but have the desire to get the release (Br. 4, 4, 6). Now, the Upaniṣadic passage (Br. 4, 4, 2), which speaks of the going together of vidyā and karma, is applicable to men immersed in saṃsāra only, and not at all to those who desire to be released. Naturally, with reference to the saṃsārī jīva, the word 'Vidyā' will never mean the Ātma-vidyā; it will mean either the vidyā which is enjoined, or the vidyā which is prohibited'. Similarly, Karma also will mean either works like sacrifices which are enjoined, or works like killing which are prohibited.

अष्ठयनमात्रवतः १ १२

[Adhyayana—reading; mātra—only; vataḥ—of him who has (a particular thing).] (Works are recommended) for him who has merely read the Vedas. 12

The Sruti-passage (Chā. 8, 15, 1,), cited by the pūrvapakṣin in Sūtra 6, does not mean that the reading of the Vedas necessarily includes the understanding of their meaning and the subsequent realization of the Ātman. So, the recommendation of works, we insist, is restricted to those who merely read the Vedas, without understanding the meaning, and who are moreover not inclined to work. In the case of such persons, the reading of the sacrificial portion of the Vedas may give rise to the knowledge of the sacrificial acts. And yet the knowledge of the Ātman as derived from the Upaniṣadic portion of the Vedas has its own independent purpose of leading one to mokṣa. Therefore, it is in no way a reason for recommending the doing of works, just

1. According to Anandagiri, to imagine a woman as naked is an example of prohibited vidyā; to meditate on the udgīthā is one which is enjoined.
as the knowledge of one particular sacrificial act is not a reason to make one qualified for doing another sacrificial act.

नारिषेपात् | १३

[ Na—not; a-विशेषत्—without specification. ]

There being absence of specification, (the rules of conduct) do not (apply to those who have realized the Ātman).

The rules of conduct referred to by the pūrvapakṣin in Sūtra 7, apply only to those who are qualified to do actions, and not to those who have realized the Ātman, since there is no specification to this effect.

स्तुतयेनसुनमातिवा | १४

[ Stutaye—for the sake of praise; anumatiḥ—permission; vā—or. ]

Or the permission (to do actions) is for the sake of praise (of knowledge).

Or, we can interpret the passage of the Isāväsyopaniṣad cited in Sūtra 7, in another way. No doubt, the context shows that the doing of acts refers to persons who have realized the Brahman; yet it appears to us that it is a permission given to such persons to act, only with the view of praising their knowledge, and not to show that knowledge is subordinate to action. For we are told immediately afterwards that no work will cling to such men on account of their power of knowledge, even if they be doing them throughout their whole life of a hundred years.

कामकारण चैके | १५

[ Kāmakārena—willingly; ca—and; eke—some. ]

And because some (people have) of their own accord (shown disregard for action).

Besides, there are people who, as the result of their Ātma-vidyā, have realized the uselessness of the fruits
of all other means, and so have given them up of their own accord. They have expressed this by saying, as the Upaniṣad of the Vājasaneyins puts it, 'Now that we have realized the Ātman, what shall we do with offspring?' (Br. 4, 4, 22). They would not have expressed this, if the fruit of Ātma-jñāna had not been available immediately, but available, like the fruits of karma, only at a later time after death. It follows therefore from this also that knowledge is not subordinate to action, and that the Sruti-passages which narrate the nature of the fruit of knowledge are not merely arthavāda sentences, but statements of facts.

उपमदे च। १६

And (because Sruti speaks of) the destruction (of the qualification for doing works). 16

Besides, Sruti tells us that the knowledge of the Ātman destroys the entire world of avidyā, consisting of actions, and of their means and fruits. 'When all this becomes the Ātman, who should see whom and who should smell what?' (Br. 2, 4, 14). And if there be anyone who would cherish the idea that a person may become qualified for doing actions after he attains the realization of the Ātman, we have to say unto him that there being nothing left beyond the Ātman which remains to be achieved, there would be no scope for action, nor for any qualification for it. Knowledge of the Ātman is therefore independent of any kind of action.

उधवरितःनु च शब्दे हि। १७

[Urdhva-retahsu—in the case of those who observe continence; ca—and; sabde—in Sruti; hi—for.]

And (the vidyā is mentioned even) for those who observe continence; for (this is indicated) in Sruti. 17

The Ātma-vidyā is independent of action also because it is mentioned as available for those who observe continence, that is, for those also who belong to
the three āśramas viz. the Brahmacarya, the Vānaprar-
stha, and the Saññyāsa.

On the contrary, works like agnihotra which are to be performed by the householders are impossible to be performed by those who belong to these three āśramas. Now, it will be wrong to suggest that these stages in life are not even mentioned in the Vedas; for we do get clear indications about their existence in the following Śruti-passages: ‘Dharma has three branches; as for him who is lodged in Brahman, he gets immortality’ (Cha. 2, 23, 1); ‘And those who practise penance and śraddhā in the forest’ (Cha. 5, 10, 1; Mu. 1, 2, 11); ‘Wishing to attain the world of Brahman only, the saññyāsins renounce everything ’(Br. 4, 4, 22); ‘One may become a saññyāsin straightway from his studentship’ (Jā. 4). In other words, without recourse to the condition of the householder, or without taking into consideration whether one has paid or not his three debts, one is allowed by Śruti and Smṛti to adopt any of the three stages requiring chastity.

1. The first āśrama or stage of life is Brahmacarya; it is the period of studentship usually spent at the Guru’s place. The second is known as Gṛhaṁśaśrama, the married life. The third, the Vānaprasthaśrama, means residence in forest. After the duties of the married life are fulfilled, a man is expected to withdraw his interest from samsāra and devote his attention to spiritual good. Saññyāsa is the last and the fourth stage, where the spiritual work is expected to be carried to the fullest extent without any attachment to world and actions.

2. Śraddhā here does not mean faith, but the faithful observance of upāsanās like devotion to Hiraṇyagarbha and others.

3. Śruti not only allows saññyāsa directly after Brahmacarya, leaving between them the two āśramas of the house and the forest, but also allows to adopt the duties of any of the three āśramas, according to one’s fitness and liking.

4. One is said to have paid the debts of the ṛṣis (sages) by accepting Brahmacarya, the debt of the gods by offerings in sacrifices and the debt of the fathers by begetting progeny, especially a son during Gṛhaṁśaśrama.
Jaimini (says that the above-mentioned Sruti-passages contain only) a reference (to āśramas other than that of a householder; they are) not injunctions; for (other Sruti-passages) censure (these āśramas). 18

Jaimini holds that the three āśramas other than that of the householder do not exist except in name, since the passage (Chā. 2, 23, 1) referred to in Sūtra 17, does not contain excepting their bare mention, any verbal form which will indicate an injunction regarding some action to be done in any one of them. The passage in question defines, in the first place, the four āśramas, and then, secondly, tells us that the first three āśramas, viz., the Brahmacarya, the Gārhashya and the Vānaprastha, have got the limited fruit of achieving the world of the blessed, while the fourth, viz., the sannyāsa is being praised for having got the unlimited fruit of being lodged in Brahman or immortality. No doubt, a reference like this may be said to involve the existence of the three āśramas also, but it must be remembered that their existence is accepted by Smṛti and custom, and not by any direct statement from Sruti. On the contrary, the Sruti-passage, 'One must perform agnihotra to the end of life,' not only favours the Gṛhaṇāśrama but also goes against the remaining three āśramas. Or else, these āśramas may be said to have some value for those who are unfit for being householders, that is, for those who are blind, deaf etc., or are somehow unfit to perform sacrifices and worship.

It may be pointed out that the passage under consideration (Chā. 2, 23, 1) mentions the Gṛhaṇāśrama

1. Agnihotra is to be performed by one who has his wife alive; and if one is to continue the life of a householder to the end of his life, where is the room for other āśramas?
along with others; and so, if it can be said that it has
got an existence of its own, the other three also can be
said to have it. But the reply of the pūrvapakṣin would
be that the existence of Gṛhausthāśrama is proved by
reference to other Sruti passages also which enjoin, for
instance, the performance of agnihotra. The other āśramas, on the other hand, have no such basis in Śruti,
and so, a reference to them is for the purpose of mere
praise, and not for enjoining any performance of duty.
Besides, there are passages in Śruti which directly
censure the life which is led according to the three
āśramas: 'He who removes the fire, murders the god; offer
your Guru the best rewards, and do not break the line of
your family' (Tai. 1, 11, 1); 'Even the beast knows that a
sonless being gets no world'. Again, the passages which
mention 'the penance and upāsanas of those who live in
the forest' (Chā. 5, 10, 1; Mu. 1, 2, 11), refer to the
path of the gods and not to the āśramas. It is doubtful
if the word 'śākhā' is used for āśrama. Similarly, the
passage, 'The saṁyāsins renounce everything in order
to attain the world of Brahman' (Br. 4, 4, 22), contains
no injunction regarding the performance of some duty,
but merely the praise of the greatness of the world of
Brahman. And, finally, our present discussion will not
be affected, although the Jābāla-Sruti recommends the
acceptance of saṁnyāsa direct from Brahmacarya.

अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणः साम्यश्रुतं: । १९ [Anuṣṭheyaṁ—fit to be adopted; Bādarāyaṇah; saṁya-
Sruteḥ—on account of equality of Śruti-statements.]

Bādarāyaṇa (thinks that other āśramas) are fit to be
adopted, on account of Śruti-passage containing
identical meaning. 19

Bādarāyaṇa rejects the opinion of Jaimini that āśra-
mas other than that of a householder are to be adopted,
if a man is unfit to perform agnihotra due to some
reason or other, and holds that they too are sanctioned
by the Vedas, and so, must be adopted in the same
way in which the Gṛhausthāśrama is adopted. Just as the
two ways of wearing the sacrificial thread, viz., hanging it round the neck, or hanging it from the right shoulder, have each got a peculiar propriety, but are merely referred in the context of the third way of wearing it, which also has got its own peculiar propriety¹, even so the reference to other āśramas along with that of an householder is sufficient to enable us to presume that they too, like the latter, are useful for performing certain duties, and are equally sanctioned by other Śruti-passages. The Upaniṣadic passage, especially, ‘Wishing to achieve the world of Brahma, the sannyāsins renounce everything’ (Br. 4, 4, 22), clearly shows us what is enjoined in this āśrama, viz., to renounce everything if one wishes to realize the Brahma. Similarly, the passage, ‘Those who practise penance and upāsanās in the forest’ (Chā. 5, 10, 1), shows what one has to do as a Vānaprastha, over and above the knowledge of the five fires which is recommended for him in the previous passage.

As for the contention of the pūrvapakṣin that it is doubtful whether the passage under discussion (Chā. 2, 23, 1), mentioned in Sūtras 17 and 18, refers to other āśramas or not, we reply that, in the first place, there is a specific reference to number ‘three’ in the passage, ‘There are three branches of Dharma’; and that, secondly, these three branches are further described

1. The yajñopavītā or the sacrificial thread which is worn by Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas, and Vaiśyas at the time of the upanayana ceremony is worn always afterwards, but in three different ways corresponding to three different occasions. It is kept suspended round the neck in doing all sorts of work pertaining to human beings. It is worn on the right shoulder and suspended on the left side of the body upto the waist at the most, when one is engaged in doing works intended for the fathers. And it is worn on the left shoulder and suspended on the right side of the body, to indicate that works are being done for the gods. These three ways are known as Nivita, Prācināvītā and Upavītā respectively. Now, we find that the first two ways are merely mentioned in the context of the third; but this does not mean that they have only nominal value. They two have as much functional value as the third has.
as having specific characteristics, and not any of them at random. Sacrifice, study and charity, for instance, indicate the Grhasthāśrama; celibacy, the Brahmacarya; and the words 'penance' and 'forest' in the passage referred above (Chā. 5, 10, 1), indicate the Vānaprasthāśrama. Hence, we conclude that the passage under discussion (Chā. 2, 23, 1) not only refers to the other āśramas, but tells us clearly that they also must be adopted as the Grhasthāśrama is.

बिविन्न धारणवत् । २०

[ Vidhīḥ—injunction; vā—or; dhāraṇa-vat—like supporting. ]

Or (it may be construed) as an injunction, as in the case of supporting (by means of samidh). 20

Or we might say that the passage under discussion (Chā. 2, 23, 1) is intended to inform us about the injunctions regarding our duties in the āśramas, in spite of the fact that the whole of it may be construed as one sentences, the former part of which tells us about the fruits of the first three āśramas, and the latter, the condition of being lodged in Brahman. As however the injunctions corresponding to the āśramas are not mentioned in any other place, and as the reference to the other āśramas is specially a novel feature of this passage, it would be better to construe the passage as made up of several sentences, which inform us of the several injunctions, rather than as one sentence in which the first part serves the purpose of eulogising the Brahmanic condition, which is mentioned in the second part.

This is analogous to a case in Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. In a sacrifice to the fathers, known as Mahāpitrīyajña, it is enjoined that when the pot containing the offering is to be carried near the āhavaniya-fire, it should be carried along with the samidh or the fire-stick below it; for, we are told immediately after this injunction that to carry the pot with the samidh above it is to carry it for the sake of gods. Now, are we to say that the reference to the carrying of the pot with a samidh above it is only
subsidiary to the injunction of carrying it with a samīdh below, inasmuch as the context is of a sacrifice to the fathers and not to gods. But as Jaimini has decided it in Adhyāya third, known as ‘Seṣalakaśaṇa’ of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, the carrying of the pot with a samīdh above it must be construed as something which is definitely enjoined, because there occurs no such injunction elsewhere, and so the occasion is said to be novel in spite of the fact that it is not in keeping with the context. Even so, the passage under discussion (Chā. 2, 23, 1) informs us about injunctions and does not merely refer to the āśramas.

Even supposing that the passage contains only a reference to the āśramas, we must say this much at least that it enjoins some injunction regarding the condition of residing in Brahman, which has been eulogized as having the unlimited fruit of immortality. Now, this life of being one with the Brahman is either possible for any person belonging to any one of the four āśramas, or to the saṇnyāsin only; for the saṇnyāsāśrama happens to be one of the four āśramas referred to by the passage, or, is exclusively separate from the other three, if it is not referred to along with them. According to some, the word ‘penance’ in the passage refers to both the dwellers in the forest and the mendicants. But this is not correct. For as the Brahmacāri and the Grhaṣtha are referred to by characteristics peculiar to them, even so must these be. As the mortification of the flesh is peculiar to the hermit in the forest, it will be appropriate to refer to him by means of the word ‘penance’. The mendicant or the ‘bhikṣu’, on the other hand, has his distinctive attribute of possessing control over the senses; and so, it can hardly be said that it will be expressed by the word ‘penance’. Besides, it will not be correct to say that the four āśramas are comprised into three, since Sruti has expressly stated them to be four, the first three of which lead a man to the worlds of the blessed, and the fourth leads him to immortality. Just as Yajñadatta cannot be said to be clever if both he and Devadatta
are already known to be stupid, but that Viṣṇumitra can be said to be clever as opposed to the two stupid persons, even so the saṅyāsāśrama is stated to be opposed to the other three āśramas.

It may now be pointed out by way of objection that the word 'Brahma-saṁstha', which means 'lodged in Brahman', may be applied to any person irrespective of āśramas provided he is so lodged, and so need not be restricted to the mendicant only; on the contrary, if it is so restricted, it may mean that the Brahmanic life is the result of the saṅyāsāśrama only, and that knowledge of Brahman which is said to lead to immortality would be useless. We meet this objection by saying that the life in Brahman means to become so absorbed in Brahman that activities peculiar to the first three āśramas cannot be carried without committing any breaches. The saṅyāsin, on the other hand, having renounced all such activities can hardly commit any breach. No doubt, the restraint of the senses and the control of the mind, which form his duties and which he cannot afford to neglect without loss, are not only not opposed to his being lodged in Brahman, but are, on the contrary, helpful to it, just as sacrifices etc. are helpful to men of other āśramas. That there remains nothing to be done by such a man can be seen from the following Srutis and Smṛti: 'Renunciation is Brahman; for Brahman is the highest; it is renunciation which rises superior to all the lower penances' (Mahanārāyana 21, 2); 'Ascetics whose minds are pure, and who ascertain the Vedantic object of knowledge, become liberated by the means of renunciation' (Mu. 3, 2, 6; Ma. Nā. 10, 6; Kaiva. 3); 'They fix their minds in Brahman, find their real nature in it, have all faith in it, and are completely absorbed in it' (B. G. 5, 17). From all this it also follows that it is not merely the āśrama that is responsible for the immortality which a saṅyāsin attains, but the knowledge and the renunciation which he possesses. We therefore reach the conclusion that the passage under discussion
(Chā. 2, 23, 1) tells us about the duties of a saññyāsin, though it may only refer to other āśramas.

So far, we have been discussing without taking into consideration the Jābala-Sruti which directly enjoins the saññyāsāśrama. According to it, one is allowed to become a saññyāsin after going through in succession the earlier āśramas of Brahmacarya, Gārhasṭhya and Vānapraṣṭha, or immediately from any one of them (Ja. 4).

Now, we cannot say that this passage recommends the saññyāsa for only those who are somehow unfit to do works; for it is a general statement without any specifications. Besides, there is another specific injunction regarding those who are 'unfit,' 'Let him be Vrati, a snātaka, a keeper of fire' or not, any one of these' (Ja. 4).

And further it is wrong to say that the saññyāsāśrama is meant for those who are unfit; it is, on the contrary, meant for fixing oneself firmly in the knowledge of Brahman. "Dressed in colourless garment, with his head shaven, pure, and guileless, having no wife, and living on alms, is this wandering 'parivrad' (saññyāsin) intent on the realization of Brahman" (Ja. 5). From all this we conclude that there are āśramas which enjoin chastity, and that the knowledge of Brahman which may belong to such persons is independent of actions.

2 स्तुतिमावाभिकरणम् । (२१-२२) ।
स्तुतिमावाप्रयाप्त्रानादिति चन्दनपूर्वैत्वात् । २२ ।

[Stuti—praise; mātram—only; upādānāt—owing to reference; iti cet—if it be said; na—not; apr̥uvvatvāt—on account of novelty.]

If it be said (that Śruti-passages about udgītha etc.) are for the sake of praise only on account of their reference (to sacrificial parts), it is not so; for (they contain) novelty. 21

1. A vrati is he who observes rules of conduct and study while he is a Brahmacārin. A snātaka is he who has finished his course of study, but is not married. The keeper of fire has his wife necessarily alive: while he, whose wife is dead and who has not married again, is forbidden to keep the agniḥotra.
To consider now whether the following Śruti-passages are meant to praise the udgītha and others, or to enjoin meditations on them. 'The udgītha is the eighth', the best, and the innermost essence of all, and holds the highest place' (Chā. 1, 1, 3); 'The earth is the Ṛk, the fire is the Sāman' (Chā. 1, 6, 1); 'This fire-altar built of bricks is verily the world' (Śata. Brā. 10, 1, 2, 2); 'The group of hymns, known as uktha, is the earth' (Ait. Ār. 2, 1, 2, 1). According to the pūrṇapaksin they are meant to glorify the udgītha and others, because these are mentioned as members of the sacrificial acts, just as juhū, kūrma, and āhavanīya² are praised by being called the earth, the sun, and the heaven.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies. It cannot be said that these passages are merely glorifying in character; for they contain in them the additional, novel¹ information that the udgītha and others are to be meditated upon. The Pūrva Mīmāṁsā (1, 2, 7) tells us that glorifying sentences are useful only in so far as they are subservient to sentences which are injunctive in character. And, as the passages under discussion can hardly be understood as glorifying the udgītha and others which are enjoined as meditations in altogether different places, the only way left for us for saying that the passages are not useless is to consider them as containing injunctions regarding the meditations on the udgītha and others. As for the argument that these passages are analogous to statements regarding juhū, kūrma, and āhavanīya, we say that the latter are in close proximity with other sentences in the same Upaniṣads, which enjoin


2. Juhū is the ladle used in a sacrifice; kūrma is the fire-altar built in the shape of a tortoise; and āhavanīya is the name of a fire.

3. The novelty of the udgītha, for instance, is that it is the innermost essence of all other essences like earth, speech, ēk, sāman, etc., and is the highest because it is the symbol of Brahman. As such it is a fit object of meditation.
Hence it follows that the passages under discussion enjoin some meditations.

भाष्यशब्दाधि | २२

[ Bhāva—existence; śabdāt—on account of words; ca—and.]

And on account of words indicating the becoming (after something). 22

Besides, there are words in the passages which clearly indicate in accordance to those who know the Nyāya, that one is to meditate on the udgītha, or on the sāman, or think oneself as the uktha (Chā. 1, 1, 1; 2, 2, 1; Ait. Ār. 2, 1, 6). And again, special fruits are said to accrue from these meditations. For instance, one who meditates on the udgītha ‘fulfils all desires’ (Chā. 1, 1, 7); ‘Singing the sāman, he gets his wishes fulfilled’ (Chā. 1, 7, 9); ‘All the higher and the lower worlds belong to him’ (Chā. 2, 2, 3). Hence, too, the passages under discussion are meant to enjoin meditations on the udgītha and others.

⁴ पारिप्रेक्ष्यव्रत्यं (२३–२४)

पारिप्रेक्ष्यव्रत्यं ह्रति चेन विशेषितलब | २३

[ Pāriplava—the ceremony of narrating stories during Aśvamedha-sacrifice; arthāḥ—having the purpose of; iti cet—if it is said; na—not; viśeṣitavat—on account of specification.]

If it be said (that stories told in the Upaniṣads) are for the purpose of the pāriplava, it is not so; for (certain stories) are specified (for that purpose). 23

During the Aśvamedha-sacrifice, it was customary to narrate the Vedic stories of Manu, Yama, and Varuṇa respectively on three successive days to the king who performed the sacrifice. This is what is known as the ceremony of pāriplava. Now, there arises the doubt

1. Pāṇini mentions five such forms of the verb to be or to do in the potential or the imperative mood to indicate vidhi, nimantraṇa, āmantraṇa, sampṛśna, and prārthanā, i.e. injunction, invitation, and prayer.

V. E. 19
whether the other Upaniṣadic stories also serve the purpose of pārīplava, or are meant to instruct the vidyās which are discussed in close proximity with them. For instance, there are the stories of Yājñavalkya and his two wives, Maitreyi and Kātyāyani (Br. 4, 5, 1); of Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa, who went to the abode of Indra (Kau. 3, 1); and of Jānaśruti, the great grandson of Janaśruta, who used to give away wealth and feed innumerable people (Chā. 4, 1, 1). The pūrvapakṣin holds that these Upaniṣadic stories serve the purpose of pārīplava, because they are, after all, like any other stories. So, from this it follows, as he believes, that the Vedānta-passages do not aim at giving us knowledge, but they are, like mantras, subservient to the performance of sacrifices.

It must be remembered, we reply, that the stories which have been recommended by Sruti are specific in character, viz., of Manu, Yama, and Varuṇa. They are not any stories, if specification has any meaning; and so it cannot be said that the Upaniṣadic stories are for the purpose of pārīplava.

तथा चैक्ताकृत्याप्पर्यन्तवन्ध। २४

[Tathā—also; ca—and; eka-vākyatā—of unitary meaning; upabandhāt—on account of connection.]

And also because (the Upaniṣadic stories) form a connected meaning as a whole (with that of the vidyās). 24

If then the Upaniṣadic stories do not subserve the purpose of pārīplava, it will be reasonable to hold that they are useful in giving an expository account of the vidyās in connection with which they are told. They create in the minds of the readers a love for the vidyās, and make them easily understandable. When one reads the story in the Maitreyi-brāhmaṇa, for instance, about how Yājñavalkya tells his dear wife that ‘the Ātman must verily be seen’ (Br. 4, 5, 6), or the story in the Pratardana-brāhmaṇa connected with the vidyā of ‘Prāṇa as the conscious Ātman’ (Kau. 3, 2), or the story of Jānaśruti connected with the vidyā of ‘the wind as
the absorber of all' (Cha. 4, 3, 1), it is but natural that one would take interest and understand the vidyās easily in the light of the stories. This is analogous to what happens in the Karma-Kāṇḍa. There also stories are told in order to praise certain injunctions which are proximate. The story about Brahma Deva, for instance, that he cut out his own omentum for the purpose of offering it in a sacrifice, easily carries conviction in the mind of the sacrificer that the omentum is to be sacrificed. Hence it follows that the Upaniṣadic stories are not meant for the purpose of pārīplava.

\[ 5 \text{ अष्टीन्धनाध्यायिकरणम्} \ (25:) \]
\[ \text{अत एव चाष्टीन्धनाध्यायिनेष्वा} \]

\[ \text{[ Atah—hence; eva—only; ca—and; agni-indhana-ādi—replenishing fire and so on; anapeksā—absence of need.]} \]

And for this very reason there is no necessity of replenishing fire. 25

This Sūtra refers to the first Sūtra of this pāda. For what was decided in the first adhikaraṇa, viz., that Ātma-jñāna is independent of action in achieving the end of human life, and confirmed in the next three adhikaraṇas, is being told with the intention of summing up of the results, after making a few additional remarks in this adhikaraṇa. Works like igniting the sacrificial fire, which are enjoined for the different āśramas, are not necessary so far as the result of the Ātma-vidyā is to be achieved, as the summum bonum of life.

\[ 6 \text{ सर्वप्रेष्याधिष्ठितेष्वरम्} \ (26–27) \]
\[ \text{सर्वप्रेष्या च यज्ञादिश्रुतेन} \]

\[ \text{[ Sarva—all; apeksā—need; ca; yajña-ādi-Śrutēḥ—on account of statements in Śruti regarding sacrifice and others; aśva-vat—like a horse.]} \]

Because yajña and other (works) are stated by Śruti (as means, the vidyā) is in need of all of them; this is like a horse. 26
Let us now consider if works enjoined on the āśramas are not at all necessary for vidyā, or are necessary to some extent at least. Notwithstanding what has been said in the preceding Śūtra, it cannot be said that works like sacrifice and others are of no use for vidyā. For, although the highest end of the human life, namely, the mokṣa, is not dependent on anything else except the knowledge of the Ātman, this knowledge itself, so far as its origination in man is concerned, is dependent on works. We get the following Sruti which tells us that sacrifices and other works are useful as means of knowledge and as fulfilling the desire for having it. ‘The Brāhmaṇas desire to know the Ātman by means of the study of the Vedas, sacrifice, charity, penance, and fasting’ (Br. 4, 4, 22). Similarly, another Sruti, after having told us that brahmacarya is a means of knowledge, tells us that sacrifices also are means of knowledge, because ‘What people call sacrifice is really brahmacarya’ (Cha. 8, 5, 1). We learn the same thing from another Sruti still, ‘I shall now tell thee briefly about that abode, the Brahman, which all the Vedas describe, which all the penances declare, and desiring which people observe brahmacarya’ (Ka. 1, 2, 15). ‘Works wash away’, as the Smṛti says, ‘the impurity of man; as for knowledge which is the highest destination, it arises when the impurity is removed’. Just as a horse is specially used for drawing a chariot and not a plough, even so, the various duties attached to āśramas are useful in producing in man the vidyā though not the fruit of it.

1. Even now in India horses are not generally used for the purpose of ploughing the fields.
But he (who desires to get release) must, all the same possess control over the senses, calmness of mind and so on; for these are enjoined as helpful to that (i.e. knowledge) and so must be resorted to necessarily. 27

Some may think that the passage, 'The Brāhmaṇas wish to know the Ātman by means of sacrifice, study, etc.' (Br. 4, 4, 22), is no injunction but an arthavāda only, used for the purpose of glorifying the vidyā. But this much at least is certain that the seeker after the knowledge of the Ātman must possess the qualities of 'control over the senses, calmness of mind, patience, and steadiness'. For we are told that as a result of these virtues, 'he sees' the Ātman, and becomes free from sins' (Br. 4, 4, 22-23). This need not be construed as a mere praise; for the reference to the result of the Ātma-jñāna, viz., the non-clinging of the sin, will have no meaning; but, on the contrary, it enjoins the practice of the several virtues as means to the realization of the Ātman and the subsequent freedom from sin. Hence, these virtues at least are necessary, even if sacrifices, etc. are considered as not necessary.

And yet, works like sacrifices must be considered as useful for knowledge, inasmuch as they are linked to it through 'the desire to know the Ātman', as said already in Sūtra 26. And, as this connection between sacrifice and the desire for knowledge is altogether new, and not met with before, the passage under discussion (Br. 4, 4, 22) is a statement of injunction, and not of praise only. We have the authority of Jaimini in deciding a similar case in the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā (3, 3, 34). Pūśan is said to receive crushed food in a sacrifice, because he has no teeth. But there is neither the deity of Pūśan (sun) nor the offering of crushed food in the darśa-pūrna-māsa sacrifice, where we get this statement. And yet, the statement being unique, it is construed as having its

1. Unlike the Kāṇvas, the Mādhyandinas have explicitly used the word 'sees' as in 'let him see', so as to bring out the force of an injunction.
application in all other sacrifices which are modifications of the darsapūrṇamāsa. A similar conclusion was reached in Sūtra 20. Hence, not only virtues like calmness of mind etc. are useful to the springing up of knowledge of the Ātmān, but works also like sacrifices and other must be considered to be so. The difference however between the two kinds of means is that, whereas the moral qualities go to form the internal means, works like sacrifices etc., form the external ones.

And because Sruti tells it, there is permission (to eat) all food (only) when there is danger to life. 28

During the course of the conversation of the prāṇas, the Chāṇḍogas tell us that 'there is nothing which does not become food for him who knows that prāṇa is the consumer of all kinds of food' (Chā. 5, 2, 1). Similar is the statement of the Vājasaneyins (Br. 6, 1, 14). Now there arises the doubt whether the permission to eat all food, which is implied in these two statements, is enjoined by Sruti as being helpful to knowledge, just as the moral qualities and the works are, or is mentioned by way of glorification of the vidyā. The pūrvapaksīn thinks that it is an injunction; for there is the reference to the special or the novel activity of eating all kinds of food. This appears, no doubt, as going against the ordinary rule of eating some kind of food and of avoiding the other, but which, being mentioned in close proximity to the prāṇavidyā, is helpful to acquire it. There is however no contradiction between the general and the special rules, according to the pūrvapaksīn. For, while the general rule is true, the special rule is applicable in some particular cases only, just as killing is allowed in a sacrifice, though prohibited in a general way; or just as
meeting a woman who approaches voluntarily is allowed as an exception in the Vāmadevya-vidyā only (Cha. 2, 13, 2).

To this we reply. There is no injunction, because there is no verbal form expressive of it. Nor can we assume an injunction; for, in the first place, it is impossible for a man to eat the food which is fit to be eaten by dogs and other animals. And, secondly, the passage under discussion (Cha. 5, 2, 1) first states that 'all food eaten by dogs or other animals becomes the food of prāṇa', and then states that 'for one who knows this there is nothing which does not become food'. This means that the passage is only an eulogy of the food of prāṇa, and not an injunction which allows eating of any food. It is exactly this conclusion which the Sūtra helps us to have, namely, that one may eat forbidden food only to save one's life from starvation. The same Upaniṣad tells us how a Brāhmaṇa-sage, named Cākrāyaṇa, for instance, being tormented by hunger, when the crops in the land of the Kurus had failed on account of the invasion of the locusts (or hailstorm), had to eat on two successive days beans which were left over after being eaten by a conductor of an elephant, but how he refused to drink water offered by the same person (Chā. 1, 10, 4). The sage explains his conduct by saying that he could not have saved his life if he had not eaten the beans; but, as for water he could have got it anywhere else, and that there was therefore no danger to life. So, Śruti tells us that the wise person also must observe rules regarding what must be eaten and what not, provided of course there is no danger to life. Hence it follows that the passage under discussion (Chā. 5, 2, 1) is only an arthavāda.

अवाचाच्च ॥ २९॥

[A-bāḍhāt—on account of not being contradicted; ca-and. ]

And on account of there being no contradiction (the passage under discussion is an arthavāda). 29

It is only in the light of the argument set forth in the preceding Sūtra, that the general rule regarding
what food should be eaten and what not, will not be contradicted. We get this rule defined, for instance, in the passage, 'When the food eaten is pure, the mind becomes pure' (Chā. 7, 26, 2).

अपि च स्मर्येऽऽि ३०

[Api—even; ca—and; smaryate—is told in Smṛti.]
Smṛti also tells (the same). 30

We also learn from Smṛti that there is no restriction regarding food in case the life is in danger, and that just as the lotus leaf is not stained by water, even so there will be no sin which will be incurred on that account. And yet, we find many Smṛti passages which instruct us to avoid what is not to be eaten under ordinary circumstances. On no account, however, liquor is allowed; for if a Brāhmaṇa is found to drink liquor, the punishment for that is that boiling liquor should be poured down his throat. Such a man is said to be a worm.

शब्दश्चातोऽकामकारेऽऽि ३१

[Sabdhah—Śruti-passage; ca—and; atah—hence; a-kāmakāre—for not doing things according to liking.]
And hence (another) Śruti-passage which puts a stop to the doing (of things) according to liking (is also found consistent). 31

In the Kāṭhaka-samhitā also we read that inasmuch as there is provision for capital punishment for drinking liquor, a Brahmīn should not do so. Now, this Śruti, which intends to put a stop to the doing of things according to one's liking and to the eating of prohibited food, will be consistent, only when we take the passage under discussion (Chā. 5, 2, 1) as meaning an arthavāda only, and not as an injunction:

< आश्रमकर्माधिकरणम् | (३२—३५)
विहितत्वाच्छात्राश्रमकर्मायि | ३२

[Vihitavāt—being enjoined; ca—and; āśrama-karma—actions pertaining to āśramas; api—even.]
And because actions pertaining to āśramas are enjoined, (they must be done by him) also (who does not desire mokṣa). 32

We have already seen under Sūtra 26 that works enjoined on the āśramas are useful as means of knowledge. There arises now the question whether these works are to be done also by him who sticks to a particular āśrama, but who has neither any desire to acquire any vidyā nor mokṣa. According to the pūrvapakṣin, there are two possible answers. Either we have to obey the rule that ‘agnihotra and other actions are to be performed till the end of life’, or to believe, according to Sūtra 26, that these actions are only means of getting knowledge. In the one case, the actions which, as duties, are permanently binding on men, cannot be said to be enjoined as means for the sake of knowledge; in the other case, if the āśramite actions are considered as means of knowledge, they are not permanently binding on men as duties. In other words, they are optional, and so need not be performed by those who do not wish to have final release.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies. Works which are permanently binding as duties must be performed even by him who has no desire for being released. As for the objection of the pūrvapakṣin that they may not in that case be considered as means of knowledge, the next Sūtra comes as a reply.

[-Sahakāritvena—on account of there being co-operation; ca—and.]

And on account of being co-operative (members, works are useful for the springing up of knowledge). 33

As explained, under Sūtra 26, works which are permanently binding on men, such as the study of the Vedas etc. are helpful for the production of the knowledge of the Ātman. But it need not be said that these works are useful in bringing about the fruit of the Ātma-jñāna, viz.,
the mokṣa, in the same way in which the prayāja and other sacrificial acts are useful as co-operative members to bring about the fruit of the dārsapūrṇamāsa sacrifice. For there is no vidhi or injunction with reference to Atma-vidyā; nor is mokṣa a result which is to be accomplished from vidyā at some future time, just as the heaven is to be accomplished by sacrifices like dārsapūrṇamāsa and other subordinate co-operative members like prayājas. We have explained this under Sūtra 25. Therefore, when it is said that works are useful for knowledge, what is meant is that they are useful for the springing up of that knowledge in man.

Nor must we suppose that there is necessarily a contradiction between actions which are obligatory and actions which are optional. For the same actions may have these contradictory aspects, on account of their being connected in different ways. Agnihotra and other works are to last till the end of life. The connection of the work with man is permanent here, but knowledge is not the result in this case. On the other hand, when the same works, viz., agnihotra etc., are to be performed for the sake of the search of the Ātman, their connection with man appears to be impermanent, that is, optional; but, in this case, the result is the springing up of the knowledge itself in man. This is analogous to the sacrificial post made of the khadira-wood. It is permanently connected with sacrifice; for the animal is to be tied at the post only. But it is optionally or impermanently connected with the person who sacrifices; for the sacrificial post is to be made of khadira-wood only when the sacrificer wishes to acquire valour and not otherwise, in which case the post may be made of any other wood.

सर्वथा—पि त एवोमयलिंगात् । ३४

[Sarvāthā-apī—in any case; te—those; eva—only; ubeha—both; liṅgaḥ—on account of sign.]

In any case, on account of the signs (present in Sruti and Smṛti) indicating both ways, the same (sacrificial acts are to be performed). 34
The Śūtrakāra wishes to remove in this Sūtra the suspicion that works useful for knowledge may be different from those sacrificial works which are recommended to be performed for the sake of attaining the heavenly world. The same kind of works, viz., the agnihotra and others are to be performed, either because they are considered obligatory on the āśramas, or because they are helpful for the origination of the knowledge of the Ātman. This is not like the distinction between the special agnihotra which the Kuṇḍapāyins perform ‘for a month’ and their usual agnihotra. The Śruti-passage (Br. 4, 4, 22), for instance, which tells us that the ‘Brahmins desire to know the Ātman by means of the study of the Vedas etc.’, refers to those very means, which have already been established as obligatory on the āśramas, but as having only a further connection with the desire for the knowledge of the Ātman. In other words, the works do not appear as new, as in the case of the agnihotra of the Kuṇḍapāyins. Similarly, the Smṛti-passage (B. G. 6, 1) which recommends the doing of works without aiming at the fruits thereof, obviously refers to the works which are already known, but teaches us that the same works done without attachment to fruit are able to produce in us the knowledge of the Ātman. Similarly, again, the same forty-eight śaṁskāras which are considered to be essential for purification and for qualifying a person for Vedic works, are mentioned in connection with the origination of knowledge. So there is no difference between works mentioned in the Karma-kāṇḍa and those mentioned in the Upaniṣads for the sake of production of knowledge in some person.

1. The forty-eight śaṁskāras are: — 14 from the jīva’s embryonic condition to his marriage; 5 ordinary sacrifices; 7 Mahāyajñas; 7 Somasamsthās; 7 Havih samsthās; 7 Pāka- samsthās; and the last 8 are: adhyāna, pṛāyaṇa, Karma, Japa, death, collection of ashes, collection of bones, and śrāddha. These last eight are mentioned by some others as the qualities of the soul such as absence of jealousy and others.
Sruti also declares that (persons performing works) are not overcome (by passions, etc.).

Another reason why works like sacrifices which are obligatory on the āsramas are also useful for attaining the knowledge of the Ātman is that the persons who perform them are not overcome by passions and afflictions. As the Upaniṣad says, ‘The Ātman which is found out by Brahmacarya does not perish’! (Chā. 8, 5, 3).

But even (those who are left hanging without any āsrama) in the middle (are qualified for vidyā); this is seen (in Śruti and Smṛti). Now that we have seen the utility of the āsramite actions for vidyā, it may be contended that persons who do not belong to any āsrama, such as the widowers, or those who have no money to get themselves married again, are not qualified for having it. But Śruti tells us that Raikva, who had no money to marry a second time, could impart the Samvarga-vidyā to the king Jānaśruti, and that Gārgi or Vācañavi, the daughter of the sage Vacaknu, could ask Yājñavalkya questions regarding Brahma-Jñāna, at the court of the king Janaka (Chā. 4, 1; Br. 3, 6).

1. This means that the knowledge of the Ātman does not perish because it is kept constantly fresh by the daily performance of the āsramite duties, etc.
It is told about Saṁvarta and other authors of Smṛtis that they became great as yogins, notwithstanding that no āśramite duty was expected of them on account of their being naked, and so on. But the question as to how it was that such persons could acquire the vidyā inspite of their not doing any āśramite action, is answered in the next Sūtra.

विशेषाद्वृत्तिः। ३८

[Viśeṣa—something special; anugrahaḥ—favour; ca—and.] (It is on account of) specific things (that the vidyā) favours (such persons). 38

The vidyā is available to such men on account of certain specific acts such as japa, 1 fasts, devotion to god, and, so on. The Manu Smṛti (1, 287) tells us, ‘One may perform other works or not; he whose heart is kind is a Brāhmaṇa; and, verily, by japa alone, the Brāhmaṇa makes himself perfect’. The Bhagavadgītā also (6, 45) tells us that the knowledge of the Ātman is perfected on account of the accumulation of samskāras of actions done in the several previous births. Besides, in the absence of any prohibition, it is open unto any 2 one who desires to remove his ignorance to resort to the study and to the hearing of the Vedānta-passages. So, it follows that widowers and others who do not belong to any āśrama are, none the less, qualified for acquiring the Ātma-vidyā.

अतिस्तंभरत्वम् द्रव्यायो इति। ३९

[Atah—than this; tu—but; itarat—the other; jyāyāḥ—better; lingāḥ—on account of sign; ca—and.]

But the other (condition of belonging to some āśrama) is better than this; for there are indications (of this in Sruti). 39

---

1. Japa is the counting of the beads; it consists in repeating a mantra or a name of God.
2. Excepting probably the Sudras.
It is better however to belong to some āśrama than not to belong to any. For as the Sruti says, 'One who performs the acts of merit' (according to his āśrama) goes to Brahman by the way of the light' (Br. 4, 4, 9). The same is told is Smṛti also. 'The Brahmin ought not to remain without belonging to some āśrama even for a single day. And if he were to remain āśrama-less for one year, he must perform the penance of Kṛccha'.

10: तद्भूताधिकरणस् | (४०)
तद्भूतस्य तु नात्वञ्जावो जैमिनिर्पिनियमात्युपाध्येश्यः | ४०

[Tad-bhūtasya—of him who has become that; na—not; a-tat-bhāvah—not the being of that; Jaimineh—of Jaimini; api—even; niyama—rule; a-tat-rūpa—not having that form; abhāvebhyah—on account of absence.]

He who has become that (i.e. belongs to a higher āśrama) cannot become other than that, because there is the rule, and absence of statements (of descent and of example of good men).

There arises now the question whether it is allowable for a sannyāsin to return or not to a lower āśrama. The Purvapāksin says that there is no essential difference between descent or ascent, and so a sannyāsin may descend to a lower āśrama, either because he wishes to do the duties of that āśrama in a nice manner, or because he is moved by passions.

To this we reply that the descent is not possible on account of the following reasons. In the first place, there are certain rules which are binding upon certain āśramas, and these do not allow a return to the lower

1. If the doing of acts according to one's āśrama constitutes merit, it appears that to be without any āśrama constitutes demerit. Naturally, therefore, it is desirable to have the support of merit while one is engaged in having Ātma-jñāna.

2. Kṛccha is an expiatory penance lasting for twelve days. For the first three days, one has to take food only once; for the next three days, one has to take it only by night; for the next three, one has to eat the food which comes without asking for it; and, for the last three days, one has to observe a complete fast.
āśramas. As a naiṣṭhika Brahmacāri, 'one is to live in the house of his Guru till death, without caring for bodily comforts' (Chā. 2, 23, 1); the householder is not to return to his āśrama after once he accepts the āśrama of the forest-dweller or that of a sannyāsin; and finally, one has to stick up to one of the āśramas till death, after one leaves the house of his Guru. Secondly, we have instruction regarding the ascent, but no such instruction regarding the descent. The āśrama of the householder or that of the sannyāsin, is to be accepted after finishing that of Brahmacarya, and not in the reverse manner. Besides, in the third place, there is no example of respectable persons to show that the return to earlier āśramas is possible.

As for the argument of the pūrvapakṣin that the earlier āśramas may be again resorted to with the desire to perform the actions well, we have to point out that this is against the teaching of the Smṛti, according to which, 'One's own duty, even if badly performed, is better than another man's duty which is well performed' (B. G. 3, 35). That is duty which is enjoined to be done; and not that which is capable of being performed well, so that one may choose his duty and his āśrama, as he likes. Nor can the fall from the higher to the lower āśrama be allowed on the ground of passions being surcharged; for it is not passions, but rules that must govern actions of man. This is what Jaimini and Bāṇya hold in common.

As it can be inferred that the fall (of the Naiṣṭhika) is not connected (with expiation), not even (the expiation
certain meditations, prescribed in the chapter known as Adhikāralakṣaṇa, (is available in his case). 41

As for the question whether the Naiṣṭhika Brahmacārin can expiate the sin of his fall by sacrificing an ass to Nirṛti or not, as the Āpastamba Dharma-Sūtra requires it, the pūrvapakṣin says that no expiation can make him sinless, in spite of what is stated in the sixth chapter, known as Adhikāralakṣaṇa of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā (6, 8, 22), viz., that the expiation is available as a general rule. For the sin committed by the Naiṣṭhika is like the cutting off the head from the body, and, so, nothing will enable one to rejoin the head with the body and restore life as before. The expiation may have its efficacy however in the case of the Upakurvāṇa.

उपपूर्वमापि तेके भावाश्चानवत्ततुरूपः । ४२

[Upañśūram—less serious; tu—but; eke—some; bhāvan—existence; āśana—vai-like eating; tad—that; uktam—is told.]

But some (consider the sin) as less serious, and (that therefore in the case of Naiṣṭhika also) there exists (expiation) as in the case of eating (forbidden food); this is explained (in Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā). 42

But as the fall of the Naiṣṭhika is not enumerated as one of the five horrible sins, such as spoiling the bed of one’s Guru, some consider it as capable of being expiated, just as when ing of forbidden food, such as honey or flesh, is expiated, whether in the case of Naiṣṭhika or upakurvāṇa by the fresh performance of the upanayana ceremony. When there are conflicting statements about anything Jaimini asks us (Pu. Mi. 1, 3, 8, 9,) to accept that which is supported by Śruti. The expiatory act of sacrificing an ass must therefore be taken as valid in the case of Naiṣṭhika. The statement of the Smṛti that there can be no expiation for him serves the purpose of cautioning

1. The Naiṣṭhika Brahmacārin stays and serves till death in the house of his Guru, and is not allowed to become a house-holder. The Upakurvāṇa, on the other hand, stays so long as he finishes his education; he is then permitted to marry and settle separately.
him, so that he should take care and not commit any sin. We get expiatory acts even for a Vānaprastha and a Bhikṣu. The former is to undergo a Kṛcchra for twelve nights, and to cultivate a plot of ground with grass. The Bhikṣu also is to perform all the expiatory acts like the Vānaprastha, excepting the cultivation of the soma plant, as also to perform the specific acts of purifications enjoined for his āśrama.

12 वाहिरविकरणम् (४२)
वाहिस्तुमययापि स्मृतेराचाराच्छ । ४३

[Bahir—outside; tu—but; ubhayathā—both ways; api—also; Smyteḥ—from what is told in Smṛti; ācārāt—from conduct; ca—and.]

But (they are to be kept) outside (their community) even in both the cases, on account of Smṛti and conduct. 43

Whatever may be the nature of the sin, whether
great or small, those who fall from chastity are ex-
communicated by respectable persons, for purposes of
sacrifice, study, and wedding. Smṛti refers to them with
great reproach: ‘Even one who touches a Brahmin
who has fallen from his vow and duties of āśrama,
has to undergo the Cāndrāyaṇa¹ penance, as surely as
one who has touched a corpse of a person who was
hung or was bitten to death by a worm’. ²

1. Cāndrāyaṇa is a penance which consists in taking food
in proportion to the changes in the digits of the moon. One is
to start with one morsel of food on the first day of the bright-
half of the month, two morsels on the second day, three on the
third day, and so on, till fifteen morsels on the full-moon day.
Similarly, a corresponding decrease in the number of morsels
is to be made after this so that on the Amāvāsyā day one has to
observe complete fast.

2. The preceding Sūtra makes a man fit for Ātma-jñāna,
after the sins are washed away by expiatory acts. The present
Sūtra however keeps such persons away from society, so far as
practical affairs are concerned.

V, E. 20
As regards the upāsanās subservient to actions, there arises the doubt whether they are to be performed by the sacrificer himself or by the priests who conduct the sacrifice. The pūrvapaksin holds that they are to be performed by the sacrificer himself, because fruits are mentioned. ‘Rain for others,’ ‘is brought by one who meditates on the fivefold Sāman as rain’ (Chā. 2, 3, 2). Naturally, the fruits belong to the sacrificer who is therefore said to be necessarily meditating on the upāsanās which are included within the sacrifices; though, in certain special cases, we are told that the priest obtains for himself by his singing whatever he desires over and above what he desires for the sacrificer (Br, 1, 3, 28). Hence, as Ātreya holds, the meditator on the upāsanās which are attended by fruits must be the sacrificer himself.

3. The hinkāra, prastāva, udgītha, pratihāra, and nidhana of a śāman are the eastern wind, the cloud, the rain, the thunder, and the end of rain, respectively.
udgītha will be clear to us from the Sruti which tells us that it was 'Baka, the son of Dalbha, who knew the udgītha and became the udgātā of the Naimiśiyas' (Chā. 1, 2, 13). As for the argument of the pūrva-paṅkaśin that the fruit belongs to the performer of the sacrifice and of the upāsanā, we say that it matters little, so long as the priests are paid their fees for working on behalf of the sacrificer. The fruits therefore go to the sacrificer and not to the priests.

And on account of Sruti. 46

And as Sruti tells us 'all the blessings prayed for by the priest are for the good of the sacrificer' (Sat. Brā. 1, 3, 1, 26). The udgātā who knows the udgītha should ask the sacrificer as to what things he may obtain for him by his singing (Chā. 1, 7, 8). From passages like these we conclude that the upāsanās, subservient to sacrifices, are performed by the priests, but the fruits thereof go to the sacrificer for whom they work.

14 Sahākāryeṇtara-viśyādikāraṇam (47—49)

Sahākāryeṇtara-viṣṭhīti: paksēna tuhitō vīṣṭhīdikārtu 47

[Sahakāryantara—some other thing which becomes helpful; vidhiḥ—injunction; paksena—for the case; tṛṭīyam—third; tād-vataḥ—for him who is such; vidhi-ādi-vat—like injunctions and others.]

It is an injunction regarding a third thing which is useful for him (who has not perfected his knowledge); this is like (other) injunctions. 47

The Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (3, 5) recommends us to possess knowledge (pāṇḍitya) and yet lead the life of child-like innocence (bālya), and further states that a person becomes the muni after combining the pāṇḍitya with the bālya, and that he becomes the Brāhmaṇa after combining 'amauna' with 'mauna'. Now there arises

1. Amauna is the same thing as the combination of bālya and pāṇḍitya; mauna therefore means the height of wisdom.
the doubt here whether the mauna is enjoined or not; for there is no verb indicating injunction, just as there is with reference to the condition of child-like simplicity and learning which is recommended to be had in the beginning of the passage. ‘Munitva’ and ‘Paññitya’ mean one and the same thing. So when the injunction regarding Paññitya is over, there would only be an ‘anuvāda’ or reference to ‘muni’, and not another injunction again. This is similar to the reference to ‘Brähmaṇa’, at the end of the passage. For the context of the whole of the Brähmaṇa-passage is from the very beginning regarding those who know the Brahman; naturally, any reference to Brähmaṇa afterwards will not be an injunction, but anuvāda only.

To this we reply. The passage does contain an injunction regarding mauna or the state of a muni, because it comes as a new and additional strength to knowledge, in the same way in which learning and child-like simplicity are enjoined before it. The word ‘mauna’ need not be supposed to be a synonym for the word ‘learning’ used before, but as meaning the further stage of learning or of mature wisdom, which comes into being on account of repeated thinking. The passage, ‘Vyāsa is the best among munis’ means best among men of extraordinary wisdom (B. G. 10, 37). Neither does the word necessarily indicate the Saṁnyāśaśrama, though it can be said to have been sometimes so used, because the other three aśramas are directly in the same context. For in the first place, the word ‘muni’ is applied in connection with Vālmiki, even though he was not a Saṁnyāśin. Secondly, it is put to indicate sometimes the Saṁnyāśaśrama because what is most prominent in that order, viz., the knowledge, is indicated by that word (mauna). Hence, as said above, the maturity of wisdom, like knowledge and simplicity is also enjoined, inasmuch as it is altogether a new and an additional third thing, coming into being after the combination of the first two.
Besides, we can say that the above injunctions are enjoined on the saññyāsins, because in the preceding passage, it is the saññyāsins who are said to rise above the three desires for wealth, progeny and reputation, and to wander as mendicants, on account of their knowledge of the Ātman. And like the injunctions in Karma-Kāṇḍa these injunctions are also necessary because the knowledge does not become easily established on account of excessive attachment to mundane things.

Why then, it may be asked, has the Chāndogapāṇiṣad evinced its special regard to the householder by saying that one who does the duties of the householder attains Brahma-loka and does not return (8, 15, 1) if the injunctions refer to the saññyāsins?

To this the next Sūtra comes as a reply.

\[ Kṛṣṇa-all; bhāvāṁ-on account of presence; tu—but; gṛhiṇah—of the householder; upasamhārah—winding up. \]

The winding up (with the mention of the duties) of the householder is on account of his having all (qualities). 48

There is nothing wrong with the statement of the Chāndogya; for the householder is not only to discharge many troublesome duties such as sacrifices and the like, which are peculiar to his own āśrama, but also to discharge as far as possible other duties of other āśramas, such as keeping restraint over the senses, showing tenderness of heart to others and so on.

\[ Mauna-vat—like the āśrama of the muni; itaresāṁ—of others; api—also; upadesāt—on account of being told. \]

Because others also are mentioned like mauna (and gārhaṇṭya, all the four āśramas are referred to). 49

Sruti has also mentioned, as we have already seen, the two āśramas of the hermit and of the disciple by reference to ‘austerity’ and ‘dwelling in the teacher’s
house' (Chā. 2, 23, 1) respectively, in the same way in which it has mentioned the two āśramas of the saṅnyāsin and the householder. So the duties of all of them, or of some may be performed as one would like.' The word 'itaresām' in the sūtra points out either the sub-classes² of the āśramas or the many followers of them.

15 अनाविष्काराधिकरणम् । (५०)  
अनाविष्कुर्वनन्ननवयात् । ५०

[ An—not; āvīskurvan—manifesting; anvayāt—owing to connection.]

On account of its connection (being possible, the passage regarding bālya means that the ascetic) is not to manifest himself. 50

Let us now see what the child-like condition referred to in the preceding Sūtra really means. In the first place, inasmuch as the age of the childhood is impossible to be lived again, childhood cannot be the meaning of the word 'bālya'. It may therefore mean, in the second case, either the nature or actions of a child. According to the pūrvapakṣin it means, in keeping with the popular accepted meaning of the term, the free, unbridled, behaviour of the child such as talking, eating, and attending to the calls of nature irrespective of place and time. He does not accept that such a conduct will be considered as improper on the part of an ascetic who possesses knowledge, for Sruti itself says that such a person will be free from sin, just as a sacrificer is in spite of the acts of killing an animal in a sacrifice.

1. To perform the duties of brahma-carya, gārhasṭhyā, vāna-prastha, and saṅnyāsa one after another is one alternative; and to perform the duties of saṅnyāsa immediately after brahma-carya or gṛha-sthārama, is the other.

2. Gāyatra, brāhma, prajāpatya, and brhan are the four sub-classes of brahma-cārin; vārtāka, yāyāvarā, sālīna, and ghora-saṅnyāsika are of gṛhaśtha; vaikhāna, audumbara, vālakhilya, and phenapa are of Vānaprastha; and, Kuticaka, bahudaka haṁsa, and paramahamsa are of saṅnyāsins.
To this we reply that the passage in question has to be construed in a different way. For it is not correct to interpret the word 'bālya' in a way which will recommend the forbidden mode of behaviour so long as it has got another meaning which will not be contradictory at all. Besides, the chief duty of the ascetics being the cultivation of knowledge, the meaning we would put on bālya must be such as would help the doing of that duty. But to accept the meaning which the pūrvapakṣin puts on it is to make the performance of that duty impossible. We therefore mean by bālya the mental condition of the child, which, on account of the absence of strong affective reactions, is free from guile and conceit. The passage therefore means that the ascetic should live with child-like simplicity, free himself from guile and conceit, and cease from displaying before others his learning and righteousness. As the Smṛti says, he is a Brāhmaṇa who does not allow himself to be considered either as coming from a noble family or from an ignoble one, as ignorant or learned, and as having good or bad conduct. Secretly should the wise observe his duty, unknown, should he pass his life and move on this earth, as if he were blind, stupid, and deaf, leaving behind him no trace of his name.

16 एहिकाधिकरणम् । (५१)
एहिकमप्यप्रस्तुतप्रतिवेदे तदश्रेष्ठः । ५१

[Aihikam—in this life; api—also; a—not; prastuta—prati-bandhe—when there is obstruction to what is present; tad—that; darśanāt—on account of Śruti.]

As Śruti tells, if there is no obstruction to what is present (viz., hearing and other means, the knowledge of Brahman may arise) in this life also. 51

After having discussed so far from Sūtra 26 of this pāda the various means of knowledge, let us now consider whether the knowledge itself arises here in this

1. The greatest duty of the wise is to try to have the knowledge of the Brahman.
life or in some other life after this. According to the pūrvapakṣin it arises in this life only; for it arises, he says, as the result of hearing and thinking about the Vedānta-passages, and that nobody ever resorts to these means with the intention that he may have knowledge in some other life to come. Sacrifices also which produce their fruits in heaven after death, are useful otherwise as means of purifying the mind, and for the origination of knowledge on account of direct śravaṇa and manana, in this very life.

To this we reply that the knowledge of the Ātman will arise in this life, if the means of śravaṇa and manana necessary for its origination are not obstructed by other actions which are about to give their fruits. If, on the other hand, there comes about the obstruction, the knowledge may arise in some other life. Of course, there is no knowing as to when, where, and by what means a particular action will give rise to a particular result. Besides, different actions have different or even opposite results; and so, it remains unknown as to which action will overpower which on account of its more powerful results, as also when exactly śravaṇa and manana will be powerful enough as not to be obstructed by other actions. It is in view of this that the Ātman is said to be difficult to realize. ‘Innumerable are they who do not even hear about the Ātman; innumerable are they who do not understand Him, even after hearing about Him; it is a wonder that there may be some one who will describe Him; wonderful still to realize Him; and wonderful again that one should realize Him after the Guru has shown the way to it’ (Ka. 1, 2, 7). Similarly, the Śruti-passage which tells us that Vāmadeva knew himself to be Brahman even while he was in the womb of his mother shows us that the Ātma-jñāna originates as the result of the means adopted in previous births; for it is impossible that the means of knowledge should be available for a child in the womb. In the Bhagavadgītā also Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna that even though
the yogin does not reach perfection in this life, his good works do not lead him to any evil condition; but that, on the contrary, as a result of them, he first goes to the blessed worlds, and then after being born in a good family becomes connected with the knowledge in previous birth, and thus ultimately reaches perfection after passing through several lives (6, 40-45). From all this it follows that knowledge arises after the destruction of the obstacles to it, and that one may aspire to have it either in this or in a future life.

As to the fruit in the form of release, there is no such rule; for that condition has been ascertained (by Sruti). 52

We have seen that in view of the difference in excellence and strength of the means of vidyā, there arises the difference regarding the time when the vidyā may arise; that is, it may arise either in this or in some future life. Even so, one may now ask whether there arises some difference in the case of mokṣa, so that it can be said to be superior or inferior in quality. It is with reference to this possible doubt that the Sūtrakāra says that there cannot be any such difference, because the state of final release has been asserted by all the Vedānta-passages as of one kind only. Mokṣa, in other words, is nothing but Brahman, and Brahman, as we know, is of one nature only, 'It is neither coarse, nor fine' etc. (Br. 3, 8, 8); 'The Ātman is described as not this, not this' (Br. 3, 9, 26); 'Where one sees nothing else' (Chā. 7, 24, 1); 'What is seen before is the immortal Brahman itself' (Mu. 2, 2, 11); 'All this is verily the Ātman' (Br. 2, 4, 6); 'This great, unborn, undecaying,
immortal, fearless Ātman is verily the Brahman' (Br. 4, 4, 25); 'When all this becomes the Ātman, who should see whom?' (Br. 4, 5, 15).

Besides, though it may be granted that the difference in the means may cause some sort of difference in the vidyā which results from them, it is certain that there will be no difference in mokṣa; because mokṣa is, as we have repeatedly seen, not a thing to be accomplished in future, but is an ever accomplished fact, and that it is achieved through knowledge only. And the difference in knowledge too cannot ever be said to be of quality. Knowledge of the Ātman is ever of the highest quality and can never be lower in value. At the most, there may occur a difference in time, so far as its origination in this or in some future life is concerned. But there is neither any difference in the quality of the vidyā, nor in that of mokṣa which arises from vidyā.

Moreover, the Ātma-vidyā being one and the only means of mokṣa, there cannot be any distinction with reference to its fruit or mokṣa, just as there is distinction with reference to the fruits of the many actions, or just as there may be a distinction of results of the several vidyās with reference to the Saguna Brahman on account of the addition or omission of certain qualities, according to the various upāsanās. But this does not apply to the meditation on the Nirguna Brahman. The condition of mokṣa is the same for all; all those who have realized the Brahman enjoy the same bliss.
Repetition (of certain actions useful for knowledge is required) on account of instruction being given more than once.

The third adhyāya was almost wholly devoted to the discussion of the means of achieving the lower and the higher vidyās. We shall now discuss about the fruits of vidyā, as also some other topics, as the occasion may arise. In the first eight adhikaranaś, however, we shall take up the discussion of the means, as it has been left unfinished in the third adhyāya.

To begin with, there arises the doubt with reference to the following Śruti-passages whether the mental acts involved in them are to be performed once only or more than once. The passages are: ‘The Ātman is to be seen, heard, thought about, and meditated upon’ (Br. 4, 5, 6); ‘One should know the Ātman and have wisdom’ (Br. 4, 4, 21); ‘One must search Him out, and should desire to know Him’ (Chā. 8, 7, 1). The pūrvapakṣin holds that the mental action involved in knowledge is to be performed only once, like the prayāja-action in a sacrifice. There is no necessity of doing it more than once, because this is not recommended by Śruti. Whether it is śravana, manana, or dhyāna, let it be done once only and not more than once.

To this we reply that the Śruti instructs the repetition of the mental acts as is clear from the words ‘heard’, ‘thought’, and ‘meditated upon’. Each one of these actions refers to the same knowledge of the Ātman,
under one or other form. And so they must all continue
to be performed till the intuitive vision\(^1\) of the Ātman
is gained, just as the action of beating the rice must
continue till the grains are freed from husk. Besides, the
words ‘upāsanā’ and ‘dhyāna’ are applied to such mental
states which imply the repetition of the meditative act.
The devotion to the king or the Guru implies the constant
practice of doing loyal service unto him; the devotion
of a woman to her husband who has gone away on
business, also implies the constant remembrance of him
and the constant longing to meet him again. Even the
word ‘Vid’ which means ‘knowing’, and which ordinari-
ly denotes only one act, implies repetition, inasmuch
as it is used in the Vedānta-passages as a synonym for
the word ‘upās’ which means ‘meditation’. For instance,
the passage in the Chāndogyopaniṣad about the king
Jānaśruti and Raikva tells us that one who ‘knows’
what Raikva knows, viz., the saṁvarga-vidyā which is a
part of the Brahma-vidyā, gets the same fruit as Raikva
has got (4, 1, 4). But the topic ends, we are told,
with a request on the part of Jānaśruti to Raikva to
impart him the knowledge of the ‘upāsanā’ which Raikva
was doing (4, 2, 4). As opposed to this, another topic
begins with the word ‘upāsanā’ or meditation, as in ‘One
should meditate on mind as Brahman’ (Chā. 3, 18, 1), but
ends with ‘knowing’ as in ‘Onc who knows this shines
by the lustre of Brahman and gets glory and fame’ (Chā.
3, 18, 3). From this it follows that even in cases where
the verbal form of the words, for instance, ‘vid’ and
‘upās’, is in favour of the instruction being once, the
implication is that repetition is to be practised, because
the words are used as synonyms of each other.

\(^2\) 1. The fruit of the Ātma-jñāna is directly perceived;
it is not to be assumed as being perceivable in heaven, or as
being invisible like merit (punya).
The sage Kauśitaki who was endowed with one son as the result of his having meditated on the udgītha as the sun, advises his son, we are told, that he should meditate on the rays of the sun for having many sons (Chā. 1, 5, 2). This clearly shows that the meditation on the rays involved repetition of the process, as it is impossible to meditate simultaneously on all the rays taken together. Now what is true in this case is also true in all other meditations.

Objecting to this one may say that repetition may hold good in respect of meditations where the fruit is to be accomplished at some future time, but that it would serve no purpose in respect of meditation the object of which is the presentation in consciousness of the eternal, pure, intelligent, and fearless Brahma. It need not be said that the knowledge of the identity of the soul and the Brahma may not originate by hearing about it only once. For what cannot be achieved by hearing once, e.g., the statement ‘Thou art that’, may not be achieved by hearing it several times. How can we say that in course of time reasoning may come to help us to know the meaning of the sentence which we may not understand when it is first heard? For reasoning would do its work even in the first instance. Nor can we hold that the hearing of a sentence and the reasoning about it would together give us a specific knowledge of the situation. It will be a general knowledge, just as, the knowledge that a certain man is suffering from ache in his chest is general to us and not specific, as it is to him, because he complains about it, and because we infer so from the tremor in his body. But what is required here is not the general but the specific knowledge of Brahma which alone can remove ignorance. Once again the objector therefore will come to the conclusion that no amount of repetition will turn a general knowledge into a specific one. To know whether it is general or specific, one single instance is sufficient, and so repetition will serve no purpose. Besides, no one can lay down a general rule and say that Sruti and reasoning put together will
not enable anyone to apprehend the truth directly on the
first occasion. For those who are the most intelligent
amongst us can do so. No doubt, one may allow that
repetition has its utility so far as the understanding of a
complex thing or of a long chapter is concerned. The
vague or general understanding at the start may develop
into fuller and precise knowledge by frequent acts of
attentive study. But the knowledge of Brahman has
no distinctions in it, such as a general knowledge and a
specific knowledge; it is pure consciousness. So there
will be absolutely no use of repetition.

To this we reply. We agree that repetition is use-
less for him who can realize that Brahman is the soul of
all after hearing the Sruti-sentence ‘Thou art that’, once
only; but we affirm that it is useful to him who cannot
have this experience at once. That is why Svetaketu,
for instance, requested his father to instruct him again
and again about Brahman, and his father too gave him
the same instruction of the mahā-vākya, ‘Thou art that’
several times (Chā. 6, 8, 7). This is what the passage
regarding the seeing, the thinking, and the meditating
on the Atman (Br. 4, 5, 6) means. It is but a common
experience that we get ourselves rid of our misconcep-
tions regarding the meaning of a sentence and come to a
fuller understanding of it, when we read or hear it again
and again.

Besides, we come to know that what is indicated by
the term ‘thou’ is identical with what is indicated by
the term ‘that’. In the first place, the term ‘that’ indi-
cates the intelligent Brahman which is said to be the
cause of the origin, the subsistence and the dissolution
of the world. And, secondly, from the following Sruti-
passages we get the additional meaning about the nature
of Brahman, viz., that it is free from the attributes of be-
ing born, and so on; that it lacks the qualities like gross-
ness and others which ordinarily belong to substances; and
that it is of the nature of the luminosity of conscious-
ness or intuitive experience. The Sruti-passages referred
to in this connection are: 'Brahman is infinite and of the nature of truth and knowledge' (Tai. 2, 1); 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (Br. 3, 9, 28); 'Brahman, the unseen seer, the unknown knower' (Br. 3, 8, 11); 'Not produced' (Mu. 2, 1, 2); 'Not subject to old age or death' (Br. 4, 4, 25); 'neither coarse, nor fine; neither short, nor long' (Br. 3, 8, 8). Similarly, the Vedántins also know what is meant by the term 'thou', viz., the directly intuited self of all, the subject which sees and hears, the innermost Ātman which lives within the sheaths of the body, the senses, the pāṇa, the mind and the intellect, and finally, as having the nature of Brahmanic consciousness. If, now, the meanings of these two words are not properly understood owing to ignorance, doubt, or misconception, the meaning of the sentence, 'Thou art that', will not also be properly understood. Naturally, therefore, repeated attention to the Sruti-sentence will help one in understanding the true meanings of these words.

It is true that the Ātman which is the object of knowledge is without parts; but as people have superimposed upon it several things consisting of parts such as the body, the senses, the mind, the intellect, the objects of the senses, and the accompanying pleasure and pain, the method of realizing its real nature would be to discard one after another the parts superimposed on it, by successive acts of attention. Thus we may have the various stages in the realization of the Ātman. As for those who possess acute intelligence, and whose mind is not clouded by ignorance, doubt, or wrong notions, there is no necessity of repeatedly thinking about 'Thou art that'. The meaning of the sentence will be immediately experienced by them even when they hear it for the first time; and the knowledge of the Ātman which thus emerges, without there being any need for successive acts of attention, dispels all avidyā from their minds.

Notwithstanding the possibility of this, one may raise here the doubt whether there can be anyone
indeed who will have the experience that the Ātman is not subject to pain or sorrow. To this we say in reply that the realization of the Ātman consists in exactly this experience of one’s own self, viz., that he is of the nature of pure consciousness, and, as such, free from all sorrow and pain. Otherwise, what appears as the self as being painful is nothing but the false appearance of pain superimposed on the Ātman, in the same way in which the body, the senses, and so on are falsely superimposed on the Ātman. Just as when some part of the body is cut or burnt, the wrong feeling of ‘I am being cut or burnt’ arises, or just as when his sons and friends are in misery, a man wrongly feels that he himself is miserable, even so the pains and sorrows are falsely attributed to the Ātman. Like the body or the friends, pain also is different from the caitanya or the pure consciousness. That this is so is proved in deep sleep. As the Śruti says, consciousness persists in deep sleep; ‘Seeing he does not see in sleep’ (Br. 4, 3, 22). But pain ceases to exist in dreamless sleep. It is with reference therefore to a person who has realized the Ātman that Śruti says that there remains nothing to be done. ‘What shall we do with offspring, when we have the Ātman as our world?’ (Br. 4, 4, 22). Or, as the Bhagavadgītā says, ‘As for the person who sports with the Ātman, and is content and delighted with the Ātmanic life, there remains nothing to be done’ (3, 17). For him, however, who has no such immediate realization of the Ātman, repetition of śravaṇa, manana, and so on is absolutely necessary.

Be it noted in this connection that Śruti does not require of that person also who has realized the meaning of the sentence ‘Thou art that’ to undergo the discipline of repeating śravaṇa, manana, and meditation; for he may thereby be dislodged from the unitive condition. For to do so is like giving the bride in marriage for the purpose of killing the bride-groom. And if some one were to adopt the process of repetition not for the sake of having the experience of himself being the Brahman, but
simply because he thinks that Sruti has enjoined it on him as a duty, he would certainly not have Brahma-jnāna, but would instead have a consciousness of duality opposed to it, on account of which he will consider himself as the agent who has to perform the duty of repetition. In the case of a slow-minded person, on the other hand, who is likely to give up the meaning of the sentence altogether from his mind, because he is unable to realize it on account of his ignorance, doubt, etc., it is desirable that efforts must be made to fix his mind more and more on the meaning of the sentence. Hence it is that the Sruti-passages recommend the repeated practice of upāsanās. From all this it follows that repetition is necessary,—whether of the upāsanās in the case of saguṇa Brahman, or of śravaṇa, manana, and meditation, in the case of nirguṇa Brahman, for the sake of having Brahma-jnāna.

2 आत्मत्वोपासनाधिकरणम्। (३)
आत्मेति तुपुगच्छन्ति ग्राह्यं ति च।३

[Atmā; iti—as; tu—but; upa-gacchanti—maintain; grāha-yanti—make others understand; ca—and.]

But (the Sruti-passages) accept (Brahman) as the Ātman, and make others understand (in the same way). 3

There follows now the discussion with regard to the way in which the highest Ātman is to be meditated as the very ‘I’ in us, or as different from it. No doubt, the word ‘Ātman’ is used by Sruti in the sense of the internal self which is capable of being directly apprehended. But there still arises the discussion because the word may either be used in its primary meaning, namely, that which points out the identity of the individual soul and God, or used in its secondary meaning, namely, that which points out the difference between them.

V. E. 21
The pūrvapākṣin holds that they are different, because both are endowed with contradictory qualities, such as sinlessness etc., and the opposites of these. If God possessed the attributes of the samsārī jīva, then he would be no longer God; on the other hand, if the jīva were to be the same as God, there would be none to study the Vedānta-sāstra. In either case, Sruti will be useless. Besides, our ordinary experience which accepts this difference between the jīva and the Īśvara, as also other means of proof will be contradicted thereby. Even supposing that they can be contemplated as identical, just as Viṣṇu and other deities are contemplated on images, the pūrvapākṣin says that on no account can God be the same as the individual soul.

To this we reply. There is no difference between the two, because as the Jābālas say while addressing the divinity, ‘I indeed am thou; and thou indeed art I’. God is the same as the self. Other Vedānta-passages also say, ‘I am the Brahman’ (Br. 1, 4, 10); ‘Thy self is this which is within all’ (Br. 3, 4, 1); ‘He is thy self, the immortal, ruler within’ (Br. 3, 7, 1); ‘The Ātman is the truth; that thou art’ (Chā. 6, 8, 7).

In view of these passages which teach us directly the primary meaning of the word ‘Ātman’, and the identity of God and the soul, how can we accept the contention of the pūrvapākṣin that they teach us the secondary meaning, and as such, teach also the contemplation of God merely on symbols or images? Besides, there is difference between the two forms of expression, which Sruti uses in describing the contemplation of God on symbols, and the contemplation on Him as non-different from the soul. For instance, when the contemplation of Brahman is recommended on the symbols namely, the mind and the sun (Chā. 3, 18, 1; 3, 19, 1.), the description expresses a one-sided relation between the mind and Brahman, or between the sun and Brahman; but where the contemplation takes the form of the realization of the identity between the Brahman and the soul, the description of it is done in both ways, from
the soul to the Brahman, and vice versa, as in, 'I am thou, and thou art I'. Moreover, Sruti conveys us the same truth when it censures the view according to which there is difference between God and soul. 'If a man worships a deity, thinking that he is different from it, he is ignorant' (Br. 1, 4, 10); 'He who sees any difference goes from death to death' (Br. 4, 4, 19); 'He who thinks that all this is different from the Ātman, is abandoned by all' (Br. 4, 5, 7).

As for the other objections of the pūrvapakṣin, we note, in the first place, that it is not correct to say that things having contrary qualities cannot be identical; for the opposition itself is based upon avidyā. Secondly, it will be wrong to suppose that there will be no God at all, if he is to be considered as identical with the soul. Sruti being authoritative on this point says that God exists. Besides, it is worth remembering that the identity of God and the soul does not mean that God assumes the qualities of the saṃśārī jīva; it means, on the other hand, that the so-called contrary qualities of the jīva are due to avidyā, and so the real nature of jīva is the same as that of God. Thirdly, it is wrong to suggest that the doctrine of identity would mean that there would be no persons to study the Vedāṇta, or that it would go against the practical experience of duality. For what we mean is that the jīva is certainly entitled to the study of Vedāṇta during his state of ignorance, which constitutes his worldly life of experience as based on the means of proof, before the illumination dawns on him. But as the Sruti says, 'When all this becomes the Ātman, who should see whom' (Br. 2, 4, 14)? During this condition of the Brahmanic knowledge we do admit that there will be no place for perception and other ordinary means of knowledge. Nay, we do admit that there will be no room for Sruti¹ too. For as the Sruti itself says, 'Then a father is not a father; then the Vedas are not the Vedas' (Br. 4, 3, 22). In the non-dual condition of

¹ For Sruti, after all, affords us only Sabdāpramāṇa.
knowledge, it is no objection to say that Sruti also ceases to be operative.

If finally a question is asked as to the place where the avidya, which is the cause of distinctions, is to be located, we reply that it is to be located in the person who asks such a question. If to save oneself from this position, one were to say that he is God himself according to Sruti, then from the view-point of God, we say in reply, there would be no avidya anywhere. In other words, avidya being a non-entity, there cannot be, as some would like to say, any duality at all. Hence, we must fix our mind on God as the internal Atman of all, including the individual souls.


t 3 प्रतीकःचिक्रिपनम् । (४)

न प्रतीकः न हि सः । ४

[ Na—not; pratike—in symbol; na; hi—for; sah—he. ]

Not in the symbols (is the self to be contemplated); for he (i.e. the meditator) does not (think them as being the self). 4

Now whether the meditation is ādhyātmika or ādi-daiivika, that is on the mind, or on the ākāśa as Brahman (Chā. 3, 18, 1), or whether it is on the sun as Brahman (Chā. 3, 19, 1), or again, on the name as Brahman (Chā. 7, 1, 5) etc., there arises the doubt whether in the meditations like these on the symbols the apprehension of one’s own self is involved or not. According to the pūrvapakṣin the self is apprehended, because Brahman is the universal self of all, and because the symbols being after all the effects of Brahman are identical with the cause.

To this we reply that the meditation on the symbols should not assume the form of ‘I am that symbol’, for the meditator can never think of the several different symbols

1. For the question itself is the index of the dualistic assumption in the mind of the questioner.
as the same as himself. In the first place, the symbols, are symbols; and if they are to be considered as one with Brahman because they are the effects of it, they will lose their character as symbols, and so will be useless for the sake of meditation. Whence then will there be room for meditation on a symbol in the form of 'I am that symbol'? Nor, secondly, can it be said that the Sruti-passages which recommend meditation on the Brahman should be construed as recommending meditation on the individual self on the ground that the jiva is identical with Brahman; for the fact that the soul is the author of action etc., is not omitted in those passages. In other words, it is on the removal or the non-removal of the characteristic marks of the jiva as being the doer, the enjoyer and so on, that Sruti either teaches us that the jiva is identical with the Brahman, or that, the two being distinct, we should resort to meditation. Not only does the meditator conceive himself as different from Brahman, but conceives the symbol also as different; and hence, we can never say that the symbols are to be meditated in the form of 'I am the symbol'. Just as two different vessels of gold, known as 'rucaka' and 'swastika' are identical in the sense that they are made of gold, even so, no doubt, the meditator and the symbols, though different, may ultimately be resolved into Brahman. But, as said above, the symbol will not be useful for meditation, if it is taken to be identical with the Brahman, or the meditator. Therefore it is that we say that the symbol cannot be meditated upon as 'I am the symbol'.

4 अद्भुतत्वदिकरणम् । (५)  
ब्रह्मद्विद्वृक्षणपरत् । ५  
[ Brahma-drśṭih—viewing in the form of Brahman; utkarṣṭat—on account of increase in glory.]  
(One should meditate on symbols like the sun and others) viewing them as Brahman; for (this) adds to the glory (of the symbols).  5
Another doubt, which arises in connection with the Sruti-passages cited in the preceding Sūtra, is whether Brahman is to be meditated upon the sun and so on, or whether the sun etc. are to be meditated upon Brahman. And the doubt arises because no particular reason, ¹ can be decisively pointed out as responsible for the same case used for both the terms in ‘Āditya, Brahman is’, ‘Prāṇa, Brahman is’, ‘Lightning, Brahman is’ etc. The words Brahman, on the one hand, and āditya, prāṇa, etc., on the other, are so entirely different like the words ‘horse’ and ‘ox’ that, in the first place, there can be no identity of meaning between any two of them, and hence no adequate reason for having the same case. Nor, secondly, can it be said that āditya and other things are causally related to Brahman; otherwise, just as the vessels are said to be of the same nature as that of their cause, viz., the clay, even so they can be said to have the same nature as that of Brahman. But, as we have already pointed out in the preceding Sūtra, when the effects are resolved into their cause, there would be statements regarding the existence and nature of only the Brahman as their cause, and so there would be no symbols or images for the purpose of meditation. And what, after all, do we get by resolving a few of the effects such as āditya and others into their cause, viz., the Brahman, when all other things in the world remain without being similarly resolved into Brahman? There remains therefore a third possibility to account for the same case; it is to superimpose āditya on Brahman, or vice versa. But which of them is superimposed on which remains still a matter of doubt.

According to the pūrvapakṣin there is neither any rule nor any Sruti-statement to guide us in this matter. It may however be, says he, that Brahman is to be meditated upon as āditya; for, as the śāstra tells, it is the meditation on Brahman that is productive of fruits.

¹ Refer to the four possible reasons mentioned in Sūtra 9 of Adhyāya third, Pāda third.
In other words, it is the meditations on āditya and others which are to be superimposed on Brahman, and not vice versa.

To this we reply that it is the meditation on Brahman alone which is to be superimposed on āditya and others; for it is on account of the superimposition of the most excellent entity on them that the āditya and other things are glorified during meditation. In the absence of any definite Sruti-statement, our experience of everyday life appears to give us the rule that the higher in value should be superimposed on the lower. The charioteer should be viewed as a king, for to view the king as the charioteer is not only to lower the king in esteem, but is also of no advantage 1 to us.

Besides, the words ‘āditya’ and others are stated first in the passages under discussion. Naturally they must be taken in their primary meaning. The word ‘Brahman’, on the other hand, which comes afterwards cannot obviously be co-ordinated with the literal meanings of the words āditya etc., which have come before it. Therefore the only way to interpret the word ‘Brahman’ is to understand it as meaning ‘like Brahman’, and then the whole passage would mean, ‘Āditya is to be contemplated as Brahman’. This would be quite clear in view of the word ‘iti’ which is used invariably after the word ‘Brahman’ in the passages such as, ‘One should meditate on āditya as Brahman (ब्रह्माति)’, and which means ‘as’, ‘like’, or ‘in the form of’.

To explain the same analogously. Just as in the sentence, ‘He considers the shell as silver’, the word ‘shell’ denotes the shell as it actually exists, but the word ‘silver’ means the ‘idea of silver’ and not the actual silver; even so, the passage under discussion means that the āditya must be viewed as Brahman. Moreover,

1. Similarly, if the āditya or the sun is meditated upon as Brahman, mokṣa will be the result of it. But this is not possible if Brahman is meditated upon as the sun; for the sun is incapable of yielding the fruit of mokṣa.
in the passages complementary to those under discussion we find that the words ‘āditya’, ‘speech’, and ‘idea’ are put in the accusative case, indicating thereby that they are the objects of meditation, and so are to be conceived as Brahman (Chā. 3, 19, 4; 7, 2, 2; 7, 4, 3).

The argument of the pūrvapakṣin that Brahman is to be meditated upon in all the above cases, is not adequate even though it is the Brahman which will ultimately yield the fruits of meditations. As we have already shown, āditya and other things are only the objects of meditations, though it may happen that Brahman, which is the supreme witness and ruler of all, will give the fruits of these, meditations even as it gives the fruit of the hospitality we may show unto guests,—a point which we have already cleared in Sūtra 38 of Adhyāya third, Pāda second. With all this, however, we may say that we do meditate on Brahman also in all the cases under discussion, because the meditation on Brahman is superimposed on the symbols, just as the meditation on Viṣṇu is superimposed on his images.

5 आदित्यादिमत्यधिकरणम्। (६)
आदित्यादिमत्यधिकांग उपपचे:। ६

[Āditya-ādi—the sun and others; matayah—idea; ca—and; ange—on the members; upapatteh—being available.]

And the ideas of āditya and so on (are to be superimposed) on the members (of sacrificial activity), for (it is thus that results of actions) become available. 6

There are certain meditations which are limited to the parts of some sacrifices. The following Sūtri-pas-
sages make us aware of some of them: ‘Let the udgītha be meditated as the shining sun’ (Chā. 1, 3, 1); ‘Let five sāmans be meditated upon the five worlds.’

1. The five worlds are the earth, the fire, the space above, the sun, and the heaven; and the five sāmans are: hīṅkāra, prastāva, udgītha, pratihāra, and nidhana (Vide Sūtra 42 of Adhyāya 3, Pāda 3).
(Chā. 2, 2, 1); 'Let the seven-fold sāmans be meditated upon speech' (Chā. 2, 8, 1); 'This earth is hymn, and the fire is sāman' (Chā. 1, 6, 1), etc. Now there comes the doubt whether the contemplations on udgītha and others, are superimposed on āditya and others, or vice versa.

The pūrvapakṣin says that in the case of Brahman we could ascertain some special eminence on account of its being the cause of all, and on account of its being free from sin and other blemishes, and that therefore it is superior to āditya and others. But udgītha, āditya, and others are all equally the effects of Brahman, and so there being no special reason, we are unable to say why any one of them has got any eminence over others. Or we may decide that udgītha and other things are to be superimposed on āditya and so on. For we know that udgītha and other things are parts of a sacrifice, and that it is by doing some actions we get their fruits. So, it is natural to expect that āditya and other things may also yield fruits, provided they are meditated upon as udgītha and so on. Similarly, the meaning of the words 'ṛk' and 'sāman' as the earth and the fire respectively, which we can have from the two sentences, 'The earth is the ṛk, and the fire is the sāman' (Chā. 1, 6, 1), 'The sāman is placed upon the ṛk' (Chā. 1, 6, 1), can be said to be adequate only if the whole meaning is taken to be that the earth and fire are to be viewed as ṛk and sāman, and not if ṛk and sāman are to be viewed as earth and fire. The charioteer will be viewed as a king and not

1. The seven sāmans known as, hiṁkāra, prastāva, orkāra, udgītha, pratiḥāra, upadrava, and nidhana are to be superimposed on the seven words or forms of speech known as, hu, pra, ā, ut, prati, upa and ni.

2. Ṛk will represent earth only if it is superimposed on the earth and not otherwise. Besides, we find that fire in a sacrifice exists on some ground (earth); similarly the sāman exists on the ṛk. Therefore we can say that ṛk and sāman indicate earth and fire respectively.
the king as a charioteer. Similarly, the locative case which is applied to the word ‘loka’, (‘lokesu’, meaning ‘in the worlds’) indicates that the meditations on the sāman are to be superimposed on the worlds. Similarly, again, we have the same truth being conveyed by another passage, ‘Thus Gāyatra sāman, consisting of himkāra etc., is woven on the five prāṇas’ viz., the mind, the speech, the eye, the ear, and the vital breath (Chā. 2, 11, 1). And just as in the passages such as ‘Āditya is Brahma’, Brahma which comes last, is to be superimposed on the Āditya which comes first, even so, himkāra etc. which are mentioned last are to be superimposed on earth and so on which come first. From all this we conclude that things which are dependent on sacrificial actions are to be superimposed on āditya and other things which are independent of these sacrificial actions.

To this we reply. The ideas of āditya and so on are to be superimposed on udgītha and others; for it is only by meditation on them as āditya and so on, that we can consider the udgītha and the other parts of sacrifice as being purified and as contributing to the increase in merit which will arise by performing the sacrifice. Knowledge of the correct way of meditation, faith, and devotion are said to add strength to actions (Chā. 1, 1, 10). Now, it may be pointed out that this may take place in the case of those upāsanās which contribute towards the successful termination of sacrificial actions, but that it will be otherwise in the case of those other upāsanās which can be performed independently of sacrifices, and which therefore can have independent fruits of their own. And that is why it may be said that there is no necessity of meditating on the sāman as the worlds. But we reply that in those cases also the meditations belong to that person only who has got a right to perform the sacrifices which include the meditations. Naturally the fruits thereof are not to be had independently, but because of their having contributory part in the accumulation of the merit of the sacrifice as
a whole; just as the godohana vessel which is ordinarily used for milking the cows, is able to achieve the special fruit of making a person endowed with cattle, only when it is used for bringing water in a sacrifice, and is thus made to contribute to the total merit of the sacrifice. Reaching the sun etc. are the results of actions which involve udgītha and others, and so are necessarily superior to the latter. Besides the passage, 'Let meditation be made on Om, the udgītha' (Cha. 1, 1, 1), represents the udgītha as the object of meditation; and therefore āditya and so on are to be superimposed on udgītha and others.

Nor do we accept the argument of the pūrvapākins that āditya and others will themselves assume the form of works and will therefore yield the fruits, if they are meditated upon as udgītha and so on. For even the meditation on udgītha and so on as āditya and other things, will not cease to have the form of works, and will therefore continue to give their fruits. Similarly, the use of the words 'ṛk' and 'sāman' in the sentence, 'This sāman is placed on this ēk', for indicating 'earth' and 'fire', respectively, is made not because ṛk and sāman are superimposed on the earth and the fire, but because they get these secondary meanings by implication or lakṣaṇā which is possible in two different ways. Norwithstanding therefore that the ṛk and sāman are to

1. Meditation on udgītha will give its fruit as it happens to be a part of sacrifice; it will continue to give this fruit with greater strength if it is mediated upon as āditya. The superimposition of āditya on udgītha does not therefore destroy the nature of udgītha as a part of karma.

2. In the sentence, 'There is a house on the Gangā,' the words 'on the Gangā' mean 'on the bank of the Gangā river'. This lakṣaṇika meaning arises on account of the nearness of the bank with the river. But in the sentence, 'Agni reads the anuvāk', the word agni or fire means a person who is as bright or intelligent as fire. Here, there being nothing common between fire and man, the meaning is due to a remote connection between intelligence and fire.
be meditated on as the earth and the fire, their relation with the latter two being possible on account of the earth and the fire being mentioned immediately before in the same passage, they are taken to mean by laksana the earth and the fire respectively. It cannot, however, be denied that the word ‘charioteer’ may also be used for a king, when, for instance, the king himself does the work of the charioteer. Besides, the position of the words in the sentence, ‘This earth itself is rksa’, conveys to us the meaning that the rksa itself is to be viewed as the earth. If, on the other hand, Sruti wanted to convey the meaning that earth is of the nature of rksa, the sentence would have taken the form ‘This earth is rksa itself’. The conclusion of the topic under discussion also refers to the singing of the sāman (Châ. 1, 7, 7,). We mean thereby that the reference is to the knowledge of the upāsanās which form parts of a sacrificial karma, and not to those which are linked to earth and so on. Similarly, though the word ‘worlds’ is put in the locative, the accusative case of the word ‘sāman’ indicates that the object of the meditation is sāman and not the worlds. And so the worlds have to be superimposed on the sāman; in other words, it is the sāman which is to be meditated upon as the worlds. As opposed to this, it will be wrong to hold that the worlds are to be meditated upon as sāman. In the same way, in the passage, ‘This Gāyatra sāman is woven on the prānas’ (Châ. 2, 11, 1), the sāman is the object of meditation.

One may feel some difficulty to decide as to which is the object of meditation when both the terms in the sentence are used in the accusative case. But in the passages where we know that the entire sāman, whether it is five-fold or seven-fold, is praised

1. ‘The earth is the rksa, the fire is the sāman’ (Châ. 1,6,1).
2. Be it noted however that the relation here of the charioteer with the king is not suggested by laksana.
as being good for meditation, (Chā. 2, 7, 1; 2, 8, 1; 2, 9, 1) we have no difficulty in saying that sāman alone is the object of meditation, and that the worlds and the āditya are to be superimposed upon it. Once the object of meditation is clearly set forth, it matters little if sometimes the sentence puts the two members in the reverse order. For instance, even in the sentence, 'The earth is the himkāra', as opposed to 'The himkāra is the earth,' it is the himkāra which is to be meditated as the earth. Thus it follows that āditya and other things which are in no way parts of a sacrifice are to be superimposed on udgītha and others which do go to form the parts of a sacrificial action.

The meditation should be done while sitting; for the possibility (of its being done properly is thus only).

There arises next the question regarding the posture of the body to be adopted while one is meditating. If the meditations happen to be members of a sacrificial action, it is obvious that the bodily postures for these meditations must be the same as for the sacrificial action itself. Similarly, there should be no anxiety to determine whether one must sit, or stand, or lie down while one is having perfect knowledge; for this depends entirely on the object of knowledge itself, and not on bodily posture. But so far as we are concerned with other meditations, which are subservient to the springing up of knowledge, but which are not the constituent parts of a sacrifice, there arises the doubt whether a particular bodily posture is to be adopted or not. The pūrvapāksin says that there should be no such restriction, for the meditations as such are, after all, only mental,
and can therefore be carried on in any posture of the body.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies that the meditations must be done while sitting only; for thus only can they be carried on, with the mind fixed on an identical object of experience. This is not possible when one is walking or running; for then the mind is easily distracted. Nor will the mind be able to concentrate on the subtle being, when it is required to maintain the balance of the body and to keep it erect. To lie down and to meditate is not also desirable; for it is very likely one may go to sleep. On the other hand, a person who sits will be able to avoid all these difficulties and carry on his meditation safely.

**व्यावाच्चः**

And on account of (the word) 'dhyāna' (being used). 8

And because the word 'dhyāna' also indicates like the word 'upāsanā' the unbroken stream of the consciousness of an object, we say of a woman that she is thinking of her husband who has gone on a journey, with a fixity of attention, or of a crane that it is looking for its prey with a steady look, unbroken attention, and without moving its limbs. Now, such a kind of dhyāna is possible without effort for a man who does it while sitting. Therefore we conclude that the meditations are to be done by adopting the posture of sitting.

**अचलत् चापेक्षयः**

[ Acalatvam—immovability; ca; apeksya—having in view. ]

And in view of the immovability (Sruti ascribes the word dhyāna to the earth). 9

And because the earth is immovable, Sruti speaks of it 'that it is meditating as if' (Chā. 7, 6, 1). This also shows us that one should sit and meditate.
And Smṛti tells (the same). 10

The Bhagavadgītā also recommends the sitting posture for meditation (6. 11). Similarly, the Yoga also teaches us several sitting postures such as the ‘padmāsana’, and so on.

7 एकाग्रताविकरणम् (११) यत्रेकाग्रता तत्राविशेषत् । ११

[Yatra—where; ekāgratā—one-pointed attention; tatra—there; ā-viśeṣat—there being nothing specific.]

There being no specific (instruction, meditation may be carried on), wherever one-pointed attention (is possible). 11

One may ask if there are also any restrictive rules for meditation regarding place, time, or direction, just as there is regarding posture of the body. No doubt, we are told that a certain sacrifice is to be performed in the forenoon, in a spot which slopes towards the east, and with the face of the sacrificer turned towards the east; and in certain Śruti-passages (Sve. 2, 10) we are advised to select a place for meditation which is clean and level, free from dust, pebbles, fire, and insects. It may be a cave or shelter, which will please the mind on account of a pond nearby and the occasional sounds of birds which are not harsh. And yet, so far as the meditation is concerned, no hard and fast rules are necessary; for it can be carried on in any place where the mind is pleased and attains concentration.

8 आप्रायणाविकरणम् (१२) आ प्रायणात्त्रापि हि दृष्टम् । १२

[A-prāyaṇāt—till death; tatra—there; api—even; hi—for; dṛṣṭān—is seen.]

1. In this sitting posture the legs cross each other, and the heels are placed in the pits of thighs.
(Meditations are to be repeated) till death; for even at that time it is seen (from Sruti that there is the consciousness of the object of meditation). 12

It has been proved in the first adhikarana of this pada that all upāsanās whatsoever must be repeated. It has also been made clear that just as the rice-grains are to be beaten till the grains are separated, even so the upāsanās which culminate in perfect knowledge are to be repeated till this knowledge is attained. No such injunction is possible when the knowledge of the Atman dawns, nor will it be of any use for him who has realized it. Now, so far as the other upāsanās which result in the attainment of prosperity, heaven or Brahma-loka, are concerned, there arises the doubt whether they are to be repeated for some time only or till death. According to the pūrvapakṣin, such a meditation may be repeated for some time only; for thereby we shall be satisfying the injunction of the Sruti that there should be repetition of the meditations.

To this we reply that the upāsanās must be repeated till the end of life; for it is by means of what is finally remembered that the unseen results of actions come to fructify in a new life. As the Sruti says: 'The jīva comes to enjoy the fruits in the new life corresponding to the desires which he had cherished at the time of death before' (Br. 4, 4, 2); 'He goes to prāṇa along with his desires at the time of death; the prāṇa becomes endowed with light and carries the jīva to a world which is suitable for the desires entertained' (Pr. 3, 10). The instance of the caterpillar which takes hold of a new blade of grass before leaving the old one, (Br. 4, 4, 3) points to the same conclusion. Naturally, the upāsanās also which are to fructify in new lives to come, must be consciously desired and repeated at the time of death; otherwise different desires would produce different effects. The following Sruti and Smṛti passages tell us that even at the time of death, there remains something to be done by man. 'Whatever idea
he entertains at the time of leaving the body, he becomes that; the yogin is ‘steadfast in his mind at the time of death’. (B. G. 8, 6 and 10; Sat. Brā. 10, 6, 3, 1). Similarly, one is advised to remember the three mantras at the time of death, namely, ‘Thou art imperishable; thou hast not fallen from your real nature; thou art the subtle essence of the prānas’ (Chā. 3, 17, 6).

Similarly, one is advised to remember the three mantras at the time of death, namely, ‘Thou art imperishable; thou hast not fallen from your real nature; thou art the subtle essence of the prānas’ (Chā. 3, 17, 6).

On the realization of that (viz., the Brahman), the earlier and the later sins are destroyed and do not originate again; for this has been declared (by Śruti).

Here ends the appendix to the third Adhyāya; and now begins an enquiry concerning the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman. There arises in this connection first the doubt whether, on attaining the knowledge of Brahman, the misdeeds of man cease to bear any fruit or not. The pūrvapakṣin holds that like all works the misdeeds also must bear fruits; for if they were to die out without giving rise to their fruits, both Śruti and Smṛti would be contradicted. It may be contended that there are certain ceremonies which are expiatory in character; but the pūrvapakṣin says that these are to be performed on account of certain special events, and not for the purpose of washing away the effects of the sinful deeds. For instance, the sacrifice known as ‘Kśāma-vatī-istī’ is performed if the house of an agnihotrin is burnt by fire; but in no way can it undo the damage. And even admitting that the sins are washed away by some such expiatory acts, there is nothing to prove that Brahma-vidyā is thus recommended to be attained for a similar purpose. The argument, that there would be no mokṣa for anyone if the knowledge of Brahman is...
not supposed to destroy the results of sins, has no force; for mokṣa too, like the fruits of works, is dependent on the circumstances of place, time, and cause. From this it follows that sinful deeds do not cease to bear fruits even after the attainment of Brahma-jñāna.

To this we reply that the Sruti is emphatic on the point that one who has realized the Brahman is free from the effects of works. His future ‘sins will not cling to him, as water will not to a lotus-leaf’ (Chā. 4, 14, 3); his accumulated sins of the past ‘will all be destroyed, as the iṣikā-sticks are burnt in fire’ (Chā. 5, 24, 3). Similarly, we are told that ‘all the actions of a man are destroyed, his doubts vanish, and the knots of his heart are broken, when he sees the Atman which is here and beyond’ (Mu. 2, 2, 8).

No doubt, we admit that works do possess the power to produce their fruits. Sruti also favours this view. But this does not mean that this power of the works to produce the fruits is not prevented by knowledge and other means. Sruti cannot therefore be interpreted to mean that a particular fruit must, at any cost, be enjoyed by the doer of a particular action. Consequently, the general teaching of Sruti and Smṛti that works are not destroyed is not contradicted, if we hold that the whole store of our past actions along with their fruits is destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, or is prevented from coming into fruition on account of expiatory ceremonies. We have the Sruti, ‘He who performs the āṣvamedha sacrifice, and he who knows the Brahman go beyond all sins, including the sin of having killed a brahmin’ (Tai. Sam. 5, 3, 12, 1). Besides, when we have the direct injunction of undergoing an expiatory act for the purpose of counteracting the evil results of an action, where is the point in denying

1. When the murderer of a brahmin is asked to undergo a penance for twelve years, it is clear that the penance is meant to wash away, or to prevent the evil effects. No doubt, a bath may be taken on some special occasion to acquire merit, but it is also true that the bath washes away the dirt of the body.
this and assuming that an expiatory act is only occasional and is intended to acquire some other result like merit?

As for the argument of the pūrvapakṣin that the knowledge of Brahman is not enjoined in the same manner in which the expiatory acts are enjoined for the purpose of destroying the evil effects of misdeed, we say that we do meet with such injunctions in the complimentary passages of the statements with regard to saguṇa vidyās. There we are told that the devotee not only gets the divine glory and power, but becomes also free from sins. And there is no reason to say that this is merely a statement of praise of the injunction; it is, on the other hand, a statement about the result which will follow if the meditation is done according to injunction. With regard to the knowledge of the nirguṇa Brahman, however, there is no such injunction indeed; but the very fact that the Ātman is free from being the author of actions means, in the case of one who has realized the Ātman, that actions and the fruits thereof are as good as being destroyed. The future works will obviously not cling to him because he has attained the realization of Brahman; even the store of his past actions, which appeared to belong to him till he had not realized the life of Brahman, is destroyed along with his illusory jīvahood, the moment he attains the Brahmanubhava. For it is this knowledge of Brahman which makes him aware that he was, rightly speaking, never at any time before, nor is, nor can be, in future, the doer or the enjoyer of actions. It is this knowledge which constitutes his mokṣa, and which releases him from the eternal chain of works. That is why we may also say that mokṣa is not dependent like the fruits of actions on the conditions of space, time, and cause; it is, in other words, neither short-lived nor mediate in nature.

From all this it follows that on the attainment of Brahman there is an end to all sins.
The other (viz., the good deeds) also will not in the same way cling (to one who has realized the Brahman; he attains moksā), however, after the fall (of the body). 14

Now that it has been established that the effects of the misdeeds which naturally bind the soul are destroyed by Brahma-jñāna, one may say that this may not apply to good deeds, inasmuch as they are not contradictory to it. It is with a view to remove this doubt that the Sūtrakāra tells us that what is true in the case of bad deeds, is true in the case of good deeds also. For if the good deeds are not supposed to have been destroyed in the case of the person who has realized the Brahman, it is likely that their fruits may come as obstacles in his path of moksā. Sruti tells us that 'such a person verily goes beyond both' good and bad deeds (Br. 4, 4, 22). This means that both the kinds of deeds are as good as being destroyed for him. The statement that 'all the deeds of the wise man are destroyed' (Mu. 2, 2, 8) applies equally to good and bad deeds. To realize the knowledge that the Ātman is not the doer is to get oneself away from all the deeds; in other words, it amounts to the destruction of all the deeds from the view-point of the man who has realized the Ātman.

Now we sometimes find in Sruti a reference only to the evil deeds which are said to be destroyed; but thereby we are to understand that good deeds also are said to be destroyed. For the fruits of good deeds also are inferior to moksā, the fruit of Brahma-jñāna. Besides, Sruti itself used the word 'pāpa' (sin) to stand for or include the meaning of word 'puṇya' (merit). For instance, after mentioning that none of the things such
as 'day and night, old age, death, sorrow, merit, and demerit, is able to go beyond the bund of the Ātman', Sruti mentions them again immediately afterwards by the word 'pāpa', and says that all these 'evil things turn back from it' (Chā. 8, 4, 1). So, if both the good and evil deeds are said not to cling to the person who has realized the Brahman, or are said to be destroyed in their effects so far as he is concerned, it follows that he attains to mokṣa as soon as his body falls.

We have now to solve the further question whether the destruction of works by knowledge occurs only in the case of those works which are accumulated only (saṅcita) but which are yet to fructify, or also in the case of those which have begun to yield their fruit (ārabdha). The pūrvapakṣin holds that inasmuch as the person who realizes the Brahman goes beyond both evil and good deeds, all works, without any distinction, must be understood as undergoing destruction.

To this we reply that destruction takes place only of such works as have been accumulated during previous lives as also during the period previous to the arising of knowledge in this life. But the works, the fruits of which are being enjoyed, and on account of which the physical body itself exists for the sake of acquiring Brahma-jñāna, cannot be destroyed by knowledge till death. For as the Sruti says, even such a man has to wait, for final release 'till the fall of body' (Chā. 6, 14, 2). On the other hand, if all works, saṅcita as well as prārabdha, were to be destroyed by knowledge, there would be no reason for the continuance of the body itself, and there would be immediate final release.
Some one may say at this that if knowledge of the Ātman has got the power to destroy the works, how will it be possible to say again that it destroys some works only and not others? Fire will burn all seeds whatever with which it will come in contact; never does it happen that it will burn some of them and leave others unburnt. We must remember however that, in the first place, we do require the fruition of some actions in order to have knowledge; and that, in the second place once such fruition of actions has started its career, for instance, in the form of our physical body, we must wait till it is exhausted, that is, till the body falls, even though there is the emergence of knowledge; just as the potter who has set his wheel in motion must wait till it stops—unless of course he stops it deliberately—even after the production of the jar. And what is known as the destruction of the works is after all the effect of the cancellation of false knowledge by the knowledge of the Ātman as the non-doer of actions. But the wrong knowledge also lasts for so long as the impressions due to it last on the mind; just as the impression of the illusion of having seen two moons is left on the mind for some time, even after the illusion is removed by the knowledge of one moon. Besides, what is the good of discussing whether the person who has realized the Brahman retains his body or not for some time till death? For to possess the body and to realize the Brahman at the same time is a matter of one's own experience, and cannot be determined or refuted by another person. The description of the 'Sthitaprajñā' which we get in Śruti and Smṛti (B.G. 2, 55-68) confirms our belief that one can be established in the knowledge of the Brahman and yet possess the body. The conclusion we arrive at, therefore, is that saṅcita karma alone, whether good or bad is destroyed by knowledge.

1. Our physical body itself, for instance, is the fruit of our actions, and it is necessary even for the purpose of the realization of Ātma-jñāna.
But (actions) like agnihotra are for the same effect (viz., mokṣa as arising out of knowledge); for Śruti declares thus.

We have shown under Sūtra 14 that the non-clinging and destruction of the evil deeds are also to be applied in the case of good deeds. Now the question to be decided is whether this is true of all good deeds or of some only. And the reply of the Śūtrakāra is that it does not apply to certain actions like agnihotra and others, because they are useful in originating the Brahmanjñāna itself. As the Śruti says, ‘The Brāhmaṇas wish to know the Ātman by means of the Vedic study, sacrifice, and charity’ (Br. 4, 4, 22). It need not be said that because works and knowledge aim at achieving their respective ends of sāṁśāra and mokṣa, they cannot have a common purpose. For, curds and poison which may ordinarily cause fever and death respectively, are seen to produce the same effect, viz., mental satisfaction and bodily health, if curds is eaten with sugar, or if a small dose of poison is swallowed under the influence of mantra. Even so, works combined with knowledge will bring about mokṣa. No doubt mokṣa cannot be said to be the effect of works; and yet works being subservient to knowledge, may be indirectly useful to bring about the mokṣa. This is true however with reference to the works which precede the origination of knowledge, and not with reference to those which follow the realization of Brahman; for Brahmanubhava which is not subject to injunction, lies beyond the sphere of the śāstras. Hence, also, for one who has realized the Brahman, the agnihotra and other actions cannot be said to be essential.
So long, however, as the Upāsanās with reference to saguna Brahman are practised, actions like agnihotra and others need not be excluded; for the meditator has not yet reached the stage of realizing that the Ātman is not the doer of actions. And yet it must be remembered that these actions also will help to produce the knowledge, if only they are done without any desire for having their fruits.

अतोऽस्त्यापि दोकेःणामुभयोः | १७

[ Atah—than this; anya—other; api—even; hi—for; ekesām—of some; ubhayoh—of both. ]

According to some, there are (good works) other than these; (there is agreement) of both (the teachers). 17

Now there are, besides the agnihotra and other works of routine, certain other occasional good works which are undertaken with a view to have their fruits. It is such good works (kāmya karma) of a person who has realized the Ātman that are, according to some, shared by his relatives after his death (Kau. 1, 4). For being abandoned by him, they are, as shown in Sūtra 14, as good as destroyed for him. It is with reference to such good or bad works pursued with the desire for having their fruits that both Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa declare that they are not useful for the origination of Brahma-jñāna.

१३ विद्याज्ञानसाधनत्वाधिकरणम् | (१८)

यदेव विद्ययति हि | १८

[ Yat—which; eva—the same; vidyayā—by means of vidyā; iti—thus; hi—for. ]

( And the Sruti ) ' whatever ( is done ) by means of vidyā', ( points that action is subservient to knowledge ). 18

We have seen so far that the routine obligatory duties of agnihotra and the like, if done with the intention of achieving mokṣa, are not only useful in destroying
our sins and in purifying our minds, but are also useful in enabling us to achieve the Brahma-jñāna due to which there will be the final release. Now, the Śruti-passages, which recommend the election of that man as the Brähmana-priest who first ‘knows the vidyā and then sacrifices, recites, or sings,’ go to point out that agnihotra and the like are connected with the vidyās; while there are other Śruti-passages like, ‘one who knows this Aksara, and one who does not know it, are, both of them, the doers of actions’ (Chā. 1, 1, 10; 4, 17, 10), which point out that agnihotra and the like are not connected with the vidyās. Hence, there arises the doubt whether agnihotra and the like are the causes of producing the vidyā, because they have got this power in them independently of any vidyā, or because they are connected with them. The doubt is confirmed because, while sacrifices, in general, are said to be subservient to the knowledge of the Ātman (Br. 4, 4, 22), the agnihotra and the like are said to possess additional power, if they are connected with vidyā and faith (Chā. 1, 1, 10).

The pūrvapakṣin cites the following passages in support of his view that works connected with vidyā are superior to those which are not so connected, and that, therefore, the sacrifices of the former kind alone are helpful for the realization of the Ātman. ‘The day on which he sacrifices after knowing this, that same day, he will conquer over death’ (Br. 1, 5, 2); ‘Knowing which, you will be free from the bonds of action’; ‘Karma is far inferior to knowledge’ (B. G. 2, 39 and 49).

To this the Sūtrakāra replies. Just as a Brahmin possessing knowledge is superior to one not possessing it, similarly, works like agnihotra combined with knowledge are better than works which are not so combined. But this does not mean that the latter are absolutely useless; for the Śruti-passage cited above (Br. 4, 4, 22) mentions in a general way that people ‘seek the knowledge of the Ātman by means of sacrifices’. The other Śruti-passage also (Chā. 1, 1, 10) does not make any
special distinction of the agnihotra combined with vidyā from the agnihotra which is not so combined, except in the point of the degree of its utility to the origination of knowledge of the Ātman. So we conclude that both the kinds of agnihotra are useful; the only difference between them is that one is more useful than another. All works, therefore, which are of a routine obligatory nature, such as agnihotra and the like, and which might have been done during any period prior to knowledge, in this or in lives previous to this, are subservient to the knowledge of Brahman, in the sense that they wipe out the effects of our evil deeds and are greatly useful in increasing our capacity to resort to the more direct and internal means of knowledge such as, the hearing, and the reflecting on the Sruti-passages with faith, devotion, and meditation.

19 इतरकर्माधिक्षेत्रं। ( १९ )
वैगोगेन स्तवितरे शुपयित्वा संपत्ते । १९

[Bhogena—by enjoying; tu—but; itare—the other two; kṣapayitvā—having destroyed; sampadyate—realizes.]

As for the other two (varieties of ārabdha-karma, he) destroys by enjoying (them, and) realizes (Brahman). 19

We have already shown that the sañcita-karma, or the store of good or evil deeds which have not begun to yield their fruits, is destroyed by Brahma-jiñāna. But so far as the ārabdha-karma or the works which have begun to give fruits are concerned, one has to exhaust them first by enjoying their fruits and then become united with Brahman. As Sruti says, he has to wait till the fall of the body before he can become Brahman (Chā. 6, 14, 2; Br. 4, 4, 6). It need not be said that because a person will necessarily continue to become aware of the various distinctions of the practical life even after he attains the Brahma-jiñāna, he may also be aware of them in the same way after he dies; just as,
due to some disease of the eye, one may continue to have the appearance of two moons, even though he knows pretty well that the moon is one only. For there remains nothing to be enjoyed after death, which may act as a cause of experiencing multiplicity, just as there remains before death a portion of the fruits of the prārabdha-karma which must be exhausted by being experienced till the fall of the body. Nor should it be supposed that some one or more actions of the saṅcita-karma may spring forth as the cause of fresh enjoyment of fruits after death. For the whole of the saṅcita-karma or the store of actions has already been burnt by knowledge in its very seed or capacity for producing fruits. In other words, the production of new fruits after death is impossible, because the very support of this production, viz., the false knowledge, is uprooted by Brahma-Jñāna. Absolutely adequate therefore is our view that the wise man will necessarily attain to mokṣa as soon as his prārabdha is exhausted.
Because it is seen and [stated in Sruti; speech (is merged) in mind. 1

Now begins the description of the path of the gods which is available for those who are devoted to saguna upāsanās. The Sūtrakāra, therefore, first describes the successive steps by which the soul passes out of the body,—a process which, as will be shown later in Sūtra 7, is common to both who know the saguna Brahman and who do not.

We get one such description about what happens at the time of death, thus: ‘Speech is merged in mind, mind in prāṇa, prāṇa in light, and light in the supreme deity’ (Cha. 6, 8, 6). Now there arises the doubt whether what is merged in mind is the organ of speech only, or speech along with its function. The pūrvapakṣin takes a literal meaning of the Sruti-passage and favours the former view. To have the latter view, on the other hand, says he, is to take unnecessarily a secondary meaning of the passage, when, as a matter of fact, the primary meaning is available.

To this we reply that it is not speech as organ, but speech as function that is merged in mind. For though it is true that the literal meaning of the Sruti-passage under discussion is in favour of the merging of the speech itself, and though, as the Sūtrakāra himself will speak of the total absorption of the senses and their functions in Sūtra 16, what is meant in this Sūtra is the absorption of the function of speech only. On the contrary, if the
intention of the Sūtrakāra, in the present Sūtra, were to refer to the total absorption of the organ of speech and its functions, as applying to all the dying persons whether ignorant or otherwise, there would be no special propriety to refer to it again in Sūtra 16, in the case of the death of the wise persons only. So, what the present Sūtra means is that the function of speech comes to an end, even when the mind continues to function. Besides, this is what we observe. As a matter of fact, nobody is able to observe the speech and its activity as merging in the mind. Nor can one infer about this kind of merging, as one can about the merging of pots in clay; because speech is not the effect of mind, as the pot is of the clay. When however we are concerned with the functions only, their origination and merging may not be related with their cause. For instance, heat as the function of fire comes forth from fuel which is of the nature of earth, and is extinguished in water. So, instead of taking the word 'speech' in its literal meaning as bereft of function, we should, as the Sūtrakāra suggests, take it as identical with its functions, and then interpret the Sūtra as referring to the merging of the function of speech in the mind.

अत एव । सर्वारण्यः । २

[Atah—hence; eva—same; ca—and; sarvāṇi—all; anu—after.]  
And for the same reason all (sense-organs go) after (mind). । २

Though the preceding Sūtra specially mentions the speech alone as merging in the mind in order to keep itself close with the Śruti-passage (Chā. 6, 8, 6), we have to understand by parity of reasoning that all the senses also merge in the mind in the same manner. In other words, the functions of the eye and other organs are observed to come to an end, even when the mind is functioning. This is borne out by another Śruti-passage: 'He whose light has vanished is born again, as being
endowed with mind, and all the senses merged in it' (Pr. 3, 9). So, like the function of speech, the functions of other organs also follow the mind, or are merged in it, at the time of death.

2 मनोविकरणम् (२)
तन्मनः प्राण उचरात् (२)

[ Tat—that; manah—mind; prāne—in prāṇa; uttarāt—from what comes afterwards.]

That mind (is merged) in prāṇa; (we know this) from subsequent (sentence). 3

If by the merging of speech, we are to understand the merging of the functions of speech, are we, in a similar way, to understand by the merging of mind, about which we learn immediately after in the same passage, the merging of the functions of the mind in the prāṇa? The pūrvapakśin holds that it is the merging of the mind itself, because in the first place, this is what the Sruti-passage literally means; and because, in the second place, prāṇa may be considered as the cause of the origin of mind. He explains the latter point by citing two Sruti-passages: 'Mind is made up of food (i.e. earth); and prāṇa is made up of water' (Cha. 6, 5, 4); 'Water has produced the food, i.e., earth' (Cha. 6, 2, 4); hence, he says that mind may be said to be produced out of prāṇa, and therefore also merged in prāṇa.

To this we reply that the merging of the mind in prāṇa is with reference to its function, just as the merging of the senses in mind is with reference to their functions only. We observe this actually in the case of persons who are in deep sleep, or are about to die; mind stops functioning even though the prāṇa continues. It is impossible to think that the mind itself is merged in prāṇa; for prāṇa is not the cause of the origin of mind. Besides, even if the prāṇa is taken to be the cause of mind in an indirect manner, as the pūrvapakśin holds,
the mind will be merged in food, the food in water, and
the prāṇa also in water. Nor is there any proof for the
supposition that mind comes out of prāṇa which, in its
turn, comes out of water. If, therefore, we remember,
what we have already said under the preceding Sūtra,
viz., that a thing and its function are identical, we can
understand by the merging of the mind, the merging of
the functions of the mind in prāṇa.

2 अध्याषाचिकिरणम् । (४—६)
सोसौध्यक्षे तदुपगमादिरुः । ४

[ Sah—that (= he); adhyakṣe—in one who supervises; tad—that; upagama-ādibhyah—on account of things like the
approachment towards and others.]

That (viz., the prāṇa is merged) in the supervisor
(viz., the individual soul) on account of the ‘approaching
towards’ and the like (on the part of the prāṇas with
reference to the jīva). 4

It has now been established that a thing which
does not originate from another cannot merge in it so
far as its own nature is concerned, but can merge in so
far as its functions (vṛttis) are concerned. Now,
regarding the merging of prāṇa, there arises the doubt
whether its function is merged in light, or in the indi-
vidual soul which acts as the supervisor of the body
and the senses. The pūrvapakṣin holds that it is merged
in light, as told by Sruti, and that there is no reason
why we should assume something else.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies that the merging of
prāṇa occurs in the individual soul, who though intelli-
gent is bound by the limitations of ignorance, activity,
and the impressions of former experiences left on the
mind. For as the Śruti says, ‘All the prāṇas go to the
soul when a man is about to die and when his breathing

1. Even on the view of the pūrvapakṣin what we may at the
most be entitled to hold is that both mind and prāṇa are the co-
effects of water.
becomes difficult' (Br. 4, 3, 38); 'When he departs, the five-fold prāṇa departs after him. And when the prāṇa departs, all the lower prāṇas or the senses go after him' (Br. 4, 4, 2). This same passage tells us that the 'jīva then becomes endowed with knowledge', that is, endowed with senses or the lower prāṇas which are the instruments of knowledge. The reason therefore for going beyond the literal statement of the Śruti, viz., 'prāṇa merges in the light,' and for believing that it merges in the individual soul, is that the soul alone is mainly responsible for the processes like the departure beyond the body and so on.

The Sūtrakāra, however, gives an explanation regarding the statement 'Prāṇa merges in light,' in the next Sūtra.

भूतेषु तच्चुते: । ५

[ Bhūteṣu—in the elements; tat—that; Sruteḥ—On account of Śruti. ]

( Along with prāṇa, the soul goes ) to the elements; thus declares the Śruti. । 5

The Śruti-statement regarding the merging of prāṇa in the light is to be construed as the merging of the soul coupled with prāṇa in the subtle elements, which, along with light involved in it, constitute the seed of the gross body. It can be said of a man that he travels from Mathurā to Pātaliputra, even if he travels first from Mathurā to Srughna, and then from Srughna to Pātaliputra. Similarly when the prāṇa merges into light, it is contradictory to say that it does so along with the soul after merging itself first into the soul itself.

But how indeed shall we be able to include other elements with 'tejas' (light) when the latter alone is mentioned by Śruti? To this the next Sūtra comes as a reply.
ADHYAYA IV, PĀ. II, SŪ. 6

नैकसिमिन्दशेयतो हि । ६

[Na—not; ekasmin—in one; darśayataḥ—both of them declare; hi—for.]

(The soul) does not (reside) in the one (element of fire only); for this is seen (from both the question and answer).  ६

We have already noticed under Śūtra 3, 1, 2 why and when the water assumes the form of puruṣa, and have come to the conclusion that the new physical body which the soul assumes consists of more than one element. The subtle elements therefore which envelope the soul must also, corresponding to the gross ones, be more than the 'tejas' element. 'Earth, water, fire, air, and ākāśa' are said to be the 'five imperishable' subtle elements, out of which all these things are produced in succession' (Manu Śmr. 1, 21; Br. 4, 4, 5).

An objector may say that there is another Śruti-passage which tells us that both Yājñavalkya and Ārtaḥāa have answered the question as to where the soul must be residing when all the senses cease to function, by saying that it is 'karma', and have confirmed their assertion by praising it (Br. 3, 2, 13). It is true, no doubt, we say in reply, that karma has been described as the abode of the jīva; but it is so described in the context of the description of the bondage in the form of the senses and their objects which the karma produces for binding the jīva. Here, on the other hand, the elements are said to be the abode because the object of Śruti is to acquaint us with the knowledge of how a new body is formed out of them. The praise of karma referred to above points out only that the karma of the soul happens to be the chief abode; but this does not exclude the fact that the jīva has another abode, viz., the elements. There is no contradiction therefore between the two Śruti-passages.

1. These are, of course, to be considered as imperishable till the soul is not finally released.

V. E. 23
This process of departure of the soul is common (to both the ignorant and the wise); and (this kind of) immortality (belongs to him who is wise, but who has) not burned (avidyā and other defects).

Now, this departure of the soul and its abiding in the subtle elements is applicable, as the pūrvapakṣin thinks, to the ignorant people alone and not to the wise, because it explains the occurrence of a new birth in the case of the former; whereas being endowed with knowledge and consequently with immortality, the latter can never be born again. No doubt, we meet with this description of the departure of the soul in the context of the Ātma-vidyā which Uddālaka imparts to his son Śvetaketu (Chā. 6, 8), but it does not on this account, says the pūrvapakṣin, refer to its being a constituent part of the vidyā. On the contrary, like other things, such as hunger, thirst, and sleep which are common to all living beings, it is used as an aid to the understanding of the subject under discussion. It is, in other words, with a view to impress on the mind the teaching that 'the soul is nothing but the Ātman, the highest deity, in which the light in the dying man becomes merged', that the departure of the soul is described. But as there is another Sruti which straightway denies 'the departure of the prāṇas of him who knows' (Br. 4, 4, 6), it can only be said that the present description of the departure of the soul belongs to the ignorant people.

To this we reply. The departure of the soul, described so far by the merging of speech in mind, of mind in prāṇa, and so on, applies equally to both the ignorant and the wise without any distinction, till the
parting of the ways. The soul of the ignorant takes its abode in the subtle elements which go to form the seed of the gross body, and being impelled by karma migrates from one body to another; while the soul of the wise resorts to the vein which is lit by knowledge and is known as the entrance into mokṣa.

As however immortality is the result of knowledge and does not depend on a change of place, an objector may say that it is improper to speak about the souls of the wise as taking their abodes in the elements or as having a sojourn on some path. Our reply to this is that the kind of immortality supposed by the objector is only a relative one, and is available for one who has not burnt the defects arising out of avidyā, but who, on the other hand, wishes to obtain heaven and such other worlds, by resorting to saguna upāsanā. It is with reference to such a wise man that the abiding of the soul in the elements and the journey on the path can take place.

1. In the case of the ignorant, the veins or the nādis have an opening in the lower regions of the fathers etc., while in the case of the wise they have an opening high up in the head which leads them to Brahmaloka.

2. What is known as absolute immortality can take place only in the case of one who has realized the nirguṇa Brahman.

3. By ‘wise’ is meant here the saguṇa upāsaka.
As against this, we hold that the subtle elements of fire and so on, which are the support of the organs of senses, continue to exist till there comes about the final release from samsāra. Sruti says that some souls reappear in the form of 'embodied, organic beings or inorganic matter, according to their past knowledge and works' (Ka. 2, 2, 7). If it be not so, death would put an end to all upādhis, and there would be a general and complete absorption of all the souls into Brahman. Then there would neither be any necessity for the study of the Vedānta, nor of any injunction to perform a sacrifice for obtaining the heaven or any other fruit. But we must remember that nothing short of the Brahmanic knowledge will release us from the illusory bondage of samsāra. Hence, even though Brahman is the ultimate cause in which the elements are said to merge at the time of death, they are not completely merged, but continue to remain there in the form of seed, as they remain during the conditions of sleep and the dissolution of the world, only to reappear in some form or other.

Sruti tells us that the tejas which, along with other subtle elements, is the support of the departing soul, passes through the veins. This means that it must be subtle in size. And because it is lustrous, 'nothing can stop it in its passage. It is on account of these two reasons that persons who are by the side of the dying man do not see it while it is passing out of the body.

1. The word in the commentary is ‘Svachchatvāt’, and it should better be translated as 'on account of being pure'; 'lustrous' is in keeping with 'tejas', while 'purity' will fit in with the 'invisible passing out' of the soul.
Hence (it is) not (destroyed) by the destruction (of the gross body). 10

It is on account of its subtle nature that the subtle body is not destroyed, even though the gross body is destroyed by being burnt, or in some other manner.

And on account of proof, the warmth (of the physical body is due) to the same (subtle body). 11

The warmth we feel by means of touch in the living body belongs to the same subtle body. For when a man dies, his gross body remains the same in shape, size, and general features, but there is left no warmth in it. On the other hand, there is warmth, so long as the body is living. This shows that warmth is not due to the gross body, but due to something else, viz., the subtle body which departs from it at the time of death.

If it be said (that the prāṇas of one who has realized the Brahman do not depart from his body) because it has been so denied, it is not so; for the denial refers to (the departure) of the soul (of such a man). 12
immortality there is neither the departure nor the journey of the prāṇas. As the Sruti says 'the prāṇas do not depart in the case of the man who has no other desire except the Ātman, whose all the desires are fulfilled and who is (therefore) without any longing', (Br. 4, 4, 6).

This means, in other words, that the prāṇas do not depart from the body of one who has realized the nirguṇa Brahman.

The latter part of the present Sūtra constitutes the reply of the pūrvapakṣin. The denial of the departure of the prāṇas, says he, is with reference to the soul and not to the body; for the departure of the prāṇas from the body is a feature common to all. This is the reason why the Mādhyandins in their reading of the text, use the ablative case and not the usual genitive case of the person under discussion. The sentence, 'His prāṇas do not depart', does not give us any definite knowledge whether they do not depart from the body or from the soul; but the sentence, 'Prāṇas do not depart from him' excludes the impossibility of their departure from the body, and shows that they do not depart from his soul.

The subject-matter of the passage under discussion is also the soul, the enjoyer of heavenly pleasure or bliss, and not the body. What the passage therefore means is that the prāṇas do not depart from the soul, when the latter, in its turn, depart; that is, they remain with the soul. In other words, when a man dies, the soul departs from the body, along with the prāṇas.

To this the next Sūtra comes as a reply.

स्पष्टो हेकेताम् । १३

[ Spastah—clear; hi—for; ekeśāṁ—of some.]

(The above view is wrong); for according to some, (the departure of the prāṇas from the body) is clearly (denied). 13

The pūrvapakṣin is wrong in his statement that the denial of the departure of the prāṇas refers not to the
body but to the soul. For certain Sruti-passages clearly indicate the denial of their departure from the body. To a question asked by Ārtabhāga, Yājñavalkya replies that the prāṇas do not depart from the body, when such a man dies; on the contrary, they are dissolved in the body itself. And it is in confirmation of this truth that it is further said that the body therefore becomes swollen and inflated (Br. 3, 2, 11). The ablative case (tasmaṭ) used by the Mādhyaṇḍins no doubt indicates the soul as the chief subject-matter; but on account of the close connection of the soul and the body, it may be assumed in a secondary way that they are identical, and as such, the word ‘tasmaṭ’ which means ‘from him’, will be taken to mean ‘from the body’. Otherwise the condition of being swollen etc. will not at all be applicable to the soul. So we must fit in the Mādhyaṇḍina recension of the passage under discussion with the Kāṇva recension of the same which uses the genitive case, and which means therefore the denial of the departure of the prāṇas from the body.

Moreover in the same Upaniṣad elsewhere (Br. 4, 4, 2), we read first about the departure of the soul either through the eye or the skull, and then about the departure of the chief and the lower prāṇas after it. And after we are told that this departure and the migration of the soul occurs in the case of ignorant men, we are also told as to what happens in the case of those who are wise and have no desires (Br. 4, 4, 6). Now if the intention of Sruti were to inform us of a similar departure in the case of the wise also, there would be no meaning in making specific distinction between the ignorant and the wise. The above passage therefore must be construed as meaning that the departure and journey of the prāṇas have reference to the ignorant and not to the wise. Besides, how will the departure and the journey of the soul or of the prāṇas will at all apply to him who has become united with the omnipresent Brahman, and whose desires and actions have become completely extinct? ‘He realizes the Brahman even while the body is living’ (Br. 4, 4, 7).
And Smṛti says so. 14

That there can be neither the departure nor the journey of the soul or the prānas in the case of the wise is also written in the Mahābhārata. ‘Even the gods become bewildered’, we are told, ‘when they try to find out the path of him who has no path, who has become the Self of all beings, who sees all beings as his own self’. No doubt, there is the story of Suka, the son of Vyāsa, who is said to have gone to the region of the sun with a view to have final release, and yet answered back the calls of his father who was going behind him. We need not however construe his story as telling us about the departure of the soul or the prānas in the case of one who has realized the Brahman. It indicates, on the other hand, the giving up of the body by Suka in a particular place, by means of his yogic powers. And this appears to be correct because Suka is described as moving through space more rapidly than wind and as making his powers known to all. Nay, he was seen by all; and how else can any one be seen unless he has assumed some kind of body? But he who knows Brahman can neither be said to move nor depart. In Sūtra 7 of the next pāda, we shall have again an occasion to discuss the Śruti-passages concerning the departure of prānas.

7. वागादिर्याधिकरणम् । (१५) ।
तानि परे तथा ब्राह । १५

[ Tāni—those; pare—in the Brahman; tathā—in the same manner; hi—for; āha—is said. ]

Those (elements and sense-organs are merged) in the Brahman; for (Śruti) says so. 15

1. By the ‘wise’ are here meant those who have realized the Brahman and have therefore no other desires to be fulfilled.

2. The knower of the Brahman goes beyond both the paths, which are known as the path of the Gods and the path of the fathers.
As for the absorption of the sense-organs and the elements in the case of a person who has realized the Brahman, we say that they are absorbed in the Brahman only. For, as the Sruti tells us, 'The sixteen parts (kalās) of the spectator approach the person and are absorbed in him' (Pra. 6, 5). No doubt, another Sruti speaks of the absorption of the fifteen parts in the elements themselves (Mu. 3, 2, 7). But this, we say, is the ordinary view of the matter; the parts of the body come out of the elements of earth and others, and so merge back into them. But the former passage tells us that the parts of the person who has realized the Brahman also become Brahman. They are merged in the elements, and then are further merged along with the elements in Brahman.

Hence there is no contradiction.

< अविभागाविभिकाकरणम् | (१६) 
अविभाज्यवचनात् | १६

[A-vibhāgah—non-difference; vacanat—on account of saying.]

Complete (is the absorption of the kalās in Brahman) for (Sruti) says so. 16

The Sūtrakāra hereby removes the doubt regarding the possibility of there remaining something as a potential energy even after the parts are merged, as in the case of ordinary men, by asserting emphatically that in the case of one who has realized the Brahman, the merging is absolutely complete. As the Sruti says, 'Even the names and forms of the parts are dissolved; there remains only the Puruṣa; he becomes without parts and immortal' (Pra. 6, 5). It stands to reason also that once

1. The sixteen kalās are; the five elements, senses, mind, prāṇa, faith, food, valour, penance, mantra, action, loka, and name.

2. If mind and prāṇa are counted together as one kalā, there would be only fifteen kalās.
the parts which are due to avidyā are dissolved by 
vidyā, there remains no trace of them. They become 
absolutely one with Brahman.

9 tādākoḍaṣṭidhikaraṇaḥ (१७)
tādākoḍaṣṭijaṅgālāni tathākāśītāhāram viśvaśāṃṣṭyaḥ 
auśstātiyogācaḥ hārdāuṣṭuṣṭāḥ: śrūtāvibhīkaḥ (१७)

[Tat—that; okāh—house; agra—end; jvalanāṁ—illumina-
tion; tat; prakāśita—illumined; dwāra—door; vidyā; sāmar-
thyāt—on account of power; tat; śeṣa—a part; gati—way; anu-
smṛti—meditation; yogāt—due to; ca—and; hārda—one living 
in the heart; unugṛhitam—is favoured; śata—hundred; adhikayā 
—by more than.]

The end of the abode (of the heart in the case of 
both the wise and the ignorant) being lighted up, the 
doors (of the departure of the soul) is illumined thereby; 
owing to power of knowledge and meditation on the 
way (of departure) which is a part (of that knowledge, 
the wise man) is favoured by him (i.e. Brahman) who is 
in the heart, and (departs) by the one (vein) which 
exceeds a hundred, (and is located in the skull). 17

After having incidentally said what he had to say 
regarding the nirguṇa vidyā, the Sūtrakāra resumes 
the discussion about the saguṇa one from where it was left, 
viz., the departure of the soul upto the beginning of the 
ways. The present Sūtra describes how the soul enters 
on the way. The soul first comes ‘to stay in the heart, 
after having taken within him the powers of the sense-
organs’; and then, when a ‘point in the heart is lighted 
up, and the soul is guided by this light, it departs either 
through the eye or through a hole in the skull, or through 
any other part of the body’ (Br. 4, 4, 1-2). Now, as 
no special difference is pointed out, it may appear at 
the outset that the wise and the ignorant depart in the 
same way. But the Sūtrakāra points out against this 
that, though the door of the departure is equally illumini-
ated by the light in the heart in both the cases, the
difference between the two is that, whereas, as the result of his knowledge, the wise departs through the skull, the ignorant departs from some other place. For if the wise also were to depart from any other place, not only will his knowledge be of no use to him, but superior places like heaven will also be denied to him. It will be proper, on the other hand, to expect that being benefitted by his meditation on the way itself which will lead the soul through the vein in the skull, the soul of the wise man should actually travel by that way after death. Besides, as the result of his excellent meditation on the Brahman in his heart, the wise man is favoured by the Brahman; and then, being in nature like unto Brahman, he ascends to the hundred and the first vein and passes through the skull. The souls of other men, on the other hand, pass out through other veins. As the Sruti says, 'Out of the hundred and one veins proceeding from the heart, the one that leads up through the skull takes a man to immortality; the others that are spread in different directions' bring a man back to samsāra (Chā. 8, 6, 6).

[Raśmi—ray; anusārī—one which follows].

(Whether one dies during day or night, the soul follows the ray). 18

In a chapter of the Chāndogya-paniṣad (8, 1, 1) we are told about the Dahara-vidyā, or of the city of Brahman in the small room within the heart; subsequent to this, we are told about how the veins and the rays of the sun are connected with each other (8, 6, 1); subsequent to this, again, we are told that the soul departs at the time of death by means of these very rays (8, 6, 5); and finally, subsequent to this, again, (8, 6, 5) we are told that it attains immortality when it rises by the vein reaching up in the skull. This means that when the soul departs through the hundred and first vein, it
Vedanta Explained

departs by following the rays. But one may think that inasmuch as the rays are absent by night, this sort of departure by following the rays may be possible only in the case of the man who dies by day. But as there is no specific Sruti statement in this respect the Sutra asserts that the following of the rays is equally possible in both the cases, that is, whether the upâsaka of the saguna vidyā dies during day or night.

निशि नेति चेत संवंधस्य यात्रेऽहारित्वाहिर्शयति च । १९

[Niśi—at night; na; iti cet—if it be said; na; sanihandhasya—of connection; yāvat—so long; deha—body; bhāvitvāt—on account of existence; darśayati—shows; ca.]

If it be said that (the soul) does not (follow the rays) during night, it is not so, on account of the existence of the connection (of the veins and the rays) till there is the body. (Sruti) also declares so. 19

It will be wrong to suggest that the soul of that person only who dies during the day follows the rays, and not that of a person who dies during night; for the connection of the veins and the rays is not broken by night, but lasts throughout the day and night so long as the body exists; ‘Spreading out of the sun, the rays enter into the veins; and spreading out of the veins they enter back into the sun’ (Chā. 8, 6, 2). That the rays of the sun exist during the summer night is clear from the atmospheric warmth. They do not make their presence felt during the nights of the cold season, and appear as nonexisting, because they are few in number. This is what also occurs during the days of the cold season, on account of the rays being hindered by the cloud. So it will be correct to say with the Sruti that ‘the sun makes the day by night’.

Besides, if the soul of a person who dies at night were to rise upwards without the help of the rays, the Sruti statement, ‘He departs by the rays’ (Chā. 8, 6, 6) will have no meaning. Nor have we any authority of Sruti to restrict this statement only with the upward
departure of persons who die during day, so that we may say that those who die by night rise upwards even without the aid of the rays. And if perchance the wise man also were to die by night, he would be prevented from going upwards, as if he has committed a fault. Knowledge, in this case, may appear to be not necessarily connected with its otherwise declared fruit of leading up the soul to immortality. And if knowledge is not thought to be dependable, nobody would ever try to have it. To get out of these difficulties, if one were to say that the soul may wait till day-break in order to follow the rays, we have to note that this also may not be possible, if in the meantime, the dead body is burnt, and if along with it the veins also are burnt, so that there would be no connection of the veins and the rays. But, on the view which we hold, viz., that the soul follows the rays by night as well as by day, there is no need of waiting till day-break, in case a person dies by night. Sruti tells us that the soul takes as short a time to reach the sphere of the sun by following the rays, as the mind takes it in reaching there (Chā. 8, 6, 5).

11 दक्षिणायनाधिकरणम् (20–21) अत्त्रायनेश्वपि दक्षिणे 20

[Atah—hence; ca—and; ayane—in the going; api—even; dakṣīṇe—in the south.]

And for the same reason (the soul follows the rays) even when (a person dies) during the southern journey of the sun. 20

As the soul need not wait till day-break, even so we say by parity of reasoning that the soul of the wise person who dies during the southern journey of the sun (dakṣināyana) need not wait for the fruition of vidyā till the sun begins to move towards north (uttarāyana). There is no knowing when death will come; but ignorant people wrongly believe that uttarāyana is an excellent period for dying. No doubt Bhīṣma is known to
have waited for his death till uttārāyāna; but, in the first place, this only shows his regard for the customary belief of his time; and secondly, he could prove thereby that he had got by the grace of his father the power of choosing the time of his own death. As for the meaning of the Sūtra-statement (Chā. 4, 15, 5) 'they go from the bright half of the month to the six months of the uttārāyāna', we shall explain under Sūtra 4, 3, 4. But so far as the Smṛti-statement (B. G. 8, 23) regarding the times of death which determine the return or otherwise of the yogins is concerned, the next Sūtra comes as an explanation.

योगिनः प्रति च स्मर्येन स्मार्ते चैते। २१

[Yoginah—of the yogin; prati—towards; ca—and; smar-yate—says the Smṛti; smārte—having the view of Smṛti; ca; ete—these two.]

The reference to the times of death is with reference to yogins, and both (Śāmkhya and Yoga) are Smṛtis (only). 21

The rule regarding the proper time of death such as 'fine day, bright half of the month', and so on, applies to the yogins mentioned in Smṛtis, and not to the upāṣakas mentioned in Sruti. The Yoga and the Śāmkhya as mentioned in the Smṛti, viz., the Bhagavadgītā, are different from the meditation and the knowledge mentioned in Sruti; and so the decision regarding the proper time of death which Smṛti has taken is not applicable in the case of the saguṇa upāṣaka, as mentioned in Sruti. It may be pointed out that along with the rule regarding the proper time of death, the Bhagavadgītā mentions in the same passage the two paths, the devavāna and the pitṛayāna (B. G. 8, 24 and 25). But it

1. Yoga means disinterested action (B. G. 6, 1); Śāmkhya or knowledge means to experience that action is being done by body and the senses and not by the Ātman (B. G. 5, 9). Both these are different from upāsanās, e.g. that on the Dāharākāśa.
must be remembered that our refutation concerns
the aspect of the time of death which is promised to
told just in the previous verse, and which alone con-
stitutes the point of contradiction between the Smṛti
and Śruti. Of course, the contradiction too can be
resolved if we interpret the words ‘fire’ etc. in the Smṛti
as divinities leading the departed souls,—an explanation
which we shall find under Śūtra 4, 3, 4, with reference
to similar words in Śruti (Chā. 4, 15, 5).
ADHYAYA FOURTH
PADA Third.

1 आचिराचिकतस्य । (१) आचिरादिनी तत्तथिते । ॥

[Archi—flame; adina—beginning with; tat—that; prathithi—being well-known.]

(Whoever desires to go to Brahmaloka by means of upāsanā) goes by (the way of) fire; for (the way) is well-known). । 1

We have shown so far that the departure of the soul from the body in the case of both the saguna upāsaka and the unwise, is the same till the beginning of the way. Now, so far as this way of the upāsaka is concerned, it appears that it may not be one but more than one. It is described as one where the rays pass through the veins (Chā. 8, 6, 5); or as one which goes from 'light to the day' (Chā. 5, 10, 1); or as that which leads one 'on the path of gods to the abode of Indra' (Kau. 1, 3); or as that which 'leads to vāyu' (Br. 5, 10, 1); or as that which makes a man 'free from passions and guides him through the gate of the sun' (Mu. 1, 2, 11). The pūrvapāksin maintains that the ways are different, because, in the first place, they are mentioned in different places; secondly, they form the parts of different upāsanās. Thirdly, the emphatic statement that declares the rising of the soul by the way of the rays will be contradicted, if we expected the fire and others as mere stages in it; the way of the rays, in other words, is a way different from others. And so lastly, the statement, which mentions the speed of the mind as the speed in which the soul travels to the region of the sun, must have been made with reference to one way only as distinguished from other ways. All this shows that the ways are different.
To this we reply that whoever wishes to realize the Brahman by means of upāsanās must necessarily go by the path which begins with fire. For it is this path which is well-known to all who possess the knowledge of the upāsanās. Even in the chapter which deals with the vidyā of the five fires, we read how the other upāskas also in the forest who meditate on the truth with faith attain to the road which begins with fire (Br. 6, 2, 15). The question is not whether this road leading to Brahmaloka is to be assumed where it is not mentioned; it is to determine that this is the only road the stages or the stations on which, or the attributes of which, are mentioned in parts in different passages. The determination that the road is one only can be arrived at by recognizing that some of the stages mentioned in many places are to be found among the stages which are mentioned in the path of fire. What we have to do is to combine the several stages mentioned in several places as constituting one road, just as the particulars of one upāsanā are combined with other particulars of the same upāsanā which are mentioned elsewhere. So long as, therefore, the destination is one, viz., the Brahmaloka, and so long as some part of the same road is recognized in all the places, we can conclude that it is one and the same road. We see this illustrated in the following Sruti-passages: 'They live in that Brahmaloka for as many excellent years as the Brahmadeva lives' (Br. 6, 2, 15); 'He lives there for innumerable years' (Br. 5, 10, 1); 'Whatever greatness or victory belongs to Hiranyagarbha, he obtains that' (Kau. 1, 7); 'Whoever meditates on Brahman by remaining celibate, attains the Brahmaloka (Chā. 8, 4, 3).

As for the argument of the pūrvapakṣin that the emphatic statement that the way is constituted by the rays will have no meaning if it is held that the way is constituted by fire and other stages, we have to remark that the statement only means that the rays also constitute an essential stage on the road. Neither can it be said that the statement is intended to exclude the stages
Vāyu in the arcir-mārga, the question arises as to where we are to locate it.

Now the arcir-mārga as mentioned in the Chāndogya is: 'From light to day, from day to the bright half of the month, from this to the six months during which the sun moves to the north, from this to the year, from year to the sun, from sun to the moon, and from moon to lightning.' But as there is no mention of Vāyu, we have to find a place for it, by taking into consideration what other passages have to say about it with or without any specification. The Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad, for instance, simply mentions the approach to the abodes of Vāyu and other deities as facts only, and makes no reference to any specific order of succession. But the Brhadāraṇyaka (5, 10, 1) mentions specifically that when the soul reaches Vāyu, the latter makes a wheel-like hole for it to pass on to Āditya (sun). So we determine the place for Vāyu as being between the year (Sāvīvatsara) and the Āditya, and not after Agni, as the Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad may wrongly be taken to suggest.

A further consideration of what the Vājasaneyins say, viz., 'From months to the abode of gods, and from it to Āditya' (Br. 6, 2, 15), coupled with the statement above from the same Upaniṣad will enable us to say that the soul goes from the abode of gods to Vāyu and from Vāyu to Āditya. Comparing the Brhadāraṇyaka with the Chāndogya, we find that whereas in the first there is no mention of the sāvīvatsara, in the second there is no mention of the devaloka. But as both the Upaniṣads are authoritative, we have to insert what is lacking in each one of them. But here also we have to note that as sāvīvatsara (year) is related to the months, we have that stage earlier than the stage of devaloka. So the complete order is: from months to year, from year to the abode of gods, from this abode to Vāyu, and from Vāyu to Āditya.
On account of connection (between the two) Varuna (is to be placed) beyond lightning. 3

As the arcir-marga of the Chandogypaṇiśad mentions moon and lightning beyond Aditya, and as the Kauśitaki mentions Varunaloka, we have to place Varuna beyond lightning. Besides, there is a connection between the two. Rain comes down, when within the thundering clouds there first occurs the dance of lightnings (Chā. 7, 11, 1). Similarly, Indra and Prajāpati mentioned in the Kauśitaki-passage, must also be placed beyond Varuna, inasmuch as like Varuna they also appear to be additions and are not given any particular place in the arcir-marga.

On account of this being indicated, (these are) the conductors. 4

Let us now think about the nature of the various things such as the light and so on. Just as a traveller wishing to reach a town is told that he would meet on his way first, a hill, then a banyan-tree, then a river, and then a village, and just as he becomes convinced that the way is correct when he meets them all one after another, even so it may mean that we are to understand that the light and so on are the marks on the way. Or, because the word ‘loka’ which means place of enjoyment is affixed to the words ‘Agni’, (Kau. 1, 3), ‘men’, ‘fathers’, and ‘gods’ (Br. 1, 5, 16), it may mean thereby that it is either a world of men, or of fathers, or of gods.
Or, because as the Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa tells us, it indicates 'the worlds of day and night to which men are attached' (10, 2, 6, 8), are we to understand that light and so on are places of enjoyment on the arcir-mārga, or the path of gods? In any case, according to the pūrvapāksin, they cannot be considered as conductors or guides to the travellers on the way, because they do not possess intelligence.

To this we reply that the light and so on are guides to the travelling souls. For when the souls reach the lightning we are told that a non-human person comes there to lead them on to Brahman. This means, by implication, that the guides which lead the souls upto lightning are human beings. Otherwise there would be no meaning in using the word 'amānava' (non-human) with reference to the guide at the stage of lightning. The word 'amānava' is useful to posit the existence of not only guides before the soul comes to lightning, but also to posit the humanity of those guides. But the objection comes that mere indication is no proof of anything. To this the next Sūtra comes as a reply.

उभयायेयामोहात्रतिसदृशः । ५

[Ubhaya—both; vyāmohāt—on account of infatuation; tat—that; Siddheḥ—being established.]

On account of both (the way and the travellers on the way) being non-discerning it is proved that (light and other things are the guides). 5

As neither the things like light and so on which make up the way, nor the souls in which the senses have been collected together on account of their being separated from the body, are discerning and free, it is proper to expect that like drunken and senseless people they are guided by intelligent deities of light and so on. Light and other things cannot be taken as mere stationary marks on the way which may enable the soul of the man who dies by night to reach the day. Besides, we have already seen under Sūtra 4, 2, 19, that the soul does
not wait till the break of the day. Viewed however under the aspect of gods, light and so on assume a permanent and intelligent nature; and then the language ‘light leading to day’, ‘the day to the bright half of the month’, and so on, is not only useful to make us aware of the causal sequence, but also looks natural, as if it is an instruction to a man to go to Balavarman first, to Jayasimha afterwards, and to Kṛṣṇagupta, last of all.

If we now compare the beginning and the end of the passage in which the devayāna or the arcir-marga is described (Chā. 5, 10, 1-2), we shall find that whereas in the beginning the souls are said to approach the light, in the end they are said to be led by a super-human guide to Brahma. From this also we find that the same relation, which holds good in the end of the passage between the soul and the guide, holds good even at the beginning. And further, though the souls cannot be said to enjoy on the way, inasmuch as the organs are all collected together, the various regions such as Agniloka, Vāyu-loka, etc., can very well be mentioned as places of enjoyment for the persons who have already gone there and lived as residents of those places. In view of this, therefore, Agni and Vāyu can be said to be the guides who lead the souls to their own regions.

But how can Varuṇa, Indra, and Prajāpati, it may be asked, be considered as the guides, since they are placed beyond lightning, and since Sruti tells us that beyond the lightning, there comes a non-human being who conducts the souls till the Brahmaloka is reached? To this the next Sūtra comes as a reply.

\[ Vaidyutena—by one residing in the lightning; eva—only; tataḥ—from there; tat—that; Srutēḥ—of Sruti. \]

As the Sruti states (the souls are led) by him only who resides in the lightning. 6
The non-human person who is referred to as coming immediately after the lightning and as leading the soul unto Brahmaloka (Br. 6, 2, 15) after leading them first through the regions of Varuṇa and others, is not only not prevented from doing so, but is also helped, on the contrary, in his mission by Varuṇa and other deities. It is in this indirect manner that Varuṇa and others can be said to be responsible for leading the souls unto Brahmaloka. So it follows that the 'arci' and the other things following it are to be considered as the guides of the souls after death.

5 कार्याधिकरणम् । (७–१४)
कार्यं वादारिस्य गत्यपपत्तेः । ७

[ Kāryam—effect; Bādariḥ—person so named; asya—of this; gati—movement; upapatteḥ—being possible. ]

Bādari (holds that the souls are led) to the effect (viz., the Brahmaloka); for the movement (towards it) is possible. 7

Now that Brahman may mean either the saguna or the nirguna aspect of it, there arises the doubt whether the person in the lightning leads the souls to the one or to the other of them. As Bādari says, it is to the lower, saguna Brahman, which is the effect of the other, that the souls are being led; for it is this kind of Brahman which can be considered as having a particular location, and as a destination towards which movement is possible. But with reference to the highest Brahman, on the other hand, which is omnipresent and is the inner self of all, it will be impossible to conceive the idea of someone going towards it, as if it is a destination to be reached by actual movement.

विशेषपित्वाच । ८
And on account of (the Brahman) being qualified (it is this to which the souls are led). 8

That it is the saguna Brahman to which the souls are led is also clear from another Sruti-passage which
tells us that they ‘live in the worlds of Brahman’ for innumerable years (Br. 6, 2, 15). The meaning of the word ‘loka’ (world) as the place of enjoyment and its use in the plural show us clearly that it is not the higher but the lower Brahman that is meant to be the place where going is possible, and as the being which is capable of abiding through its different conditions. No doubt, the word ‘loka’ is sometimes used to refer to the highest Brahman, as in ‘Brahman alone is this world, O king’ (Br. 4, 4, 23); but it is only in the secondary sense that it is so used. Besides, the language, namely, something being the abode and some one residing in it, cannot be used with reference to the highest Brahman. We therefore conclude that it is the lower Brahman to which the souls are being led by the person in the lightning.

But in view of what was already proved under Sūtra 1, 1, 3, viz., that the highest Brahman alone is the cause of the origination, subsistence and the decay of this world, one may say that the word Brahman cannot be truly speaking applied to the lower Brahman at all. And therefore, he may say that the Sruti-passage (Chā. 4, 15, 5) which tells us that the souls are led to the Brahman means that they are led to the highest, nirguna Brahman only. To this the Sūtrakāra replies in the next Sūtra.

सामीप्यातु तद्यथवेदः। ९

[Sāmīpyāt—on account of proximity; tu—but; tat—that; vyapadesāḥ—indication.]

But on account of proximity (to the highest Brahman), it is designated as that (viz., the lower Brahman). 9

There is nothing unreasonable if the word Brahman is applied to the lower or saguna aspect of it; for the saguna and the nirguna are proximate to each other. Besides, what is known as saguna is nothing but the nirguna Brahman as conceived under the adjuncts of mind and intellect, and as an object of worship.
But, one may still say that if by Brahman we are to understand the lower Brahman, the souls which are led to it must be thought of as making a return journey to the mortal world. For nothing but the highest Brahman can ensure permanence to them. And yet, the returning of the souls is contradictory to what we are taught by Sruti: ‘Those who proceed on the path of the gods do not return to saṃsāra’ (Chā. 4, 15, 5); ‘They have no rebirth’ (Bṛ. 6, 2, 15); ‘Rising up by the hundred and first vein, he reaches immortality’ (Ka. 2, 3, 16).

To this we reply.

कार्यात्येष तदृश्यक्षेण सहात: परमभिधानात् । १०

[ Kārya—effect; atyaye—in dissolution; tat—that; adhya-kṣena—by one who rules; saha—with; atah—from this; param—to the highest; abhidhānāt—being told. ]

During the dissolution of the effect (viz., the world of the lower Brahman, the souls) along with the ruler of that (world, realize the Brahman) which is higher than that; this is told (by Sruti). 10

When the Brahmaloka also becomes reabsorbed in the highest, pure abcd of Viṣṇu, (that is, the Brahman), all the souls who might have arrived till then in Brahmaloka become endowed with the knowledge of the real, and attain final release along with the Hiranyagarbha, the ruler of that world. This is what is known as krama-mukti or the release by successive steps, after which of course, there is no return. But in any case, actual movement of the souls, as we have already seen under Sūtra 4, 3, 7, is not possible with reference to the highest Brahman.

स्मरतेष । ११

And on account of Smṛti. 11

Smṛti also agrees with the view that all the souls along with the Hiranyagarbha merge during final dissolution in the highest Brahman only. This means that
the actual movement of the souls is only up to the region of the lower Brahman. This is what the Sūtrakāra has proved in Sūtras, 7 to 11. As for the corresponding pūrvapakṣa of this conclusion, it shall be told in Sūtras 12 to 14.

परं जैमिनिप्रमुख्यत्वात्।

[Param—the highest; Jaiminiḥ—the person so named; mukhyatvāḥ—on account of its being the chief thing.]

As (Brahman is to be understood) in its principal meaning, Jaimini (thinks that the souls are led) to the highest Brahman. 12

As Brahman means in the primary and the secondary sense, both the higher and the lower Brahman, Jaimini holds that wherever possible the primary meaning should first be taken into consideration, and that therefore the Śruti-passage (Chā. 4, 15, 5), ‘The souls are led to Brahman,’ must be construed as meaning that they are led to the highest Brahman.

दर्शनाच।

And because Śruti (says so). 13

Besides, the immortality which is said to be obtained by the soul, after rising up by the hundred and first vein (Chā. 8, 6, 6), is possible only when the realization of the highest Brahman is achieved, and not when the lower Brahman or the Brahmaloka is approached. For, the latter being an effect of the highest Brahman is perishable. ‘It is little, it is mortal; for it is seen as something different from the Ātman’ (Chā. 7, 24, 1). Besides, the Kathopanishad which also speaks of the going up of the soul to Brahman, shows us that the topic under discussion is of the highest Brahman only (1, 2, 14) and not of any other thing.

न च कार्यं प्रतिपत्तिभिः।

[Na—not; cā—and; kārye—in the effect; pratipatti—achievement; abhisārdhiḥ—intention.]
Moreover, the desire which the soul may cherish at the time of death, viz., that of ‘reaching the assembly-hall of Prajāpati’, is not to be taken as referring to the lower Brahman which is mentioned in the immediately preceding sentence of the same passage (Chā. 8, 14, 1) as the chief subject-matter. It is ‘that in which the names and forms are contained’ (Chā. 8, 14, 1), that which is the ‘Ātman of all, who is named as ‘yaśas’ or glory, and like unto whom there is none’ (Sve. 4, 19). The same is told with reference to Dahara-vidyā. The golden-hall built by Brahmadeva in the city of Brahman, and known as Aparājita is to be reached by going over there (Chā. 8, 5, 3).

So much then from Sūtra 12 constitutes the pūrva-pakṣa, the siddhānta standpoint being already put forth from Sūtra 7 to 11. We say so because that which is stated in the pūrva-pakṣa is capable of being disproved by what is said in the siddhānta, and not vice versa. If, on the contrary, we were to reverse the position and treat what is told in Sūtras 7 to 11 as the pūrva-pakṣa, in keeping with the general custom that the pūrva-pakṣa is mentioned first and the siddhānta afterwards, we would be taking the primary sense of the word ‘Brahman’ as nirguṇa Brahman, in a context where we cannot legitimately take it at all. The going of the soul referred to in the Dahara-vidyā, in the context of the knowledge of the nirguṇa Brahman, is not for the purpose of establishing this going with reference to nirguṇa Brahman, but is for the purpose of eulogizing the knowledge of the nirguṇa Brahman itself. It is to eulogize, in other words, the greatness and the immediacy of the final release which comes as a fruit of the knowledge of nirguṇa Brahman, that this movement of the soul, which though irrelevant from the view-point of this knowledge, is mentioned in its context. As a matter of fact, the movement has its relevancy with reference to the knowledge of the lower or sāguṇa Brahman. This is analogous to the reference of the other hundred veins, the passage of the soul through which causes transmigration
only, in the otherwise irrelevant context of the hundred and first vein, the passage through which causes the soul to reach the Brahmaloka. Besides, the sentence referring to the entrance in the hall of Prajāpati can be separated from the previous sentence, which tells us that nirguna Brahman is the illuminator and the repository of names and forms, and can be construed as referring to the attainment of saguna Brahman or Brahmaloka. And though it is true that the lower Brahman cannot be said to be the self of all, yet like an arthavāda sentence which is used for the purpose of eulogizing some thing, it may be spoken of as the self of all, in the same way in which it can be spoken as the 'dear of all, and as the possessor of all desires' (Chā. 3, 14, 2). It follows therefore that all the passages which speak about the movement of the soul refer to the lower Brahman only.

As against this, in view of the general practice, those who think that the former set of the Sūtras, viz. from 7 to 11 constitutes the pūrvapakṣa, are of opinion that the movement of the soul is with reference to the highest, nirguna Brahman. But this is impossible, because Brahman being omnipresent, and the inner self of all (Br. 3, 4, 1; Mu. 2, 2, 11), can hardly be said to be the destination towards which the soul moves. How is movement possible with reference to Brahman which is already reached, and is not different from the soul (Chā. 7, 25, 2)? It is no argument to suggest that Brahman being endowed with all powers may somehow, in a secondary sense, be taken to be the object towards which movement is possible, just as persons living on one and the same earth are conceived as going from one place to another, or just as the child is said to become a man even though its soul remains the same. For Brahman is said to possess no distinctive qualities of its own. 'It is partless, actionless, faultless, taintless, and tranquil' (Sve. 6, 19); 'It is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long' (Br. 3, 8, 8); 'He is within and without, and yet unproduced' (Mu. 2, 1, 2); 'The great unborn Atman is without decay or death, and is the immortal, fearless,
Brahman indeed' (Br. 4, 4, 25); 'He is described negatively as not this, not this' (Br. 3, 9, 26). Brahman, in short, does not possess differences of place, time, condition, or parts, and cannot therefore be said to be the destination towards which the soul moves.

It may again be contended that Brahman has got various powers, inasmuch as it is declared in several places that it is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and the dissolution of the world. But it must be remembered that these passages are only subservient to other Sruti-passages which declare the reality of Brahman alone, and the unreality of anything else than Brahman. For what Sruti aims at is not to show thereby that different things originate from Brahman, like vessels from clay, but to show that like clay Brahman alone is the reality and that nothing else is real. In other words, the passages, which aim at denying the differences in the case of Brahman, are self-sufficient to convey the meaning that nothing remains to be desired or done by the man who really knows that the Atman is one, permanent, and pure. For instance, 'What sorrow or infatuation can there be for him who beholds the unity?' (Isa. 7); 'Oh Janaka, you have attained fearlessness' (Br. 4, 2, 4); 'The wise does not fear anything; nor is he distressed with the thoughts of not having done good deeds or of having done bad deeds' (Tai. 2, 9). Negatively also, we arrive at the same conclusion, viz., the wise man who finds unity is always contented. For instance, Sruti censures a man 'who sees here any difference' by saying that 'he moves from death to death' (Ka. 2, 1, 10).

As opposed to this, passages which mention the origination of the world and so on have not themselves the capacity to convey the meaning which if realized will put an end to all desires. And yet, they imply another meaning over and above the obvious meaning of explaining the origination of the world and so on. That meaning is, as has been said already, to make us aware
that Brahman alone is the 'root' of the world which must be known (Chh. 6, 8, 3; Tai. 3, 1, 1). The aim of these passages then being primarily to make us aware of the unity of the Atman and not of explaining the origination of the world and so on, Brahman can never be the object of destination towards which movement of the soul may be possible. As a matter of fact, we have made this point clear under Sūtra 4, 2, 13; the denial of movement of the soul to the highest Brahman is explicitly stated in the passage, 'Of him who has realized the Brahman, the prāṇas do not depart; himself being already the Brahman, he is merged in Brahman' (Br. 4, 4, 6).

Nor can the movement of the soul to the Brahman be explained, whatever may be the relation of the soul to the Brahman. In the first place, if the soul be identical with Brahman, no motion is possible; for Brahman is motionless. Secondly, if the soul is a part of Brahman, it cannot remain apart from the whole; and hence too movement of the soul to the Brahman is impossible. Besides the conception of the parts and the whole is inapplicable to Brahman. If, in the third place, the soul is said to be the modification of Brahman, we reach the same conclusion. For never can anything remain apart from the cause of which it is a modification. Never can a jar remain apart from clay; and if it does it is itself destroyed. The jiva being essentially Brahman, and Brahman being permanent, it can hardly be said that the jiva moves towards the Brahman or that Brahman undergoes the condition of samsāra. And if, in the fourth place, the jiva is different from Brahman, it is either atomic, or mediocre in size, or infinite. That it cannot be atomic or mediocre, we have already seen under Sūtras 2, 3, 19 and 2, 3, 29. The belief in an atomic soul is inconsistent with the experience of a sensation all over the body; the soul which has a mediocre extent will be perishable in nature; and motion is impossible to be conceived in case the jiva is omnipresent. Besides, the Sruti instruction, 'Thou art that' will serve no purpose if the jiva were to be really different from Brahman, or
if it were to be merely a part or modification of Brahman. On these views, either the condition of samsāra will cling to the soul, and then, there will be no mokṣa for it; or, if the samsāra is to come to an end, the jīva also will come to an end. But none of these views holds that the imperishable Brahman constitutes the essence of the individual soul.

In this connection, some people may put forth their imaginings thus: A man may do his daily routine of works such as sandhyā and agnihotra, or may do some occasional expiatory works, and thereby be free from sins; similarly, he may exert to keep himself away both from heaven and hell by abandoning actions which are either desirable or forbidden. As for the works whose fruits he has begun to enjoy in the existing life, it is certain that they will be exhausted till the fall of his body. Naturally, in the case of such a man, there being no remnant of work which may cause the beginning of fresh body, there may arise the condition of disembodied life or mokṣa even when there is no knowledge of Brahman as the self of all.

But all this is baseless imagination; for nowhere it has been propounded that a man should behave in this way in order to attain mokṣa. It is presumptuous to hold that works will cease to bear fruits in the way that is suggested, and that there would therefore be no fresh life in store for a man. On the contrary, it is natural and easy to suppose that a man accumulates innumerable good and bad results of his actions in one life and that therefore different lives are necessary to enjoy them. It is natural to suppose that while the result of some works are being enjoyed in one life, the results of some other works lie waiting for proper circumstances of place, time, and so on. In view of these latter works, it cannot be said even in the imagined case of the person described above, that there remains no results of any work which may not be the cause of new birth. That works leave behind them their results has been
established both by Sruti and Smrti. ‘Those whose conduct is good, obtain excellent births’ (Châ. 5, 10, 7). This proves that good works also become the cause of new births, notwithstanding their being the cause of wiping out the results of bad actions to some extent. The routine and the obligatory works also do not stop at preventing the production of evil, but are themselves the cause of incidental results such as the attainment of heaven and other regions. ‘A mango tree, though planted for the sake of fruits’, says Apastamba, ‘gives also shade and fragrance; similarly, one gets additional advantages by the performance of religious duty’. Besides, who indeed can there be who will, during his whole life-time, abstain himself from doing an action which is forbidden, or which is recommended to be done for the sake of achieving some object of desire? Even the most perfect and the intelligent of persons, commit some faults, however minute they may be. We can never be absolutely certain therefore that no trace of karma will be left, and that there will not be any cause for having a fresh bodily existence, except in the case of those who have attained the knowledge of the Real or the Brahman.

And further, if the soul is to be considered as essentially the doer of actions and the enjoyer of their results and not as identical with Brahman, there will be no chance of its ever being free. Just as the fire can never be separated from its heat, even so the samsûric condition of the jiva will never be separated from it, inasmuch as the doing and the enjoying which are the characteristics of the jiva, as also the other causes, such as place, time, and circumstances which produce the sam-sâra, are inextricably bound with the jiva. But if, on the other hand, we believe with the Sruti that there is no other way to moksa except knowledge (Sv. 3, 8), the doing and the enjoying on the part of the jiva will have only a phenomenal existence. Just as the dream-life is real till the wakeful life has not begun, even so the whole of the practical life with its reliance on the
means of sensuous knowledge is real, till the Ātmanic knowledge has not dawned upon consciousness. ‘One sees the other, where there exists the duality, as it were; but who should see whom when all this becomes the one Ātman only’ (Br. 4, 5, 15)? In the same way, from the view-point of one who has realized the Brahman, all the talk about Brahman as the destination to which the soul moves, becomes devoid of any meaning.

In view of this, the Śruti-passages, which speak of the movement of the soul, must consequently be referred to the Saguṇa-vidyās, such as that of the five fires (Sūtra 3, 1, 1); or that of the Paryanka or the couch (Sūtra 3, 3, 27); or that of the Vaiśvānara (Sūtra 1, 2, 24); or that referring to the lotus-like palace in the heart (Chā. 8, 1, 1), where the Saguṇa Brahman is spoken of as Vāmanī (the dispenser of the fruits of actions) and Satyakāma (whose desires are immediately fructified); or that referring to breath as Brahman, or to ‘ka’ and ‘kha’ as Brahman (Chā. 4, 10, 5). There is no passage, on the other hand, which says that the soul goes to the highest Brahman. Nay, of him who has realized the Brahman, we are told that ‘the prāṇas do not depart’ (Br. 4, 4, 6). And yet, in certain passages such as ‘He who knows the Brahman reaches (आप्राति) the Highest’ (Tai. 2, 1), the verb ‘āp’ has no doubt the meaning of going or reaching. But it does not mean reaching to some other place; it simply means the realization of one’s own real nature after the dissolution of the names and forms which are falsely superimposed on the Brahman.

For one more reason we cannot hold that the movement has reference to the highest Brahman. It seems improbable that one who has realized the Brahman and is already fully satisfied with that condition will require any further incentive of being told that he would derive joy by the movement of his soul towards Brahman. This is possible for one who has not realized the highest Brahman, but who is devoted to the life of meditation on the lower or sguṇa Brahman. And yet
not being mindful of the distinction between the lower and the higher Brahman, statements regarding the soul's going which are relevant with reference to the lower Brahman are wrongly connected with the higher Brahman.

Thus we are committed to the view according to which there are two types of Brahman, the lower and the higher. As the Upaniṣad says, it is the Om which is both the lower and higher Brahman (Pr. 5, 2). It is the higher Brahman which, when the distinctions of names and forms are negated, is described only negatively, as neither coarse nor subtle, and so on. And that is the lower Brahman which is qualified by some name and form, for the purpose of meditation. For instance, it is said to be 'of the nature of mind, of having prāṇa as its body, and light as its form' (Chā. 3, 14, 2). It need not be said that this distinction between the lower and the higher Brahman goes against the instruction of the Sruti that Brahman is one, because the very names and forms which are responsible for this distinction are the upādhis due to avidyā. And because there does not occur the destruction of avidyā in the case of those who meditate on the lower Brahman, Sruti tells us that they obtain whatever fruits they wish to have, such as the glory and lordship over the worlds, including 'that of the fathers' (Chā. 8, 2, 1). Naturally, therefore, as the different fruits are connected with different regions, there is nothing unreasonable in holding that the soul moves unto those regions. Indeed, here too, we have to remember that the soul is truly speaking the all-pervading Ātman only; but just as the all-pervading ākāśa (as explained under Sūtra 2, 3, 29) is said to have its connections with jars and other things, even so the soul or the Ātman is viewed as making a movement on account of its connection with intellect and other adjuncts.

From all this it follows that what is stated in Sūtra 4, 3, 7 is our conclusion; while what is otherwise set
forth in Sūtra 4, 3, 12, is for the sake of giving aid to the understanding.

6 अप्रतीकालंकनानविधिकरणम् । (१५—१६)
अप्रतीकालंकनानविधिकरणम् बादरायण उभयांशदोषाचतुःतुष्ट । १५

[A—not; pratika—symbol; ālambanān—to those who have resorted; nayati—leads; iti—so; Bādarāyanaḥ; ubhayathā—both ways; a-dōṣāt—there being no fault; tat—that; kratuḥ—of one who meditates; ca—and.]

Bādarāyana (maintains that the man in the lightning) leads those who do not resort to symbols (of Brahman); both ways, there is no fault; one who meditates on that (viz., the kārya-Brahman also goes to Brahmaloka). 15

We have proved so far that the movement of the soul is with reference to the lower or the kārya-Brahman, and not with reference to the highest Brahman. There arises now the doubt whether the immortal person in the lightning leads to Brahmaloka all the persons who meditate on the saguṇa or the kārya-Brahman, or some of them only. The pūrvapakṣin maintains, in accordance to what has been stated in Sūtra 3, 3, 31, that all those who meditate on some one or the other of the saguṇāvidyās are led to Brahmaloka.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies that this is true of all persons who meditate on the saguṇa forms of Brahman, but not of those who meditate on the symbols representing the Brahman, such as the name, the speech, the mind and so on. For, in the case of the meditations on the symbols, the mind is not fixed on Brahmaloka, as it is so fixed when the meditation is on some form of saguṇa Brahman. It may be pointed out that in the vidyā of the five fires, it is stated that the meditator is led to Brahman (Brahmaloka) even though the mind of the meditator is not so fixed on it (Chā. 4, 15, 5). This may be true in the case where it is specially mentioned; but as a general rule, we must understand that only those
who meditate with a view to go to Brahman (Brahmaloka) are led towards it, and not others who, because of their meditation on the symbols, do not fix their minds on Brahmaloka.

विशेषं च दर्शयति । १६

[Višeṣam—a specific difference; ca—and; darśayati—Sruti declares.]

And Sruti declares a specific difference in the case of meditations on symbols. 16

As for the meditations on symbols such as name, speech, mind and others, Sruti declares that each of them being greater in importance than the preceding one, it is attended also by a corresponding important result, superior to what has gone before. (Chā. 7, 1, 5). This difference in fruits shows that the meditations on symbols are not the same as those on the other forms of saguṇa Brahman.
On account of the word ‘sva’ (which means ‘own’ the soul) after having approached (the highest light) manifests (in its own nature). 1

We are told in the Chāndogyopanisad (8, 12, 3) that ‘when the serene being, after having risen from the body, meets the highest light, it manifests in its own form’. Now, regarding this form, the pūrvapakṣin holds that it is a new form which the soul assumes, inasmuch as even the mokṣa which it attains can be considered as a fruit, just as the forms assumed by the soul in heaven and in other places are new, so that it may be able to enjoy the respective fruits. Besides, the word ‘manifests’ can be said to be a synonym for the word ‘origination’. And if the form were to be its own, then the soul could have manifested itself even during its former conditions; for how can a thing’s own nature be ever absent from it? The form therefore which the soul manifests must be a new form.

To this we reply. The word ‘sva’ in ‘one’s own form’ (svena rupena) clearly shows that the form in which the soul manifests is not new, but its real own form. Otherwise there would be no meaning which can be attached to the word ‘sva’. To say that even all the new forms which the soul assumes may be called as its own forms, because they are then owned by it, is to bestow no particular meaning on the act of manifestation. But the manifestation will be definitely and properly explained, if we say that the form in which the soul manifests is its own real form, that is, the form of the Ātman itself.
What then, it may be asked, is the exact difference between the form of the soul after manifestation and its form during the different conditions before manifestation? To this the reply comes in the next Sūtra.

**Muktah—released; pratijñānāt—on account of statement.**

In accordance with the statement (of Sruti, the soul) is released (on account of the manifestation of its own real form). 2

The soul becomes free from bondage when it manifests in its own form; it then abides in its own real nature, viz., the pure nature of the Ātman itself. And it was exactly this which was denied to it in its three former conditions of wakefulness, dream, and sleep. As narrated in the Upaniṣadic story which comes before the passage under discussion (8, 12, 3), Indra soon becomes aware of the defects in the successive teachings of Prajāpati regarding the nature of the Ātman. If the Ātman were to be only a reflection of the body in water, then, as Indra discovered it would be blind if the body is blind; if in dreams it were simply to wander and imagine as it liked, it would sometimes come to grief; and if it were just the experience in dreamless sleep, it would be as good as nothing. In short, the condition of the soul in its three former states was stained by some defect.

Besides, it was in view of the imperfections of the soul in its three above-mentioned conditions that we are told that Prajāpati undertakes the task of imparting the knowledge of the sinless Ātman (Chā. 8, 7, 1), and concludes at the end of the story that 'pleasure and pain do not touch the bodiless Ātman', and that 'the soul which appears in its own form is the highest Person' (Chā. 8, 12, 1-3).

Now regarding mokṣa as a fruit, we must understand that it is nothing but the cessation of bondage;
and this is what is meant by the word 'manifestation'. In no way, therefore, mokṣa can be thought as something absolutely new. Analogously, it is like health which means the absence of any signs of disease.

आत्मा प्रकरणात् | 3

[Ātmā prakaraṇāt—on account of context.]

On account of context, (the jyoti or the light means) the Ātman.

And because in the context of the passages under discussion, the word jyoti or light, with which the soul is said to come in contact, means the sinless and deathless Ātman (Chā. 8, 7, 1) and not the physical light, as already explained under 1, 3, 4, we have to characterise the soul as being released. As against this, to understand the word jyoti as meaning physical light is to ignore the topic under discussion and introduce a new one. Sruti also uses the word jyoti as Ātman elsewhere; 'The gods worship the Brahman, which is the light of lights' (Br. 4, 4, 16).

2 अविभागेन द्वीत्वाधिकरणस् | (४)
अविभागेन द्वीत्वात् | ४

[A-vibhāgena—undivided; drṣṭatvāt—on account of being seen.]

As is seen (from Sruti, the released soul abides in Brahman) in an undivided manner.

Some one may think that the soul remains different from Brahman, even after it meets the highest light; for the reference to the soul’s movement (Chā. 8, 12, 3) and its meeting the light suggest respectively the difference between the abode and the abider, and between the subject and the object it meets. But just as the rivers which run into the sea become one with the sea (Mu. 3, 2, 8), or 'just as pure water mixed with pure water remains pure, even so the soul of the wise sage becomes the highest Ātman only' (Ka. 2, 1, 15).
What then, it may be asked, is the exact difference between the form of the soul after manifestation and its form during the different conditions before manifestation? To this the reply comes in the next Sūtra.

Muktah = released; pratijñānit = on account of statement.

In accordance with the statement of Sruti, the soul is released (on account of the manifestation of its own real form). 2

The soul becomes free from bondage when it manifests in its own form; it then abides in its own real nature, viz., the pure nature of the Ātman itself. And it was exactly this which was denied to it in its three former conditions of wakefulness, dream, and sleep. As narrated in the Upaniṣadic story which comes before the passage under discussion (8, 12, 3), Indra soon becomes aware of the defects in the successive teachings of Prajāpati regarding the nature of the Ātman. If the Ātman were to be only a reflection of the body in water, then, as Indra discovered it would be blind if the body is blind; if in dreams it were simply to wander and imagine as it liked, it would sometimes come to grief; and if it were just the experience in dreamless sleep, it would be as good as nothing. In short, the condition of the soul in its three former states was stained by some defect.

Besides, it was in view of the imperfections of the soul in its three above-mentioned conditions that we are told that Prajāpati undertakes the task of imparting the knowledge of the sinless Ātman (Chā. 8, 7, 1), and concludes at the end of the story that ‘pleasure and pain do not touch the bodiless Ātman’, and that ‘the soul which appears in its own form is the highest Person’ (Chā. 8, 12, 1–3).

Now regarding mokṣa as a fruit, we must understand that it is nothing but the cessation of bondage;
Audulomi (thinks that the soul manifests) in the form of consciousness only; for that is its essence.

If the manifoldness of character which arises on account of upādhi is to be excluded from the nature of Brahman, as explained under Sūtra, 3, 2, 11, the only form in which the soul can manifest itself, says Audulomi, is the consciousness which is said to be the only nature of Brahman (Br. 4, 5, 13). In view of this, it cannot be said that qualities like freedom from sin which simply make us verbally aware of their meaning, and which have their origin in duality, are included in the real nature of the soul or Brahman. Similarly, qualities like immediate fruition of desires etc., are dependent on the supposition that Brahman has desires on account of the adjuncts of intellect and others. These also cannot form the real nature of the soul or Brahman. In the same way, attributes which imply love, sport, or eating cannot be ascribed to Brahman, because they also imply something which is loved or eaten. At best, they may suggest the absence of all pain in Brahman, or may be used for purpose of eulogizing the free nature of Brahman. As the Upanishad says, 'Internally or externally, this Ātmā consists of nothing else but one homogeneous mass of consciousness' (Br. 4, 5, 13). Hence, the only words which can express the real nature of the manifested soul is the beatific, pure, consciousness of the indescribable, qualityless Brahman.

Notwithstanding this, Bādarāyaṇa (thinks) that there is no contradiction (in saying that the soul possesses) other qualities mentioned before, because there is reference and so on.
Notwithstanding the fact that pure consciousness constitutes the real nature of Brahma, Bādarāśīyiṇa thinks that there will be no contradiction in saying that the released soul possesses also the glory and the other qualities which are mentioned about Brahma in view of the phenomenal existence of the world.

8 संकल्पाविभिन्नम् | (8-9.)
संकल्पाद्वा तु तत्कृत: | 8

[Samkalpāṭ—from wish; eva—only; tu—but; tat—that; Srutēḥ—on account of Sruti.]

But as Sruti says, it is by mere will (that the released souls fulfil their desires). 8

We are told in the Dahara-vidyā, which recommends the meditation on Brahma in one’s own heart, that by the mere wish, a meditator can meet his dead forefathers (Chā. 8, 2, 1). The pūrvapākṣin, however, thinks that this goes against the ordinary experience, according to which over and above the desire there must actually be the act of going to the place where the person must be residing. Besides, if there is mere wish or imagination, the objects of desire and the enjoyment of them will themselves be imaginary and not real. Even the desires of a king are not materialized unless the appropriate means are resorted to.

To this we reply. The other means which are said to be necessary must also be due to the wish itself. For if the means are supposed to be due to efforts, the wishes of even the released and the wise persons will be fruitless, in spite of the statement of Sruti. Our ordinary experience will not be our guide in matters where Sruti is the sole authority. The will of a released person differs from that of an ordinary person; and hence that which is produced from such a will must have all the stability and certainty of an actual concrete fact.
Anant eva chaananyachyapti: 9

[ Atah—hence; eva—only; ca—and; an—not; anya—another; adhipatih—lord. ]

For this very reason (the released soul) is without another lord. 9

It is generally observed that as far as it is possible, even an ordinary person does not wish that another person should control his wishes. In the case of the wise person then, who gets himself released, it is impossible that there should be another lord over him. As Sruti says, ‘There is freedom in all the worlds for them who, after realizing the Ātman, and realizing that all their desires are therefore capable of fructifying immediately, leave this world’ (Cha. 8, 1, 6).

5 abhayāvikaranam (10-14)

Abhāvan vādārih kesavam 10

[ Abhāvan—non-existence; Bādariḥ; āha—said; hi—for; evam—thus. ]

Bādari (says that the released soul does) not possess (body or sense-organs); for (Sruti also) says so. 10

Though the will implies the existence of a mind that wills, Bādari says that one who has realized the knowledge and release has neither body nor sense-organs. The specific mention of the word ‘manasā’ (with the mind) in the statement ‘He rejoices in seeing the desires of the Brahmaloka mentally’ (Cha. 8, 12, 5-6), excludes the possibility of his having a body and sense-organs during the condition of mokṣa.

Bhāvan ājiminivikalpayamnānadv 11

[ Bhāvan—existence; Ājiminiḥ; vikalpa—option; āmananāt—being told. ]

Jaimini (holds that the body and the sense-organs) exist; for an option has been told (regarding this in Sruti). 11
In the opinion of Jaimini, the released person possesses not only the mind but the body and the sense-organs also. For the capacity to become three-fold, fivefold, etc., (Chā. 7, 26, 2) is not possible, unless there is a body. No doubt, this capacity to become many is mentioned in the context of the knowledge of the Bhūman, that is, the nirguna Brahman, for the purpose of eulogizing the power of Brahman; but the glory and the power we must understand, are also available as fruits of the knowledge of Saguna Brahman.

As in the case of the twelve-days sacrifice, Bādarāyaṇa (thinks that the released person is) of both kinds. 12

As Sruti points to both ways, Bādarāyaṇa concludes that the released person can be with or without a body, as he likes. This is possible because all his various desires become fulfilled instantaneously. This is analogous to the sacrifice which lasts for twelve days, and is called either as a ‘satra’ or as ‘ahina’.

When there is no body, it may happen as in a dream. 13

When there is no body and no sense-organs the condition of the released person would resemble that of the dream. For then, even if the objects do not actually exist, their existence in the mind is sufficient to make one experience them as if they existed.

1. It is known as satra on account of the plurality of priests (from 17 to 24); and as ahina, because it is recommended to be performed by one who wishes to have progeny (Pū. Mi. 2. 3, 5).
When there is (a body, it may happen) as in the wakeful condition. 14

If, on the other hand, the released person has a body the objects of his desires may really exist, as in the waking state.

Like one flame (lightning other flames, the soul of the released person) enters into (other bodies); Sruti also declares thus. 15

If, as shown under Sūtra 11, the released soul has got the capacity of becoming threefold, fivefold, etc., the question that arises is whether the bodies which consequently come forth are like our own bodies possessing souls in them, or, are like soulless wooden figures. The pūrvapākṣin holds the latter view, because there can be no separation¹ of the soul and the mind, and so they will have no connection with additional bodies.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies that neither the supposition of soulless wooden figures, nor that of the new souls entering new bodies will be compatible with the teaching of the Śruti (Chā. 7, 26, 2) that the soul

---

1. Even granting that the soul is all-pervading, it has to manifest itself as consciousness through some mind; and as it readily manifests itself through that mind which is influenced by past innumerable impressions, it may not manifest in a new mind and so be located in an additional body; and even granting that it is so associated with a new mind, and therefore, it comes to live in an additional body, the pūrvapākṣin says that there will arise the confusion due to its being compelled to experience fruits for which it is not responsible.
becomes threefold, fivefold, etc. The soul has the power of modifying itself into many souls, and of entering into new bodies, just as one flame can produce many new flames. The science of Yoga teaches us how the one soul, which possesses the power of actualizing immediately its wishes, can divide itself into as many souls as there are bodies created by it. Those other bodies have all their internal organs or minds which, however, are conformable to and connected with the one soul of the released person (Yoga Sū. 4, 4-5).

But this cannot be admitted, one may contend, if in view of the following Sruti-passages, the released soul cannot be said to have any specific knowledge: ‘If there is nothing beyond the Ātman, who can see anything else, and how?’ (Br. 2, 4, 14; 4, 3, 30); ‘Like one expanse of water, he then becomes one, pure, non-dual seer’ (Br. 4, 3, 32).

To this the Śūtrakāra replies:

स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरगृहतंमन्यस्मात्विष्कृतं हि ॥ १६

[Svāpyaya-sanipattyoh—of deep sleep and mokṣa; anyatara—one or the other; apekṣam—with reference to; āvishktam—manifested; hi—for.]

(The absence of specific knowledge) refers either to deep sleep or mokṣa; this is manifested (by Śruti). 16

Whenever the absence of specific knowledge is mentioned, the context is always either of the dreamless sleep or of mokṣa. For instance, ‘Having originated from these elements, he perishes after they perish’; (Br. 4, 5, 13) ‘When all this becomes the Ātman to him there is no specific knowledge for him’ (Br. 2, 4, 14); ‘During sleep, he sees no dreams, nor has any desires’, (Br. 4, 3, 19). So, not to have any specific knowledge is a quality that belongs either to dreamless sleep or mokṣa.

Now though this lordly power is really the fruit of saguṇa vidyā, the mention of mokṣa is not inconsistent, because it is proximate to the power and glory.
Excepting the creation etc., of the world, (with reference to which God) is the topic under discussion, (and where the released soul cannot be considered) because of its being remote, (the released soul may be said to have all other divine powers).

Now, there arises the question whether those who meditate upon the sāguna Brahmaṇa and consequently obtain equality in form with the deities, in spite of their retaining their psychic individuality, also possess the unlimited divine power or not. The pūrvapāksin holds that they do possess it, because Sruti tells us that they obtain ‘svarajya’ and freedom in all the worlds (Tai. 1, 6; Chā. 8, 1, 6) and that ‘all the gods bring offerings to them’ (Tai. 1, 5, 3).

To this the Sūtrakāra replies that the released soul may get all such powers as that of becoming smaller or larger in size, but it will not have the power of creating the world. For wherever, the problem of creation, maintainance and destruction of the world is being discussed, the eternal God is said to be exclusively responsible for it. The soul, on the other hand, which comes after the creation of the world cannot be the cause of the latter, and so is not discussed along with God. Even the other powers are derived by the souls, when they make a search for God, and worship and meditate on him.

Besides, it is likely that if one released soul may think of creating the world, another may think of destroying it. This is possible because both of them have their individual minds even in their released condition, and so there may arise a confusion. To suppose, on the
other hand, that all of them may act with one mind is to suppose that all of them are dependent on the will of God.

If it be said that (the souls possess unlimited power) on account of the direct teaching of Sruti, it is not so; for it is said that (these powers depend upon God) who resides in regions (of the sun etc.) and who is the appointer (of deities) to the offices. 18

Now even the 'svārājya' or the sovereignty which the pūrvapakṣin considers as the mark of the unlimited power on the part of the released souls, is itself dependent on the highest God, who being the in-dweller of the regions of the sun and other deities has got the power of appointing them to different offices. It is to indicate that svārājya is not the unlimited power, that Sruti mentions immediately after this that the released soul attains the highest God, and then like God becomes the lord of all minds, of the eye, the ear and the knowledge (Tait. 1, 6, 2).

As (Sruti) declares there is also (another form of the highest God) which is not abiding in the modifications. 19

Besides, the highest God is not simply immanent in the sun and other modified things but is also one
that is eternal and transcendent. 'The greatness of the Person is such that his one foot is all these beings, while his three feet remain immortal in the heavens' (Chā. 3, 12, 6). It is therefore impossible to maintain that those, who have never even thought to know what nirguna Brahman is, but have, on the contrary, pinned their faith to the saguna aspect of it, will ever realize the former. In other words, those, who become satisfied by knowing the saguna Brahman only, must also remain satisfied with a limited power only. They cannot have the unlimited power of God.

दृष्यतबेत्वा प्रत्यक्षानुमाने। २०

[ Darśayataḥ—they (two) show; ca—and; evam—thus; pratyakṣānumāne—perception and inference. ]

And, perception and inference indicate the same. 20

Sruti and Smṛti also declare that the highest Light transcends the things of the world. 'The Sun does not shine there, nor the moon, nor the stars, nor the lightnings; much less the fire' (Ka. 2, 2, 15; Sve. 6, 14; Mu. 2, 2, 10; B. G. 15, 6).

भोगमात्रसाम्यविलिङ्गाच। २१

[ Bhoga—enjoyment; mātra—only; sāmya—equality; lingāt—from sign; ca—and. ]

And there being signs to show the equality in enjoyment only (of the devotees and the Lord, the released soul cannot possess unlimited power). 21

The released soul may be equal to the Lord in the point of enjoyment only and not in power. The Hiranyagarbha says to the approaching released soul, 'Enjoy the nectar-like waters as I do' (Kau. 1, 7);
'All the beings will honour him who knows the deity, just as they honour the deity itself' (Br. 1, 5, 20); 'He obtains thereby equality in bodily form and residence with the deity' (Br. 1, 5, 23). All these passages tell us also, by way of implication, that in other respects the released soul and the deity are different from each other.

One may say that if the power of the released soul be not unlimited, it will be perishable, and then the so-called released soul shall come back to saṃsāra.

To this the revered preceptor, Bādarāyaṇa, replies in the next Sūtra.

अनावृत्तिः शन्त्यादन्यावृत्तिः शन्तान्। २२

[ Anāvṛttih—non-return; śabdāt—on account of word (Sruti). ]

As Sruti says, they do not return; they do not return. 22

Those who go by the vein and the ray and come on the path of the gods, consisting of light and other stages, reach, ultimately the Brahmāloka. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad (8, 5, 3) describes this world of Brahma as being the third beyond earth and heaven; as consisting of two seas of nectar, known as 'āra' and 'nya'; as having a lake known as Airām-madiyam which is full of wholesome food;¹ as containing an Aśvattha tree which showers the soma-juice;² as having in it the city of Brahmadeva, known as Aparājīta;³ and as having in that city the golden hall, built by Hiranyakarṣaṇa. And so, when once the souls reach this Brahmāloka, they

1. Airām—food; madiyam—wholesome.
2. Soma, here, means nectar.
3. Inaccessible to those who lack knowledge and activity.
do not return from it, just as those who go to the region of the moon by means of their actions return to saṁsāra. Sruti favours this conclusion by saying, 'One who rises by the one hundred and first vein in the heart becomes immortal' (Chā. 8, 6, 6); ‘Those who go to Brahmaloka do not return again’ (Chā. 8, 15, 1; 4, 15, 5; and Br. 6, 2, 15). This non-return or the release in successive stages in spite of their perishable nature of their power and glory, we have already described under Sūtra 4, 3, 14.

In short, if those who meditate on the saguṇa Brahman reach ultimately the Nirvāṇa or Mukti along with Hiraṇyagarbha, it is no wonder that those who have removed the darkness of their ignorance by the light of their Brahmanic anubhava which is eternally perfect have already attained it.

“Om Tat Sat”
SUMMARY
ADHYÄYA II
PÄDA III

Sūtra

1 - 5  The view of the pūrvapakṣin that ākāśa does not originate.

6 - 7  The Vedāntin holds that ākāśa also is an effect of Brahman; for if Brahman is known ākāśa becomes known, but not vice versa. The Chāndogya account of the origination of fire from Ātman is not inconsistent with the Taittirīya account of the origination of ākāśa, vāyu, and fire in order of succession, if only we suppose that ākāśa and vāyu have been omitted by Chāndogya, probably with the motive of giving an account of tajjālān. If śūnya-vāda is not to be accepted, the Ātman must be presupposed as existing before ākāśa. The Ātman is implied even in the refutation of the Ātman.

8  Vāyu also is a product of Brahman; for if Brahman is known, vāyu will be known; but if vāyu is known, Brahman may not be known.

9  To suppose that Brahman may be a product like ākāśa and vāyu will lead us to infinite regress. Therefore the uncaused, original cause of all is Brahman alone.

10  The cause of fire, as of anything else in the universe, is ultimately Brahman only. But this is not inconsistent with the Taittirīyaka view that fire is not only mentioned after vāyu but that it also springs forth from vāyu, which is, in its turn, nothing but Brahman in a modified form.

11  Water is the connecting link between fire and earth.

12  If we are not to omit the earth as the link between water and food (herbs and corn), then the
word 'anna' means the earth and not food etc. The latter are produced out of earth.

13 Creation is not worked out by the elements themselves, independently of God. The highest God, on the other hand, assumes the forms of elements, and residing within them he thinks of their modifications and produces them.

14 Dissolution occurs in the reverse order of creation. The cause will not dissolve so long as the effect lasts; nay, it may continue even though the effect is dissolved.

15 The two orders of sense-organs and of elements may not interfere at all, whether the senses are produced before or after the elements are produced.

16 Birth and death mean the connection and severence respectively of the body from the soul, which is neither born nor dies.

17 The individual soul is a mode of the unmodifiable Brahman itself; it appears as different owing to upādhis.

18 The Ātman being the jīvatman, it is eternally conscious of itself, during the three conditions of wakefulness, dream, and sleep.

19-28 The pūrvapakṣin says that the soul is atomic in size, and yet pervades the whole body by its intelligence.

29-32 The jīva has no origin; it is identical with Brahman. Therefore it cannot be atomic in size. It is as pervading as Brahman. Intelligence as a quality of the soul cannot wander away from it; if it pervades the body, it is not atomic in size. The anūtva of the soul (i.e. of the Ātman) means that its nature is too subtle to be discerned by the intellect; or, it is falsely considered as atomic on account of the limiting adjuncts of mind and intellect. This connection of buddhi and soul is potential in sleep and dissolution; it manifests
at the time of wakeful condition and creation, and lasts till the samsāra lasts.

33-39 The soul and not the unconscious buddhi is the real and independent doer, in the spheres of knowledge and actions. Buddhi which is merely an instrument falsely usurps the power of the soul in being conscious.

40 The soul is however said to be the doer on account of the upādhis; for if the authorship were natural it would never be able to get rid of it. The Ātman is identical with knowledge itself.

41-42 Man has limited freedom to act in view of the results of his past actions and future intentions; ultimately God is the only efficient cause but is neither arbitrary, nor unjust, nor cruel.

43-52 The jīva being identical and yet different from Brahman, it is said that the jīva is, as if, a part of Brahman. Even the entire universe is a pāda (a part) of Brahman. And yet the jīva-hood and its pain being due to avidyā, the Lord will in no way be affected thereby. Statements about the difference between the two are occasional, and meant to emphasise the identity. One who has realized the Brahman has, in a way, transcended both injunctions and prohibitions, but is not specially indifferent to them. The jīva is the reflection of the Ātman in buddhi; so it is another way of telling that it is born of avidyā.

53 The plural souls and adṛṣṭa will merely confuse the location of activity of karma and enjoyment of fruit with reference to plural bodies and individuals.
Like the elements, the prāṇas also are originated.

They are eleven and not seven.

They are subtle and limited in size, though neither atomic, nor all-pervading.

The chief prāṇa which is the oldest and the best is also born of Brahman; the other prāṇas come into being after their special seats, such as ear, nose, etc., are formed. The chief prāṇa is the sustainer of the other prāṇas.

And yet, the chief prāṇa is, like the other prāṇas, an equally useful instrument to the soul, an equal partner with them in their quarrel for superiority, and is not only non-independent, but also non-intelligent, limited, and perishable. Though it has no specific sense-organ, it has got the five-fold function of lending support to all the senses.

Its subtle nature makes it both all-pervading and limited in size.

Ultimately, the divinities of fire, wind, etc. are responsible for the elements, the sense-organs (the prāṇas) and their various functions. And yet, the one, permanent jīva, and not the many divinities, is the possessor of the instruments and the enjoyer of merits and demerits. After death the prāṇas follow the jīva and not the divinities; for the latter belong to the class of prāṇas themselves, and are their guides only; or they are like instruments.

Excepting the chief prāṇa, the lower prāṇas are the organs of sense, and not merely the functions of the one prāṇa. Mind is a kind of sense-organ. The chief prāṇa keeps awake, when the others go to sleep, it is the immortal, life-principle. The lower prāṇas are
absolutely dependent on the chief prāṇa, for their being and nature.

20-22 The entire evolution of names and forms, which forms a tripartite nature of fire, water, and earth, is the work of the highest Lord or Brahman. Even the so-called man-made things are ultimately dependent on Brahman or God. There occurs the tripartite combination in the body of man also.

ADHYĀYA III
PĀDA I.

Sūtra

1 - 7 The jīva is enveloped by all the elements when it departs from the body. The prāṇas also accompany it, and are not merely absorbed in fire, air, and other elements. Sraddhā means water and not faith, on account of the Vedic usage and on account of the possibility of its being offered in a sacrifice. The water therefore which includes curds, milk, etc. when thrown in fire as oblation, comes back in subtle parts and resides as apūrva or invisible merit in the souls of the sacrificers and leads them on after death to heaven and other regions. Persons who lack the knowledge of the Ātman or of the five fires can merely do works, and so can only go to the moon and other regions as enjoyers and as subservient to the deities; but they must return after the merit is exhausted.

8 - 11 The remainder (or the anuśaya) of works causes the descent. But it is not the remainder of some fruits which are being enjoyed, it is in the form of the complete fruits which have not begun their career as yet. Conduct which is good or bad, and which indicates the quality of mind will not of itself be the cause of new birth; it must be combined with works, and is therefore indicative of the remainder of works.
12-26 Those who perform sacrifices go to the world of the moon and enjoy; but those who do not perform them come under the sway of Yama, and suffer. Those who have neither knowledge nor works of public utility to their credit are denied entrance on either of the two paths, of the Gods and of the fathers, and so, they are born again and again. These do not go to the region of the moon. The bodies of such low creatures are formed without water being turned into oblation. During descent the souls become similar to ākāśa and other elements, and come in contact with rice or barley plant, and so on.

ADHYĀYA III

PĀDA II

Sūtra

1-6 Illusory character of a dream, in spite of prediction being sometimes possible by it. There is, during dream, no room for chariots and horses within the body of a man; nor is it possible for the soul to wander outside the body. The objects in the dream sometimes cancel one another, not to speak of their being cancelled by the waking life. In a sense, the dreamer himself is the creator of the dream, inasmuch as like the waking life the dream also supplies joys and sorrows for the dreamer in accordance with his good and bad works. The dream experience is valuable to bring out the self-luminous nature of the Ātman; for there are neither the objects, nor the senses, nor again the contact between them. Ultimately, the Lord is the author of our dreams as he is of the objects of the waking life. Even liberation comes as the result of the grace of God.

7-8 The nāḍis, the pericardium, and the Brahman are to be taken together as constituting the place of sleep; and yet better still, Brahman alone is the place of deep sleep, the nāḍis and the pericardium where only the upādhis of jīva rest, being only the gates of
Brahman. In fact, the jīva being identical with Brahman, it is only a metaphor to say that Brahman is the support of the jīva. Had the soul resided in the nādis and the puritaṭ, there would have been no cessation of knowledge of the objects in the world, because there is then no cessation of the upādhis. It is only when the soul becomes one with Brahman (whether in sleep or waking life) and free from adjuncts that it does not cognize anything other than itself.

9 The person who wakes up is the same person who goes to bed. Final release is not obtained by merely going to sleep, even though the soul rests in the Ātman. In points of specific works, knowledge, and fruits, every soul is different from every other.

10 Swoon appears like sleep or death, but is different from all other states.

11-21 Brahman is devoid of qualities; it does not become a different entity on account of upādhis, just as white crystal does not become red on account of red flower kept near it. Every time the difference is said to be for the sake of devotion. Sruti is careful to declare, that it does not affect the Brahman, which is homogeneous inside or outside like a lump of salt, and dwells even within the upādhis. The proposition, Brahman is intelligent, itself implies that Brahman exists.

The intention of passages which describe Brahman as Saguna is not with a view to cancel the view of plurality afterwards, but to achieve certain results such as glory, wealth, etc. The phenomenal world is to be destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman only. The knowledge of the rope will in the same moment destroy the illusion of the serpent on it. Passages like ‘the Ātman should be seen’ etc., only direct our attention to a fact which is already accomplished; this is done by the Guru. Injunctions and prohibitions are all useless. Besides, seeing the Ātman is equivalent to mokṣa. Meditations may be for mundane purposes, and so may be likened to performances of sacrifices.
22 ‘Neti’, ‘neti’ does not mean the denial of Brahman; for this would mean the opposite of what the Vedāntin wishes to ascertain; it only means the denial of the two forms of Brahman, visible or invisible, or of whatever that can be thought of as existing apart from Brahman. ‘There is nothing else beyond Brahman’, means Brahman is posited in spite of negation.

23-26 Some rare person sees the Ātman by means of meditation, purity of mind, and grace of Ātmajñāna itself.

27-29 The relation between the meditator and the object of meditation is like that between the serpent and its coil, hood etc. (The two are one and the same.)

30-33 The non-intelligent world does not exist apart from Brahman.

34-37 The language of connection of the soul with Brahman, arises on account of the upādhis; otherwise the soul is already the Brahman.

38-41 Not apūrva but God, as Bādarāyaṇa holds, is the guarantee of the distribution of fruits.

---

ADHYĀYA III
PĀDA III

Sūtra

1 The knowledge of Brahman cannot be of different kinds according to different injunctions. Such difference may exist with reference to objects of ordinary experience or of illusion.

2 A minor difference such as the mention of the sixth fire does not alter the knowledge of Pañcāgni-vidyā; for the sixth fire, viz., the funeral fire is actual, while the five fires are imagined for the purpose of meditation.

3-4 The rite of carrying fire on the head refers to the followers of a particular branch of the Veda and is not a part of Brahma-vidyā.
5 Things which are subservient to the knowledge of Brahman are to be combined in all places, whether they are explicitly mentioned or not.

6–8 Just as the darśa-sacrifice and the paśu-kāma sacrifice are different in spite of certain identical actions enjoined to be performed, similarly the vidyās of the Vājasaneyins and the Chāndogas are different; because in the one the prāṇa is the udgātā, in the other, it is the udgītha. In the Chāndogya itself we get two vidyās and not one because the udgītha is described as ‘greater than ākāśa’ in one place, and as ‘possessing a golden beard’ in another. The same name does not necessarily indicate that the vidyās are the same. But where there is no special reason to believe that they are different, the same name is sufficient to indicate that the vidyās are not different but one only e. g. Saṃvarga-vidyā, Paṅcāgni-vidyā and the Vaiśvānara-vidyā.

9 The word ‘udgītha’ qualifies the word ‘Om’, which is only a part of the whole of the udgītha. They are not synonymous of each other; nor is one of them superimposed on the other, nor again sublated on account of another.

10 Qualities mentioned with reference to the chief prāṇa in one place are to be combined with the other qualities of prāṇa mentioned in other places, even if the former are not mentioned.

11 Qualities like bliss, knowledge, and omnipresence, etc. must be taken to be present in all places, for Brahman which is described in these places is one and the same.

12 But Qualities like joy, greater joy, etc. which differ in degree and appear to depend on persons, and which go to form the innermost sheath of jīva known as ānandmayakośa, not only do not belong to Nirguna Brahman, but do not form the aspects of Saguṇa Brahman also. And yet they are recommended for meditation, only with other qualities such as saṃyadvāna and satyasankalpa.
14 Puruṣa is mentioned as the highest of all for the sake of knowledge and of achieving mokṣa, and not for meditation.

15-17 The same puruṣa is spoken of as the Ātman, and the way to realize him is to restrain the speech in mind. Thereby we reach the knowledge of Viṣṇu or Puruṣa, which is the end of the journey. The Vājasaneyaṁs and the Chāndogas start the inquiry either with Ātman or Sat, but ultimately come to the same conclusion that Ātman and Brahma are one and the same.

18 The sipping of water is to be considered as the dress of prāṇa; and all food is to be considered as belonging to prāṇa.

19 Even in the same Sākhā or branch of study, if the vidyā is one, particulars mentioned in different places can be grouped together. The repetition of particulars is a clue to know that the vidyā mentioned in Agnirahasya and Brhadāranyaka is the same Sāṇḍilyavidyā of the Vājasaneyins.

20-22 The two secret names ‘ahar’ and ‘aham’ refer to different persons, one living in the Sun and the other in the eye. Therefore the vidyās are two.

23 The mere fact of their being connected with Brahma does not make the vidyās one and the same. The ādhidaivika vibhuti of Brahma mentioned in the Khlia of the Rāgayanas cannot be incorporated in the Brahma-vidyās (whether ādhyātmika or ādhidaivīka) of their own Upaniṣad, the Chāndogya. The qualities such as holding the universe, are heterogeneous from the qualities mentioned in the vidyās.

24 So also, when the Chāndogya considers the human life itself as a sacrifice, and when the Taittiriyaka considers it as belonging to a person who has realized the Ātman, and when there are numerous points of disagreement between the two versions, the only conclusion that can be had is that the two Puruṣa-vidyās are not one, but different. One is the continuation of
the Brahma-jñāna; another leads to the attainment of one hundred and sixteen years.

25 Mantras and sacrifices mentioned in the Brāhmaṇa-passages cannot be connected with the vidyās in the Upaniṣads. For the motive of the former may be to hurt an enemy, that of the latter to have an upāsanā. The mantras may be subordinate to sacrificial actions but may have nothing to do with the vidyās, though they might have been mentioned in close proximity.

26 The good and the evil results are both abandoned by the wise; they are then taken by relations and enemies of the person respectively.

27-28 The good and the evil are abandoned by the wise even at the time of death; they need not linger beyond death, for there remains nothing to be achieved.

29-31 The devayāna-mārga has reference to meditation on Saguna Brahman, but has nothing to do with the person who has realized the Ātman and who has no desire. The good and the evil have therefore no connection with the devayāna-mārga, in the case of such a person. The path has again a proper place in all the saguna vidyās which aim at ‘abhyudaya,’ or Brahmakā.

32 Persons who have realized the Brahman and the divine office-bearers who regulate the course of the universe remain in bodies so long as their works are not exhausted. Thereafter, they become one with Brahman and enjoy the bliss of mokṣa. The sancita and the kriyamāṇa kinds of karma are destroyed when the highest Ātman is seen; and so like burnt seed they become incapable of producing new bodies. The prārabdha however continues to the end of the body, because the body itself is the result of prārabdha. Further, the great sages or divine beings also are required to keep their minds purified till they enter into the abode of the highest Ātman along with the Hiranyagarbha. Vāma-deva’s instance further shows that Brahman is to be realized as being identical with one’s own self and with all.
33 All the negations of qualities in all the places must be combined to describe the Brahman, just as, as seen under 3, 3, 11, all the positive characters are to be taken together.

34 Brahma-vidyā is one, though there is reference to the two birds one of which eats and the other does not.

35-36 Brahma-vidyā is one in spite of the fact that questions and answers about it are more than one.

37 The reciprocal way of stating ‘I am He’, and ‘He is I’, is not merely for strengthening the belief of the identity of the devotee and God, but for the purpose of meditation in both ways.

38 The Satya-vidyā is one, in spite of different fruits.

39 The dahara-vidyā of the Chândogya is with reference to Saguṇa Brahman, that of the Brḥadāraṇyaka is with reference to Nirguṇa Brahman, though the two vidyās are similar in many respects.

40-41 The prāṇāgnihotra is to be performed only when the food is available for dinner, and is to be omitted when there is no food.

42 Upāsanās mentioned apparently in connection with certain sacrificial acts are not necessarily connected with them. Uṣasti Cākrāyaṇa’s warning to the priests that their heads will fall if they do their duties without knowing the deities shows that the vidyās are different from sacrifices. Besides, devotion to vidyās have their independent additional fruits over and above those of the sacrifices.

43 Meditations on vāyu and prāṇa are separate, in spite of their being declared as one; for the ādhiḍai-vika form of meditation is different from the ādhyātmika, notwithstanding vidyā being one. Besides, while vāyu is the absorber of the other deities, prāṇa is of the other lower prāṇas (i.e. senses).
44-52 The mental fires built by knowledge do not form part of a sacrificial action; for they are mental in character, and not actual. The other subordinate actions are also mental. And the fruits mentioned in the two Brāhmaṇas which come before and after the description of the fires are immortality and the cessation of desires, which are obviously the results of vidyā and not of action.

53-54 The vidyās are connected with persons or selves who are different from bodies. Difference in the qualities of the two. If consciousness is the property produced by the elements, it cannot make the latter as objects of its knowledge. The presence of the body is only an occasion for the manifestation of consciousness.

55-56 Different branches of Vedic study may have the same vidyās.

57 The Vaiśvānara is to be contemplated not in parts, but as one whole. For the several fruits of the partial upāsanās are included in the fruit of the upāsanā on the Vaiśvānara as a whole.

58 The object of knowledge may be one, but there may be different types of devotions with reference to its different qualities or fruits.

59 To resort to all the vidyās recommended for the realization of God is to get the mind distracted. To be devoted to one of them whole-heartedly is sufficient.

60 With regard to the wish-fulfilling vidyās, on the other hand, one is free to meditate on any one of them or on all of them.

61-66 The upāsanās are not subservient to sacrifices, but serve the purposes of men; and so they cannot be combined.
Sūtra

1 -17 Bādarāyaṇa holds that knowledge of the Ātman is an independent means of attaining the supreme end of man, viz. mokṣa. Jaimini holds on the other hand that it is not independent of sacrificial actions. The pūrvapakṣin holds that great persons like Janaka, Uddālaka Yājñavalkya, and Aśvapati Kaikeyi were busy in doing actions in spite of their Ātma-jñāna, but it must be noted that we are not dealing with the transmigrating, embodied soul. Yājñavalkya himself, we are told, renounced all after saying to his wife that the knowledge of the Ātman alone constitutes immortality. Such vidyās alone which are merely wish-fulfilling and therefore involve prohibitions and injunctions, may follow the soul after death. Similarly, works are recommended for those who merely read the Vedas; but they may be shown to be done by persons who have realized the Brahman inasmuch as such persons are not affected by the doing of works. There remains nothing to be done by one who has realized the Ātman.

18-20 Jaimini holds that the three āśramas other than the Gārhaṣthya are to be accepted by those who, due to some reason or other, cannot maintain the āgni-hotra. Bādarāyaṇa opposes this by saying that all the four āśramas have special characteristics and utility. The advantage of the sannyāsāśrama is that the person can devote himself entirely to the realization of Brahman, without being distracted by the duties of the other three āśramas.

21-22 Sruti-passages about udgīthā are not mere statements of glorification, but are meant to enjoin meditation; for they contain novel information regarding special fruits which accrue from meditation.

23-24 Upaniṣadic stories regarding Manu, Yama, and Varuṇa are not simply stories, for the purpose of
being narrated during an āśvamedha sacrifice, but are for the purpose of creating a love for the vidyās (of the Atman, the prāṇa, and the wind) in connection with which they are told. This is analogous to the story of Brahmadeva in the karma-kāṇḍa cutting his omentum for the purpose of sacrifice.

25 Ātma-vidyā is independent of works such as the igniting of sacrificial fire, etc., which are enjoined in the different āśramas.

26-27 And yet so far as the origination of the Ātma-vidyā in man is concerned, it is dependent on works. The practice of several virtues at least is decidedly useful for the realization of the Atman and the subsequent freedom from sin. Works like sacrifices are connected with the desire to know the Atman. Virtues and works go to form the internal and external means of the act of realization.

28-31 Restrictions about food and water must be observed, as a general rule, even by the wise.

32-36 Works obligatory on āśramas may be useful for origination of knowledge if they are done without attachment to fruits.

37-39 All persons, whether they belong to some āśrama or not, are entitled to have Ātma-vidyā; but better it is to belong to some or other āśrama, for this will make the acquisition of the Ātma-vidyā easy.

40 Sruti allows the ascent from one to another āśrama, but not the descent. For the duties of a higher āśrama cannot be given up simply because one desires to do so, or is roused by passions.

41-43 Expiatory acts are available in all the four āśramas.

44-46 The fruits go to the sacrificer, and not to the priests.

47-49 Wisdom consists in combining knowledge with innocence and child-like simplicity.
50 Secretly should the wise observe his duty, unknown should he pass his life, and not leave behind him a trace of his name.

51 Ātma-jñāna may arise in one’s life, if there are no obstacles to śravaṇa and manana.

52 Ātma-jñāna means mokṣa itself, though the latter is spoken of as the result of the former.

ADHYĀYA IV
PĀDA I

Sūtra

1 Meditative acts, such as śravaṇa, manana, and contemplation, must be continued till the intuitive vision arises. Repeated meditation means repeated attention to the meaning; and so what is superfluous and superimposed on the Ātman is eliminated gradually. Similarly, upāsanās on the aspects of saguṇa Brahman must be repeated.

2-3 ‘I am thou’ and ‘Thou art I’ are equally true from the view-point of identity between the jīva and Brahman. If the distinction is due to avidyā, where is the latter to be located? It is to be located in the mind of the person who asks this very question; for from the view-point of God there is no avidyā at all.

4 Meditation on symbols will never assume the form ‘I am the symbol’.

5-6 But the meditation on Brahman should be superimposed on the symbols. Similarly, the ideas of āditya and so on are to be superimposed on udgīthā and others.

7-12 Meditation should be done while sitting, and not so much while standing or lying down. It can be carried on whenever the mind can attain concentration; and the upāsanā should be continued till death.
13-14 One who has realized the Brahman is free from the good or evil effects of works, whether of the past or of the future; but the prarabdha must be experienced.

16-17 Disinterested works may be combined with knowledge, and so made subservient to mokṣa, though agnihotra etc. are not essential for one who has already realized the Brahman. Such actions will be useful for one who meditates on saguṇa Brahman.

18 Works like agnihotra etc. which are combined with knowledge are better than those which are not so combined. And yet the latter are not totally useless on that account. They are useful in wiping out the sins and evil deeds, and are useful in increasing our capacity to resort to the more direct and internal means of knowledge, such as śravaṇa and manana.

19 Avidyā being uprooted and prarabdha being exhausted the wise man will attain to mokṣa as soon as the body falls.

ADHYĀYA IV
PĀDA II

Sūtra

1-6 At the time of death the functions of speech and other senses merge in the mind; then the mind also stops to function and merges in prāṇa; the prāṇa then merges first in the soul, and then along with the soul in the light and other elements.

7 The departure of the soul out of the body, till the parting of the ways, is common to both the ignorant and the wise. Taking his abode in the subtle elements, which form the seed of the gross body, the ignorant is impelled by karma to migrate from one body to another. The soul of the wise resorts to the vein lit by knowledge and goes on the path toward liberation. The wise man, however, is here meant to be the upāsaka of the saguṇa Brahman.
8–11 The subtle body made of the subtle elements which are the support of organs of sense etc. continue to exist after death till there comes about the final release, due to the knowledge of Brahman.

12–16 In the case of one who has realized absolute immortality on account of having burnt the defects of avidyā, there is neither the departure from body nor the journey of the prāṇas. He realizes the Brahman even when the body is living; the organs and the elements become one with Brahman.

17–21 The soul of one who meditates on the saguṇa Brahman, on the other hand, ascends to the hundred and first vein, and passes through the skull, and then follows the rays of the sun, even though the upāsaka dies during night, or when the sun is moving towards the south. The ignorant people wrongly believe that a particular time is excellent for dying.

ADHYĀYA IV

PĀDA III

Sūtra

1 Those who wish to realize Brahman by means of upāsanās must go by the path of fire etc. to Brahmaloka.

2–3 The stages on the way are: light, days, the bright half of the months, the six months during which the sun moves to the north, the year, the abode of gods, the wind, the sun, the moon, lightning, Varuṇa, Indra, Prajāpati, and Brahmadeva.

4–6 These names of stages such as light and so on are really the guides to the travelling souls, as is suggested by such phrases, ‘light leading to day’ and so on.

7–14 The destination to which the souls are led is the saguṇa Brahman or Brahmaloka, and not the nirguṇa Brahman. And yet the souls do not return;
for they too attain final release by being absorbed in nirguna Brahman, along with Brahmadeva or Hiranyagarbha. This is what is known as krama-mukti as opposed to videha-mukti or jivan-mukti. There can be no movement with reference to nirguna Brahman, which is all pervading; for the jiva is essentially Brahman and so cannot be said to move towards itself.

15-16 Those alone who meditate on saguna Brahman and not on symbols go to Brahma-loka.

**ADHYAYA IV**

**PADA IV**

Sūtra

1-3 The soul becomes free from bondage when it manifests in its own form, and abides in it. The condition of the soul, on the other hand, in the three conditions of wakefulness, sleep, and dream is stained by one or other defect.

4-9 When the soul meets the highest light and manifests in its own form, it becomes one with Brahman. Consciousness alone, or chiefly, constitutes then the nature of the released soul. The attributes e.g. sinlessness may be said to belong to Brahman from the phenomenal point of view. The released soul is his own Lord.

10-16 The released person can be with or without a body. The released soul can divide itself into many souls, just as one flame can produce many flames.

17-22 Souls which are said to be released, in the sense of having come to dwell in the Brahma-loka, can assume different forms, but are unable to create different worlds. For this power of creation, subsistence, and dissolution is of the nirguna Brahman only. Along with Hiranyagarbha these relatively released souls become finally merged in the nirguna Brahman, and do not return again.

Om Tat Sat.
Important Extracts from Upaniṣads and other sources as found in Śaṅkara’s Commentary

Numbers in brackets indicate the adhyāya, pāda, and sūtra of the Brahma-Sūtras.

Aitareya Aranyaka

2, 1, 6—अहमुक्तमस्मीति विद्यातु। (3, 4, 22)
2, 2, 4, 6—यथोध्यो तोपसी तोपसी तोपशम (3, 3, 37)
2, 4, 2, 4—अप्रेष्योभूतव गुल्म प्रविष्टाः। वायुः प्राणो भूवा नासिके प्रविष्टाः। (2, 4, 14; 3, 3, 43)

Aitareya Upaniṣad

1, 1, 1-2—ॐ आत्मा वा इत्मेक प्रथम आसीनान्तत्वकिन्तु मिथ्य। स ईश्वर लोकान्ति खुजात इति स ईमाँङ्गकान्तकुक्तत। अभो मरीचीमृञ्जयाः। (3, 3, 16)
1, 2, 2-3—ताम्यो गामानयं तत्सवमानयं ताभ्याः। पुघमान-यत्वा अहुवन। (3, 3, 16)
1, 3, 11-13—स ईश्वर कर्घ न्विवं मद्दे स्यादिति स ईश्वर कर्तर्ण्य परष्च इति। स ईश्वर यदि वच्चाभिनिवार्थं यदि प्राणो भिमाविनान्तिति। यदि चक्षुषा देव्य यदि श्रोणे शृङ्खल यदि त्वा स्पृश्य यदि मनसा ध्याते। यथयाङ्गनामात्मकायत्वं यदि शिष्णु विनियोगमयं कृष्णमिति। स एतमेव सोमां विनियोगद्य द्वाय प्राप्य। ... स एतमेव पुरवं व्रह्मतत्तममप्पूत। (3, 3, 17)
3, 3—एष श्रीकृष्ण देव्य एष प्रज्ञापन्ते सच्छं देव्य इमानं च पंच महामूल्याति। ......... सच्छं तत्त्वान्यायेऽम।। प्राणाः प्रतिष्ठति प्राणान्यायो लोकं प्रहः प्रतिष्ठा प्राणां व्रह। (3, 3, 17)

Bhagavadgītā

2, 24—अच्छेढोयमवद्होयमक्रोयोऽशोष्य पव च।
निवृत्य: सर्वगत: स्थायुः। जोशोऽनन्तः। ||
(2, 3, 29; 3, 2, 37)
2, 25—ज्ञातं कृष्णर्चित्वाहमस्वयमिकायोऽस्यमुस्खते।
तस्मातेवं विदर्जितेऽनं नामस्वरूपितमहि। || (3, 2, 23)
3, 17—यत्नायमर्गिनं स्याद्वामंनतः मानवः।
आंमन्यः च संचुपःसन्मयः कार्त्त्व न वििने। (4, 1, 2)
3, 35—अत्यान्तस्त्रयमां विमुः प्रत्यार्मानश्रुतिनां। (3, 4, 40)
3, 42—हस्तस्यायनं पराग्रहायुपिन्िुष्ट्यः परं मनः।
मनस्तनु परा निधिर्द्योऽनुः परस्तनु स। (2, 3, 15)
4, 37—यथेष्ठोभिः सहिदा दर्शिनमप्पुत्रमुनेर्दृशृः।
शानाशिः मर्यसम्पाणि भस्मसामुकुन्तं तथा। (3, 3, 32)
5, 17—तद्व्यस्तःस्त्रयमानस्तलिप्तं यामण्यः।
गल्फणक्षुण्णाविषाणटी श्रानापूर्वकान्नं। (3, 4, 20)
6, 11—शुचिः देवं प्रतिध्यानं स्थारम्स्तमाणमं। (4, 1, 10)
6, 45—अक्षमस्तंस्तिश्वस्तो यति परं गतिः। (3, 4, 38)
7, 21—यो यो यां यां तन्मुं भत्तः धर्माच्याच्यतुमिन्िः।
तस्य तस्याचलोऽहं नामुं नामेव बिन्धयामि।
स तया ध्रुव्या युद्धस्त्यायायाःपरमा।
रम्भरे च ततः कामायमेव विभिन्नानि नानः। (3, 2, 41)
8, 6—यं यं चाइपि समस्तव्रं त्वज्ञायनं कवःवरम्।
न तमेवति कौलेयं सदा तद्वाच्याविन्य। 3, 3, 56;
4, 1, 12
8, 10—प्रयाणकांतं मनसायश्वेन भस्मया युक्तो योगवेशन चैव। (4, 1, 12)
8, 23—यव कालोऽवज्ञातुस्तिस्तगृहम् चैव योग्येऽ।
प्रयाता याति तं कालं वक्त्यायि भगवानर्तम। (4, 2, 20)
8, 26—इत्युत्कृत्यां गती लहे जगानं शाश्वतं मते।
पक्या यात्मनावृतिस्यायान्यतिः पुनः। (3, 3, 31)
10, 4—दुहिद्वांसंसागायहः श्रमस्यां दृमो दामो।
पुचक्कुं दुशुं भोऽभवो भयं चायमेव च। 3, 3, 31
10, 5—अहिन्ता समता तुष्टिस्तो द्रारं यतोमुत्सयः।
भविन्ती भावा भूतानि संत एव प्रथिधिव:।
13, 12—चेष्ठा यतंप्रवक्त्यामि यज्ञात्वास्तवमुखेष्वः।
अनादिमन्यं च न सत्त्वासुक्तः। (3, 2, 17)
15, 6—न तद्व्यस्तय्यं सूर्यसन्त शादांको न पावकः। (4, 4, 20)
15, 7—ममैलंसो जीवांको जीवभूतं सनातनः। (2, 3, 45)
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad

1, 3, 19—यसमात्समाचारगाम्यम उत्कामिति तद्वेत् तत्चुस्मयेप हि वा अन्यानां रसः। (2, 4, 11)

1, 3, 22—यदेव सम: पज्विना समो मद्रकेन समो नायोन सम प्रमित्विभिस्ते: समोनेन सर्वेण तस्मादेव सामाइवते साम: सायुज्य पठोकां य पवमेतस्माय वेदः। (2, 4, 13; 3, 2, 12)

1, 3, 28—स उद्यातासस्तमने वा यजमानाय वा ये कामं कामयते तमागायति । (3, 4, 44)

1, 4, 1—आत्मेषेन्द्रमय आसीतुपुस्यविवः। (3, 3, 16)

1, 4, 7—स यप हि प्रविदः। आत्मार्णेः। यथा धुरः धुरवाने- स्वहितः स्यादिष्ठ्यमरे वा विष्णुवर्कुलाये तें न पद्यति । (2, 3, 17 and 27)

1, 4, 10—अहं प्रहासिः। (2, 3, 17 and 30, 47; 3, 2, 27; 4, 1, 3; 4, 4, 4)

तद्वेत्यदश्यन्विष्पर्ववेद: प्रतिपेदेशं दत्तमवं स्वर्येष्यति । (3, 3, 32)

अथ श्रीस्वत्त्वां देवतामुपासवेश्योस्तन्त्योस्तसावन्योस्तमस्मिति न स वेदः यथा पश्चयत्स स देवमामः। (3, 1, 7; 4, 1, 3)

1, 5, 2—यदहेक जुहोति तदह: पुन्मृत्युमपजयतीथिष्येवं विद्यान्। (4, 1, 18)

1, 5, 3—श्रीप्रायमनेःकुदाति मनो वाचे प्राण्य। मनसा हेव पवस्यति मनसा बृजाति। काम: संकल्पो विचिन्तित्सा अह्वायश्च धृतिमहाविपिन्यमित्वस्त्तरं मन: एव। प्राणोऽपनो व्याय उद्यान: समानोऽन इत्येतस्तर्व प्राण पवेतस्यो वा ध्यायत्मा वाक्यनो स्वतंत्मो: प्राणाय:। (2, 3, 32 and 40; 2, 4, 12 and 18)

1, 5, 20—पुन्मेववांगुर्पण्यगच्छति न ह चे देवान्येवांगुर्पण्य। 2, 4, 16)

1, 5, 23—तेनो पतस्ये देवतायेव सायुज्य्य समोकां जयति। (4, 4, 21)

2, 1, 20—स यथोर्नामस्मनस्तनुतनोमत्वथाय: शुद्भा विस्फु- लिङ्गाय व्युत्चर्यमेवत्सामादातमन: सवं प्राणा: सवं ठोका: सवं देवाः। सवार्ण भूतानि व्युचरतिः। (2, 3, 17; 2, 4, 1 and 3)
2, 3, 1—द्रव यथाणो स्थे सृष्टं चेतासम्यं वन्यम्य चामृतं च स्थितं च यथा: सर्वस्य त्वम्। (3, 2, 22)

2, 3, 3—वायुधातुरिं वेदसूतम्। (2, 3, 4)

2, 3, 6—अर्थान्तरेऽन्ति नेनि नेनि न लेनामादिति नेतन्य-त्यरास्यथ नामान्यं सत्यम् सत्यमिनि। (3, 2, 17 and 22, 30)

2, 4, 5—न वा अंग पन्य: कामार्थ पनि: पियो भव सत्यममस्तु कामार्थ पनि: पियो भवनि। जायांमतो, पुत्राणं, विषमयं, प्रणं, ज्ञात्यमयं, लोकानं, देवाणं, भुतानं, ज्ञात्यस्यं। आत्मा वा अंग दृष्ट्यं: अर्थायम्यं मन्नयम्यं निरेदिधायसित्वं मेंजयमानों वा अंग दृष्टिन अन्तरण मत्या विज्ञानेतें सर्वं विद्वितम्। (2, 3, 59: 2, 4, 2: 3, 4, 2 and 8)

2, 4, 6—सर्वं ते विद्याह्यो द्वितीयम्: सर्वं एवेदेन्वा औद्देशं क्रृतमिमे लोकं इसे देशा इमानि भृतार्णिं सर्वं दद्यमात्मा। (2, 3, 6: 3, 2, 36: 3, 4, 52)

2, 4, 10—अस्य मन्तो भृतस्य निव:धितिनेदेशः। (3, 4, 8)

2, 4, 14—यथ भि न्ततत्तिव भवनि नदितम सत्यं जिद्विनि, भवनि, परम्रोणिति, अभिप्रदिति, मन्तो, विज्ञानानि। यथ वा अस्य वचनोत्वानुक्रमस्व-सूक्तकेन कु लिंगं, पस्येत्, गृह्यणान्, अभिप्रदेत्, मन्तोत्, विज्ञानियान्। (3, 4, 16: 4, 1, 3: 4, 4, 16)

2, 5, 1—ब्रह्माय्मयं पुरुषभ्यं तजोमयोऽस्मात्म: पुरुषो यथान्तर अस्यायः मध्यामः शास्त्रेन्तज्ञांग्योऽस्मात्म: पुरुषोऽस्तेव स योगमात्मेदहसुतेद्विद्वं बलंदं सर्वेन्। (3, 2, 12)

2, 5, 18—पुरुषं इरिपं: भुतस्यं चतुर्पद:। पुरं सं चक्री भुवने पुरं भुतक्य आविशादिति। (5, 2, 21)

2, 5, 19—तेदेद्वं ब्रह्माय्ममपरमस्त्यस्मात्मायामात्मा यथा सर्वायुः। (2, 3, 17; 3, 2, 14 and 21, 30, 36)

3, 2, 10—यद्रेद् सर्वं भृतसायुः। अदिक्षेत्रु मेषु: सोद्यमात्मपुन्न्तरं वज्ञति। (3, 3, 51)

3, 2, 11—यत्रापि पुरुषं धिर्यत् उद्द्समानं र्षभं: औमन्त्रानथो 3 नेति नेति होवाच यात्वक्योऽस्वं समस्मीयन्ति स उद्द्सम्यात्माय-त्याधमातो मृतं: शेषेते। (4, 2, 13)

3, 4, 1—यथायांत्यतः देवसंस्कारम् त आत्मा सर्वान्ततसं में- भ्रात्वक्षेत्रेष्य य त आत्मा सर्वान्ति: कतमो यात्वक्य सर्वान्तरो यः
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad

3, 4, 2—एतत्र तः आत्मा सर्वान्तरोऽर्थस्तोतरतार्थम्। (3, 3, 36)

3, 5, 1—सर्वान्तरोऽर्थस्तोतरतार्थम्। दोषे योऽर्थस्तोतरतार्थम्।

3, 7, 3—यः पुष्यित्वा विद्युष्यित्वा अन्तरोऽर्थस्तोतरतार्थम्। यः पुष्यित्वा: विद्युष्यित्वा।

3, 8, 8—स होराचेत्तैः तद्धर्षर्ग मानिः ग्राह्यां अभिवद्यान्यस्यवृत्तः
    मन्नज्ञवहसमस्यमीर्महतमस्येदम्। (2, 3, 7; 3, 2, 11; and 14; 3, 4, 52; +, 1, 2; 4, 3, 14)

3, 8, 9—पत्स्य वा अष्टेशस्य प्रश्नाते गारिः ग्राह्यां सृष्टिमन्त्रस्य
    विद्युष्यित्वा तित्तं:। 3, 4, 8)

3, 8, 11—तद्वा पत्स्यर्ग गार्घ्यतेद्व द्वृष्यतुन्तं योऽर्थस्तोतरतार्थम्।
    मन्नज्ञवहसमस्यमीर्महतमस्येदम्। (2, 3, 30; 3, 4, 8; 4, 1, 2)

3, 9, 26—स एव नातिनेत्त्वा मानिः ग्राह्यां न हि श्रीयतेद्वस्यन्तः।
    न हि सत्यतेद्वसतिः नोऽर्थस्तोतरतार्थम्। (3, 2, 23; 3, 4, 52; 4, 3, 14)

3, 9, 28—विद्यामानस्य व्रह। (2, 3, 18; 4, 1, 2)

4, 1, 2—देवो भूखः वेणार्थमेः। (3, 3, 59)

4, 2, 4—अर्थम् वै जनकान्तेद्वसतिः। (4, 3, 14)

4, 3, 7—योऽर्थ विद्यामानस्य: ग्राह्यां द्विभवज्ञान्तेद्वसतिः।
    पुस्तः। स समस्य: सन्तुभूषयम् लोकानुसंचरत्व: ज्ञातेश्वर देवायतीव स हि स्वात: भूष्मेंम लोकमोक्षिताम्। (2, 3, 24 and 30, 40; 3, 3, 17)
4, 3, 8—स यो मनुष्यां जायमानः शारीरिकांसंपंश्यामाः पावमिः संस्कृत्वानं व संकामिन्ध्रयमानः पावमो विज्ञानी। (२, ३, १६)

4, 3, 9—वस्तु स्वाभाविक प्रस्तुतिन्तुया पुगाः स्वरुपश्चोऽविर्भवति। (२, ३, १८)

4, 3, 10—स न तत्र रथ्य न रथ्योगान न पन्यानो भवन्ययं रथ्ययोगान्यः स्तुतान। (३, २, १)

4, 3, 11—स्वायं शारीरिकांसंपंश्यामाः स्तुतानिकाश्चैति। स्वायमादाय पुगां अविर्भवान युम्भेन्द्र: संडर एकः। (२, ३, १८ और २०)

4, 3, 12—प्रज्ञान र्यनेयस्वरूपः कृत्यं वर्णाकृतायादस्तुतिविवा। सु इत्यतेद्योधो यत्र काम्य दिर्मन्य: पुगाः एकः। (१, ३, ३४; २, ४, ११; ३, २, ३)

4, 3, 21—तथा विशयविशया संपरिवधा न वायूं विज्ञान वेद नान्तरस्मैन्यायां पुगाः प्रवाहान्यता संपरिवधाः न वायूं विज्ञान वेद नान्तर तद्वा अस्थित्वादश्चासमस्मास्यमायाण्यमकाम रूपे दौरान्तरम। (२, ३, ४०; ३, २, ७ और ३१)

4, 3, 22—अत्र विशारदिता भवति मानामाण्यता भवति लोका अलकात्वा देवा अदेवा बेद्वा अवेद्यः। तत्र स्तंभांसंपन्नौ भवतिः। अहवान्यं पुगेन्द्रात्मात्मां वायूं नीर्विक्रम तद्यदा स्यावर्धौकालान्यदुव्रुप्य भवति। (३, २, १०; ४, १, २ और ३)

4, 3, 23—यद्य तत्र प्रधान पद्यमेव तत्र प्रधानेन न तद्यदा हदुर्द्वीपाद्विपरिवोधे विंद्यत्विवात्यिवायाः। न तु तद्विद्वित्यमस्तित ततोऽस्त्रीय द्विविन यत्स्थितेऽ। (२, ३, १८; ४, ४, ४)

4, 3, 30—स तद्विद्वित्यमस्तित ततोऽस्त्रीय्यहिन्नेऽत्यहि यद्विद्वित्यमस्तित ततोऽस्त्रीय्यहिन्नेऽत्यहि। (२, ३, १८; ४, ४, १५)

4, 3, 31—वत्र्य वा अन्यविद्व र्यात्मानयोगिते। (३, २, ७)

4, 3, 33—स यो मनुष्याणं शक्ति: समूहो व्यवस्थायोगितिः स्वर्णांक्षे प्राप्ते: संपन्नर्यं। स मनुष्याणां परम आन्त्रेजश्च ये यस्ते मनुष्यां शास्त्रान्त्रेजश्च ये यस्ते मनुष्यानां शास्त्रान्त्रेजश्च ये यस्ते मनुष्यानां शास्त्रान्त्रेजश्च। यस्य परम आन्त्रेजपरम श्लोकमः स्मार्थितो योगेऽछ। (३, १, ७)

4, 4, २—तत्सं दैत्य दैत्यस्थायां प्रयोगः तेन योगेऽत्थैय आत्मा निष्कामति चक्षुयो वा मूल्यो वा वायुविश्वेयो वा शरीरदेशयुक्तमस्ति
प्राणोऽनूकामति प्राणमृत्तिमान्तं सर्वं प्राणा अनूकामति। तं वियाकरणां समन्वयस्य शूर्यशास्त्री च। (2, 3, 20; 2, 4, 6 and 16; 3, 1, 3 and 4; 3, 4, 5 and 11; 4, 1, 12; 4, 2, 4 and 13, 17)

4, 4, 3—तदया तुमालामुक्ता तुम्स्यांते गत्वान्यमानकाम्यांक्यांसमन्वयस्यांविसेवायमार्गमेते शारीरं निहत्यािविदा गमयिष्वान्यमानकामयामाक्यांसमन्वयस्यान्तरि। (3, 1; 1)

4, 4, 4—अयमार्गमेते शारीरं निहत्यािविदा गमयिष्वान्यन्तरं कल्याणार्थूंपुं सँक्तेत। (3, 1, 1)

4, 4, 5—स वा अयमार्ग म्रह्म विशालयो मनोमयां प्राणमयोऽशुक्षमयः शोकमयः पृथिवीभक्ष्य आयोमयं आयुमयं आकाशयस्तेजस्योऽतीजयः कामयमयोऽकामयः सङ्करयस्तत्तदृश्योऽदृश्य इति। यथाकर्म यथाचारी तथा भविष्य। (2, 3, 30; 3, 1, 9; 4, 2, 6)

4, 4, 6—प्रायस्तं कर्मस्य शंकां चेतं करोत्यजयम् तस्माश्चोकाँशुकुररंत्रयमे तोकाय कर्मण इति। त कामयमयोऽयाकामयोऽयोऽकामो निष्काम आयास्तिक आयास्तिको न तस्म भाना उक्तकामति श्रृणव सच्चिद्यामेति। (2, 3, 19; 3, 1, 8; 3, 2, 26; 3, 4, 11; 4, 1, 19; 4, 2, 7 and 12, 13; 4, 3, 14)

4, 4, 7—अयमार्गोऽस्तन्तो भक्त्व्यत्र भ्रक्त्य समस्युते। (4, 2, 13)

4, 4, 8–9—हुः पञ्चा चित्तं पुराणं। तस्मान्योऽक्षुमुश्न नीत्मातृ: निम्न्तरं यहिष्ठेत्ती। चग पञ्चा ब्रह्मणा हानुविष्ठस्तेतेित उष्णाक्षुऽऽएस्वतस्त्रय। (3, 4, 39)

4, 4, 16—तदेवं ज्योतिषं ज्योतिषं हरिदान्तस्यहरिदान्तस्यमृतम। (4, 4, 3)

4, 4, 19—समस्यानुस्त्रृतत्वं नेतु नामस्तिक तिक्ष्ण। गृहोऽहमुप्रेिति य इह नामेव प्रस्थित। (2, 3, 47; 3, 2, 13 and 36)

4, 4, 20—चिरज। पर आकाशानं आत्मा महान्यथ:। (2, 3, 21)

4, 4, 21—सम्भवं धीरो विवाय प्रज्ञा कुर्वित्य प्राहण:। (4, 1, 1)

4, 4, 22—स वा एव महान्यथ आत्मा योऽय विशालयोऽप्राणेय एमृत्य एमृत्य आकाशास्तिकमेव तस्वेय बही। तत्मेते वेदालुक्चनेष्व ग्राहणा विविद्यित्तिति त्ये द्वेष तस्वेय तपस्याः श्वास्थोत्स्रतेन विद्वत्तु सृवियमेव भविष्य:। एतस्य वशे तथुौ बिवान्तं प्रज्ञा न कामयते कि प्रज्ञा करिष्याधी श्रुतं नोद्यामात्यं लोक इति। अत: पापपराश्चर्यित्ति: कल्याणकर्ममिष्युः उ हृदयेत पते।
तरंि नेङ्न इतापिि तपतः । ( 2, 3, 21 and 29, 43; 3, 3, 39; 3, 4, 15 and 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 34; 4, 1, 2 and 14, 16, 18 )

4. 4. 23—तस्मादेवलिन्दया द्वारा उत्तरतत्त्विन्दुः समाहितो भूतास्तमण्येकास्तमां पद्यमः । ( 3, 4, 27; 4, 3, 8 )

4. 4. 24—स वा पप महानज आयमानादेऽ चातुर्यावो विन्दूः वर्षे य एवं चालः । ( 3, 2, 39 )

4. 4. 25—स वा पप महानज आयमानाजरोमीरोजनुतोभयो बहाद्वर्यः ई बहाद्वर्यः हि वे बहर भवितः य एवं चालः । ( 2, 3, 17; 3, 3, 17; 3, 4, 52; 4, 1, 2; 4, 3, 14 )

4. 5. 6—आत्मा वा अर्थ द्वरः त्र्तश्यो मंत्यो निद्रायालित्ययो मंत्रयायामनी खल्ले श्रुति मय विद्याय एकं सर्वं विदितमः । ( 2, 3, 6; 3, 4, 1 and 24; 4, 1, 1 )

4. 5. 13—स यथा निथवनशोनरोनरोव्यः देवश्य राजय नैवें वा अर्धमामास्तमनन्तरोव्यः देवश्य प्रमादय गमनेन्ध्रो भूतासः समुद्रायात्त्विन्दुः य प्रत्य सम्बास्तमायायः प्रदीप्तिः हेवच यागरक्तः । ( 2, 3, 17 and 18; 3, 2, 16; 4, 4, 6 )

4. 5. 14—सा हेवच देवस्तैव या भगवानमोहातामान्यापि वा अहिंमो विज्ञानामीति स हेवच न वा अर्धीं मोहं ब्रह्मस्वायत्वाधी वा अर्धमास्तमामनलितन्त्रायः । ( 2, 3, 17 )

4. 5. 15—Vide 2, 4, 14 above ( 3, 2, 7; 3, 3, 39; 3, 4, 1 and 9, 52; 4, 3, 14 )

5. 5. 1—स यो हृते महायण्य प्रथमाय वेदः सत्यं प्रदेशिः । ( 3, 3, 20 and 38 )

5. 5. 2—तत्कस्त्वयमस्त्रु स आदित्यो य एष पत्सिमन्य्यदेः पुरुषो नथायरं द्वात्तिर्नाशन्तुपुरुषः। ( 3, 3, 20 and 38 )

5. 5. 3 & 4—य एष पत्सिमन्य्यदेः पुरुषस्तस्योपनिदहिजिः। योस्यं द्वात्तिर्नाशन्तुपुरुसस्तस्योपनिदहिजिः। ( 3, 3, 21 )

5. 6. 1—मनोवनोभिः पुरुषो भाः सत्यस्तम्यन्तुद्विधे वा श्रीहिंसौ योस्य वा स एष सर्वस्यायातः सर्वस्याचिमपिः सर्वं सत्यपिः प्रशासिः यदिः किच। ( 3, 3, 19 )

5. 10. 1—यदा वे पुरुसोसामालोकाविन्दुः स वायुमायुच्च तस्सै स तत्त्व विन्दिहः यथा रथचक्षुः खं तेन ऊँचे आक्रमते स
Chandogya Upanishad

1, 1, 1—सत्यमेव सत्यमात्मकस्तो वेदतां भवति। (3, 3, 7 and 9, 55; 3, 4, 22; 4, 1, 6)

1, 1, 3—सत्यमेव सत्यमात्मकस्तो वेदतां भवति। (3, 3, 42)

1, 1, 7—सत्यमेव सत्यमात्मकस्तो वेदतां भवति। (3, 3, 9 and 42)

1, 1, 10—सत्यमेव सत्यमात्मकस्तो वेदतां भवति। (3, 3, 42; 3, 4, 4; 4, 1, 6 and 18)

1, 5, 12—सत्यमेव सत्यमात्मकस्तो वेदतां भवति। (3, 3, 38)

6, 1, 1—यद श्रेष्ठ च श्रेष्ठ च वेद त्वेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ स्वानां भवति। (3, 3, 1)

6, 1, 13—यद श्रेष्ठ च श्रेष्ठ च वेद त्वेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ स्वानां भवति। (2, 4, 8)

6, 1, 14—यद श्रेष्ठ च श्रेष्ठ च वेद त्वेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ स्वानां भवति। (3, 3, 10 and 18; 3, 4, 28)

6, 2, 14—यद श्रेष्ठ च श्रेष्ठ च वेद त्वेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ स्वानां भवति। (3, 3, 2)

6, 2, 15—यद श्रेष्ठ च श्रेष्ठ च वेद त्वेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ स्वानां भवति। (3, 3, 31; 4, 3, 1 and 2; 6, 8, 9; 4, 4, 22)

Chandogyopaniṣad

1, 1, 1—यद श्रेष्ठ च श्रेष्ठ च वेद त्वेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ स्वानां भवति। (3, 3, 7 and 9, 55; 3, 4, 22; 4, 1, 6)

1, 1, 3—यद श्रेष्ठ च श्रेष्ठ च वेद त्वेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ स्वानां भवति। (3, 3, 42)

1, 1, 7—यद श्रेष्ठ च श्रेष्ठ च वेद त्वेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ स्वानां भवति। (3, 3, 9 and 42)

1, 1, 10—यद श्रेष्ठ च श्रेष्ठ च वेद त्वेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ स्वानां भवति। (3, 3, 42; 3, 4, 4; 4, 1, 6 and 18)

6, 1, 1—यद श्रेष्ठ च श्रेष्ठ च वेद त्वेष्ठ श्रेष्ठ स्वानां भवति। (3, 3, 38)
1, 7, 5—अथ य परोक्षरितशिला पुनः टट्टने सेवकेतसाम तदुस्कर्थ तथजुतस्तूपनां। तत्स्थित्य तदुस्कर्थ रूप्य यद्यपुर्व रूप्य यावमुख्य गेण्यो तौ गेण्यो यज्ञाम तन्नाम। (३, ३, 2२)

1, 9, 1-२—पारा शिल्य वा रूपाति भूतानि आनाकाशांव समुथ-चन्त आकाशां मर्यादाणिया चिंतुभिः व्यायामारासः परायणम्। स यथा परंपरायात्रिवात्र यथा पारात्तं। (३, ३, ७)

1, 10, 9-११—या देवता प्रसन्नावं उद्भोवं वित्तापमां संवेदनियां वस्त्रयो हर्षीय्रियां। उदगायकमिय, वित्तापियशिविमुखः वे विवधपन्ती। (३, ३, ४२)

2, 8, १ वाच तत्त्विषे स्वामीपांती। (४, १, ६)

3, 6, १—न वे देवा अश्रुनि न प्रियति पंतदेवायुं देवा तुष्णति। (३, १, ७)

3, १२, ६—नावास्त्य महिमा ततो ज्यायंहृ पूणः। पारोक्ष्य सर्वं भूतानि विपादयामुने दिव्य। (२, ३, ४१; ४, ४, १९)

3, १२, ७-९—योक्ष्य बृह्यः गुमायाकाशः यथा योक्ष्यमानः पुर्व अकाशः स योक्ष्यमानहठ्ठाय आकाशः। (३, २, ३५)

3, १४, १—सर्वं खतिवर्यं वर्ष तज्ज्वालनिन्ति शान्त उपासित। २, ३, ६ एव और; ३, २, २१; ३, ३, ५९)

3, १४, ३-४—यथा अत्मानन्द्रोहिौर्ध्वीयादिवीन्द्रीयायेवं यवाहा सर्वः पादा ज्यायातन्त्रुवादाह ज्यायाणाथित्या ज्यायान्तन्त्रिरित्वात् ज्यायान्त्रियो ज्यायान्त्रियो लोकेभ्यः। सर्वकम्य सर्वकामः सर्वंङ्गः सर्वंङ्गः सर्वंनिद्द्रोस्तवा यथायतात्तरः स्वामान्तन्त्रियारः यथा म आत्मानं पद्यं वृह्यांतिनं प्रत्यामु-संभवितास्रोवति यथ्य स्वात्त्व नावास्त्य संप्रियितास्रोवति समाह शासिण्यः। (२, ३, ७ एव और २९; ३, २, ११ एव और २१, ३७; ३, ३, २३ एव और ३२, ५८, ५९; ४, ३, १४)

3, १७, ६—सं धर्म आंगिस्ततोपस्तवेतयामेतत्त्वचं प्रतिपेदेत-शिरितमिति, अच्युतस्तमिति प्राणसंहितमिति। (४, १, १२)

3, १८, १-४—मनोमहेश्वरेर्द्वित्वत्वमं ज्यायामथायथितेवत्तमाकाशो ब्रह्मित। तदेवतबुधातात्विकम्याविख्याति। वाक्याद्वारः प्राणः पादएक्षुः पादः श्रोतं पाद इव ज्यायामसः। ज्यायादेवस्तमिति पादत्रोबाजः पाद आदित्यः पादो दिशः पादः इति। (३, २, १२)

3, १८, ३—वातुष्य ब्रह्मणः चतुर्थः पादः। सोधिना ज्योतिष्यः भावि च तपति च कौत्या यदासा प्रहावर्षेऽसै। (४, १, १-४)
3, 19, 4—अदिरिः ब्रह्म से उपार्जित। (4, 1, 5)

4, 14, 3—यथा पुनःचरणाश्च आयो न सिद्धेन्तं प्रवेशविदिः पाणे कर्म न श्रव्यत इति। (4, 1, 13)

4, 15, 5—अथ यदु चैवासित्वद्यक दिन्ति यद्र न आचिष्योऽसाधसिद्धि आचिष्योऽऽडहर्ष आयुभावप्रभावप्रार्थ्यद्यक दिन्ति मायोस्वत्तमसिद्धि संबंध्यं संबंध्यं संबंध्यं संबंध्यं आदित्यावचेत्यद्यक चेत्यद्यक बिजृतं तत्रुक्योऽऽड। च एव गम्यावेष्ठै देववयो ब्रह्मचार्य न्येष रूपवर्णमार्गे यथार्थ आयो नावर्तने। (4, 2, 20-21; 4, 3, 2 and 8, 9, 12; 4, 4, 22)

4, 17, 10—एवविद्ध वै ब्रह्म यथं यज्ञमाण्यं तिथिः तिथिः तिथिः तिथिः तिथिः रूपवर्णमार्गे आयो नावर्तने। (3, 3, 66; 4, 1, 18)

5, 1, 6—अथ है प्राणो अहङ्कारविद्यूः दैवश् एव्यायामस्यहम एव्यायामस्यहम। (2, 4, 11)

5, 2, 8—यद्र तम्मु नास्येव स्वियं स्वियं स्वियं स्वियं स्वियं स्वियं तत्र जानीवाचेत्यस्माद्यकन्ते (3, 2, 4)

5, 3, 3—केषु यथां पञ्चस्यामाहुतवां: पुष्करवचसोऽभवन्ति। (3, 1, 1; 3, 1, 17)

5, 9, 1—इति तु पञ्चस्यामाहुतवाः पुष्करवचसोऽभवन्ति स उत्त्वार्थतं गर्मो दशा वा नव वा मायोस्वत्तम शायत्व याबद्धाः जावते। (3, 1, 1)

5, 10, 1—न चैवेते रहस्येश्च ब्रह्म ता तप इत्युपास्तै तेषां विषयमित्वसंभवः नास्येव श्वसनं हृददृश्याः। (3, 3, 31)

5, 10, 3—अथ व इस्मे प्राण इस्मे केषु तद्यथो इस्मे प्राण इस्मे केषु तद्यथो इस्मे प्राण इस्मे केषु तद्यथो इस्मे प्राण। (3, 1, 6 & 17)

5, 10, 4—सोमो राजा तह्युवनामं व देवा भव्यति। (3.1.6)

5, 10, 5—तस्मात्सम्बावस्तुपविदिः अर्थामचेत्याः न विनिविंतः लोको भव्यतिः अर्थात् हृददृश्याः अर्थात् हृददृश्याः अर्थात् हृददृश्याः अर्थात् हृददृश्याः अर्थात् हृददृश्याः। (3.1.6)

V. E. 28
5, 10, 8—अःतिनेत्र: प्रथमेन कर्तव्यम् च न नानामात्म शुध्राण्यसहवृताः भूनानि भवन्ति जायस्त्व ध्रुवतेषोऽस्मिनावर्गां तेनासौ लोको न संपूर्णे तस्मादञुषुपसैत। (3, 1, 1 & 17; 4, 3, 1)

5, 18, 1-2—गुस्तेष्वेनां वास्तेद्यत्रामात्रविविधानामां वास्वानसुपासैत संबर्च्यु लोकेषु संबर्च्यु भूलेषु संबोधाःस्वस्तवत्तमति। (3, 3, 1 & 4, 57)

तथा हि वा पत्स्याचनो धेवानरस्य मूर्तैः मुनेनात्मकुविभवस्यः प्राणः पृथ्वलकान्तामां संपेतुहो बहुतो वस्तिनां रूपः प्रतिवेष्य पारी। (3, 3, 57)

5, 19, 1—तथद्वृत्त प्रथममाहारकणजलावलियः स यां प्रथमाहारूपी जुगुख्यात् जुगुख्यावधानाय स्वाहोऽति। (3, 3, 40)

5, 24, 3—यथेष्वीकान्तायरमाको प्रोत्तः प्रतियेते सहस्य सर्वं पापानां प्रत्यक्षेत। (4, 1, 13)

5, 24, 5—यथेष्व शुद्धिता बाला मातरं परुषपासत पं वर्षाणि भूतान्यप्रिष्ठोमुपासैत। (3, 3, 40)

6, 1, 2-6—धैर्यकोपे यत्रु सौम्येन महाप्रणा अनुजातिः मा सन्तयोःस्तुत तमादेशास्त्रपायः॥ २॥ वेनास्यतं शुद्धे भव्यम्रतं मतम् विस्तारं विख्यातिः। ॥ ३॥ यथा सौम्यकृत पुराणं पुराणं सर्वं मुनायम् विस्तारं स्वाभवात्सर्वस्याः विकारो नामदेयं भृविकितं वेष स्तरम्॥ ४॥ यथा सौम्यकृत लोकमणि सर्वं लोकमणं विस्तारं स्तरम् ॥ ५॥ यथा लोकमणेन नवनिकत्तनेन सर्वं कारणाःपरं विस्तारं स्तरम् ॥ ६॥ (2, 3, 5 & 6; 2, 4, 4; 3, 3, 17)

6, 2, 1—संदेश सौम्येदम आस्तिकमेवाध्यात्मितयमू। (2, 3, 1 & 5; 6; 3, 2, 21 & 32; 3, 3, 12 & 17)

6, 2, 2—कथमसत: सजायेऽति। (2, 3, 9 and 10)

6, 2, 3—तदेषज्ञ पद्ध स्यां प्रजायेँति तत्तेज्ञस्त्रजत। ततेज एक्ष्यत बहु स्यां प्रजायेऽति तद्पोऽस्त्रजत। (2, 3, 6 and 10, 12; 2, 4, 1; 3, 3, 17; 3, 4, 8)

6, 2, 4—ता आप एक्ष्यत बहः स्यां प्रजायेऽति ता अहःस्त्रजत। (2, 3, 12 and 13; 4, 2, 3)
6, 3, 1—तेषां कङ्क्वेन्द्र भूतानां त्रीणेष्व बीजानि भवन्याण्डजं जीवजमुद्ध्रिज्ञाति। (3, 1, 20)

6, 3, 2—अनेन जीवनात्मकाः जुप्रकीण्य। (2, 3, 17; 2, 4, 20; 3, 2, 6 and 21)

6, 3, 3—तासा निवृत्वं निवृत्तमं कर्माणि तेषां देवते-मातिल्लो देवता अनेचे जीवनात्मकाः जुप्रकीण्य नामुपे व्याकरोऽ। (2, 4, 20)

6, 4, 1—वद्द्रे रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तर्पूणं जण्डुकुऽ तदपि वर्त्तीणं तद्भ्रस्य। (2, 3, 12)

6, 5, 1—अत्रमिदं वेदा विपीयते तस्य यः स्थविरो धातुस्त- तुरिरं भवति यो मध्यमस्तत्त्वं योजनिब्धतस्तनं। (2, 4, 21)

6, 5, 4—अत्रमं हि सोम्भ मन आपोमयं प्राणस्तेजोमयी वाक्। (2, 3, 15; 2, 4, 4; 4, 2, 3)

6, 8, 1—सता सोम्भ तदा संपश्रो भवति स्वमणि मूतो भवति। (3, 2, 7 and 10, 31, 35)

6, 8, 3—सतान्तकुंकुममुलति सोम्भ विजानिधि नेदमस्मूृतं भविष्यति। (4, 3, 14)

6, 8, 6—अस्य सोम्भ पुरस्य प्रयतो वाङ्कमनसति संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजोमयी तेजः परस्या देवतायाम॥ (4, 2, 1 and 2)

6, 8, 7—पत्तास्त्थैः सर्व सत्त्वत्यं स आमो तत्स्यमिति अष्टेत- केतो। (2, 3, 6 and 17, 30, 47; 2, 4, 4; 3, 2, 21 and 27; 3, 3, 17 and 36; 3, 4, 8; 4, 1, 2 and 3; 4, 4, 4)

6, 9, 2—सति संपथ न चिह्नं च तति संपथाञ्च ऐति॥ २॥ (3, 2, 7 and 9)

6, 11, 3—जीवापि वाच फङ्केद्रे फङ्केद्रे न जीवो फङ्केद्रे। (2, 3, 16 and 17)

6, 14, 2—आचार्याणांपूर्वेऽ क्वै तस्य तावदेव विषय वायश्व विमो- श्येश्वर संपत्य ऐति। (3, 3, 32; 3, 4, 1; 4, 1, 15 and 19)

7, 1, 5—स यो नाम श्रेष्ठायुपासे यावशास्त्रो गतं तत्वस्य तथा कामचारो भवति। (4, 1, 4; 4, 3, 16)

7, 2, 2—स यो वाच श्रेष्ठायुपासे यथाकामचारो भवति। (4, 1, 5)
7. 4, 3—स योऽं कल्यां गणेऽप्रज्ञापि, परंतु स लोकान्नवाम्
भुवः प्रतिद्वितान् प्रतिजितोऽथभ्यमानान्यभ्यमानोऽसिद्धविन्यति। (4, 1, 5)
7. 6, 1—ध्यायनीय शुद्धिः। (4, 1, 9)
7. 11, 1—तत्समाः स्वयं गौतम्यं स्तनयति वांशिक्षणः (4, 3, 3)
7. 15, 1—प्राणों ह विना प्राणों मात्रा प्राणों भावः। (3, 3, 58)
7. 24, 1—यथा नायनगण्यं नायनेण नायिकोऽजानाति स
भूमाभ यथायतद्विध्यवाणयन-अव्यवाणयन-वाणीज्ञाति तद्दल्यो य द्रमा तदनुष्ठलयः तदन्त्यम्। (3, 4, 52; 4, 3, 13; 4, 4, 4)
7. 25, 2—स पश्चाध्ययनाम् उपरिगुप्तम् पश्चाट पुर्बस्तास् दृष्टिम्
योऽं स उपसं कर्म शर्मन्यायकोऽहकारदेशः एवाहमेववायस्ताना-
हस्मुरितवादः पश्चाटः पुर्बस्तास् दृष्टियातोऽहस्मुत्तरतोऽहभश्चिंतास्य। (3, 2, 36)
आपूर्द् शर्मन्यायको पश्चाटः अन्मरतिशल्यान्वीय अस्त्राणां श्वासः
भवति। (3, 2, 36; 4, 3, 14; 4, 4, 4)
7. 26, 2—आदशुद्धी सत्वायिशस्: सत्वायिशन्द्रा ध्रुवा सत्वाः
सत्वः कस्मे सर्वसम्यीला विक्रमेऽः। (3, 3, 32; 3, 4, 29; 4, 4, 15)
8. 1, 1—अथ यहंसमिष्ठर्कालपुरं द्विभु चुंडारकं वेदम् द्वीरो-
उस्मिष्ठाशास्त्रसमिष्ठर्कालस्तुताश्चवेदम् तदात्वतिशास्त्रमिष्ठविन्यत्विन्यतिः।
(3, 3, 23; 4, 2, 18; 4, 3, 14)
8. 1, 3—याबाद्या अयामाहाशास्त्रात्ताँत्तेनोऽन्ततःग्रंथोऽकाय उमे
अस्मिथाशास्त्रवृद्धिवी अन्तर्वेश समाहितेः। (3, 3, 23)
8. 1, 5—प्रथ अत्यात्मप्रकारप्रमाणं विज्ञे विगुणायिशशीको विज्ञ-
धातस्य स्पितः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः। (3, 3, 39)
8. 1, 6—अथ यहंसमिष्ठर्कालपुरं द्विभु चुंडारकं वेदम् द्वीरो-
उस्मिष्ठाशास्त्रसमिष्ठर्कालस्तुताश्चवेदम् तदात्वतिशास्त्रमिष्ठविन्यतिः।
(3, 3, 39; 4, 4, 9 and 17)
8. 2, 1—स यदि पितुतोककायं भवति संककपादेश्वर्यं पितः
समुन्तितविन्यति। (4, 3, 14; 4, 4, 8)
8. 3, 2—योऽं सत्यकामः सत्यवेदम् अद्यार्थहृद्देशस्तवेदम् अद्यार्थः
विन्यति। (3, 2, 9)
8. 3, 3—स तथा अत्यात्म महः (2, 3, 24)
8. 4, 1—सैन्य सेवमहोपर्य तत्तो न जरा न मृत्युष्न शोको न
मुहँतं सत्तो अन्तः पापान्यायो निवर्त्ते पितार्य पापान्यायोऽहं भक्तिरः।
(3, 2, 7 and 10, 31; 4, 1, 14)
8, 5, 1—अथ यथा इत्यागाभिभक्ते गर्भाचर्यस्मेव ततः। (3, 4, 26)

8, 5, 3—पप्प्यात्मा न नियतिः यं गर्भाचर्याणानुविन्दते। (3, 4, 35)

8, 5, 3—तद्धपराजिता पूर्वेष्ण; प्रभुविनितं हिरण्यम्। (4, 3, 14)

8, 6, 1—अथ त्यथा इद्यास्य नाद्वस्ताः: पिण्डगच्चाणिष्ठित्रः

8, 6, 2—आिन्द्रगार्दृश्यात्म्यात्मानं त्यां: (आित्यास्य रक्षमय:)

8, 6, 3—तद्चैत्यत्यस्त: समस्तं: संप्रसंस्क: स्वाम्न न विज्ञानात्याचु तदा नाद्वस्ता। (3, 2, 7)

8, 6, 5—अथ यथे गर्भाचर्यायात्मानं स्वप्निदर्श्यस्य मान्यमते। (4, 2, 18 and 19, 4, 3, 1)

8, 6, 6—शतं चैतका च इद्यास्य नाद्वस्तास्य मूर्यान्समयितः

8, 7, 1—य आत्माप्रहपदपापमाविज्ञर विद्युत्तिदशको विज्ञान

8, 8, 1—सर्वक्षे ब्रह्मा भगव आमान पन्ध्राच आ ठोमभ्य आ न्येश्यम्य: प्रतिरूपमितिः। (2, 3, 27)

8, 12, 3—पवमेव शंक्त्यानं गर्भाचर्यारूपमुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुष्णं स्वेत रूपेतार्थिष्ठिन्यते स उत्तमं: पुरुषः। (3, 4, 8; 4, 4, 1-5)

8, 12, 4—अथ यथे तद्वादास्य ज्ञानयिनिणत: च चाश्वय: पुनस्य: दार्शनाय चक्ष्यरूपः यो वेदेष्व विज्ञानीति स आत्मा गन्ध्राच ग्राहम्। (2, 3, 18; 2, 4, 15)

8, 12, 5—स आत्मा मनस्तीतान्त्यामाप्न्दन्तरमयः। (4, 4, 10)

8, 15, 1—आचार्यकुलान्त्याज्ञीय यथाविधायः गुरोऽ: कर्मातिदेवेष्यरमास्मान्त्य कुलमे: गुरूची दैवेऽ स्वाध्यायमच्चानो ... वर्धालोकमभी

8, 15, 2—संपत्ते। (3, 4, 6 and 12, 47; 4, 4, 22)
Isāvāsyopanishad

2—कुर्वेंशेषस्तोत्रे वर्णस्य विचित्रिकर्मेन्द्रत्नं समाँ॥ । एवं न्यै नाय- । वेदोऽध्वजे न कर्म लिङ्गं नं ॥ (३, ४, ७)

7—तत्र को मेहः कः शोक एक्यम्यमुन्दरमयणः ॥ (४, ३, १४)

Jābalopanishad

4, 1—ब्रह्मचर्य समाय गृही भवेत्। गृही भृत्य वर्ती भवेन्। वर्ती । भृत्य प्रवेशत्। यदि केताधियुक्त महायोगिणिव महक्रेदाग्निषाधियुक्तमणाधि यानाधि । अथ । पुनःसमाये तथा स्वात्मात्मवो वा स्वात्मवो वान्वशास्त्रसिंहा वा । (३, ४, १७; ३, ४, २०)

5—अथ परिवारविवर्णवासामुण्डोपपरिप्रवहः। जुग्निश्वाही। बैशाष्यानो । वर्धमूयाय भवेत्। (३, ४, २०)

Kathopanishad

1, 2, 6—न संप्रायः। निन्धाविन वांन प्रमायनं विचित्मोहने मूल्यं । अथ लोकां नास्ति पर इति मानी पुनः पुनर्विसायाधिते मे। (३, १, १३)

1, 2, 7—अवकाशायिणि बहुविधिः न तथः। नृणालोकिः। बहवो ये न विद्यः। भावनां यथा कुशलोकण्य लघुत्तस्मार्थं हाना कुशलापु- । शिष्यः। (३, ४, ५१)

1, 2, 1४ अन्यत्र भाषाड्यामात्रामृद्वाभास्त्रानन्तरात्। अन्यत्र भूताभ्यः भावं यत्वद्विविशिष्टः। (३, २; ३, ३, ३४; ४, ३, १३)

1, 2, 1५—सार्वे बेदेः वापरमाणवित्तितत्वानि सवार्थविषय:ः वयहदिन्तः। परिचित्तं यथायणयां चरितं ततं पदं संप्रेक्षण अवेनमः। (३, ३, ४; ३, ४, २६)

1, २, २८—न जायते निरते ते विचित्तविभाषयूक्तविषयः। केवलो निश्च: शास्त्रविभयां पुराणों न हृते हन्तममेने शारीरः। (२, २, १७)

1, ३, १—क्षत्रो प्रविष्टे बुद्धिः। बुद्धिः विषयं प्रविष्टे। (च्यों)। ज्ञातं प्रविष्टं तथा प्रविष्टोऽपै र्यो न च विन्यालीकेता:। (३, ३, ३४)

1, ३, २—यः सेवृज्ञजानानमकस्तः। श्रास्त्रविषयः। (३, ३, ३४)

1, ३, ३—आत्मां तथां श्रास्त्रविष्टे शारीरं रथसेवकुवः। (च्यों)। तु न कार्यतं विभिन्नातं मन:। प्रथान्वयं । (२, ३, १५)
1, 3, 4—इन्द्रियाणि हयानांतिश्वयांस्तेषु गोचरान्। आत्मेन्द्रियणानि नामोऽयुक्तं भोकेत्याऔहुम्नीपिनः॥ (2, 3, 15, and 40)
1, 3, 9—सोःशस्त्र: पारमाःमोरिताः तत्रःस्त:। परम: पदपः। (3, 3; 15)
1, 3, 10-11—इन्द्रियेष्यः परा शरीरं वर्मम्यक्ष करं। मनस्स्थतं परा कुदंरूपयनः महानः। महतं एवमचन्मयकामयुक्तं। परं। पुरुषात्म परं किंचितसा कायः सा परं गतः॥ (3, 3, 14)
1, 3, 12—परं स्तवः प्रसंगस्तवामः न प्रकाशते। दश्यते \त्वःध्ययं बुद्ध्यः सुसम्यं सुसृत्वविशिष्टः॥ (3, 3, 15)
1, 3, 13—प्रकटाऴअःमनस्ति प्रादस्तःचर्चेत्यां आत्मिः। (3, 3, 15)
1, 3, 15—अनुस्थथूपः महोऽमालयेव तथाजारसं नित्यमन्वत्वच्यतु। अनायःत्तु महतं। परंवर्मम्यक्ष नवम्यात्ममुच्यते॥ (3, 3, 14; 3, 3, 14)
2, 1, 1—परांचि कालव नवम्यक्ष्ययम्यालावणार्द्धप्रवत्ति नान्य-पालम्। कालिकर्त: प्रत्यगात्मणमेक्षदावात्चार्चसुसृत्वविशिष्ट॥ (3, 2, 24)
2, 1, 10—मुखः। स मूर्त्यमामोरिः य इह नानेये पदति। (4, 3, 14)
2, 1, 11—महेष्वेत्वात्मवं नेह नानास्वस्ति किंचि। मूर्त्यः। स मूर्त्यं गरुऽवत्ति य इह नानेये पदति। (3, 2, 13)
2, 1, 15—प्रकृतिः शुष्के मूर्त्यममालयेकं तार्कःवेव भवति। परं मूनेव-विन्यासात्मा भवति गौतम। (4, 4, 4)
2, 2, 8—य परं स्फुते साधति कामं कामं पुरुषो निर्मिताणाः। (3, 2, 2 and 4)
2, 2, 11—एकस्वथं सर्वभूतात्मरात्मा न लियते लोकनेवन बाधः। (2, 3, 47)
2, 3, 2—महेष्वेत् च वहाँमुच्यतं य प्रत्यहुरमुच्यस्ते भवति। (3, 3, 4; 3, 4, 8)
2, 3, 13—स्तोतिच्योपरसः। (3, 2, 22)
2, 3, 16—शैवाः च र्द्धर्ष्यः नार्गस्ततां मूर्त्यममालये। (4, 3, 9)
Kausitaki Upaniṣad

1, 2—ये ये के चार्मकोटिकामयति चन्द्रमसमेव ते सर्वं गच्छति। (2, 3, 19)

1, 3—स परं देवयानं पन्थामायस्तादिलोकमागच्छति स वायु
लोकं स आत्मस्थलं स वृजालोकं स इन्द्रलोकं स प्रजापतिलोकं स
ब्रह्मलोकम्। (3, 3, 27; 4, 3, 1 and 2)

1, 4—तत्तुन्ततुनुतुनेत्र विधुरुतेत सस्पे पिया शाययः सुखतुल्य
नत्यं घरन्म्। (3, 3, 26 and 27; 4, 1, 17)

1, 7—तमावहों वे खलु मे धसावमे ते लोक द्रि स या व्रजो
जिनिया व्यदिस्यो जिति जयति ता व्यद्रि वय्रुते य पत्रे वेदे। (4, 3, 1;
4, 4, 21)

2, 9-14—भ्रातो निःशेषसादनं। सर्वच द ये देवता अङ्केल्यसे
विविधमाना। (3, 3, 10)

3, 2—स होवाच प्राणोदस्मिस प्राहात्मा ने मामायुस्तमित्युपास्य।
3, 4, 24)

3, 4—स यदास्माच्छलायातुलकामति सहेर्वैं: सर्वसमकामति।
(2, 3, 19)

3, 6—पश्या शरीरं समस्तक्षेत्रियं शरीरं सुखदुःख्यें आमति। (2, 3,
28 and 29)

3, 8—पर हेंनेन साधु करक्षायं ते यमभो लोकेव्य उश्चिनी
पते। पर प्रवेनसाधु कर्म कार्यस्ति ते यमभो नित्यीपते। पर लोकपाल पर
लोकाधिपतिपर सवेदः। सम आमति विश्वास। (2, 3, 41, 3, 2, 41)

4, 18, 19—तत्सु तत्र भवति यदा सुंद्हर: स्वयं न कं च तत्त्व व
तासिस्म्याण पयोकाय भवति। (3, 2, 7)

ततथा शुरुः शुरुस्वरे:विहित: स्वाधिष्ठानस्थोऽ विश्वभरकाले
प्रवेशवेश प्रश्न आत्मेऽऽ शरीरमयमात्रामयमविष्णु आ लोभ्यम आ नरभ्रमः।
(2, 3, 27)

Kenopanisad

1, 3—अन्तदेव तद्बिद्विद्वायो अविद्वायधि। (3, 2, 17)

Manu Smṛti

1, 21—अण्यो मात्राविनि शिष्यो दशार्यानाणु या: स्वुतताः।
ताभि: सार्थेःसंयं सर्वं संक्षेपतुस्वर्णेऽः॥ (4, 2, 6)

2, 87—जयमेव तु जसीच्येवत्रहाणो नात्र संशयः।
कुर्याद्यदत्वा वा कुर्यास्मितं त्राण उच्यते॥ (3, 4, 38)
Mundakopanishad

1, 1, 3—कामिन्तु भगवो विखाते सर्वमिन्द्र विखातं भवति।

(2, 3, 6; 2, 4, 2)

1, 1, 5—तथ परा यथा तद्वकसरधिगम्यते। (3, 3, 33)

1, 1, 6—ययतद्येवमग्रहायमगोग्रचन्मक्षु: श्रोते तद्वविषणिधं।

नित्यं विन्दुं सर्वं ज्ञातं सर्वं ज्ञातं यद्वकसरधिगम्यते। (3, 2, 23; 3, 3, 33)

1, 2, 11—तथ: श्रद्धे ये हृदयसन्दर्भं श्याता विद्वानो भैश्ययथे चर्यायं चर्यायं।

सुर्यंहरेण ते विरजता: प्रवाह्यति यत्रातु: स पुरुषो हाल्ययताम। (3, 4, 17–18; 4, 3, 1)

2, 1, 2—तदष्टतस्तवं वथा युतीवापकाहिसुल्लेह: सहस्रशा: प्रभवते सहस्त्रः।

तथानुष्ठापितवा: सोम्य भावा: प्रज्ञान्ते तत्र चैवापि यथेऽरन्ति। (2, 3, 17)

2, 1, 4—दिव्यो हान्तेऽ पुष्कं सबाहास्यन्तुरेऽ वजः।

अप्राणो हामाना: शुभो सक्षरायतः परः। (2, 4, 2 and 8; 3, 2, 14; 4, 1, 2; 4, 3, 14)

2, 1, 3—परस्मार्जन्यं ज्ञातं मतं: सबैवत्र्याणिः तथ।

अव वायुज्वेतिरप: पृथिवी विश्वस्य धारिणी। (2, 3, 1 and 10, 15; 2, 4, 1–3 and 8–9 and 17)

2, 1, 8—सत श्राणा: प्रभवं तस्मातसतांतिः: समिध: सत होमा:।

सत इमे ठोका येषु चर्यन्ति श्राणा युद्धाशया निहिता:।

सत सत। (2, 4, 1 and 5)

2, 1, 10—पुष्कं वेदं विश्वं कर्म तपो ब्रह्म परासुम्भा:।

पताभ वेदं निहितं युद्धायों सोविविया वांधिः विकिर्तीद्व लोम्य। (2, 4, 2)

2, 2, 6—अकधिबेदं विधायघ आत्मानं। (2, 3, 39)

2, 2, 8—मिथितं तद्येवतिषकुद्धरन्ते सर्वं संदर्भा:।

श्रीयते वास्य कर्माणि तस्मातस्ते परावरे। (3, 3, 32; 4, 1, 13)

2, 2, 10—न तत्तु युवों भावि न चन्द्रार्कं नेमा विकृतो भावि।

कुलोऽध्मसि:।
तमेव भालमनुभावि सवं तद्य भासासर्वायिन्द्र विभावित।

(4, 4, 20)

2, 2, 11—प्रवृत्तेदमू मुद्रं पश्चत्वकालं पश्चात्लब्धं दिशं तद्धृष्टं रहस्व।
अयत्ताय अस्वं पृथ्वीमं विशिष्टमं विशिष्ठम्।

(2, 3, 6; 2, 4, 2; 3, 4, 52; 4, 3, 14)

3, 1, 1—हा स्युप्नं संयुक्तं सङ्कायं समानं बुद्धे परिक्षणं जाने।
तयोराकृ निपति स्वात्मन्त्रीति सम्बन्धां अभि-

(2, 3, 47; 3, 3, 34)

3, 1, 2—समानं बुद्धे पुरुषं निमयानं सीखिन। शोचकं मृथ्युमान।
ज्ञातं यत्र पद्यत्वन्यययोगास्मिन महामायमिति क्षीत-

(3, 3, 34)

3, 1, 3—यद्र पद्यं पद्ये नक्षत्रं कर्त्तिर्मीटि पुरुषं अन्योन्युम।
तदा विष्णुपुण्यंपवे विष्णु नरं जनं दयमायसमि।

(3, 3, 26 and 29)

3, 1, 8—न च युक्ते ग्रहाद्व नापि वाचा नार्त्ते वेधत्वम्या कर्मकां वा।
शान्तसवें विजुद्वस्तस्ततकतं न पद्यते निकलं

(3, 2, 23-24 and 27)

3, 1, 9—प्रेमशुरसमा वेदसं वेदित्यो विशिष्मयाणं पंचाय

(2, 3, 22 and 29, 32)

3, 2, 6—वेदान्तविष्णुस्वविष्णवन्धः। संवादसम्यगः तत्त्वः।
ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाहे परामुर्ता। परिमुच्यन्ति सम्र।

(3, 4, 20)

3, 2, 7—सगन्त। कलः। पंचदशः प्रतिष्ठा। देवाश्च सवं प्रति देवनास।
कर्मकां विष्णुमयमध्य आत्मा परेस्वमेय सवं पशी-

(4, 2, 15)

3, 2, 8—यथा तथं स्यद्नाशायं। समुद्रसस्तं मध्यमिन्ति नामकं

(3, 2, 27: 4, 4, 4)

3, 2, 9—स यो ह वै तत्परं व्रज वेद। अर्थे भवति नास्यावस्थानं
विचक्ते भवति। तर्ति शोकं तर्ति पापाणं गुहा

(3, 2, 26, 3, 4, 1)

3, 2, 10—तेसामेतवै व्रजविवादं वनेत शिरोयंत। विचिवंसु

(3, 3, 3)
Praśnopaniṣad

2, 3—तात्त्विकः प्राण उवच। मा मोहमापयथाहुमेतंतपच्य-स्तम्भां प्रक्षत्वाद्वायाणमवस्यथ्य विधायामीति। (2, 4, 11)
3, 6—हृद्धयो हृद्ध आतमा।
3, 9—तस्मादुपरानात्तेजा: पुनर्भवित्वमिन्दृवैमेनसति संपाधमाने। (4, 2, 2)
3, 10—यज्ञस्तेनेव प्राणमायाति प्राणस्तेजसा युक्तः। सहास्त्रमा यथासंकलितं त्वोकं नयति॥ (4, 1, 12)
4, 9—एष हि श्रुतः स्वर्ग श्रोता श्राता रसियता मन्त्रा बोधा कर्ता विश्वात्मा पुरुषः। (2, 3, 33 and 40)
5, 2—एतदे स्त्यक्षम परं चापरं च श्राय यद् यद्याकारः।
तस्माहिद्वानेतेश्वस्यत्नेवैकत्तमनेति॥ (4, 3, 14)
6, 5—यक्षेमा नव: स्यंदमाना समुद्रायणा: समुद्र: प्रायस्तं गच्छन्ति मिथेते तासा नामार्थे समुद्र: इत्येवं प्रोच्येते। एवमेवास्य परिदर्शिरिमा: बोङ्गश बला: पुरुषायणा: पुरुषं प्रायस्तं गच्छन्ति मिथेते चास्यू नामार्थे पुरुषं इत्येवं प्रोच्येते स एवोकलोमृतो भवति। (4, 2, 15)

Ṛgveda Samhitā

2, 12, 1—यो जात पञ्च प्रथमो मनस्तनप। (3, 3, 56)
10, 129, 2—न मृतयुक्तीद्वृत्ते न तारं न प्रायव अध्यात्मित्व। आनीत्यां स्वधया तद्वेकं तस्मादायन्तं परः
क्षिप्नाश। (2, 4, 8)

Satapathā Brāhmaṇa

1, 3, 1, 26—या के काण्च पञ्च कीत्विज आत्ममापाससत इति
अत्मानायेच तामादाससत इति द्वीत्याच। (3,4,46)
10, 5, 4, 16—विद्यय तदारोहन्ति तन कामां यथागतं। न तद्व
दक्षिणां वैलि नाविद्वाङ्गस्तपशनि। (3, 3, 31)

Svetaśvatara-paniṣad

1, 11—शत्या देवं सर्वपारापदानि: श्रीरः केशोत्कुमुदयुप्रहणि:।
तस्याययालाचुतींः प्रेमायेदे चिरेश्वर्ये केलाह आनापासं। (3, 2, 5)
1, 12—भोक्ता ऋण्यं प्रतितार्वं न मन्वा सर्वो श्रेण्यं चित्वं भ्रमणेत।
(3, 2, 13)

2, 10—समभुजः शरीराधिविषुः कार्याः किर्तिन्ते शर्मवज्जुः च मित्रपि।
मनोजुः नुकृति ृ न तु च चक्रुपादन गुहायात्मकात्मकां प्रयोजयेत॥
(4, 1, 11)

3, 8—वेदांतेन न महान्तमातिदिन्योऽन्तः परस्तानाः।
तमेव विदित्वानिष्ठस्य नात्यं प्रथा विचित्रेतवनाय॥
(2, 3, 30; 4, 3, 14)

3, 9—यस्मात् पापरमस्तिः किर्तिकर्मातिदिन्याः न ज्योतिः
कथितः। बुक्ततृ च सत्त्वं दिवसी निम्नेवेक्षनेत्तेन्द्र पूर्ण
पुर्वेऽन सर्वस्म॥ (3, 2, 36)

4, 3—तव श्रीं तवे पुमामस्तिः तवे कुमारं उत्स वा कुमारं।
तवं श्रीं दुर्गेन वशिष्टं तवं जानो भवनम विच्यनामुखः॥
(2, 3, 43)

4, 19—न तस्य प्रतिमा अभित्य यस्य नाम महायशः।
(2, 3, 7; 4, 3, 14)

5, 8—अराध्याओः हार्षविधिः रसः। वातायनाः वातायनाः
शात्तथा कलिपतस्य च। भागों जीवं स: विष्णुः स: चातुर्याय कल्पते॥
(2, 3, 22 and 29)

6, 9—स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपो न चास्य कथिताज्ञितय: न
चाहिये। (2, 3, 9)

6, 11—एको देवं सर्वभृतेषु गृहः सर्वभृतारम्भम्
कर्मम्याहः सर्वभृताधिवासः साक्षी चैता: देवतो निर्माणः।
(2, 3, 17; 3, 3, 35)

6, 19—निष्कालं निफिलं श्रात्तं निरबंधं निरंजनेषु। अमुकम्
परं सेलं दुःखेश्वरमिश्रातासम॥ (4, 3, 14)

Taittirīyopaniṣad

1, 11, 2—यान्यनयनम् कर्माणि। ताति सेवितद्वानि। नो
इत्यादि। यान्यस्तम्कं छुचरिताति। ताति तवोपयस्यानि। नो
तराणि।
(3, 1, 9)

2, 1—ओऽ व्रहिविदग्धोऽः परम्। सत्यं शान्तमर्नन्ते व्रहस्। यो वेद
निहितं गुहायो श्रमस्य ध्योमुः। सोस्तुः सर्वाधिकामानसह भ्रष्टा
तस्मादा एतस्मादातमन आकाशं संभूतं। आकाशानागुंः, वायोमंगी, अग्रेापं, अद्वृत्यं पृथिवीं, पृथिवया ओपधयं, ओपोग्रोफानसं, अतात् पुरुषं। स वा एव पुरुषोपरस्मयं। (2, 3, 5 & 6, 12, 24; 2, 4, 1; 3, 2, 22 & 20; 4, 1, 2; 4, 3, 14)

2, 4—यतो वाचो निकरतं तेषां प्रभवं मनसा सहं। आनन्दो ब्रह्मणो विद्वानुः न विभेदती कर्मचर्यत। ...... तस्य श्रद्धेष दिः। ऋषतं दश्चिमणः पशुः, सत्यमुच्छः पशुः, योग आत्मा, गहः पुरुषं प्रतिष्ठा। (2, 3, 40; 3, 2, 22)

2, 5—विद्वानं यथं तनुः। कर्मणं तनुःपि च। विद्वानं देवः सर्वं ब्रह्म वयेनामुःस्ते। ...... तस्य प्रियेष दिः। मोदो दश्चिमणः पशुः, प्रमोदे उच्छः पशुः, आनन्दं आत्मा, ब्रह्म पुरुषं प्रतिष्ठा। (2, 3, 32 & 36, 40; 3, 3, 11-12)

2, 6—अस्तनेव स भवति अस्तद्वृक्षतिः सोि चेत्। अस्ति श्रद्धेन चेते चेते सन्तमें सतो विदुः। ...... सोिकामयत वषु स्यां प्रजायेत्। स तपस्तत्वं इत्यं सर्वयुगं। यद्रों यतिः। तत्सर्वाः तदेवायुपविद्यत। (2, 3, 10 & 13, 17, 47; 3, 2, 22)

2, 7—अस्तं इत्मग्नासीत् ततो च तद्यायत। ...... यद्य होवेष एतस्मात्वात् वेंवेत् नामेन्सनेत् निर्ल्ययनेन भर्गं प्रतिष्ठा विद्ययते। अथ सोिभयं गतो भवति। यद्य होवेष एतस्मात्वात्ममं तरं करुष्टे, अथ तस्य भर्गं भवति। तस्येष भर्गं विद्वेयम्यक्ष्यं। (2, 3, 10 & 17; 2, 4, 1; 3, 2, 23; 3, 3, 4)

2, 8—भीषयस्मादात् पवेत्। भीषयेदेवति सूर्यः। भीषयस्मादप्रिम्येष्वन्द्रः। मृत्युलब्धवति पश्चमः।

2, 9—आनन्दो ब्रह्मणो विद्वानुः न विभेदते कुत्तलेषः। पवेत्। हृ बचव न तपति किमां साधु नाकरणं किमां पापमकर्मम्। (3, 2, 17; 4, 3, 14)

3, 12, 7—(Tai. Ar.) वर्णं सुपाणि विचित्वे धीरो नामांति क्रत्वांशभिवन्द्याये। (2, 3, 43)
विज्ञने योंचक्किम गनयांः ॥

1. दृष्टतो नेय दृष्टिश्चुतजन्तुः सदृशुरोरोपश्चादातुः। 
   स्थांश्रूिन्त्वकत्वः स नयति यद्यो स्वर्णवैमादममारम् ॥
   न स्पर्शनि तथापि ध्रुतचरणयुगो सदृशुः स्वायतिष्ठते, 
   स्विः सायं विपुलं भयति निरुपमस्ते वातोक्तिकोऽपि ॥

2. आद्रो वद्यमास्मीक्ष्यनुभव उदिते स्खत्वर्क्ष रे वा पूणात् ॥

3. सुवर्णार्ज्ज्वायमानस्य सुवर्ण्ये च शास्त्रवतम ।
   दृष्टतो जायमानस्य ब्रह्मचर्ये च तथा भवेत् ॥

4. कारणं ध्यतिक्षणं पुमानादी धियोक्ष्येत्।
   अन्वथेन पुनस्तवि कारं नियं प्रपद्यति ॥

5. कारणं हि कारणं पद्ये-प्रत्यक्ताय विज्ञं ज्ञेत्।
   कारणात्मक ततो गच्छेत् वादशी भवेत् अनन्यविति: ॥

6. सत्यपि भेदवयायः नाथ तबाहै न मामकीनन्त्रस्मृ।
   सामुद्रो हि तरागः क च न सामुद्रो हि तरागः ॥

7. नादानुसंधानम न्योरस्तु तुत्यं । त्यां साधनं न तत्वपद्धति मने् ॥
   अवत्तस्मात न्यथे चतुरं सारं। तत्वात्मेन विस्तारं मनो में ॥

8. अः निर्विकल्प्यो निराकारहुपो विमुक्तावध सर्वध्वं सवेद्विद्रयाणं ।
   न वा सक्तं नैव मुक्तिनैमित्वधिशृंगनतःः शिवोऽहि शिवोऽहि ॥
NEW LIGHT ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚĀMKARA

I

AIM AND METHOD

1. The ethico-spiritual motives.

The aims and the motives of the philosophy of Śrī Śāmkaraśārya are too deep to be sought in a superficial manner. Some take him to be a commentator only, and conclude that he has neither a point of view nor a philosophy of his own. Others consider him to be more of a theologian than a professional philosopher, and therefore think that it would be too great an honour to him to compare him with Plato, Hegel, or Bradley. Some others find in him a religious preacher who is, more often than not, dogmatic, and who, therefore, sacrifices reason and logic to tradition and authority. Some others go to the extent of confusing him with the atheist, the sceptic, and the nihilist in disguise. All these views, we hold, are hasty conclusions; they arise either on account of prejudice, or imperfect understanding of his writings as a whole. The aim of his philosophy, as we understand, is through and through moral and spiritual. It is at once theistic and mystical; and we shall be completely wrong if we say that there is the slightest touch of materialism or agnosticism anywhere in his writings. Equally wrong will it be, if Śāmkara is understood as preaching merely the gospel of pessimism, despair, renunciation, and illusionism. His message is just the opposite of this in essence and spirit. The Vedānta of Śāmkara stands for courage and strength of character, for optimism and hope, for a life which being in touch with the Real, is full of activity, contemplation, joy, knowledge, contentment, and service to mankind. The notes of pessimism, asceticism, renunciation, and illusionism, which are necessarily found in his
philosophy, are only a prelude to a higher and fuller life
which will be realized only through the constant prac-
tice of moral virtues, and an unswerving devotion to
God. Disinterested and altruistic action, meditation,
prayer, and the consequent attainment to Godhood or
the Absolute through the grace of God, are but the
different aspects of this ethic-o-spiritual discipline. Jñāna,
then, means the realization of Brahman, and not merely
an intellectual understanding about it.

The method he has adopted is, as we may call it,
the dialectic method or the method of construction
through criticism. It consists in the positing of one's own
thesis (svamatamandana) on the ground of the refuta-
tion of the thesis of the opponent (paramatakhandana),
though Sāmkara seems to be always anxious in giving the
most sympathetic consideration to what his opponent
has to say. He is not merely a critic of the failings of
others, or merely a judge who assesses the good or the
bad points in them; but he also appears like a pleader
who has taken a brief for his own opponent for the
time being. If anyone wants to know what the oppo-
nent of Sāmkara has to say, he has only to read the
admirable account which Sāmkara himself so faithfully
gives before he begins his attack against it. To a
certain extent, this is Socratic in character; but there is
no profession of ignorance on the part of Sāmkara.
What he wants is justice for him as well as for his
opponent. And so he meets his opponent in the way
in which he is required to meet. A believer in the
Vedas will find Sāmkara equally a believer; a non-belie-
ever will find him as if he too is a non-believer. Sāmkara
never brings in the Sruti-passages in favour of his posi-
tion when he is confronted by a Jaina or a Buddhist. He
meets them on the platform of reason alone. When he
meets a subjective idealist or a nihilist, he assumes him-
self to be a realist; when a realist, he becomes an idealist;
when a Sāmkhya, a theist; and when a theist, a mystic.
In doing this all, however, he uses one weapon or the
other as he finds it convenient and useful. Sometimes
it is sufficient for him to show that his opponent is contradicting himself; sometimes his view-point is shown to be partial and one-sided; sometimes the argument is shown to involve the regress ad infinitum, or as falling short of ordinary experience, or as incapable of being extended to a higher form of life.

2. All-sided, integrated experience and values.

As the Ācārya is anxious to pay his attention to all the sides of human experience, and as he appears therefore to be at once a realist, an idealist, a theist, and a mystic, it is natural that he should employ several criteria to distinguish one kind of truth from another, and so to establish in his philosophy different orders of reality. It is generally said that there are in his philosophy different degrees of truth and reality. In a sense this is true; for there abides the same universal Caitanya in all the types of experience. The illusion, the dream, and the experiences in the sleeping and the waking conditions are all dependent for their very existence on this common substratum of Consciousness. If Brahman is one, without a second, then it must be present in all the things and the experiences of our life. The illusion too is dependent for its being on some concrete existence; the illusion of the snake appears on the reality of the rope. Behind the illusory object also there is the Caitanya of the knower combined with the Caitanya of the this (idam) aspect of the rope. Without some kind of assimilation of the objective and the subjective elements in cognition, of a like identified with like, there is no possibility of the occurrence of an illusion also in the Advaita scheme of Śaṅkara. The illusion, in other words, takes place on the sattā of Brahman; and so all experiences including Brahmanubhava, on the one hand, and illusion, on the other, are different from each other in degrees only. And so, we may say that the dream is more real than the illusion, the waking life more real than the dream, and so on. But there is also a difference
so far as the knowledge of Brahman is concerned, we
shall begin by noting that what Sāmkara means by
Vāstu-nāmān is that the Brahman-bhava is a category by
itself. It transcends the empirical distinctions of the
knower, the known, and the knowledge. Just as the sun
will continue to be self-evident though there may be
no object to shine upon, even so apart from the purusa
or the empirical self and his sense-organs and purposes,
the Vāstu, that is, the Atman, or the Brahman would be
self-valid by its own criterion of self-conscious activity
or caitanya. It is an indivisible, homogeneous anubhava
or knowledge, in which the two moments of subject and
object are not given but created arbitrarily by one who
feels the necessity of somehow imparting it to others in
some intellectual or logical form. It is futile therefore
to expect that there would be any verbal reply from the
side of Sāmkara to the questions, ‘Knowledge for whom?’
or ‘Knowledge of what?’, except the reply that it is the
knowledge for itself and the knowledge of itself. Either
this means nothing from the empirical point of view, or
it means everything from the point of view of Brahmana-
nubhava. Brahman is not simply the name of a percipi-
ent being among others, so that Brahmanubhava would
mean the knowledge of something else with reference to
that being; nor does Brahman mean an object among
other objects, so that Brahmanubhava would mean the
knowledge of some being with reference to that object.
Nor can we get any satisfaction by describing Brahman
as neither the subject nor the object, i.e. a tertium quid
simply; for it will then neither explain the subjects nor
the objects. So, it ought to be shown to be both, viz., as
the eternal subject, and as the eternal object; the former
because all the percipient beings are dependent for their
very existence, nature, and activity on the Brahman as
the antaryāmin of all, and the latter because it is the
ever-lasting bahiryāmin or the transcendent object, in the
discovery and the gradual assimilation of which all the
moral and spiritual progress of the mankind is summed
up. Left to itself, Brahman would neither be glorified
nor condemned by being described as the subject or object; even the very name Brahman in Brahmānubhava would be superfluous from the view-point of the blissful, caitanyānubhava itself. This indescribable, supersensuous, homogeneous, indivisible, unique, and non-dual experience, which is at once conscious activity and bliss, is what is known as Vāstu or Brahman, according to Śaṅkara, and is absolutely independent and transcendent of all the empirical subjects or objects, and of the empirical criteria of judgments and values. To put it negatively it is not puruṣa-tantra.

The peculiarity of this Brahmanic life, however, is that it allows itself to be shared by the individual soul, which has in it the capacity for exhibiting the opposition of the subject and the object, which is so essential from the epistemological point of view. As a matter of fact, so long as the individual soul has an experience of this ecstatic, unitive life, he becomes one with Brahman; and so, there would be no sense in saying that the soul as the subject or the knower is having a knowledge of Brahman as the object. He is, as a matter of fact, during that particular time, nothing but Brahman; that is, as explained above, nothing but the indivisible anubhava itself, without there being any subject or object. The propositions, ‘Tat tvam asi’ and ‘Aham Brahma asmi’, are literally the expressions of this experience; there is not in it the slightest awareness of the distinction, so necessary from the logical point of view, between the aham and the Brahman, or between the Tat and the tvam. The anubhava in him is the unification of the two to such an extent, that the aham and tvam are completely dissolved or cancelled in the life of the Brahman or the Tat. What remains in it is the Brahman and not the soul; and that too not as something transcendent only or immanent only, but as the coalition of the two. This means that even in the case of an individual soul who has an experience of this life, the Brahmānubhava remains a mystery which is indescribable in terms of subject or object.
4. Brahman as subject and Brahman as object meet in man:

But when the need to describe this life is felt, the words subject and object are bound to come; and so, once again, with reference to these words we have to describe the mystic experience in exactly the same way as we have described the Brahmanic life above, viz., as either the eternal subject, or the eternal object. That is why the author of the Chāndogyopaniṣad does not see any contradiction in describing first objectivity that Brahman is to the right, and to the left, and upwards, and downwards, and so on, and immediately afterwards in describing subjectively that the ‘I’ or the Ātman is to the right, and to the left, and upwards, and downwards, and so on. The object is nothing but the subject and vice-versa. Brahman within and Brahman outside is one and the same. But the glory of man, as described by Śāṅkara Vedānta is that the meeting point of these two is in man, and that the ultimate value of the one transcendental, real Object of inquiry and realization is to be found in the innermost recess of the heart, by resorting to moral purity, devotion, and spiritual contemplation. Be it remembered, however, that these latter methods do not and cannot create or modify the nature of the object in any way; they only enable the man himself to make simultaneously new discoveries regarding the nature of the object beyond him as well as the subject within him. The moral and the spiritual progress he makes within him, he comes to know, is not ultimately due only to his own efforts or to the society in which he is, but is due to the grace imparted to him by the Object which itself must be moral or spiritual in nature. The human efforts are necessary not because they bring about a change in the nature of the object, but because they bring about a change in our notions of the self. It is by the gradual elimination of what is not-self, that we are able to establish progressively a kinship, a similarity, and an identity between the subject and the object. The human effort, or the puruṣa-tantra
is useful as a way of discovering that the real subject is no other than the object, and that the highest ethical and spiritual values in man and society are ultimately to be discovered as already existing in the object itself. The object, in other words, is thus revealed in a subject which grows, and which, therefore, becomes identical in nature with the object. Man becomes Brahman, the puruṣa-tantra ends in Vastu-tantra.

5. **Brahmānubhava abounds in contradictions.**

To return to the discussion of the criteria of reality. How far will non-contradiction be helpful to us as a criterion? In a way Saṃkara accepts this test, and as some say, he makes it a corner-stone of his system as a whole. What is contradicted is false or unreal, and what is not contradicted is true or real. The dream is cancelled by waking experience; the waking experience is cancelled by the experience of the Brahman, whereas the experience of the Brahman is not cancelled by any thing else. Therefore, it is said that while the dream and the waking experiences are both unreal, the Brahmānubhava alone is real. Of course, it is not a small gain. But what Saṃkara cares for is not logic and metaphysics so much as life and experience inclusive of the non-empirical consciousness. To him the logical inquiry is merely an intellectual scaffolding, the content of which is given in an immediate, supra-sensuous, concrete experience. At best, the logical approach is only a preliminary to a way of life, a justification of the intellect which will persuade the will to bear witness to the life of the Real. There is however something unique in this higher form of experience which goes beyond the intellect, a revelation which transcends the empirical knowledge, and a life which encompasses the contradictions in it, as equally real. Brahman, we are told is replete with contradictions; it is at once here and there, smaller than the smallest and larger than the largest, and so on. Here, the contradictions not only do not cancel each other, but cannot also be said to be complementaries
of each other. Nor can it be said that one of them is positive and the other negative. Every one of them, is as positive and real as any other, and together they constitute the life of Brahman or of the Brahmanvedin.


When the law of contradiction too fails us, we may have recourse to the authorities of the Srutis and Smṛtis. But, as is well known, they too abound in contradictions. Sruti however, being more reliable than Smṛti, contradictions in the Smṛtis will be reconciled by Srutis. But when the different Srutis themselves contradict each other, how are we to reconcile them? One way is to fall back upon reason, and to say that a particular Sruti which is supported by reasoning has got more weight than any other which has no such support. This is however to ignore the authority of Sruti in favour of reason, which, according to Saṅkara, must be a serviceable adjunct to Sruti. There is no end to mere argumentation, says he, however brilliantly it may be put forth to prove one’s thesis. It may be true or false. Reasoning ought to be supported by Sruti and not vice-versa. So, if the puzzles of reason and Smṛti are solved by Sruti, then the puzzles of Sruti must be solved by something else. The eye-witnesses too may disagree; even so the Sāstras may differ from each other. It is here that Saṅkara brings in the higher authority of the ‘praciti’ or anubhava of the Guru or the expert. Out of the different statements of different Srutis as standing for the different experiences of different men, that one must have greater weight, which is supported by the experience of the Guru.

Here, perhaps, one may accuse Saṅkara of being dogmatic; and, in a way, we should own that it is a dogmatic point not in Saṅkara alone, but in the philosophy of Mysticism as such. One wonders why the knowledge of the Ātman cannot be revealed by the reading of the Vedas, and as to why it is that it should be revealed through the intermediary of a Guru. But
we may only note that there is the consensus of opinion on this point throughout the mystics of the world. As Suso says, the knowledge of the Divine comes through the living word of a living person; for the word on the parchment or in the book is lifeless. Saṁkara echoes this, as if, when he says that no amount of Vedic learning will enable a man to know the Brahman, unless some kind-hearted person, who has himself realized the Brahman, imparts it to another directly through spoken words such as 'That thou art'. Nārada who knew everything under the sun and the moon ultimately felt it necessary to approach Sanatkumāra and request him to carry him beyond the ocean of Samsāra. Śvetaketu's story tells us the same. It was his father who gave him this lore of the Brahman. Saṁkara too, as we find it, for instance, in his own writings, gave it to an old man who was engaged in learning grammar, by telling him that he should resort to the name of Govinda or Gopāla, and not to anything else, if he wanted release from birth and death. The Guru occupies in Saṁkara the place which Jesus Christ occupies in Christianity. He is not only the redeemer of humanity, but is also the intermediary between man and God, or what is the same thing, between the soul and the Brahman. It is he who points out the real way to the erring traveller and brings him back to his home (Cha. 6, 14, 1-2). Nay, he works out a miracle which is not possible for a 'parisa' stone; for, as Saṁkara tells us about the mythological belief, the parisa changes iron into gold, but not iron into parisa itself; the Guru, on the contrary, changes the disciple into a Guru. The disciple becomes the Guru on account of the acquisition of the Brahmānubhava. No doubt, one flame owes its being to another; but the nature of the two is the same. The numerical plurality of the flames and the similarity of one with the other is apparent; the light in all of them is identically the same.

But in narrating this Saṁkara has led us beyond the anubhava of the Guru. The dogmatism that is lurking
in saying that the experience of the Guru is the highest
criterion of Reality will not be there in the least, the
moment it is replaced by svanubhava. Instead of an
‘heteros’ we have now in Samkara the Self itself as the
absolute standard of Reality and truth. In the absence
of svanubhava, no meaning, worth the name, can be
attached to the four mahavyakyas of the Vedanta. It is
the experience of ‘Aham Brahma asmi’ that bestows
upon the upadesa of the Guru, e.g., ‘Tat tvam asi’ the
stamp of validity and universality. The identification
of ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’ which, in theory, is applicable to
any individual soul, is verified in practice as a concrete,
undeniable fact of experience by a particular individual,
here and now, just as truly as a scientific law is verified
in a particular given case. As a matter of fact, the Guru
must be intending that the disciple should verify the
knowledge of his teacher in his own case. For, the
instruction does not come in the dogmatic form of ‘I am
the Brahman’, but in the form of ‘You are the Brahman’.
Neither does it stop with the implied narration of one’s
own experience; it is definitely intended to go beyond
one’s own experience and be applicable to all men in
the world. It is this broad-based, spiritual humanism
of Vedanta that makes room for the countless Brahma-
vedins who, in spite of the difference in degree in the
apprehension of the Real, apprehend and live the self-
same life of Sat, Cit and Ananda. Samkara often makes
a salutation to this anubhava itself, intending thereby
that it alone, finally and truly, reconciles, integrates,
and sums up all the partial views, attitudes, and
interests of life.

7. Method of assertion through negation.

The method which Samkara appears to have recom-
mended in the discovery of this anubhava is mainly the
negative one of thoughtfully eliminating one after
another every feature which lacks reality. ‘I am’, says
he, ‘neither the elements, nor the body, nor the senses,
the mind, the intellect, the ahamkāra, etc.’. But as this
does not end in vacuum, but in plentitude, he recom-
mends also the positive method of thoughtfully asserting
that one is nothing else but Sat Cit and Ānanda. Com-
mbling the negative and positive aspects, we may
call the method as the method of 'Assertion through
negation'. Or we may prefer to call it as the method
of Viveka-pralaya. It is the method by which the wise
man deliberately and consciously dissolves everything
including his own egoism in the one reality of Brahman.
This is opposed to Prakṛti-pralaya where everything
becomes dissolved for some time, naturally and with-
out anybody's effort. At the end of this viveka-pralaya,
the Brahmavedin becomes nothing else but the nirguṇa
or the nirupādhika Brahman, as the sage Vāmadeva was
known to be; or paradoxically, he becomes verily the
Ātman of all, and is therefore called the Saguṇa or the
Sopādhika Brahman. All the same, the method is the
unique, practical method of the Brahma-vidyā as opposed
to the method of avidyā which we may call as the
method of assertion through egoism.
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

1. Idealistic and nihilistic background.

The epistemological question of the genesis, nature, and validity of knowledge is an important topic in the philosophy of Shankara, and it can be understood only on the background of the metaphysical and psychological assumptions of the existence of the eternal, undifferentiated Caitanya of Brahman, and of Self-consciousness respectively. Shankara wants us to realize that the unshakable Brahma-Caitanya is the ground and the common bond of all the changing bits of knowledge. He says this against what the Vijnanavadin Baudha holds, viz., that the stream of the changing bits of knowledge is constant, and that the knowledge of the pure ‘I’ itself is made up of a series of these little bits. With every one of these, says the Vijnanavadin, the ‘I’ is identifying itself, but with everyone of these it also appears and disappears; and therefore, he says, it lasts only for a moment. That is why, instead of remaining satisfied by saying that the jar and the knowledge of the jar only are shortlived, he considers that the so-called immanent and the constant ‘I’ also is short-lived. He would not have committed this mistake, had the knowledge of an object arisen without its being invariably associated with the Caitanya of the ‘I’. But this is impossible; for according to the theory of Vedanta all knowledge, even the empirical and the illusory, arises on account of and along with the Caitanya which is necessarily involved in it, just as the continuous melting of the particles of ghee is on account of the continuous contact of fire. The Vijnanavadin is slow to understand that the continuity of the object of knowledge and of the knowledge itself are due to the continuity of the eternal knower, viz., the pure ‘I’ or Brahman.
We have to note that Saṃkara holds the same thesis against the Mādhyamikas, who take the nihilistic position. According to them there exists nothing during sleep and swoon. As there are no objects for being cognized during sleep, there is, they say, no cognition of them. So far they are right; but they wrongly hold that there is, on that very account, no cognition at all. This is like saying that because there is no object to be illumined by light there would be no light of the sun at all, or like saying that because the eye cannot see the forms of things in darkness, there would be no eye at all. And yet, the Mādhyamika believes that the non-existence of a broken jar, whether of the voluntary or non-voluntary type, is eternal. Naturally, the knowledge of this eternal non-existence, as the Vedāntin would expect the Mādhyamika to admit, is also eternal; that is, it can be said to exist even during sleep. Now, in order to avoid this conclusion, if the Mādhyamika would say that non-existence as an object of knowledge is different from the knowledge of it, the Vedāntin would reply that the fact that there is non-existence at all is known by its being the object of knowledge again. If to avoid this it be said that even though the object of knowledge, viz., the non-existence, may be different from knowledge, the knowledge is not different from its object, then it would be like saying that ‘agni’ and ‘vanhi’, both of which mean fire, are and are not different from each other. And further, reversing the argument, if it is said that knowledge is different from the object of knowledge, then it will be wholly impossible to say that there will be non-existence of knowledge, as the result of the non-existence of the object of knowledge. The non-existence of the object of knowledge is also dependent for its own existence on the knowledge of it. Eventually, whether the object is there or not (as in sleep) objectless consciousness or the Caitanya remains as an undeniable fact. Nay, even on the view of the Mādhyamikas, it cannot be said that there is complete non-existence of knowledge during
sleep, though there is non-existence of a particular kind of knowledge, such as the knowledge of a jar.

2. The witness as the ground of knowledge.

Let us understand this same point regarding the certainty of the perceiver, as also, incidentally, that of the perceived, and the perception by a brief consideration of the principle of causation, so far as it is required against the view of the asatkāryavādin, though later on we may give up both causation and empirical certainty in favour of the highest certainty of intuitive knowledge or anubhava. If what the asatkāryavādin and the Śūnyavādin say is the final truth, then not only intuitive realization but also the empirical certainty of knowledge are in danger. Śaṅkara, therefore, first proves against them the reality of the perceiver, the perceived, and the perception in the case of empirical knowledge, as also the existence of the effect prior to its origination in the form of the cause, and then goes on to establish the certainty and continuity of the Pure Consciousness in all the kinds of experience.

In the beginning of the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (1, 2) we read, “there was nothing in the beginning; all this was covered by death”. This may mean, according to the Tārkikas, that the effect does not exist before its production, that is, before its appearance with a particular name and form, but that the cause of it may exist. We may have the clay, though not the jar. The Śūnyavādin goes a step further, and says that if there was nothing in the beginning, then, there was neither the cause nor the effect. As against these views, Śaṅkara holds that inasmuch as the Śruti refers to ‘all this’ and to the fact of its being ‘covered by death’, it is clear that both the cause which covered the effect, and the effect so covered existed before the latter was produced. To say that neither of them existed before is possible only when the cause and the effect are the names of absolutely non-existent imaginary notions. In a sentence like, ‘The son of a barren woman is honoured by
flowers in the sky’, it would be correct to say that both
the cause and effect are non-existent. But in the case
of the jar which appears before us as the true existent,
it is our common experience that it is produced only
when its cause, viz., the clay exists prior to it, and not
otherwise. Similarly, over and above the evidence of
Sruti, we can infer about the existence of the cause of
this world, viz., the Brahman, as also about the existence
of the world prior to its origination in the form of its
cause.

Now, a reference to the cause does not necessarily
mean a reference to a particular form of it which it may
assume before the effect is produced. The clay may
assume the form of a lump before the jar is produced,
but it is not this form of clay that constitutes the cause,
it is the clay itself. It continues to exist in the jar and
is recognized as continuing in it, even after the parti-
cular form of clay, viz., the lump is exhausted in the
making of the jar which may be said to be the second
effect of it. And, further, this recognition of the same-
ness of the material cause is due to actual perception of
the particles of clay in the jar, and not simply inferred
on account of similarity between what the Buddhist
calls as the two momentary things, viz., the clay of
yesterday and the jar of today. What is inferred must
have its ultimate basis in perception. Now supposing
that everything is momentary, and the knowledge ‘this
is that’ as nothing but the recognition of a thing as
similar to the other, we have to accept, in the first place,
the infinite regress which would be involved in saying
about any cognition that it is valid, and secondly the
impossibility of comparing the cognitions without refer-
ence to the cognizer who falls outside the momentary
series of cognitions and the things cognized, and, there-
fore, said to be the permanent witness of all. If things
and the cognitions of them are all momentary, and if no
cognition is valid by itself, but requires another cogni-
tion to fall back upon, there would be no certainty of
anything in this world. And further, without the
sleep, though there is non-existence of a particular kind of knowledge, such as the knowledge of a jar.

2. The witness as the ground of knowledge.

Let us understand this same point regarding the certainty of the perceiver, as also, incidentally, that of the perceived, and the perception by a brief consideration of the principle of causation, so far as it is required against the view of the asatkāryavādins, though later on, we may give up both causation and empirical certainty in favour of the highest certainty of intuitive knowledge or anubhava. If what the asatkāryavādin and the Śūnyavādin say is the final truth, then not only intuitive realization but also the empirical certainty of knowledge are in danger. Saṅkara, therefore, first proves against them the reality of the perceiver, the perceived, and the perception in the case of empirical knowledge, as also the existence of the effect prior to its origination in the form of the cause, and then goes on to establish the certainty and continuity of the Pure Consciousness in all the kinds of experience.

In the beginning of the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (1, 2) we read, “there was nothing in the beginning; all this was covered by death”. This may mean, according to the Tārkikas, that the effect does not exist before its production, that is, before its appearance with a particular name and form, but that the cause of it may exist. We may have the clay, though not the jar. The Śūnyavādin goes a step further, and says that if there was nothing in the beginning, then, there was neither the cause nor the effect. As against these views, Saṅkara holds that inasmuch as the Śruti refers to ‘all this’ and to the fact of its being ‘covered by death’, it is clear that both the cause which covered the effect, and the effect so covered existed before the latter was produced. To say that neither of them existed before is possible only when the cause and the effect are the names of absolutely non-existent imaginary notions. In a sentence like, ‘The son of a barren woman is honoured by
flowers in the sky’, it would be correct to say that both the cause and effect are non-existent. But in the case of the jar which appears before us as the true existent, it is our common experience that it is produced only when its cause, viz., the clay exists prior to it, and not otherwise. Similarly, over and above the evidence of Sruti, we can infer about the existence of the cause of this world, viz., the Brahman, as also about the existence of the world prior to its origination in the form of its cause.

Now, a reference to the cause does not necessarily mean a reference to a particular form of it which it may assume before the effect is produced. The clay may assume the form of a lump before the jar is produced, but it is not this form of clay that constitutes the cause; it is the clay itself. It continues to exist in the jar and is recognized as continuing in it, even after the particular form of clay, viz., the lump is exhausted in the making of the jar which may be said to be the second effect of it. And, further, this recognition of the sameness of the material cause is due to actual perception of the particles of clay in the jar, and not simply inferred on account of similarity between what the Buddhist calls as the two momentary things, viz., the clay of yesterday and the jar of today. What is inferred must have its ultimate basis in perception. Now supposing that everything is momentary, and the knowledge ‘this is that’ as nothing but the recognition of a thing as similar to the other, we have to accept, in the first place, the infinite regress which would be involved in saying about any cognition that it is valid, and secondly the impossibility of comparing the cognitions without reference to the cognizer who falls outside the momentary series of cognitions and the things cognized, and, therefore, said to be the permanent witness of all. If things and the cognitions of them are all momentary, and if no cognition is valid by itself, but requires another cognition to fall back upon, there would be no certainty of anything in this world. And further, without the
enduring presence of a witness common to two or more cognitions, there would be no sense in saying that a thing has been recognized, and is therefore similar or dissimilar to something else. An eternal perceiver, therefore, becomes absolutely necessary to account for both the perceived and the perception.


To understand the position of Sāṅkara in this respect, we have further to make the distinction between empirical knowledge due to the senses, and the spiritual knowledge due to intuition, and note how the one is dependent on the other. So far as our knowledge of jars and other perceptible things is concerned, it is the result of three factors as is traditionally known to all. There is, first, the presence of the jar as the object of knowledge; secondly, there is the Caitanya in the form of the knower; and thirdly, there is the reappearance of this same Caitanya in the form of the object through the medium of the modification of the mind (antah-karāṇa-vṛtti) which assumes the form of the object, as soon as there is the contact of the sense and the object. Even when the object cognized is not actually present but remembered only, the mechanism of perception is not materially affected. What is important to note is that with a change in the object and a corresponding change in the vṛtti, there is no corresponding change in the Caitanya of the subject which shines by its own light and reveals itself as well as the objects which are cognized. There is only one-sided dependence, viz., of the object and the vṛttis on the subject, and not vice-versa. Whether the object is seen or remembered, it is said to be cognized or recognized only when it is joined or covered by the Caitanya. In the absence of Caitanya, it will neither be seen nor remembered. So, empirically, and from the commonsense point of view though the object is different from or independent of the subject, there will be no knowledge about it unless it is dependent upon the knowing mind (Caitanya), which though
equally independent of the object is absolutely necessary not only for the genesis of knowledge, but also for the existence or the constitution of the object of knowledge, inasmuch as the object is known to the extent to which the modification of the mind is able to cover it by the Caitanya of the self. In view, however, of the knowability of the object to the extent to which it is covered by the vṛttī- Caitanya, it may appear that the object on the empirical level has in it, as if, two parts, one known by the mind, and the other unknown. The known part may be said, so far as it is known, as constituted by the Caitanya of the mind; but the unknown part may remain beyond the mind, as a mysterious something, akin to the thing-in-itself of Kant.

This difficulty, however, will be overcome if we look into the metaphysical presupposition of the problem. No doubt, the object in being known, even on Śaṅkara’s view, is encompassed by the Caitanya of the mental mode (antahkaraṇa-vṛttī) which, in its turn, is encompassed by the Caitanya of the finite and of the Infinite knower. The object may be said to be given in knowledge for the subject to cognize; but its existence is ultimately due to Brahman, and is therefore not different from Brahman. There cannot be any noumenal overplus of an object in the Kantian sense, in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. For the Brahman is the cause, and the Brahman is the cognizer of the object, and nothing can travel beyond the Brahman and be said to exist in an unknown and unknowable manner. The knowledge of all things is guaranteed by the knowledge of Brahman. The epistemology of Śaṅkara is different from that of Kant. There we are concerned with finite subjects and with finite objects which constitute our phenomenal world. Here we are concerned not only with finite subjects and finite objects, but also with the Infinite Subject and with all other things as well as itself as the object. There, the subject and object are, as if, static, one pitted against another; here, the finite subject is in the process of becoming the Infinite by a
gradual assimilation of the object with itself; the individual soul becomes the Brahman and knows itself as all in all. In Kant, we are concerned with the objects of the waking life; but we are concerned in Saṅkara’s epistemology with the total experience of man, that is with the knowledge which can be had in all the states of life, viz., the wakeful, the sleeping, the dreaming, and the illusory, as well as the Turiya. The object is thus assimilated with the nature of the ‘I’ or the finite knower who, in its turn, is nothing but the Brahman or pure Caitanya. Even at the stage of empirical knowledge, the object is, in reality, a counterpart of the finite subject, nay even of the eternal subject, viz., the Brahman, and related with it by the bond of tatātma or unity. The object is, in other words, essentially non-different from the finite subject, which in its turn, is non-different from Brahman. Therefore, the subject has not merely the logical function of synthesising the manifold of sensuous material, as the unity of apperception has in Kant; it has, in Saṅkara, the additional, epistemological and metaphysical functions of explaining the possibility of all knowledge, phenomenal and noumenal, empirical and spiritual, and of accounting for the very existence of the objects, as well as for the existence and nature of the whole of the psycho-physical apparatus, essential for the emergence of knowledge. Thus, in knowledge, we have not, as is traditionally supposed, the mere image of the object as it is given from outside, but the image of an object which is constructed, revealed, and cognized by the Infinite subject on account of its own power of creation, self-light, and consciousness, respectively. It is these powers which, taken together, constitute the Brahma-caitanya. It is due to the limitations of upādhis and avidyā that the object does not appear as created and revealed by the self, and as identical with its real nature, viz., the caitanya. This creates a discrepancy between the metaphysical status of the object as Caitanya incarnate, in spite of its appearance with a particular name and form, and its being given in
knowledge as something different from the Caitanya for the purposes of epistemology. The object, in short, is nothing but the analogue, or the proto-type of the Brahman or the Ātman, manifested, known, and made real to the finite knower by the power of Brahma-caitanya through the ahamkāra, the manovṛttis, the intellect, and the senses. In a nut-shell the metaphysical statement of the highest truth of Vedānta is ‘All this is verily the Brahman’, the psychological and the epistemological justification of which we shall presently see.

4. Mahāvākyas, the ladder of Spiritual Knowledge.

The entire epistemologico-metaphysical structure of Śaṅkara’s advaitic philosophy may be seen to be reflected in the four mahā-vākyas which appear to have been carefully selected from the Upaniṣads in order to represent the four Vedas. Out of these ‘Tat tvam asi’ and ‘Aham brahma asmi’ are generally said to be the ‘upadeśa-vākya’ and the ‘anubhava-vākya’ respectively. The ‘ayam ātmā Brahma’, and the ‘sarvam khalu idam Brahma’, can then respectively be said to be the variations of the first two. Or, as we think them to be, they are the expressions of the different aspects of Brahmānubhava. So, instead of accepting these as dogmatic statements, it will be worth while to define and justify their meanings and to discover their inter-relations, so that we may be able to appreciate Śaṅkara’s ladder of spiritual experience as a whole.

Traditional Vedāntists are wont to explain the expression ‘That thou art’ (tat tvam asi) as meaning the attributeless Brahman, which is the common essence underlying the individual self and the omniscient Being, which are referred to by the words ‘Thou’ and ‘That’ respectively. Here what is technically known as ‘jahad-ajahad-ıkṣanā’ (Implication by means of omission and retention) is brought into operation. What is contradictory is omitted, and what is common is retained as essential. The individual self and the omniscient Being are poles asunder in their respective qualities, and
yet are essentially the same as manifestations of the, attributeless Brahman. Sáṅkara, however, will not certainly be satisfied with a mere statement of an implied meaning of tat tvam asī. The 'tat' or the Brahman must be realized in every way the same as the 'I' or the Ātman. Whatever can be said about Brahman must ultimately be said about the 'I' or the Ātman, or of the jīva in its real nature. The metaphysical statement 'Tat tvam asī' has to be epistemologically substantiated as the 'Aham Brahmanāsmi' of direct experience.

'Tat tvam asī' does not appear to be merely an intellectual formula in the mouth of Uddālaka Ārūni, but the expression of Brahmanāhava which he wishes to impart to his son Śvetaketu; for as Sāṅkara tells us repeatedly, and as Ārūni also is represented as believing, the knowledge of Brahman is only capable of being imparted by the Guru to the disciple; that is by one, who has himself realized Brahman to one who has not. Otherwise both the father and the son will have to be presumed as groping in the dark, or at best making an inference about the 'tat' on the ground of the knowledge of the 'tvam' and expressing it by what is known as Sāmānādhikaranyā. Nine times, the same instruction is imparted by Ārūni, and Śvetaketu who is represented as having studied all the Vedic lore realizes the Brahman at last. For Ārūni the 'Tat tvam asī' involved the truth of 'Sarvam khalu idam Brahma'; but for Śvetaketu it was merely first an intellectual formula. It had to pass through certain stages of experience, before it could represent to him the highest experience. In the language of logic what was analytic to Ārūni was first synthetic to Śvetaketu; it became analytic to him afterwards. Thus the transformation of the metaphysical dogma into concrete actual experience occurs after it is allowed to pass through certain definite stages of the epistemological process of apprehension of the Real.

In the first place, as a self-conceited lad, Śvetaketu must have had a direct awareness of himself,
though only a notion or an idea of Brahman, on account of inference. Āruni’s instruction brought out the first miracle. The ‘tat’, which was present in Svetaketu but of which he was not conscious, must have been aroused in him and appeared before him as an object of direct vision, as it did appear before Indra and other gods when they were puffed up with pride regarding their own strength. But now the problem must have been more difficult to solve. How to reconcile the ‘tat’ of direct vision with the ‘tvam’ (that is, the ego) of direct awareness? May be, the ego or ‘I’ has got a vapoury existence as compared with the ‘Tat’ or Brahman; may be, that the sense of ‘I’ is engendered by the stream of similar states of consciousness. But, now, in the second place, as the result of contemplation on the instruction, as also of the moral discipline, there dawns the knowledge of the second stage, ‘Aham Brahmacasya’. The ‘tat’ which was simply outside the body as a vision is now experienced also inside the body; the transcendent has become the immanent; the same Brahman which was seen with eyes open is now seen with eyes shut; that is, the vision, representing the ‘Tat’ or Brahman which was everywhere, not simply metaphysically but epistemologically, has now come to reside psychologically, so to say, in his very heart (ḥṛdayākāśa); the object has become the subject. In short, that which was intellectually believed to be the Real has become an actuality of experience.

The conviction, however, does not appear to be complete, unless it is confirmed by a reciprocatory process of apprehension. The ‘I’ in me must appear as Brahman. Therefore, in the third place, a search must be made to examine the basis of ‘Ayam ātmā Brahmac’. Now, for this, as also for the next stage, we have to travel beyond the story of Svetaketu, in other regions of the Upaniṣads. The serene Ātman, (saṃprāśādā) we are told, rises from this body, meets the Light beyond and appears in its own immaculate and lustrous form. The Ātman sees the Ātman (as if, in a mirror); it is
identical with Brahman; from top to toe, in golden colours and with golden mustaches, the form is seen even on the disc of the sun; and so, instead of remaining satisfied by saying that Brahman is to his right, to his left, upwards and downwards, and in all directions, the mystic says so about himself also. And what is true of him in theory is true of all souls. Not only Brahman is identical with the jiva, the jiva in its real nature is also identical with Brahman. And not only one soul is identical in this manner, but all souls also are identical with Brahman, and therefore identical with each other. That is why from the experience of identity of himself with Brahman, Uddalaka could vouchsafe the identity of Sveta-ketu's soul with Brahman. This constitutes the third stage of Advaitika anubhava.

And, then Śaṅkara tells us, there comes the fourth and the last stage as the acme of spiritual realization, in which the entire physical world appears identical with oneself and Brahman. If, as the cosmology of the Upaniṣads tells us, everything has come out of Brahman and is non-different from Brahman, and if Brahman has entered into all things as it has entered in all human beings, and has stayed there as the antaryāmin of all, then it will be no wonder that for a rare Yājñavā'kya here, or for a Mahātma of the Bhagavat-gītā there, all this should verily be the Brahman. This is the highest knowledge. Here do metaphysics and epistemology of Śaṅkara Vedānta meet in one point. Here is the Summum Bonum for man to be achieved as a psychological and epistemological process of apprehension of Reality by degrees and by stages.


Why then, it may be asked, are there illusions or errors? Are they not also assimilated and identified with the I and the Brahman? Before we answer these questions, let us make the distinction between several kinds of knowledge and arrange them in an ascending or descending order of truth and reality. The
highest knowledge which is at once true and real, and which is variously known as intuitive consciousness, Ātmānubhava, Brahmānubhava, etc., is that which, being non-empirical, transcends the distinction of subject and object. It is an undifferentiated, homogeneous, pure consciousness, or Caitanya in which the two moments of the that and the what, of existence, on the one hand, and of knowledge and bliss, on the other, are indistinguishably intertwined. It is the highest Truth not only because it is valid by itself on account of its self-revealing nature, but also because it gives us the standard by which we should measure the truth contained in any other cognition. It is also the highest Reality because it explains the being of everything else, by being the immanent ground of all. When it is known, everything else becomes known, but it may remain unknown even if everything else is known. In the one, non-dual consciousness or Caitanya, there is no discrepancy or contradiction involved in conceiving the that and the what, or the existence, bliss, and knowledge in a single grasp.

It will therefore be of no avail to continue to insist on the presence of the clear-cut distinction, between the knower and the known within this spiritual or intuitive kind of knowledge, though such a distinction is the invariable and the necessary characteristic of all empirical knowledge, and in giving assent to which, Śaṅkara also feels no hesitation. But it does not apply to the universal Caitanya, which we may name indifferently as the Ātman or Brahman, as the eternal subject or as the eternal object, or as the eternal experience which is at once the subject and the object. It is a unique blend of consciousness and energy, which has by implication a non-spatial and non-temporal existence, and is endowed with ānanda or bliss if it is to be eternal. For nothing can be real unless it exists as an experience, and nothing can continue to be perpetually active unless, as modern psychology teaches, it is pleasant or blissful in nature. The two moments of this
Brahmanic knowledge are distinguishable in thought, but inseparable in fact. Therefore, it can stand by itself and does not require for explaining its own existence two more separate terms as subject, on the one hand, and the object on the other. It is not a relation; nor is it capable of being explained in terms of relational thought. It is the substance or the substantive which, after the manner of Spinoza, we may say, exists in itself and can be conceived by itself. Here it is that we have a unique blend or coalition of the highest categories in psychology, epistemology and metaphysics, viz., the Self-consciousness, the Knowledge, and the Being. It is here that the Being bifurcates itself, as Professor Ramade says, into the subject and the object, and knows itself, by looking as if in a mirror, in the single act of Self-consciousness. As such, it transcends empirical knowledge. But it serves at the same time to be the ground and the immanent principle that makes all empirical knowledge possible, or without which as the sustaining power, to put it negatively, not even the empirical knowledge is possible. It is only this experience which can really be called as the universal, objective, necessary, and a-priori experience. It is universal, because the mystics all over the world speak about it in identical terms. It is objective, because, as seen above, it is transcendent and independent of all percipient beings. It can also be said to be necessary and a-priori, because it is the ground and the assumption of all other kinds of experience.

6. **Defects of Empirical Knowledge.**

So, next in order, comes this very empirical knowledge which owes its claim to truth and reality to our commonsense notions of practical utility, and to the correspondence it shows between our cognitions and things cognized. But the realistic and the pragmatic criteria, as we have already seen, are not adequate though they are serviceable to a certain extent. Against

the nihilist and the subjective idealist, Samkara assumes, no doubt, the role of a realist, and even of a pragmatist. But he holds that inasmuch as the very belief in the distinction between the subject and the object on the empirical level of experience, involves the mutual superimposition of the Ātman and the un-Ātman upon each other, the truth and the reality of empirical knowledge are only relative and subordinate to the primary and absolute reality of the supreme, undifferentiated knowledge. But if, as said above, the empirical object also is nothing else but Caitanya, and is constructed, revealed, and known by the pure caitanya or Brahman, where lies then the difference between the empirical and the intuitive levels of knowledge? The answer may be stated thus. Whereas in the knowledge of Brahman there is the reciprocity due to identity between the knower and the known, in the knowledge of an empirical object there is no such reciprocity. If the ‘I’ can be said to know the Brahman as nothing but itself, the Brahman can, in like manner, be identified with this impersonal, pure ‘I’. We have already seen how the author of the Chāndogyaopaniṣad, after having described the Brahman as being to the right, and to the left, and upwards, and downwards, and in all directions, immediately makes the knower of Brahman to say the same things about himself. We get the advice in the Paryanka-vidyā (Kau. 1, 3–5) that on approaching the couch of the Brahman, one should declare emphatically, if he be questioned as to who he is, that he is the same as Brahman. In Brahma-Sūtra 4, 1, 3, we are told that whoever will fall short of this double conviction of identity in the method of contemplation on a deity, will end in passing from death to death. ‘I am thou’, and ‘Thou art I’ is par excellence true in the case of one who is meditating on Brahman. The meaning of this all is that so far as the undifferentiated, knowledge of Brahman is concerned, it cannot be told who knows whom. As the Upaniṣad tells (Br. 4, 5, 15) when one attains the highest unity who should see whom? The implication
is not that there is none who can see anyone or think about anything, but that the Caitanya sees the Caitanya.

7. There are no degrees of Reality but degrees of apprehension of reality.

Now, so far as the empirical level of knowledge is concerned, the above proposition undergoes modification in two ways. The jiva as knower is conditioned by the upādhis of egoism, intellect, mind, and the senses; and similarly, what is known as the viśaya-caitanya is conditioned by the upādhis of space, time, circumstances, and causation. Besides, we are not prepared to call a jar as a percipient being. I know that I see the jar; but I do not know whether the jar sees me or not. I assume that there is a fundamental difference between mind and matter; as such, I am not readily prepared to admit that both are forms of Caitanya. That is why, we are aware of Caitanya on the empirical level only dimly. It consists in the awareness from the side of one's own mind; not awareness reciprocated from the other side, viz., the jar. Besides, it is the awareness which has to work through the media of antahkaraṇa-vṛttis, the senses, the light, and the objects. In short, what we get on the empirical level is the knowledge of Brahman through the several thick double glasses of upādhis, viz., of the subject and the object; it is traditionally known as the vyāvahārīka reality, and is said not to differ in kind but in degrees only from the pāramārthika reality. We must however carefully note that nowhere, at no time, and in no kind of object, there is metaphysically any diminution in quantity or in quality, so far as the reality of Brahma-Caitanya is concerned. It remains the same, though in the guise of and immanent in the empirical subjects and objects. And yet, the difference between the two orders of reality is a genuine difference; and it occurs because there comes about a change in the mode of the knower's apprehension of reality. What was apprehended on the pāramārthika level directly or immediately, and in a single, undifferentiated grasp, is broken into two parts, and then
apprehended mediately, dimly, approximately, and in a non-reciprocatory manner by only one of the two parts, viz., the mind. So, to speak accurately, there is no such thing as degrees of reality; there are only degrees of the apprehension of reality. Metaphysically, and from the view-point of intuitive experience, i.e., where epistemology and metaphysics coalesce, the real is one; mere epistemologically, and from the sensuous point of view, it appears as consisting of the many objects of the wakeful, or the dreaming condition. Besides, there is this difference between the intuited Brahman and the non-intuited empirical objects, that whereas the former is everlasting, continuous, energizing and blissful, the latter are transitory, discontinuous, inert, infatuatory, and causing misery. And so, until the defects of the latter are remedied by a constant intellectual, moral, and spiritual discipline, to call the world as nothing but Brahman is, notwithstanding its metaphysical claim to its being called in this way, is audacious and dangerous. We must, epistemologically, first rise to Brahmanubhava, and then see the world re-lit by the light of this consciousness of the Brahman. Till then we shall remain content by saying that the world we live in on the vyāvahārika level is a world in which we see the presence of Brahman through the thick glasses of upādhis, that is, a world the reality of which we dimly apprehend.

8. Value of dreams.

Next, in order comes the world of dreams. Now, shall we say with Gaudapāda that the waking life is as unreal as the dream, because both are due to imagination, or say with Śaṅkara that the dream also is real to a certain extent, though not as real as the waking life? Before we answer one way or the other, or reconcile the elements of truth in both the statements of the two Ācāryas, let us examine the characteristics of a dream. In the first place, the world of dreams is a different creation altogether. There are no actual chariots and horses, and yet we see them in a dream; and so long as
the dream lasts, these new constructs are as real to us as the concrete things are in the waking life. But we say that the dream is unreal, because it is contradicted by the experiences of the waking life; nay, it is contradicted by the experiences in the dream itself. A tree in the dream may soon appear as a man, and the man as an elephant. But, in the second place, as Samkara himself tells us, the dream is connected with the waking life. It has sometimes got a prophetic character. Coming events of the waking life cast their shadows before in the dream. There are warnings and premonitions in a dream. Like the experiences of the waking life, the dreams also, it is said, are the effects of the impressions of the actions and desires of the previous life. Though they are the creations of the jiva, they are ultimately said to be the creations of the highest Lord, just as the things of this world are. And besides, the dreams sometimes enter into living connection with the waking life. The trembling and the weeping due to fear and grief in the dreaming condition continues for some time, even after the dream is over and the man is fully awake. And further, the fact that a dream is recalled with more or less the same vividness and interest as objects of the past, shows that it is not very much unlike the actual, concrete world. All this shows that the dream is not as unreal as it is supposed to be.

If however, in the third place, the dream be compared with the waking life in some other respects, we shall find that the two orders of reality have got different values for us. For instance, during the condition of dream, the waking life is neither real nor unreal. It simply does not exist. The world of dreams is the only real and the valuable world. In a dream as such, neither comparison nor contrast is possible between it and an experience of the waking life. It is only during the condition of wakefulness that we can, for the first time, become aware not only of the contrast between the dream and the waking life, but also of the unreality of the dream, inasmuch as the objects seen in the dream do
not continue to exist and fulfil the purposes of our waking life. The waking life is thus superior to and more real than the dream because it can feel the contrast between the two states, and appreciate the worth of each. The hard facts of the objective world are not simply imaginings of the mind in the wakeful condition; in the dream they are simply this and nothing more. The dream is therefore said to be illusory when it is compared with the wakeful condition. And yet, the value of the waking life will not be more than a dream if it is wasted merely in a hunt for pleasures, and is not utilized for the purpose of the realization of the Brahman.

In one way, however, the dream affords us more room to assert that there can be consciousness without any reference to the actual objects of the world and the operations of the senses and the body. It is not in the waking life so much as in the dream that we get the evidence for the belief in the self-effulgent nature of the Ātman. But we need not, on this account, say that the dream is more real than the waking life. For the belief is not formed in the dream itself; it is the result of a comparison between the two states, after the dream is over. It is a judgment of the waking life made about the dream. The dream is not to be preferred to the waking life on account of its being only an occasion for making us guess in theory the nature of the Ātman. The evidence is only analogical and indirect. The upādhis of the body and the senses are only concealed in ignorance during the dream; they are not eliminated by us deliberately by an act of will or knowledge, as is possible in the wakeful condition alone. Naturally, they are more powerful in dreams than they are in the waking life in preventing us from apprehending the Real. Being merely a passive spectator, the dreamer has to remain a slave of avidyā, and at the mercy of fate; and as such, the consciousness of the dreaming condition is removed at a greater distance from the undifferentiated consciousness of the Ātman, than it is in the waking condition.
So, notwithstanding, Gauḍapāda’s opinion that the wakeful condition resembles the dream inasmuch as in both of them it is the citta that creates and experiences the false duality of subject and object, we feel constrained to side with Śāṅkara and hold with him that the waking life is more real than the dream, because, in the first place, it contradicts the dream and is not contradicted by it. Secondly, it is more concrete, tangible, and enduring than the dream. Thirdly, the dreams are merely subjective experiences; we have an objective common world in the waking life on account of the employment of the senses and intellect. Fourthly, the value judgments about dreams and about waking and other conditions are possible only in the waking life. And above all, it is in the waking life and not in dreams that the realization of Brahman is to be achieved. The waking life is the most precious possession we can have in this world, and the jīvan-mukti, the most precious treasure we can achieve in the waking condition, and not in dreams.

9. No Brahmandhana in sleep.

Sleep, swoon, and death are obviously the stages of unconsciousness. They differ in degrees, though in sleep it is, they say, that all beings visit the Brahman. More than the dream, the sleep may give us a very suitable occasion to study intellectually and by analogy the possibility of an experience where there is neither the subject nor the object. But sleep is nothing but ignorance incarnate in which are merged all things and differences. The feeling indicated by the expression ‘I had a sound sleep’ is explained by some as a memory of the prior actual experience in sleep, and therefore, indicative of the consciousness of the union with Brahman. But this is wrong. The experience of having a sound sleep only indicates that in sleep there was no pain, fatigue, or dream. And, if the soul is once united with Brahman, why should it fall from this blessed

condition without any reason and come to the waking condition, only to forget that it was so united? The unconscious existence of the soul in Brahman is not peculiar to it only in sleep. Like all other things in the world, the soul also has its existence in all its conditions, only in Brahman. Just as the dream offers us a peculiar opportunity to infer about the self-effulgent nature of the Átman, even so, the sleep offers us a peculiar opportunity to infer about the union or the non-difference of the soul from Brahman. But this is no conscious union in the least.

10. Supra-consciousness at the back of all.

Here, too, in sleep, metaphysically the Brahman is present; but epistemologically, there is no apprehension of it, except perhaps the apprehension of it as avidyā, as is inferrible from the subsequent expression of the experience of a sound sleep, viz., 'I knew nothing then'. Brahmanic consciousness, on the other hand, is the deliberate, immediate, unforgettable, conscious, joyful, energizing knowledge of the unity of the subject and the object. If it is to be realized at all, it is in the waking life, though it is different from the waking life, as well as from dream and sleep. It is immanent in all of them, though transcendent also, metaphysically speaking; but it is to be realized epistemologically and psychologically in the waking life of man, the logical and verbal expression of which will be 'I am the Brahman'; 'I am all this world'. Instead, if any one says that in deep sleep he might get the Brahmanubhave, then perhaps we may say that we may get it more in swoon or death than in sleep; we may as well say that a stone is better fitted for having it than a man. The Upanisadic references to sleep during which all are said to meet the Brahman, are only meant, to suggest that the rest and the comfort we get is due to the unconscious merging of the soul in Brahman, and not due to its taking rest in the puritat and the nādis. We may grant that we unknowingly meet the Brahman everyday in sleep, but we know that when we wake up we are as ignorant of Brahman, as we
the what. A general knowledge or bare awareness, on the sensational level, of something which has a zigzag, winding form, is there to start with. But before the what or the meaning of the rope, viz., that it is made of cotton, is added on to its that, the mind glides on to the what of the snake. This diversion of the mind may occur on account of different reasons. Possibly, the man is afraid to go in the dark; or he knows that snakes are usually found in that place, and so on. So, it is this mental disposition, coupled with the ignorance of the rope in its essential nature, and the general awareness of the zigzag form of the rope which happens to be a common element with the rope and the snake, that are responsible to rouse the memory of the snake and to superimpose it on the rope.

Now, what does this illusion mean for us? Is it totally unreal? Is it simply false? How is it to be related with the Caitanya about which we have been speaking? We answer these questions by saying that illusion too is a mode of apprehending the Real, though it is unconscious, instinctive, and hasty. It indicates the struggle of the spirit to know the Spirit, though due to various reasons it becomes frustrated in its attempt. We have seen how even on the empirical level, this effort of the caitanya to know the Caitanya is successful in a partial way. The real is apprehended dimly, mediately, and in a non-reciprocatory manner from the side of the knower only. How much more difficult the struggle must be when the subject is labouring under the weight of avidyā or ignorance of the substratum, the predisposition of the mind, the faulty media through which it has to work, the hurry of the situation as a whole, and the circumstance that the what of the object comes from memory? The struggle is a genuine struggle; only it is channelled in a different way on account of these several reasons. That is why, in spite of its being false and unfruitful, the illusion is not totally unreal, as the son of a barren woman is. It is real not only so long as it is not contradicted, but
also afterwards, to the extent to which it is valued as having the whole of its being in a substratum which remains unchallenged as something given for perception. The correction of an illusion is possible, because it points to the reality which is not simply transcendent but immanent in it. It is the snake which becomes the pointer to the rope, just as truly as a jar becomes a pointer to the clay. To put it negatively, it is no non-snake that points out the rope, just as it is no non-jar that points out the clay. Otherwise, the curds may as well point out the jar. So when we mentally move from the snake to the rope, we are not moving from complete non-existence to existence, but only from a possible existence to an actual existence, though the possible and the actual existents are two different objects. No doubt, for our practical life, the difference between the possible and the actual existents is too great for us to admit them together; for one of them is memorized and the other is perceived. But, in theory, the difference between the possibility and the actuality is narrowed down to a point as if, inasmuch as both the existents have got the same common characteristics, viz., the zigzag, winding form in the instance taken for illustration. It is this genuine piece of knowledge which is apprehended by the knower in any case of illusion. And this is no small gain.

In this connection, it will be worth while to note that according to Śaṅkara it will be more than useless to believe that the difference between pariṇāma-vāda and vivarta-vāda is the difference between sama-sattā and viṣama-sattā. For, as we shall show later on, both the views are compatible with each other in the philosophy of Śaṅkara, and that both serve the same purpose. Whether it is the ornament of gold or the serpent on the rope, the function of both of them is to direct the attention to the cause, viz., gold or the rope. And when the substratum is realized, the ornament and the snake are reduced to the same position, viz., as having the status of nothing but name and form.
MĀYA, AVIDYĀ, AND VIDYĀ AS POWERS OF BRAHMAN

The doctrine of māyā is not a new thing in Saṁkara. As Professor R. D. Ranade says, it comes in his philosophy as an heritage of the Upaniṣadic thought in general. Under one name or another, various Upaniṣads mention it; Saṁkara only fixes the place and the function of it in his system. What we have now to do is to establish its relation to Brahman, on the one hand, and to the world and the individual soul, on the other.

To begin with, māyā cannot be a separate entity at all; for, in that case, Saṁkara’s system will be dualistic in nature. If Māyā is the same as avidyā, then, as Saṁkara says, it is located in the Jīva or in that very person who asks any question about it (Bra. Sū. 4, 1, 3). In another place, that is, while dealing with the nature of adhyāsa or avidyā in the very beginning of his Commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, he says that it has neither beginning nor end. Now, if Saṁkara’s system is non-dualistic, and if the jīva and the world are nothing but Brahman, we have no other option but to locate the māyā in Brahman alone. There will however crop up the logical difficulty of reconciling the nature of māyā with that of Brahman. If it is of the nature of darkness or ignorance, it certainly cannot co-exist with the light or the knowledge of Brahman. Hence, by locating māyā in Brahman we must accept what is palpably contradictory in nature; or by locating it in the jīva, accept the dualism of jīva and Brahman, as also the dualism of Brahman and māyā, though the working of adhyāsa may go on without any interruption.

1. *The account of creation, a clue to solution.*

We shall however be able to get out of these and other difficulties by looking into the account which
Sarhkarā has given regarding the creation of the world, a problem which has been neglected so far in Vedānta. Following the cosmological account of the Upaniṣads, Sarhkarā holds fast to the pārvatāvadvāla so far as the creation of the elements in sequence is concerned (2, 3, 1-13). What is known as the original prakṛti is for him the Brahman. He asserts: thereby that Brahman is not only the efficient but also the material cause of the universe; and in support of this he says: unless all the created things including akāśa are considered as the products of the vikāras of Brahman, just as the pots are of clay, it will be impossible to understand how when Brahman is known, everything else will be known. In giving an account of how tejas is produced, he tells us that it is not vāyu which has produced it, but it is Brahman which, after having 'seen' and er at akāśa and vāyu, first assumed the forms of akāśa and vāyu, and then produced the tejas. As milk is transformed into curd, even so the Brahman assumes the different forms of the elements and of other things after having first thought about them. Then it enters into them as the ātman of them all, and controls and maintains them from within, though no one of them, neither the earth nor the sun nor any other thing, knows it in return. Herein we find the genesis of māyā which is implicit in Sarhkarā, but which has now been formulated explicitly by Śri Aurobindo.

2. Brahman hidden by individualized consciousness.

Brahman as the immanent principle of the world has in it the three moments of existence, conscious energy, and bliss. This conscious satā or the existence of Brahman is continuously present in all the animate and inanimate world; even after akāśa as the first product comes into being, it is Brahman in the form of akāśa which exists. If akāśa itself were to put forth this statement, it would say something like 'I am akāśa', rather than 'I am Brahman in the form of akāśa'. It will be conscious of its own existence and not of the
existence of Brahman within it. We are told that, like Brahman, ākāśa, in its turn, 'saw' within itself and produced vāyu, just as prior to the creation of ākāśa Brahman had 'seen' ākāśa within him and produced it. But it is forgotten that this capacity of 'seeing' is not of ākāśa, but that of the Brahman which had entered in it. So, when vāyu and tejas were produced, we are not to suppose that it was ākāśa which had entered into vāyu, or that it was vāyu which had entered into tejas, but that it was Brahman which had first thought or 'seen' within itself ākāśa and vāyu, and then produced them, in succession. Brahman, in other words, had assumed the forms of these first, and then entering into them, in succession, produced afterwards the tejas, that is, assumed its form and entered into it as its very soul. This means that, though at every stage of creation the conscious energy or the caitanya of Brahman is immanent in the acts of 'seeing' on the part of ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, and so on, it is being increasingly hidden at every stage by the individualized consciousness of these very products or elements. This is what is told by the Upaniṣadic passage (Br. 3, 7, 9) that though Brahman is controlling everything from within as its inner soul, the earth does not know it, the sun does not know it. It is to impress this very lesson on the mind, viz., how the Brahmanic consciousness is lost sight of, and how the superimposition of individual consciousness is set up, that there runs the Upaniṣadic story of how the sun and the wind, being puffed up with their own power, could not recognize the Brahman whose power they had within them, but how they were afterwards unable to burn or blow off a blade of grass which they were asked to do (Ken. 3 & 4).

It is the narrowing down of consciousness, and the superimposition of this limited, pointwise, individualized consciousness on the unlimited, all-pervasive, impersonal, energizing consciousness of Brahman, and the consequent self-assertion of the finite individual as against that of the Brahman even at the first step of
creation, which constitute, we may say, the first act of the infinite drama of mayā. To forget the substratum and to posit something other than it is just the essence of adhyāsa or avidyā. This is the sense of egoism, which produces the wrong notion that the product, the vikāra or the upādhi is something different from the upādhiless producer. It is as if the view which an ornament of gold should have about itself as something different from gold. But it has its existence only in name and form. Withdraw the name and form, and there remains the gold alone. Mayā understood in the sense of avidyā therefore exists only in name and form and is bound up with the self-assertive, exclusive, and restricted consciousness of the upādhis.

So much with reference to the superimposition that takes place with reference to the consciousness of the existential or the that aspect of Brahma on account of the restricted consciousness involved even at the initial stages of creation. Add to this the superimposition that takes place explicitly with reference to the what aspect of Brahma, viz., its caitanya and ananda. It becomes then the full-fledged knowledge of what one is not, or the ignorance of what one really is. The Ātman is neither lame nor blind, neither the son nor the father of anybody, neither fair nor ugly, neither miserable nor happy; and yet man calls himself so, and is ever hunting after the shortlived imaginary happiness, forgetting all the while that he is all-energy, all-knowledge and all-bliss. The divinity of ākāsa being the first product must be considered to be fortunate enough to have only one layer of avidyā around it. Or, as a matter of that, we may call either the Hiranyagarbha, the Prajāpati, the Virāt, the Brahmā, or the Iśvara to be so, inasmuch as he is the first-born. But vāyu has ākāsa as its proximate cause; it is born of an element that is already vitiated by avidyā. So, it appears that the individualized consciousness of vāyu is doubly vitiated by it. If, in this way, the inherited avidyā is to combine at every stage with a new layer of it, we have to grant that man who
is made up of several upādhis of the elements, the intellect, the mind, the egoism, and the senses, must be the most unfortunate of all, inasmuch as he has to work under the infinite burden of the several layers of avidyā. In a way, it is so. The ordinary common-sense man whose horizon has been described for him by the limited, hedonistic ways of a comfortable and smooth living, and who has therefore not gone much beyond the animal level of being guided by the gregarious instinct in order to protect himself and his race, is really under the heavy burden of avidyā and is far removed from Brahman. In the Vedāntic terminology we call such a person baddha or bound in samsāra. He has completely forgotten his own real nature, and is content with identifying himself with what he is not.


But whence comes this forgetfulness or the darkness of ignorance in the finite beings like ākāśa and others, when as a matter of fact Brahman which is immanent in them all is pure consciousness, and is the light of eternal knowledge? To answer this question we have to take into consideration the combination of two peculiar, but different powers of Brahman, the kriyāsakti and the jñānaśakti. In his commentary on the Kaṭhopaniṣad (1, 3 11) Śaṅkara calls the avyakta as the samuḥa or the collection of the different powers of Brahman, and says in Śū. 1, 4, 3 that it is also known as Māyā. Now, if Brahman’s power of knowledge alone is taken into consideration, it appears to be a contradiction to say that ignorance or avidyā comes out of knowledge. But if another power, viz., the creative power of Brahman is taken into consideration along with knowledge, we shall be able to explain not only the process of creation, as seen above, but also the emergence of avidyā out of māyā, even at the start of the creative process. As a matter of fact, the first thought of Brahman, ‘I am alone, let me be many’ is responsible for germinating it. The consciousness
of Brahman that it is one as against the possible many, and its resolve to become many are, as if, the first step of the make-believe on the part of Brahman; and so what cannot be in the nature of things, viz., the plurality comes to be there by its own right. It is this sankalpa or ahankara attached to the thought of Brahman that constitutes, we may say, the root of avidya. The sankalpa cannot be barren; it is satya-sankalpa and is therefore powerful to externalize the thoughts it involves. Hence, arise the elements, the indriyas, the bodies, the mind, the intellect, the ahankara, and the prana. These constitute the upadhis of nama and rupa. But they will be mere dead skeletons, till Brahman does not enter into them all and gets itself circumscripted, as it were, by them. The pure, advaitic, energizing, consciousness which is incapable of being characterized even as one, but which, imagining itself to be one, has, now, on account of its powers, become manifested as many and has overcome on them both its existence and knowledge. Locked at from the view-point of Brahman, there is no fundamental difference as yet between what we earlier and what appears to have come in afterwards. From the beginning to the end, it is the same, homogenous power that worked out the upadhis, and the same, homogenous consciousness which is immanent in them all. If Brahman itself were to speak, it would say ‘Where are the many? All this is myself alone’. If gold were to look at the ornaments made out of it, or the ocean to the waves on it, they would speak exactly in the same way, viz., ‘Where are the many ornaments?’ ‘Where are the waves different from me?’ Avidya is therefore involved in the very sankalpa of Brahman: but it makes no effect on it. The plurality thus only appears to be in name and form.

4. Māyā as avidyā refers to upādhis and circumscribed consciousness.

The picture presents however a different form when it is viewed from the angle of the upadhis,
which appear, as if, they are the objective, independent perceptible facts of space and time, and compel us to recognize them as different from the knower. How is there this great change? How is it that the world and the soul appear as different from Brahman? Why is it that man has forgotten that he is essentially Brahman? To answer these questions we must remember what we have said a little above, viz., that the pure, energizing consciousness has been circumscribed and narrowed down, as if, to a point by the upādhis of the body, intellect, mind and so on, just as ākāśa is narrowed down to a small portion of it by the walls of a room or of a jar. If the ākāśa in the room were to speak out what it is, it would surely either identify itself with the room and say, ‘I am a room’; or, it would be conscious of itself as limited ākāśa and say, ‘I am ākāśa bounded by the walls of the room’. Even so, a man would say that he is either the body, the intellect, the mind, etc., or say that he is the spirit possessing these upādhis. But in no case, so long as the upādhis and the consciousness circumscribed by these upādhis continue to exist together, and guide his thinking and doing, will he be able to recognize that he is the Brahman. And it is just this combination of the upādhis and of the circumscribed consciousness that we wish to call as avidyā. It is on account of this avidyā that, on the one hand, there goes on continuously the identification of the jīva (the limited consciousness) with the upādhis, and that, on the other hand, the upādhis which are like so many walls surrounding the consciousness, get themselves hardened to such an extent that the jīva soon forgets its own real nature. He feels he is different from Brahman and from other men. Just as a cloud produced by the Sun hides him from men’s view without affecting the Sun in any way, even so, the upādhis produced by the will of Brahman, limit and hide the Brahman from the view of the jīvas without affecting the Brahman in the least. And when the ignorance or avidyā becomes established in this way, it naturally leads to the adhyāsa and the distorted view
of even the limited consciousness of which Śaṅkara has spoken so eloquently at the beginning of his Commentary on the Brahma-sūtras.

Is maya then real or unreal? Firstly, it is real in the sense that it represents the will-power of Brahman. As such, it enters into the very constitution of things. It is without beginning or end. But, secondly, it is unreal in the sense of avidyā, which is, as seen above, the root cause of adhyāṣa. The jīva is not produced, and is in reality identical with Brahman; and so, the very conception of jīvahood as meaning the distorted and limited consciousness due to various upādhis is illusory. Māyā in this sense of avidyā has both a beginning and an end. Thirdly, it is unreal and yet works, as if, it is a reality, because it has its origin in the combination of the different powers of Brahman. It is the source of adhyāṣa and illusion, and is positive and real so long as the illusion lasts. In this sense, it is anivaṃsī. It is no longer the māya, i.e., the conscious, unlimited, eternal power of Brahman which exhibits itself now as creative will, now as pure consciousness, now as the sattā or ground of all, and now as the controlling power within everything. It appears as avidyā, and exhibits itself as the limiting upādhis, as the limited and the twisted consciousness of the individual ego, as the ground of the adhyāṣa or superimposition, and as the root cause of this seemingly endless samsāra of nāma and rūpa, and of the transitory fruits and miseries. The original, beginningless, and endless māyā or power of Brahman is thus found out to be transformed into avidyā on account of the confluence of its own moments of creative urge and conscious energy; and then at the next stage, there comes about the peculiar combination of upādhis and restricted consciousness, and the consequent mutual superimposition of the real and the unreal due to avidyā.
5. *Maya as vidya saves the soul.*

Thus, unlike *Maya*, the original, eternal, real, and inseparable power of Brahman, avidyā is the short-lived, real-unreal, separable power which is derived from *maya*. So, it comes to an end by the working of another power of Brahman which resides potentially along with it in the jīva. It is known as vidyā. In essence, this is nothing but the original *maya*, in its aspect of sattva-guna. It assumes the form of viveka which discriminates the real from the unreal. It then becomes the purified sattva-guna, on account of which the jīva leans for support on the advice of the experts and the illumined souls, resorts to fortitude, makes determined efforts to undo the work of avidyā, tamas, and rajas, and ultimately realizes that he is one with the Brahman. *Maya* thus may be said to assume altogether a new form of the conscious energy which will save the bewildered individual soul from its own restricted and exclusive consciousness of being different from Brahman. We call this as *vidyā*. It will no longer bind the soul by forging new and golden fetters of sattva, over and above the brass and iron fetters of rajas and tamas, but will free the soul and help it on in its journey to Ātmānubhava. *Maya*, in short, will now be an instrument of grace rather than an instrument of spreading cosmic illusion or darkness through avidyā. In the perpetual play or the vilāsa of Brahman, it is the doctrine of *Maya* which makes possible for the soul to witness the game of hide and seek. As avidyā, it hides the real only to project the unreal, as is generally supposed. But this is only half the game. *Maya* comes forward as *vidyā*, and induces the man to play the game fully. It helps him in his efforts to open the golden, tempting lid which has covered the treasure of Brahmacāyāna and to scatter away the illusion of darkness and misery. It enables him to go from death to immortal life, from the miseries of the ego to the life of ānanda and caitanya of Brahman. In its sāttvika aspect, *Maya* becomes the necessary link between bondage and liberty.
6. Parināma and Vivarta are compatible with each other.

We are now in a position to solve the much-vexed, and, in a way, the crucial question, 'Is the world real or unreal?' 'In the parināma of Brahman or the vivarta on it?' Now it is a misfortune, in the first place, that all the scholars from Ramānuja onwards should hold that the two words 'parināma' and 'vivarta' are incompatible with each other, and that, secondly, 'parināma' should connote the reality and 'vivarta' the unreality of the world. So far as Sāmkaraśārya is concerned neither of the two words is exclusively the key to the question of the reality or the unreality of the world. Of course, they are useful to point out a relative valuation of the world, which will only help us in solving the problem. The world is real not because it is the 'parināma' of Brahman, or unreal because it is the 'vivarta' on it. As Sāmkaraśārya holds, it is real because it is nothing else but Brahman; it is unreal because it is taken to be something other than Brahman. With Brahman the world is real, without it is unreal. It is up to us to view the world as real or not, to view it as endowed with the light and firmness of Brahman, or to view it as darkness and misery which may arise by clasping a superimposed shadow. There is the world-wide difference between reality and unreality; not so between parināma and vivarta. They are, as a matter of fact, compatible with each other, as Sāmkara holds. Taken separately and exclusively, Parināmavāda and Vivarta-vāda are both dogmatic. That is why Sāmkara has taken both the kinds of illustrations to make us aware of the relation between the world and the Brahman. The world is like a snake on the rope, a mirage in the desert, silver on the shell, a castle in the clouds; and it is strangely enough like a vessel made of clay, an ornament of gold, curds of milk, a ripple on water, a piece of cloth out of threads. If parināma or vivarta were to be the sole criterion of reality, the Acārya would appear as breathing hot and cold at the same time. And if he is not, and if he has a purpose in making use of these
seemingly contradictory types of illustrations, we must first cast overboard the traditional notion that parināma and vivarta are incompatible with each other, and that they are the pointers to the reality and unreality of the world respectively. To choose only one kind of illustrations and say that Saṁkara holds vivartavāda or parināmavāda, is arbitrary and false.

7. Both direct our attention to the cause.

The illustrations which convey to us the idea that the world is only an appearance are intended to direct our attention from the appearance to the substratum which is real. The snake ought to be a reminder to the rope, even so the world or the effect must be a reminder to Brahman as its cause. Similarly, the illustrations, which convey the idea that the world is the transformation of Brahman are intended to direct our attention to the fact that the cause persists in the effect, that it is the Brahman which gets itself manifested or transformed as ākāśa, vāyu, prāṇa, manas, buddhi, and others. So, whether we have the forward movement from cause to effect, or the backward movement from effect to cause, what Saṁkara is anxious to point out is the non-difference of the effect from the cause, that is, the non-difference of the world and of the jīva from Brahman. If Brahman as the cause is real, the world and the jīva as effects will be as real as the Brahman. But in viewing the effects one must be conscious of the fundamental thesis that in so doing he is only viewing the cause. In other words, if the law for the Vedāntin is 'to view the effect is to view the cause', it is immaterial if the world is taken to be on the pattern of a snake on the rope, or on the pattern of a vessel made out of clay. For in both the cases, the substratum or the cause is to be viewed. But if instead of this, the non-Vedāntin's view is to prevail, viz., 'to view the effect is to view it as different or divorced from the cause', the world is, according to Saṁkara, unreal, even though it comes out of Brahman, and is a perceivable fact of space and time.
So, though there is a great difference from the ordinary, common-sense point of view between parināma and vivarta, there is no such difference from the viewpoint of Śamkara. The chief point is not the manner or the mode in which the cause is manifested in the effects. For whether we call the world as transformation or appearance, it is still an effect; and it will be viewed as real or unreal, if it is viewed as non-different or different from the cause. We do not judge the world to be real or unreal by simply saying that it is a parināma or vivarta of Brahman; we decide it by viewing it as non-different or different from Brahman. What fundamental difference will there be if we say that the snake which appears on the rope is the transformation of the rope, or that the ornament which is the transformation of gold is an appearance on gold, so long as we are to view the snake and the ornament as effects only? What else is the ornament except the appearance of a name and a form over and above the gold, though we choose to call it as the transformation of gold? What else is the snake except the transformation of the rope into the form of the snake, though we call that the snake appears on the rope? Śamkara says, "whatever is made of gold is forever of the nature of gold; even so everything born of Brahman must be of the nature of Brahman". But, says he, paradoxically, in the same context, 'gold is perceived as an ear-ring'; 'the ear-ring, however, is nothing but a name, appearing on the gold, as silver appears on the shell'. So, in spite of the fact that the ear-ring is made of gold, Śamkara has no hesitation to say that it is but a name, and that it has the same status as the appearance of silver on the shell. We need not however be frightened by the mere words ‘name’ or ‘appearance’ as if the whole world is lost to us. Let us leave our common notions that reality and unreality are necessarily attached to the words parināma and vivarta, and understand with Śamkara that the reality behind our common-sense knowledge and illusion is the reality of cause. If even the illusory snake is thus
MĀYĀ, AVIDYĀ, AND VIDYĀ AS POWERS OF BRAHMAN 495

capable of pointing out the reality of the rope, how much more should this world, born of Brahman as it is, be able to point out that it is but a name and form of Brahman alone? And how much more should the jīva be able to realize that he is nothing else but Brahman, even though he is deluded by upādhis and superimpositions?

8. The three viewpoints.

But wait, there is a corollary to this and we must accept it with courage. If the rope is seen, the serpent disappears; even so, if Brahman as the substratum is realized, the meaning attached to the world, viz., that it consists of names and forms, vanishes. For these names and forms do not really exist as something over and above the Brahman. It is a different thing that an ordinary man does not wish to lose the grip of this saṃsāra. He will necessarily feel sorry when the ornaments he wears and loves are turned into a lump of gold; for though he knows in theory that they are made of gold, his practical interest lies in the names and forms. It is given to the student of philosophy to appreciate that the many are nothing but the different expressions of a single principle, just as it is given to the goldsmith to look upon the ornaments as gold only. There is still the higher viewpoint which Saṅkara has in mind. It is that of svānu-bhava. A mystic who has realized the Brahman will say that all this is verily the Brahman and that it is real. In his unitive experience of Brahman, he transcends all sense of duality, whether it is of the common-sense, practical worldly life, or of the theistic devotional life; and so, it will be worse than useless to press upon him the dualistic consciousness of subject and object to which we are accustomed. What he means is that if there be anything else than Brahman it is unreal; and that if there is anything born out of Brahman it is as real as Brahman because it is non-different from Brahman.
when we come to the illustration of gold and its ornament according to which the world is real, excepting the transitory appearance of names and forms. Here, both the ornament and gold have in common the that and the what, though there is some difference. The that of gold is more in extent than the that of the ornament. There is elsewhere more gold than what is found in the ornament. But so far as the 'what' is concerned, the ornament appears to possess more of it than what the gold possesses. The particular form and the name which appear in the ornament are not found in gold; and that is why when the ornament is resolved back into gold, the appearances of name and form disappear. The ornament is produced out of the real gold, and has an exchangeable value with gold so long as it exists; but when it merges back into gold, the extra marks of name and form which it had come to possess on account of its ignorance, as it were, of the fact that it is nothing but gold, and on account of its assertion, as it were, that it is only an ornament, are bound to disappear because they lack the aspect of that. In other words, they are mere imaginary, born of speech, and hang suspended on the substratum gold, as the snake hangs on the rope. Śaṅkarācārya therefore is absolutely correct when he says that the world is real because, in essence, it is nothing but Brahman. And yet, the names and forms which make the world by themselves and apart from Brahman, have got only nominal value. In one way, they can be construed as the ways of manifestation or vilāsa of Brahman, and so declared to be as real as the Brahman. And yet, they are, in another way, no better than appearances because they have only nominal existence, or an existence which is too fleeting. He recommends us therefore to accept the vivarta view of the world, even though he holds that the world as an effect is as real as its cause. For, is it not very likely that in embracing the world as reality, we may unawares be caught in the clouds of the names and forms of it, and delude ourselves to such an extent that we may not be able to see the Sun of reality.
at all? The cidvilāsa theory is, no doubt, correct; all this is verily the Brahman. But the all which includes in it the names and forms may be so alluring that we may indulge in them only, and thus lose sight of Brahman. If anybody is prepared to say that the parināma-vāda or the cidvilāsa-vāda may even transform the elements born of avidyā into Brahman, then surely we are not having the philosophy of Śāmkaraśārya. Nor is it possible from the viewpoint of the Ācārya to have any compromise with the idlers, pretenders, and rascals who wish to indulge in nothing but the sensuous and sensual pleasures of life under the pretext of being faithful to the cidvilāsa theory. The cidvilāsa ought to be the vilāsa of caitanya or Brahman with itself. This is possible only after Brahmāniḍhāva and not before it; this, in its turn, is possible only after one learns how to meditate on Brahman and forget the names and forms, by undergoing constantly a moral, intellectual, and spiritual discipline.

11. Anirvacānitya of the world, and the parting of ways.

Our discussion so far will make it also clear that we do not subscribe to the post-Samkārite view according to which the world is a parināma of māyā, but a vivarta on Brahman. The distinction between viśama-sattā and sama-sattā goes away the moment we accept the view that māyā is the name of the powers of Brahman and not of cosmic illusion. There is ultimately no other sattā from the viewpoint of Śāmkara except that of Brahman. That is why Śāmkara holds that even during the states of sleep and dream which are mutually exclusive of each other, the sattā of Brahman is constant. In sleep, the jīva is embraced by the Anāmi; and in dream, the creation of objects can be attributed, says he, to the almighty Creator. The illusory appearance also is based on some object which in its aspect of viśayacaitanya is no other than the Brahma-caitanya ultimately. The value of the world therefore is not increased or decreased by calling it simply a parināma or a vivarta.
In spite of the common-sense reality which belongs to it, and in spite of its being the pariṇāma of Brahman, it is no better than a dream or an illusion, if it does not offer us any opportunity to realize Brahman in this very life. On the contrary, in spite of its fleeting nature, and in spite of the miseries in it, it will appear to us as endowed with the light of Brahman, if we are soaked fully in the conscious energy and ananda of Brahman. The same world will give us eternity within our short span of life. The world ought to be considered as unreal from the point of view of enjoyment of pleasures only; it ought to be considered as real from the point of view of attaining Brahmanubhava. The world is then both the pariṇāma and vivarta on Brahman. It contains in it both the element of vidyā and avidyā and is therefore capable of presenting us with the double aspect of reality and unreality. It is, therefore, anirvacaniya. Now, whether we should call Brahmanubhava as real, or our common-sense dualistic experience as real will depend entirely upon us. To Śaṅkara the sense of duality in any form will be a source of unreality, misery and fear: the sense of oneness the source of reality, joy, fearlessness, and freedom. And this is the perpetual value of Vedānta and of the doctrine of Māyā in it. The Śaṅkara Vedānta does not teach us to flee away from the world thinking that it is unreal, and to become idle and lead the life of a parasite. It teaches us to stick to this world not with a coveteous mind, but with the mind of a benevolent redeemer, who saves himself first by realising the Brahmanic life, and saves others through love, sacrifice, service, and instruction of the Brahma-vidyā.

12. Māyāvāda, the best of the three views.

Now, with all this, one may hold, that we are having the Ajātavāda of Gaudapāda again in Śaṅkara. As it appears to us, the Māyāvāda is the mean or the necessary link between the ajātavāda and the cidvilāsa-vāda. It is the explanation of how what appears, from
one point of view, as the ajātavāda is, from another point of view, the cidvilāsaśa. As manifestations the many are the vilasa of Brahman; but as Brahman is the only essence, they are as good as naught. The one becomes the many; but the many are not different in essence from the one, except in name and form. That is to say, the Māyāvāda achieves the double purpose of showing of how the many can be viewed as either the appearances or the manifestations of the one. The many are retained, but then they are in essence the One; and at the same time, the names and forms are treated as transient show, and as having no independent existence over and above the One.

But one may ask, 'What are the many without the names and forms?', and say, 'It is these which are the many'. And so it may appear that we have the alternative between the reality of the one Brahman only, or the reality of it along with the many names and forms. It is exactly here, we say in reply, that Śaṅkara’s philosophy of Māyāvāda comes to our help. The names and forms according to him are not mere non-entities; not non-existent like the mirage or the horn of a hare; they are the manifestations of the One. As reminders of Brahman they are real; as transitory appearances, and as apart from Brahman, they are unreal. To become perpetually aware of Brahman and of nothing else but Brahman is the common and the real aim of all the three views, viz., the Ajātavāda, the Māyāvāda, and the Cidvilāsaśa. To put it differently, it is the common function of all the three to give up the many, if it exists apart from Brahman, as imaginary, and unreal. Where are the many? This would be the natural expression of the conviction of an Ajātavādin, who looks from the point of view of the Absolute. The Brahman will certainly not be aware of anything different from him, just as the gold or the ocean will not be aware of the ornaments or the ripples as different from it. The Cidvilāsa is just the obverse of the Ajātavāda. Here however, the viewpoint is not of the Absolute or the Brahman, but of the
Brahma-vedin who finds himself as one with Brahman and one with all. As Vāmadeva would ejaculate, the Brahma-vedin would give utterance to his experience, that he alone is to the right of himself, to the left of himself, upwards and downwards, and so on. Both are pan-theistic; but whereas in the first, the emphasis is on Theos or the Spirit which is everywhere, here, in the second, the emphasis is on the pan or the all which is informed by the Spirit. In between the two, the Māyāvāda achieves, what has not been achieved by Ajātavāda and Cidvilāsavāda, viz., the reconciliation of the one and the many, pantheism and panentheism, transcendence and immanence, vivarta and parināma, and the Absolutist and the individualistic points of view. It is the doctrine of Śaṅkara alone which teaches us to get over merely the empirical, the utilitarian point of view of the common-sense realist or the pragmatist, and to see face to face the common truth of both the so-called extreme views of Ajātavāda and Cidvilāsavāda.

The Brahman, or what is known as the undifferentiated, homogeneous, mass of conscious and blissful Caitanya, is non-dual, in the sense, that any apparent smaller portion of it, though practically conceived under the guise of name and form, is non-distinct from it. Bereft of the names and forms, the world of nature and individual souls are Brahman and Brahman alone. The names and forms which go to constitute the realm of Māyā, or we may say, the world of the common-sense realist, are as good as naught when once the anubhava of the identity of the jīva and the Brahman, and of the world and the Brahman is realized. In other words, the world of Māyā which is real to the empiricist, and an appearance to an intellectualist, becomes a non-entity to the Brahmanubhavin. And yet, paradoxically, the show of names and forms is to such a mystic a mere vilāsa of the power of B-rahman which, after all, at any time may cause the vilāsa to merge in itself. And then, who can deny that the mystic is himself the Absolute as Gauḍapāda wishes to achieve?
13. Māyāvāda ekes out the deficiencies of Ajātavāda and Īśvarāśavāda.

In one more respect, the Māyāvāda of Samkara is superior to the other two. It is better fitted to eke out the deficiencies and the dangers latent in them. Brahman is the sole reality, as admitted by all. But there are certain implications of this grand truth which may not be equally admitted by all; or which when admitted may lead to over-estimation in one respect, and partial or under-estimation in other respects. If Brahman is the only reality, then certainly the knower of Brahman can be no other than Brahman. But, who is there so bold as to declare that he knows the Brahman? Besides, ‘One who says he knows has surely not known it’ (Ke. 2, 3). ‘None has ever known me’ (B. G. 7, 26). What these statements mean is that the finite can never know the Infinite; in other words, the Infinite alone can know the Infinite. But if this alone were the correct implication of the Advaitic position, then no attempt should ever be made by anyone for the realization of Brahman and the consequent destruction of ignorance. The Ajātavāda would be true, so far as the knowledge of Brahman by Brahman is concerned. But it will be unable to explain how this Brahmanic point of view is to be made compatible with the human point of view; how, in other words, the proposition, ‘the finite human being is capable of knowing the Brahman’, is true. With the admission that Brahman is an accomplished fact, the knowledge of Brahman by Brahman will also be admitted as an accomplished fact. Nay, it may even be admitted as an accomplished fact that the individual soul, so far as its real nature is concerned, (as Kāśakṛtsna suggests 1, 4, 22) is, in theory, already full of Brahmanic knowledge. But all this is insufficient to solve the practical problem as to how the finite individual soul who is immersed in the meshes of multiplicity, ignorance, and misery of samsāra is to rise (as Audulomi hopes 1, 4, 21) above them and possess the life of Brahmanic knowledge. We do not suggest that this problem is ignored by Gaudāpāda;
but we wish to make it clear that the gravity of the problem was felt more keenly by Śaṅkara in view of the internal and external enemies that grew round him, and due to whom, the moral and spiritual freedom, viz., the concrete realization of Brahmanic life became impossible for man. It became therefore, imperative for Śaṅkara to go beyond mere theorizing about the real nature of the jiva, and to point out the practical way which cuts itself away from the nihilistic doom of the void; from the static, blissless, inactive, condition of the spectator; from the perpetual sea-saw of the earthly and the heavenly sorrows and joys; and ends along with the traveller on it in the one destination of Brahman itself. Therefore, again, it became imperative for Śaṅkara to formulate explicitly the Māyāvāda which was implicit in the Upaniṣads and in Gauḍapāda, and to explain how inspite of the fact that the knowledge of Brahman is an accomplished fact, the realization of Brahman is an end to be achieved gradually by the human being, and how in this process of achievement the Māyāvāda helps the man to discard the unreal in the sense of what is transitory and external to him, and to become assimilated with the everabiding and the innermost reality within himself. The 'neti, neti' (not this, not this) method has not only metaphysical value, but epistemological also; it is not only helpful in determining the nature of Brahman, but is also helpful in casting away the upādhis and the sheaths as irrelevent in the process of realization of Brahman as the innermost Ātman. With this achievement of the Brahmān as the innermost Ātman in oneself as the first step in Brahmanic knowledge, Śaṅkara makes the forward movement towards the second step, viz., the realization of the world as verily the Brahman. This makes Śaṅkara a cidvilāsavādin also. The world as manifestation of Brahman is only a sport of Brahman; but here the toys are not different from the player, just as the ornaments of gold are not different from gold; and so, we may say, the Brahman sports with itself. The upādhis, which were cast away as irrelevant by the
‘neti, neti’ method in making the first discovery in the path of the realization of Brahman as Atman, are found, in the second discovery of realizing the world as identical with Brahman, as endowed with (inspite of their transitory nature) the glory of Brahman. The many which were unreal on account of their being viewed as having a separate existence from the One are now real as manifestations of it. The many were unreal because they were both transitory and external or separate from Brahman; they now become real because, as manifestations of Brahman, they are viewed, as if, they are the continuations of the life of Brahman, consistent with the etymological meaning of the word (Bṛha ‘to grow’).

The everlasting ‘neti’ is replaced by the everlasting ‘yaññ'; the eternity is illustrated in the temporal sequence; the nirguna Brahman appears as bahuguna; and the ajātavāda assumes the new look of cīdwilāsavāda. But all this has been made possible by the Māyāvāda of Śaṅkara. Brahman which is asserted to be merely transcendental in character by Gaudapāda is realized by Śaṅkara to be immanent also, first by the assimilation of his own individual soul with it, and then as a spread-out, continuous whole, by the assimilation of the world with it. Neither the soul nor the world has a being over and above the being of Brahman; so far, Śaṅkara is true to Gaudapāda. But there is also another side to the picture which Śaṅkara has clearly in view, though, in a way, it is not foreign to the philosophy of Gaudapada. It is the side which appears from the view-point of the direct realization of the Brahmavedin. As said above, the Brahmavedin finds the ‘I’ in him as equivalent to Brahman, and so, instead of always saying ‘I am naught, Thou art all’, he would also occasionally say ‘I am all in all’, ‘I am the food’, and ‘I am the eater of the food’. To him there is no distinction between himself and Brahman, or between himself and the world. Brahman, now, is not only transcendent but also immanent through and through. As a matter of fact, from the view point of realization, the very distinction
between transcendence and immanence, personality and impersonality, objectivity and subjectivity, one and many is meaningless. This we suppose is the crowning victory of Māyavāda that the difference between these duals, and, as such, the difference between the Ajātāvāda and Cidvilāsavāda is annulled by showing how Brahmān is at once directly experienced as the eternal subject and the eternal object. Historically, it may be said that Gauḍapāda (as also the Upaniṣad’s) is the precursor of Saṁkara, and that Rāmānuja, and Śrī Aurobindo are the successors who complete the philosophy of Saṁkara; but philosophically it can never be denied that it is in Saṁkara that we find in advance the reconciliation of Ajātavāda and Cidvilāsavāda. Saṁkara has not only explicitly formulated what was already implicitly present in Gauḍapāda, but has also clearly shown in advance the truth of the philosophy of Śrī Aurobindo.


The only caution which Saṁkara may wish us to exercise is not to hug the false and cheap Vedānta, even though it appears under tempting lebels, and confuse the manifold experiences of the empirical level as constituting the vilāsa of Brahmān. As we have said in the preface to the First Volume, the ‘Sarvam khalu idam Brahma’ ought not to put us so low as to have compromise with the idlers, the pretenders and the rascals. The vision that all this is the sport of Brahmān comes almost at the highest rung of the ladder of spiritual experience as Professor Ranade suggests in his forward; and it will be a travesty of facts to assume that we are having it in any walk of our life without paying the adequate cost of it. As the Bhagawadgitā says, ‘Rarest is the person who experiences all this as Vāsudeva’ (B. G. 7, 9).
BRAHMAN, NIRGUÑA AND SAGUÑA

1. Some wrong notions about Brahman.

There are certain erroneous notions about Brahman which we must try to exclude from the system of Saṁkara. There is first the notion that creation is a myth or illusion, and that this illusory act of creation is due not to nirguna Brahman, but to the mysterious power known as Māya and to the Īśvara who wields it. Secondly, there is the notion that the unqualified monism of Saṁkara does not allow any room, except in the region of falsity and illusion, to the practical, everyday life of the world, and to the theistic interpretation of spiritual life which includes karma and upāsanā. There is the third erroneous notion that Brahman as nirguna is the object of knowledge only, and that Brahman as saguna, the object of devotion. We shall deal with the first of these prejudices in this part, and show that creation is a fact and that it is due to the nirguna Brahman itself, and that Māya and Īśvara, as separate entities, are not at all required to account for it. As a matter of fact, we have already considered a part of this question in our previous chapter on ‘Māya, avidyā and vidyā,’ especially during our discussion of parināmavāda and vivartavāda. It will be our task also to point out the various meanings of the word saguna, and the relation between saguna and nirguna. The second and third of the prejudices, we shall reserve for our next two chapters.

2. The Nirguna Brahman as cause of the world.

Saṁkara defines Brahman as being eternal, pure, intelligent, free, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent and one. It is eternal in the sense that it is not limited by considerations of space, time and thought; it is pure in the sense that it is not affected by the defects of finitude, multiplicity or avidyā; it is active intelligence
or caitanya as opposed to what is non-intelligent or jāda; it is free in the sense that it cannot be bound or affected. Its other two qualities, of omniscience and omnipotence make us aware that Brahman is infinite, and not finite in any form. Besides, the very word Brahman means that it is the greatest of all, and that therefore it is all-pervading and one. Feeling, however, that such a Brahman may be considered as ‘wholly other’ or transcendent only, Śaṅkara tells us that Brahman is also known as the inner Self of all, and cites in evidence the feeling of certainty and identity which everyone has about the existence of his own self. Brahman therefore is also the immanent Self of all. Besides, in Sūtra 1, 1, 2, Brahman is explicitly stated to be the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the unimaginably wonderful world which is made up of names and forms, subjects and objects, causes and effects as obtaining within space and time.

3. Evidence from the commentary of Śaṅkara.

Now, it is of utmost importance to note in this connection that in the very next sentence Śaṅkara makes use for the word ‘Īśvara’ to stand for Brahman; and he draws our attention to this fact by saying that there cannot be any other cause of the world, such as Pradhāna, atoms, or any transmigratory being “except the Īśvara who is qualified as said above”, viz., as being omniscient, omnipotent, etc. It was customary with ancient Indian writers to use many words as synonyms for one idea. The limit of this we find in Viṣṇusahasranāma, where Viṣṇu is spoken of by one thousand names. So, there should be no wonder if Śaṅkara uses some synonyms for Brahman, partly because he is compelled to convey his ideas in popular terminology, and partly because he wishes to retain the words of different Upaniṣads in his effort to reconcile them. Times without number, has Śaṅkara used words like ‘Īśvara’, ‘Parameśvara’, ‘Devatā’, ‘Ātman’, ‘Paramātman’,
'Mahat-bhuta', 'Miśra-prakṛti', etc., as substitutes for the word Brahman; and unless there is some explicit reason as to why a particular word should mean Saguna Brahman, or Isvara, or Hiranyagarbha, the context alone should be considered as a safe guide for assigning proper meanings to words. The mere presence of the word 'Isvara' ought not to mislead us into thinking that it denotes something different from Brahman. That is why after the mere introduction of the word 'Isvara' in the commentary on the Sūtra 1, 1, 2, the argument turns quickly to the nature of the knowledge of Brahman as determined by Brahman itself, even as the knowledge of a pillar is determined and conditioned by the pillar itself. And then we have in the ending portion of the commentary on the same Sūtra a reference to the dialogue between Bṛghu and his father Varūṇa, who on being implored to give instruction in the Brahma-vidyā, tells his son that 'all these beings have their origin, subsistence and dissolution in the bliss of Brahman', which according to Śaṅkara, is shown by reference to various other Sruti-passages to be in its own causal nature as nitya, śuddha, buddha, mukta and sarvajña. This alone is sufficient to give lie to the view that the world of names or forms is due to Saguna Brahman or to Isvara as distinguished from nirguna Brahman.

In Sūtra 1, 1, 3, again, Śaṅkara says that Brahman or the Great element (Mahat-bhuta) must be incomparably omniscient and omnipotent, if Rgveda and other Sāstras, which are merely the breaths of this great Being, are themselves considered as being almost omniscient. And further in what is known as the Saman-vayādhikaraṇa-Sūtra (1, 1, 4) Śaṅkara repeats that the omniscient and omnipotent Brahman is known as the cause of the world. This, he says, is the harmonious and cumulative conclusion of the Vedānta-passages, and cited in evidence typical passages such as 'Being (Sat) alone was in the beginning one, without a second' (Chā. 6, 2, 1); 'All this was in the beginning one Ātman alone' (Ait. Ār., 2, 4, 1, 1); 'This is the
Brahman without cause, without effect, having nothing else inside or outside: this Ātman is the Brahman, the spectator of all (Br. 2, 5, 19); 'That which is seen in front of one's self is the immortal Brahman alone (Mu. 2, 2, 11). These four passages are selected from the four Vedas, the Rgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāma-veda and the Atharvanaveda, and what they all point out cumulatively and harmoniously is that Brahman which is one, non-dual, homogenous, without internal or external differences, having no other existence except that of its own, is at once the ground of this world and the immanent conscious principle of all. Being identical with Ātman, and with whatever is seen in front of us it constitutes immortality or mokṣa, the Summam Bonum of human life. Nowhere in the Catuḥsūtri which is considered as the epitome of the whole of the Brahmasūtras do we get the word Māyā, or the name of any other being such as Virāt or Hiranyagarbha, except the word 'Jśvara' once in the second Sūtra, which, as we have seen already, stands as a substitute for the nirguna Brahman. Lest we may forget to fix in our mind this point of highest importance, Śaṅkara, it seems, has summarised the argument of the first four Sūtras in his introduction to his commentary of the fifth Sūtra that Brahman alone is the Self of all, and that, being omniscient and omnipotent, it is the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world.

4. Transcendence of Brahman supposed to be incompatible with creation.

To substantiate further our view that Brahman alone, and no variety of its Saguna aspect, is ultimately responsible, both materially and efficiently for the existence of the world of becoming, we proceed to point out, in a general way, what Śaṅkara says in the remaining Sūtras. But before we do so, let us make the problem difficult for us to solve, by adducing what Śaṅkara himself says in 1, 1, 4 regarding the absolute transcendence of Brahman with regard to human action
which may include devotional and sacrificial acts. Whether the argument is with the Mimamsakas or with the Viśiṇḍikas, Sāṅkara is emphatic on the point that the knowledge of Brahman is not described in the Vedic passages as being subservient to action, but that, on the contrary, it stands valid by itself. Brahmānubhava or Mokṣa being just the cancellation of the distinctions between the knower and the known, or between the agent and his action and fruits thereof, or between the devotee and the deity, there will be no scope in it for either the sacrificial acts or the devotional upāsanās. Brahman is all-pervading, eternal and immovable (Kuṭasthanitya as opposed to parināminitya) and does not undergo any transformation. Without having any body, parts or modification, it exists by itself, is content with itself, and is self-illuminating, timeless and unaffected by merit and demerit. Naturally, there remains nothing to be done after Brahma-jñāna in order to attain Mokṣa. Just as a man can sing while standing, even so there cannot be any lapse of time or intermediate action between the anubhava of Brahman and the mokṣa. Brahman is not a thing to be produced like a jar, or modified like milk into curds, or reached like a place of journey, or purified by some action like a mirror by removing the dust over it. It is not something which is to be acquired or rejected. It is only to be known and realized.

5. Refutation of the wrong belief.

In view of this it is very likely to be presumed that Brahman cannot be made responsible for the creative act of the world. But this is not correct, for what transcends the human action so far as its existence, nature and knowledge are concerned, may of its own accord become active. Similarly, what transcends human thought may itself be engaged in thinking. The activity or Brahman need not be supposed to require hands and feet and other means. The mere sankhīpa of Brahman is sufficient to produce the world, and to act as
it 'sees' or thinks. The names and the forms of world
which were seen by Brahman as ideas in his bosom
became actualised by his manifold and extraordinary
power; his actions are the natural result of his self-
luminous knowledge. ‘Handless, and yet holding fast
the things; without feet, and yet moving swift; they
call him the first and the great Puruṣa’ (Sve. 3, 19, 6, 8).
Similarly, what is meant by saying that the knowledge
of the identity of the jīva and the Brahman is not to be
attained by make-believe (bhāvanā), or superimposition
(adhyāsa), or functional similarity of growth, is that it
is impossible to conceive that the knowledge of Brahman
is the necessary effect of human activity, just as the
attainment of heavenly pleasures are conceived as the
effects of sacrifices. The supremely conscious energy
(caitanya) of the Brahman, on the other hand, can
engage itself in the activity of producing the world out
of its own bosom by entertaining notions or ideas
(īkṣaṇa = seeing) about it in terms of names and forms,
and sustaining them forever by entering (anupraveṣā)
itself into them as their self. Brahman which is transcendent thus comes to be linked with its own activity
of creation in accordance with its 'sankalpa', desire,
thought, penance, 'seeing' or knowledge. It then
becomes immanent as the antaryāmin of the world which
is nothing but the materialization of its own ideas. It
is not simply the abstract, theoretical and the logical
ultimate ground of the universe, so that we may require
further a more concrete being like Ṣiṣvāra, Hiranyagarbha, Māyā, and so on, to create the universe. It is
also the complete material explanation of them all.

When a Śāmkhya, for instance, puts forth the plea
that Brahman may be a mere witness, and that the pra-
dhāna may possess in it the causal activity of 'seeing',
just as a red-hot iron ball may be said to burn on account
of its conjunction with fire, and that therefore, pradhāna
may be supposed to be the cause of the world, Śāmkara
immediately says (1, 1, 5) that it would be more
reasonable to say that Brahman alone is the immediate
and the direct cause of the world rather than saying that pradhāna, which is dependent on the Brahman is the cause. This shows the anxiety of Saṁkara to exclude all proximate entities, including Iśvara or Māyā as being the cause of the world, and so to state again and over again that the unqualified Brahman alone is the cause.

One has merely to open the commentary of Saṁkara on 1, 1, 5, and be convinced for himself, even if it be against great authorities, about two points, viz., that the cause of the world, as repeatedly told by Saṁkara is the nirupādhika Brahman alone and that the word ‘Iśvara’ has been put unambiguously as a substitute for Brahman. Thinking that the Saṁkhya might mean by Brahman only Purusa in combination with whom Pradhāna evolves, Saṁkara appears to have deliberately used the word ‘mukhyaṁ’ (chief) to qualify the word ‘Brahman’, so that there should be no possibility of assuming any Saguna aspect of Brahman as the cause of the world. In the non-dual Brahman, says Saṁkara, even if there is nothing to be thought about prior to creation, thought will never be foreign to the nature of Brahman, just as the light that shines will not be foreign to the Sun even if there be no objects to be illuminated. But when the world and its objects are to be created, much more then will there be the fruitfulness of the thoughts about creation in Brahman, to demonstrate which the Sruti-passages are not wanting.

That nirgуна Brahman is the cause is further proved in Śūtras 1, 1, 6 to 11. The Chāndogya passage (6, 2) which mentions the Sat as the only being before creation, and as having produced the three divinities of fire, water, and earth after having ‘seen’ them first, mentions it further as the Divinity and the jīvatman which thought of entering into the three divinities and produce the various objects of names and forms. How can such a Sat which exhibits the conscious energy be said to be the non-intelligent pradhāna? It will be appropriate, says Saṁkara, to hold that the Sat means the Brahman
which is the chief seer, the conscious energy, and the Atman of all. This is further substantiated, when it is pointed out in the same adhyāya of the Upaniṣad (Chā. 6, 8, 7) that the Sat or Brahman, on account of whose immanent presence in them, the fire, water and earth, too, in their turn, are said to be in a subsidiary manner the seers and producers of different objects, is really the essence of the human self. If Sat were to mean pradhāna or any other proximate entity, it would have been absurd to tell Śvetaketu who was hankering after Mokṣa that his self was nothing but the non-intelligent pradhāna or the phenomenal entity. Nor can Sat be conceived by any stretch of imagination to be the same as Īśvara, because beyond the Sat, there is no other being about which the Śruti speaks.

The sixth adhyāya of the Chāndogya provides one more important argument in favour of the ultimate Brahman as being the cause of the world. It begins with the question as to what it is which when known, everything else becomes known, and the reply given is that to know the clay is to know every thing made out of clay; for, the modifications of clay have an existence only in name; what is real is clay only. Now, if the word Sat were to denote pradhāna as the cause, then there would have been no knowledge of the sentient individual souls. But if Sat means Brahman, then, Brahman being known, both the world and the souls will be known. The knowledge of the effects is involved in the knowledge of the Cause. It is to impress this truth upon the mind that we are being told to the end of the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya that ‘all this is verily the Brahman, just as truly as the vessels are of clay’. It is in this very strain that Saṁkara tells us in Sūtra 2, 3, 6 that if ākāśa be not the product of Brahman, it would be impossible to have the knowledge of it even if the Brahman is known. And, further, in view of the Śruti statement that Brahman is one, without a second, Saṁkara also rejects the view that ākāśa can be considered as uncaused, but as mixed with

V. E. 33
Brahman; for, in that case, no one will have the knowledge of either unmixed ākāśa or unmixed Brahman. It will not be wide of the mark, therefore, to imagine that Saṅkarā would have straightway rejected any of the post-Saṅkarite views according to which māya is either the main or the accessory cause of creation, or an eternal co-partner with Iśvara. Saṅkarā would have immediately pointed out that both the statements about Brahman, viz., that it is one without a second, and that the knowledge of it means the knowledge of everything else, would be meaningless, if Māya or Iśvara were to be thought as the ultimate cause of the universe. Māya is only the power of Brahman, and is, therefore, as necessarily involved in the nature of Brahman, as the light is involved in fire. Māya is not a separate entity; otherwise it will introduce dualism in the system of Saṅkarā. It is an inseparable power or collection of powers of Brahman, and is useful to explain all the devotional and practical life of dualism and pluralism. Brahman does not require, says Saṅkarā (2, 1, 24), even the slightest help of extraneous something to transform itself into manifold effects. ‘Various and supreme are his powers; knowledge and strength are natural with him’ (Sve. 6, 8). So it is not always necessary that there should be several causes to produce an effect. The sprout may require several causes such as soil, water, seed, etc., but milk alone is sufficient to produce curd. Even so, Brahman alone is sufficient to produce the world. It does not lack productive capacity; and so there is no need to postulate the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient Iśvara over and above the Brahman to account for the creation of the world. Even supposing that the world is unreal, it is not necessary to suppose a comparatively unreal or the phenomenal Iśvara as the cause of it. As we have already seen in chapter second, the unreal world can be explained, both for its being known and for its being created, by reference to the ultimate cause which is real, viz., the nirguṇa Brahman.
6. **Nirguna compatible with Saguna.**

It may be contended that the qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence have got meaning only with reference to the plural aspect of the world. Naturally, it may be said that the qualities have a reference to the Saguna Brahman or Iśvara who creates the world, and not to Brahman which is nirguna. Here exactly, we may say, is another pitfall in the interpretation of Saṅkara. Nirguna is wrongly considered as the opposite of saguna, just as the Infinite in western philosophy was wrongly considered as the opposite of the finite. It was given to Bradley to point out that the Infinite, instead of being alien to the finite, includes it, and yet goes beyond it. Even so, it was given to Saṅkara to point out that the nirguna, instead of cancelling the saguna, includes it and yet goes beyond it, and is continuous with it. The entire universe or the Kāryabrahma indicates only one digit or one foot of that transcendental, nirguna Brahman, which may be said to constitute its remaining fifteen digits, or its three feet.

In a recapitulatory statement of the commentary on 2, 1, 1 Saṅkara clearly uses the words 'Param Brahma' and 'Nirguṇe puruṣe' and tells us that the avyakta and the three guṇas merge in it; and immediately afterwards he uses the words 'Nārāyaṇa', 'Aham' (meaning 'Krṣṇa'), 'Īśvara', 'Paramātman' as substitutes for Brahman; and then, quoting from Sāntiparva, he says that the same Puruṣa, who is the only one Sākṣin and the internal self of all, is at the same time full of guṇas and is endowed with infinite heads, infinite hands, infinite eyes, and so on. It is this Infinite, internal self of all which, when seen, is further told as putting an end to infatuation and sorrow (Īsā. 7). Similarly, in Sū. 2, 4, 1–13, and 20, all the prāṇas including the chief prāṇa, are said to be the products of Brahman. Saṅkara is careful to point out that though it may be supposed that Hiranyagarbha is the Creator, the prāṇas have existence even before
him and his creation, as much as the Hiranyagarbha himself has got the pranas. This is indeed a clever suggestion. It simply means that not only the five mahā-bhūtas, but all things including Hiranyagarbha and the pranas also are the vikāras of this Mūla-prakṛti or the para-Brahman. And continuing this very topic upto Śūtra 20, Śaṅkara uses the word ‘Paramaśvarasya’ first, but immediately after two lines paraphrases it by ‘Parasya Brahmanah’. Or, as he puts it differently in 3, 1, 1, everything except the jīva is born out of Brahman; the obvious reason being that the jīva is identical with Brahman and therefore unborn. That the word ‘Īśvara’ stands for para-Brahman is unambiguously proved further in 3, 2, 5-6, when it is told with reference to the instruction of ‘Tat tvam āsi’ to Svetākara that mokṣa is the knowledge of the nature of Īśvara. And reciprocally, as if, he tells us in 3, 2, 38, that the same Brahman is popularly known as Īśvara when he assumes the role of the giver of fruits.

Similarly, in his commentary on the Ānanda-māyā-dhikarana (1, 1, 12-19), Śaṅkara repeats that the all-knowing and the all-powerful God is the cause of the origin etc. of the world, but immediately goes on to say that Brahman assumes two forms,—one as the object of knowledge and the other as the object of devotion. And among various passages which he quotes to explain the nature of Brahman as the object of knowledge, he quotes a passage from Tai. Ār. (3, 12, 7) which is: “Having created all, the wise Being names them and calls them by their names”. This shows that the word God (Īśvara) is used for Brahman as the object of knowledge, i.e., nirguna Brahman, which, he says, is the tail and support of ānandamaya. “The passage, ‘Let me be many, let me create’ (Tai. 2, 6)”, says he, in 1, 1, 19, “is nearer the sentence which refers to Brahman as the tail and the support (Tai. 2, 5) than to the sentence which refers to ānandamaya”. What Śaṅkara means is that the creation is due to the nirguna Brahman only.
Again, in 2, 1, 25, Saṅkara points out that Brahman, though intelligent like a potter, is not dependent on any extraneous means for the act of creation. It is unconditionally free to create, just as the spider creates a web out of the threads which he emits out of his body.

7. Different meanings of Saguna.

After having described at length how creation is a fact and how the nirguna Brahman alone is the cause of the creation of the world, let us briefly ascertain the various meanings which Saṅkara attaches to the word ‘saguna’ and the significance of the relation between the saguna and the nirguna Brahman. In the first place, Saṅkara means by saguna Brahman the entire world of effects (Kāraṇa Brahman) which includes the whole of the practical life and the Vedic lore. Secondly, he means thereby the Vibhūtis, the Avatāras, the office-bearers of the universe, such as Īśvara, Hiranyagarbha and others. Thirdly, he means thereby these same deities as objects of worship. Fourthly, he brings under saguna all the attributes of Brahman such as omniscience, omnipotence, lordship, as also those of being sarvarasa, sarvagandh, etc. Fifthly, he means the sages and the historical persons like Vāmadeva and Manu who had realized the Brahman, or persons who would realize it. And, finally, he appears to have meant thereby the various forms which the mystical vision might assume. The Puruṣa seen in the eye, the Puruṣa seen on the disc of the Sun, the form of the Vaiśvānara, and that of the Brahman on the couch (paryanka) are, all of them, the forms of Saguna Brahman. Even the highest kind of mystical experience, viz., the vision of one’s own resplendent immaculate form is, in a way Saguna. We have, therefore, carefully to note that whereas there is no ambiguity with reference to the meaning of the word nirguna, the word saguna is spacious enough to allow six different meanings in Saṅkara. To use anyone of these meanings anywhere will lead to confusion of thought. For instance, when the relation of cause and effect is
concerned, it would be proper to speak of saguna Brahma with reference to the first meaning of it. When the question of the governance of the world is concerned, it will be proper to speak of it as Isvara or Hiranyagarbha; when we are concerned with upasanas, we ought to speak of it as an object of devotion; and finally, when we are concerned with Atmavidya, we may speak of it in the sense of the spiritual Guru, or the glorious attributes of God, or again, the visions which the mystics get by the grace of God. In all these different spheres, the sagunatva represents a different degree of reality,—not metaphysically but epistemologically, as seen in chapter second. Even as mere sensible objects of the world, the saguna aspect of Brahma has a reality of its own in different degrees. Hiranyagarbha and other deities are comparatively more real in point of jnana, sinlessness, etc., and more still are the realized souls.

Thus, as said above, like the Bradleyian integration of the finite and the infinite, there is the integration of the various aspects of saguna with the nirguna. They all lead unto and culminate into nirguna, just as the steps of a stair lead, unto and end into a big hall. And if any being on this spiritual ladder can be said to be the author, the doer, the source, or the cause, then Brahma as nirguna can certainly be said to be the ultimate author, the doer, the source, and the cause of all. If Isvara and maya who are dependent for their very being on Brahma can be called as authors and doers, then, unless there is an unbridgeable gulf between them and Nirguna Brahma, it passes our understanding how on Samkhya’s premises, Brahma itself cannot be called as the author. Of course our human words suggest duality, but there is no other way to describe the Brahma except by these faulty means. The word ‘cause’ has no meaning unless there is its correlative, viz., the ‘effect’; and so we may put Brahma beyond the causal chain. But do we thereby intend to make a chasm between the phenomenal causal chain and the transcendental Brahma? Can we not still describe it—if we have to
philosophize at all—as the uncaused cause of all? If nirguna Brahman cannot be said to be the source of qualities like sarvajñatva, sarva-šaktimatva, sarvagandhatva etc., shall we be logically satisfied by attributing them to a lower and phenomenal entity like Iśvara or Hiranya-garbha? How can the ‘tail of ānandamaya’ be without ānanda? asks Śaṅkara. And it is out of Ānanda and not ānandamaya that the world has sprung. One may contend that Brahman may be wrongly conceived as endowed with qualities and powers, because it is wrongly believed as connected with the various names and forms of avidyā. But the argument is fallacious and inadequate. Is not the shining of the sun real with or without the objects on which it shines? The seer of the sight is imperishable, says Śaṅkara, even if the sight and the objects of sight are destroyed. The eye-less Vision which gives the eye its power to see is eternal. The various names and forms of this world may provide occasions to know the qualities and powers of Brahman1; but the powers and qualities do not disappear even though the names and forms disappear. Similarly, the facts of concrete spiritual experience, such as visions and sounds which make us aware of sat, chit, and ānanda, as also of other attributes to a certain extent, are an evidence of these being directly located in Brahman, which is not simply an object of devotion, but of knowledge also.

1. In short, it should be clear now that the source of the world as mentioned in Sūtra 1, 1, 2, cannot be anything other than the Nirguna Brahman, inquiry about which starts in 1, 1, 1.
V

KARMA, UPASANA AND JNANA

1. Opposition between Karma and Jnana.

It is almost a universal belief that the advaita jnana of Brahman as advocated by Saṅkara is not only diametrically opposed to karma, as light is opposed to darkness, but that it also goes beyond upāsanā, as much as the latter has its reference to some form of saguṇa Brahman only. It is easy to point out that Saṅkara also lends support to this view in several places in his writings, and that he appears to be a foe, as strong as Buddha, not only of the Mīmāṃsakas who stood for the sacrificial cult and the heavenly fruit attached to it, but also of those who, like the Vṛttikāra, Bāndhāyana, were within the camp of the Vedāntins, but who tried to have a compromise between jnana and karma by saying that both are necessary for the aspirant as well as the enlightened. We know that Saṅkara, is emphatic on the point that the Ātman or Brahman is the only self-accomplished fact, that it is not produced like a jar, or reached like a place, or modified like an ornament, or purified like gold. Similarly, a person who has realized the Brahman stands nothing to gain or lose by the doing of actions or by not doing them. Much less can such a person be compelled to act. Actions are like boats which may be useful for those who do not know swimming, but are useless for those who have reached the other bank of the river of samsāra. They originate in avidyā, have a necessary reference to the desires, efforts and egoism of men, and have their end in appropriate fruits at some place like heaven, and at some future time. One may refer to Śūtra 1, 1, 4, to find out how Saṅkara clearly brings out the difference between Brahma-jnana and Dharma-jnana. It is as follows.

Brahman being unique, the desire for Brahma-jnana can be entertained even before the study of dharma-jnana is begun. One may study the Vedānta literature
directly even before he comes to know what constitutes religious duty, or knows how to perform a sacrifice. For the two differ entirely in subject-matter and results. While dharma-jñāna has transitory prosperity as its end, Brahma-jñāna ends in liberation and bliss. Dharma-jñāna enjoins on us the performance of some religious acts, and prevents us from doing certain other acts. There is no room for injunctions in Brahma-jñāna. Even such a sentence as, ‘The Ātman must be seen, heard, and thought about’, is not an injunction; it is only a statement of a fact of actual experience. It has the function of directing the attention to Ātman. The fruits of one, such as the heaven and others, are dependent on human activity, and are to be harvested at some future time; while the fruits of the other, namely, the mokṣa and the bliss of it, are instantaneous with the realization of Brahman. The knowledge of Brahman is as immediate, direct, and necessary as the perceptual knowledge which arises as soon as there is the contact of the sense with its object; it is not mediate or optional. Nay, the knowledge of Brahman, unlike that of religious duty, enables one to live the life of Brahman itself. And further, whereas in the case of dharma-jñāna, Śrutipassages alone are capable of giving us knowledge, in the case of Brahma-jñāna, the fact of having realized it, whether by others or by oneself, is also available as an equally authoritative source of knowledge.

2. *Karma useful for emergence of jñāna.*

And yet we think that it would be a hasty generalization to say that jñāna to Śaṅkara is all in all, and that karma and upāsanā are nothing. In spite of the opposition between them, it will be worth while to see the nature of the relation between karma and jñāna, and to find out that the function of the upāsanā consists in bridging the gulf between the two, so far as the aspirant strives to realize the Brahma-jñāna. Now, jñāna as an accomplished fact is certainly independent of karma or upāsanā; nay it is itself the support of all
things including them; but the emergence of jñāna in a particular man, though not impossible for the grace of God, appears even from the view-point of Saṁkara to depend both on karma and upāsanā. Metaphysically, the jiva is Brahmā in doubt; and so, the essential nature of jiva is not in any way affected by karma or upāsanā. Nor may the person who has realized the Brahman get himself interested in the doing of actions. But, so long as this unitive experience does not arise; so long as the whole ethico-religious process of discipline is continually put into service for transforming the aspirant from the bad to the good, and from the good to the supra-good; so long, in other words, as the process of becoming the Brahman lasts,—and we think it lasts till the end of life—there should be no hesitation to say that Saṁkara believes in the efficacy of karma and upāsanā. The Brahma-jñāna is to be achieved in this life; the Ātman is to be seen, heard, and contemplated upon; the becoming is to be identified with the being; the avidyā is to be rooted out by vidyā; the grace of the Guru is to be won; the teaching ‘Thou art’ is to be grasped, retained, and assimilated; in short, everything must be done incessantly and diligently in order that the Supreme knowledge should shine itself in the aspirant and remain constantly shining till death. Saṁkara admits this all. To him actions appear to be useful for the emergence of knowledge in man; because they leave lasting impressions on the mind. And therefore, it will be a travesty of facts to say that because the Brahman itself is the support of karma and upāsanā, and is independent of them, the emergence of the knowledge of it in a sādhaka is also independent of them. Saṁkara grants the first proposition, but not the other. In view of this, it will be improper to say that because the opposition between karma and jñāna, which to Saṁkara, is as unshakeable as a mountain, in the context of the nature of Brahman, applies also in the context of the process of the realization of Brahman. Even before this realization of Brahman takes place as a particular event
in a particular sādhaka, the Brahman was there as an eternal, uncaused, accomplished, metaphysical fact, which is independent of all things in the world including karma and upāsanā. But this does not mean that the realization of it as a process, or the gradual apprehension of the Real to a greater and greater degree, does not consist of or is independent of activity or upāsanā of some sort. To interpret like this is to assume too much, and to misinterpret Śaṅkara. The nivṛtti-mārga or the jñānamārga of Śaṅkara is said to be opposed to pravṛtti-mārga or Karma-mārga, because the latter which springs forth from ignorance, and from attachment to desires, fruits, and egoism, will never put an end to the miseries of life, however, glorified it may be by the attainment of rewards in heaven. It is, however compatible with such activity as is necessary to acquire the following things, viz., the control of the senses and mind, non-attachment to the worldly and the heavenly pleasures, devotional meditations, disinterested service to mankind, and above all the uninterrupted, constant, mental activity of entertaining the self-same idea or consciousness of Brahman, embodied in the proposition ‘I am the Brahman’.

3: No opposition in the process of realization.

The opposition between karma and jñāna will cease to be a stumbling block in the philosophy of Śaṅkara, if the seemingly contradictory ideas regarding the nature of jīva are reconciled. On the one hand, the jīva is said to be non-different from Brahman; on the other, the jīva is said to become the Brahman. The one is a static, and the other, a dynamic conception; the one suggests an accomplished fact; the other, a progressive realization. As a matter of fact, there is left no choice for us. For, ‘the jīva is non-different from Brahman’ is as much true as ‘The jīva becomes the Brahman’. The contradiction is merely apparent and not real. The jīva, in becoming the Brahman, merely recognizes its own real nature; but in doing so, it eliminates something which
it is not, something which it had wrongly conceived itself to be. The metaphysical truth, viz., the jīva is non-different from Brahmān is being gradually realized in the epistemological process by casting off, one after another, the superimpositions of body, mind, intellect, and ahamkāra on the Ātmān. But this epistemological process itself which appears to be mainly negative in character is not possible without the positive search which is psychological in character, and which consists of the three-fold discipline, viz., the intellectual, the moral, and the spiritual. To accept this is to accept the proper place of karma and upāsanā in the philosophy of Sāṅkara. It is true that no amount of karma and upāsanā will ever alter the character of the Ātmān or Brahmān. It will eternally be the same. Metaphysically, the Brahmān remains unmoved and unchained in its own glory with or without the karma or upāsanā. Apart from Brahmān, the karma is as good as naught; it may be said to be of the nature of matter and darkness. But, none will ever be able to take a jump from the region of darkness and duality into the region of the self-effulgent transcendent Brahmān, and be one with the pure Consciousness, unless there is something in man by means of which he will be led gradually and without any break towards the destination. The spark of Caitanya in man cannot be kindled into the flame of spiritual life, and felt to be continuous with Brahmānic life, unless sincere moral efforts and devotional meditations are resorted to. That is why karma along with saguna upāsanā, which are also a kind of karma, is highly useful in the psychological search and the epistemological apprehension of the real. The opposition between jñāna and karma refers to the transcendent Brahmān alone; their compatibility refers to the apprehension of it by man. The Ātmān as an accomplished fact transcends karma and upāsanā; the Ātmān as a realizable fact of human experience is impossible to be achieved without them. Nay, even when a person is lodged in Brahmān, some kind of karma, e. g., disinterested, altruistic one, may continue without
binding the person to its fruits. Especially, the upāsanā must continue to the end of life (4, 1, 12). Otherwise there is the constant danger of his being led away by the considerations of body and other upādhīs. The karma and the upāsanās are the means of not only leading us from darkness, death, and ignorance, to light, life, and knowledge, but are also the means of sustaining us on the path of the Spirit.

4. The asparśa-yoga of the jñānin.

What then is meant by saying that the fire of knowledge burns all the kinds of karma whatsoever, and that there remains no scope for actions in the case of a man who has realized the Ātman? The reply is that this only tells us about the transcendental nature of the Ātman, or of the person who has realized the Ātman. When the epistemological process ends in the metaphysical Being of the Ātmanic life, there does come an end to all karma and almost to all the upāsanās, except, to put in Prof. Ranade's happy phrase, the upāsanā of remaining in the 'Self-spectacular state' of the Ātman. When all this becomes one Ātman only, who should see whom? Who should desire what? What is there which remains to be achieved by karma and upāsanā? One who attains to sarvātmabhāva cannot entertain any other desire except the continuation of the Ātmanic life. Because he is Ātma-kāma, he is, at the same time, āpta-kāma, and, therefore, a-kāma. He goes beyond grief, fear, and sin, and is not attached to anything. As the result of Ātmajñāna, the Brahmīns became free from the desires for sons, wealth, and honour, and so wandered as mendicants (Br. 3, 5); the descendents of Kavaṣā felt no need for studying the Vedas, and for performing agnihotra and other sacrifices (Kau. 2, 5); and that Yājñavalkya could renounce everything. 'Just as the serpent is unmindful of what happens to the slough which it has cast away, even so the person who has realized the Brahman is unmindful of his several upādhīs. Even while he is living, his body and his prārabdha-karma are as good as
naught to him, just as the skin which is dropped off from the body is to the serpent. But this is an ideal to be realized gradually and by approximation only. The greater the degree of the apprehension of the Real, the greater is the freedom from action and bondage; the greater the absorption in the life of the Atman, the greater is the automatic detachment from the upādhis. The lotus may remain inside the water and yet it is as untouched by water (Asparaśa-yoga of Gaudapada) as it is when it is not in water. The condition of a person lodged in Brahman (Brahmasaṁstha) is exactly like this. He does not gain anything by being amidst the upādhis and by the doing of actions; nor does he lose anything by being away from them. In the first place, the mind and intellect being absorbed in the meditation of the Atman, the senses and the organs of actions will not have the necessary incentive to perceive the objects, and to do any kind of actions. And, secondly, even if the marginal attention is given to the upādhis and the actions, they do not touch him (Asparaśa) though he may appear to be engrossed in them (yoga). But so long as this condition is not reached all moral activity has its utility, howsoever, indirectly (Paraṁparyeṇa) it may be, for the emergence of jñāna in man. Much more useful is the upāsanā in bringing out this result.

5. The Atma-kāma alone is a-kāma.

It is with reference to such a realized soul only that we can understand what is meant by a Niṣkāma karma-yogin. As Kṛṣṇa illustrates it by his own example in the Bhagavadgītā, such a man engages himself in self-less activity for the good of others only. Being extraordinarily compassionate, as Śaṅkara says, he saves the erring humanity by pointing out the way towards the realization of the Ātman. And so far as he himself is concerned he may either appear as doing nothing, or doing everything like an ordinary man; but his heart is always on the contemplation of the vision of the Ātman. Negatively, we may say that none who has
not realized the Ātman can, in the true sense of the word, be a Nīśkāma karma-yogin. For real desirelessness will spring forth when there remains the only desire of sporting and loving the Ātman. As Yājñavalkya says, all this becomes dear on account of the Ātman. The Ātman ought to be the common bond on account of which the wife, the husband, the son, the cattle, etc., should be loved, and possessed. Yājñavalkya proves this by his own example. The cows he asked his disciple to take away; the possessions he renounced; the spiritual instruction he gave his wife, Maitreyi; the curse he uttered against Sākalya who was prattling without realizing the nature of the Deity; all these diverse actions were possible for the equanimous soul, because the central object of value and love in his life was the Ātman and nothing but Ātman. So was Janaka; and so will be any other realized soul.

6. Wrong views regarding nīśkāma karma.

This will put a stop, we hope, to the attempt of making topsyturvy the idea of Nīśkāma-karma, which sometimes becomes current in the spiritual decadence of a nation. All sorts of people are said to be nīśkāma-karma-yogins, without the least care being taken to determine whether their life was morally pure and spiritually illuminating, simply because they are physically able to put in life-long efforts for a particular cause. We wonder if there can be genuine non-attachment to the fruits of actions, if the desires for them are not rooted out first, as the result of being fixed in the Brahmanic life. The nīśkāma karma is the natural accompaniment or result of a spiritually illumined life; it simply cannot exist, if egoism is not completely annihilated. Work binds a man even if it is done as an āśramite daily routine (nitya karma); again, and over again, it will turn out the same fruit in greater and greater quantity, just as work done in the fields will be the cause of better and better harvest (Br. 4, 5, 15). This will continue till the body is turned into ashes. It will not, however, bind
desirelessness, and non-attachment to actions or fruits thereof will be fixed in us as permanent characteristics, only when they are the results of Ātma-jñāna. Just as it is the light that removes the darkness, the rope that removes the snake on it, similarly, it is the Brahma-vidyā that will root out the desires, and along with them root out the attachment to actions and fruits. To reverse the process and say that niṣkāmatva will be a way or means of bringing in Ātma-jñāna, except as a make-believe, is to hope to do the impossible. It is like expecting the coming in of the light after the removal of darkness.

7. *Karma as an offering to God.*

Of course, as Śaṅkara recommends us, the first lesson in Niṣkāma-karma-yoga is to make an offering to God of our actions and fruits thereof. This minimizes the importance of the ego, no doubt. But the real niṣkāmatva will arise only when one knows the nature of God, and the nature of one’s own self as non-different from God. Otherwise, as Yājñavalkya had demonstrated it in the court of Janaka, the ignorance of the nature of the deity may cost one his very life. What this means is that we shall have to be born again and again for want of the knowledge of the Ātman. As pointed out in Adhyāya III, Pāda I, those who do merely works including sacrifices go to the moon and other regions as enjoyers and as subservient to gods, but return to saṁsāra after the merit is exhausted.

8. *Upāsanā lifts a man from karma to jñāna.*

Let us now turn our attention to the consideration of upāsanā which, in our opinion, is the link between the sātttvika type of karma, such as the offering of it and its fruit to the Lord, and the realization of the Ātman into which the upāsanā itself culminates. Śaṅkara defines upāsanā as the prolonged, continuous, stream of consciousness of the self-same object of meditation, without being disturbed by any other object (Bra. Sū. 4, 1, 7; Tai. 1, 3, 4; B. G. 12, 3; 13, 24). It is like the
knowing the deities (Chā. 1, 10, 9-11), shows the necessity of rising above the mechanical rituals of a sacrifice and of turning our attention to the knowledge of the deities themselves. No doubt, in the beginning, such knowledge will be put to use for getting the fruits of sacrifices easily and in plenty, but in course of time attention will be directed to the upāsanās themselves as freed from the sacrificial setting in which they occur. An instance of this Śaṅkara provides us in the very beginning of the Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad. The performance of aśvamedha is not possible for all; but whoever will have the correct knowledge of the sacrifice will also be said to have the same fruit. Similarly, in Brahma-Sūtras, 3, 3, 49-50, Śaṅkara says that by pointing out that the mental fires built by thought and the actual fires built by bricks and several other actions are equally powerful, Sruti expresses thereby its regard for vidyā and its disregard for works. Who indeed will put in the great toil of building the actual fire when the mental fire is equally useful?

9. Types of Upāsanās.

So, once we come to the level of upāsanās, after disentangling them from the sacrificial acts, we have to make the distinction between saguṇa upāsanā and the nirguṇa upāsanā. The Saguṇa again will be of two types; Pratīkopāsanā and Ahamgrahopāsanā. In the first, the pratīka or the symbol is different from both the meditator and the Brahman. It cannot, therefore, be meditated upon as 'I am the symbol', though it can be meditated upon as Brahman superimposed on it. In the second, a reciprocal relation is possible between the deity (or Brahman) and the soul, viz., 'I am thou' and 'Thou art I'. The superimposition of Viṣṇu on Śāligrāma is an example of the first kind of upāsanā; the Paryaṅka-vidyā where the upāsaka says to the deity, 'I am thou', is an example of the second. We are to rise from the first to the second; and then to rise again from the saguṇa upāsanā to the nirguṇa one. But there being no water-tight demarcation between the saguṇa
and the nirguna, it is just possible that we may have an upāsanā where we get the characteristics of both. Om, e.g., is a symbol of both saguna and nirguna Brahman. It is not however on a par with Śālīgrāma, an inanimate object; it is a verbal symbol, of the nature of an idea or thought, which can bind together the meditator and the meditated in one act of reciprocal love. ‘Om is the name of the highest Ātman’ says Śāṅkara, and so serves the purpose of being the nearest approach to him. He is pleased when he is called by this name, and worshipped through this symbol’ (Chā. 1, 1, 1).

Now, whither shall we be led by this meditation on Om? To the abode of the highest saguna Brahman, the Brahmālecā, or to the condition of nirguna Brahman? Supposing we are led to the abode of Hiranyakagārbaḥ, the best among the saguna Brahmanas, shall we, as followers of Śāṅkara be satisfied with it? This will grant us the ‘saḷākata’ and the ‘saṁipatā’ kinds of mukti, but not the ‘svarūpaṭā’ and the ‘sāyujiyatā’ kinds of it. The soul may live in the region of the Prajāpati and live near him, but will be different from him. And, he has to wait till Prajāpati himself would become mukta. So, liberation will be gradual (Kramamukti) and not instantaneous (Sādyomukti). But Śāṅkara’s mentor will not countenance this. He will not be content with anything less than sāyujiyamukti, and that too within the life-time of a man. He insists that the liberation must be instantaneous with the knowledge, i.e., the realization or anubhava of the identity of the jīva and the Brahman. It is not to be accepted on trust or on credit, but achieved as a prize in cash. Of course, the krama-mukti also is possible, on his view, in this very life; but then it will mean the different degrees of the apprehension of the Real. What is specially important for us to note is the significance he attaches to the Svarūpa-mukti; for it is this which will enable one to get oneself absorbed in Brahman, and enable him to make others so absorbed. As for the consideration of the royal road which makes this possible, we proceed to the next chapter.
FROM THEISM TO MYSTICISM

1. Knowledge, devotion, and grace necessary for realization.

The surest way to mysticism lies through theism. One need not side-pass theism in order to become a mystic. Theism culminates in mysticism. For what else is mysticism except being so absorbed in the silent meditation of God that the feeling of dualism vanishes, and there emerges the undifferentiated experience of unitive life? Mysticism does not connote the denial of devotion, but the fulfilment of it. The streams of devotion find their ultimate rest in the ocean of the Absolute which, therefore, is not an object of knowledge only but of devotion also. Devotion to God, on the other hand, need not suggest that it lacks the elements of knowledge and insight or anubhava in it. As the soul approaches the destination and comes increasingly under the influence of the Absolute or Pure Consciousness, devotion loses much of its youthful noise of emotions and feelings and assumes the silence of contemplation. If one must exclude superstition and blind credulity, and must grow increasingly stronger in faith and vision, then his devotional attitude to God must also be both rational and intuitive. Knowledge without devotion, if not a doubtful hazard, will be intellectual, or speculative only; it is not realization. Devotion without anubhava will be blind. This too is no realization. The vision of God, or the intuitive knowledge can be had by yogins says Śaṅkara, during meditation; and so devotion by itself without meditation and the vision of God is not enough, though it is highly useful. Mere intellectual knowledge may lead to arrogance and pride, and mere devotion to narrow-mindedness and fanaticism. Both are necessary to cut down the defects of each other and win the grace of God. And, then alone, there will be genuine faith and genuine anubhava which may be said to be the twin characteristics of any living religion.
It is at this stage that there would be no chasm between theism and mysticism; and, therefore, one need not be either a theist or a mystic. Both are the stages, one earlier, and the other later, of one and the same process which is at once devotional and experiential. Theism passes into mysticism; upāsana ends in jhāna. And yet theism has its unbridled, integral place in mysticism. The mystic continues to be a theist; the Advaitin continues to be a bhakta. As Saṅkara says, 'Not with standing the removal of difference between thee and me, as between the sea and the wave, I belong to thee, O Lord, though you may not be said to belong to me; for surely the wave belongs to the sea, even though the sea may not belong to the wave'.

2. Theism, in Saṅkara, has a novel feature.

Theism, as ordinarily understood, supplies the soil and the atmosphere to the devout soul; Saṅkara's theism supplies also the seed which grows into mysticism. Saṅkara knows that even the idol-worship is not without its value. Viṣṇu is superimposed on the Śāhigrāma, and the worship of the latter may fulfill our desires to a certain extent. Much less will he be averse to the worship of the images of the Viśhūtis and the Avasārās of God. His attack against the Bhāgavata or the Pañcarātra and the Paśupata schools is not against the devotional approach to God, as he himself says that the unceasing, one-pointed devotion has been ordained by Śrutis and Smṛtis (Bra. Śū. 2, 2, 42); but his attack is against certain philosophical misconceptions which are involved in their views such as, the origination of the individual soul (Sankarśana) from the highest Ātman (Vāsudeva); the avatāras as different and non-different; and God as finite, imperfect, and indifferent. Instead of believing in a limited number of avatāras, he says that the whole world from Brahmadeva down to a blade of grass is the manifestation of God or Brahman. Apart however, from this metaphysical statement of his pantheistic view, as also apart from the traditional form of
theism according to which God comes on earth in some visible, personal form to protect the good and destroy the evil, there is a type of theism which is peculiar in the advaita system of Śaṅkara. It supplies us with a belief in the saving power of a living, human being who has himself realized the Brahman, and who, therefore, can be called a concrete, personified, saguna incarnation or Avatāra of Brahman. This will no doubt include all the historical persons who must have had realized the Brahman or the Real in some way or other. The saving power of such historical persons is truly believed to have been continually experienced by the devout even to the present day; and the belief is assiduously preserved and carried forward by individuals and institutions. Notwithstanding, however, the theoretical equality of the living with the dead mystics in respect of their saving power, Śaṅkara appears to have given his preference to the former and not to the latter. For when a thing is in front of a man and yet remains unknown to him, the best way for another person who knows that thing would be to point it out to him. This would naturally be done far more convincingly by a living saint than by the invisible power of a dead saint. Suppose some one makes a feverish search for an ornament which he wears, but considers it to be lost; or some one, wishing to know whether all the ten persons including himself had crossed the river safely or not, finds on counting that one is missing. The best way to correct such a person would be to point out to him that the ornament has been worn by him round his neck, or that the missing person is himself whom he had forgotten to count. Now, this task of directing the mind of another person to Brahman is, as Śaṅkara believes, done far more effectively by a living person who has himself realized the Brahman, than by the Śāstras which, as we have seen in Chapter I, constitute the wisdom of the souls who had realized the Brahman, but who, unfortunately, are no longer with us. Śaṅkara's theistic belief in short, centres round the living mystic, who imparts to
others the seal of Brahma-śīva, just as other forms of theism centre round either an idol, or an image of an avatar, or the creed of a by-gone saint. All these other forms are valuable to him; he only wishes us to use them, but at the same time rise above them by resorting to the word of a living Guru. And this too, as we have already seen, is for the purpose of having the self-experience of the identity between the jiva and the Brahman, that is, of experiencing directly that the meeting point of the saguna of the Guru and the nirguna of the Brahman is in our own self, the jiva.

3. Devotion to Guru is devotion to Brahman.

But, how exactly, it may be asked, are we carried forward from the word of the Guru to the realization of Brahman? How is the bhakti which is directed towards the Guru transformed into the bhakti and jñāna of the Brahman? The answer is not very difficult to find. It must be remembered that the Guru is Guru on account of the fact that he has realized the Brahman; that the high water-mark of such realization, as it is mentioned in the Upaniṣads, is reached when the mystic sees his own lustrous, immaculate form everywhere and always (Chā. 8, 7, 12); and that the means adopted by him to achieve this must have been the meditation on some symbol like Om (Ka. 2, 5, 3). Now, relying on the Upaniṣads, is it not possible, one may ask, that one may begin to meditate on Om, without approaching the Guru? Our concern, however, for the present, is to see how we are helped by the Guru, and not to decide as to what may happen to us, if we do not seek his aid. Obviously, the instruction coming from a person who has realized the Brahman must be potent and living, and not dead and barren. Devotion and regard shown to the Guru will have their own fruit of winning his grace oft and on, and thus of accelerating the spiritual progress, from theism to mysticism, from saguna to nirguna, and from devotion to knowledge. But, when the end is achieved the means are not abandoned but retained, as
constitutive factors of the end. To put it differently, with Guru as the pivot of the Vedāntic knowledge, there will be no jump from theism to mysticism, from sagūṇa to nirgūṇa, or from devotion to knowledge. On the contrary, there will not only be the gradual transition from one to the other, but also the simultaneous presence of both. To put it differently, again, there will be no fundamental difference, from the point of view of a mystic, between the personal and impersonal, between God and the Absolute, or between an object of devotion and an object of knowledge.

Let us explain this further by reference to the Guru himself, so that it can be extended to the disciples also after they attain to the realization of the Ātman. It may appear that devotion shown to the living Guru is devotion shown only to his body, and that, therefore, this is not of much value inasmuch as the body, inspite of its being called sagūṇa, is transitory and perishable. But, if we remember that the Guru is said to be Guru when the consciousness of his physical body drops down, and the consciousness of Brahman as appearing before him in his own immaculate form arises, devotion shown unto him is necessarily the devotion shown unto the sagūṇa Brahman itself. The embodiedness of the Guru is only an occasion and an opportunity for others to direct their devotion through him, though unconsciously in the beginning, to the sagūṇa Brahman only. As the Sūtra 4, 1, 5, says, one should meditate on symbols like the sun and the moon, viewing them as Brahman, for this adds glory to the symbols. The higher in value should be superimposed on the lower. Fortunately for others, Brahman is, as if, already superimposed on the body of the Guru, just as Viṣṇu is on śāligrāma. So, the devotion shown to the Guru’s body is as good as devotion shown to the content of his spiritual realization, viz., the sagūṇa Brahman in the immaculate form of the Guru. And if the Guru is pleased, it means the sagūṇa Brahman is pleased. And further, by parity of reasoning, we may say that there being no essential difference
between this saguna of the highest order and nirguna Brahman, to please the former is to please the latter. Then comes the grace of Brahman through the Guru, about which Samkara speaks so often, and which is, we may say the beginning and end of spiritual life. It is, as if, to illustrate this point, we have the two Sutras (1, 1, 29-30) which mention that Indra's instruction to Pratardana to meditate on him (Indra) alone is due to the fact that Indra himself had realized the Brahman. Samkara comments that Indra must have had achieved this intuitive knowledge of Brahman through spiritual efforts like sravana and manana; and that is why Indra could declare that whoever would realize him (Indra) would, in no way, be robbed of his moksa. In short, what was true of Indra with reference to Pratardana, is true of any living mystic in his role of the Guru with reference to his disciples. Hence, in paying homage to any living mystic, we shall be paying homage to the saguna Brahman, and through it ultimately to the nirguna Brahman only. Thus shall we be able to make the transition from theism to mysticism, from devotion to Guru to devotion and knowledge of Brahman.

4. Conservation is of values, not persons.

In view of this it will be a gross misunderstanding to suppose that Samkara cared very little for the theistic life, and that he thought that metaphysics went beyond religion in the sense that the Absolute alone is real and that God is unreal. But, as we have seen, to be a mystic means necessarily to continue to be a theist, though the opposite is not true. For, one may be content to the end of his life to remain an ardent devotee of some personal god, and abhor the idea that the worshipper and the worshipped can together have a unitive life. He may fear that his own precious individuality will be lost in the larger whole, that his personal values may not be conserved in the Absolute, and that the merging of his ego and the egos of his fellowmen in the undifferentiated All is nothing but the extinguishing
of the several lights one after another. He does not understand the Vedantic conceptions that the so-called finite individuality is in essence the infinite individuality of the Absolute, that the merging of the egos is only the breaking of the artificial and illusory walls of these, and that the values and the lights are eternally conserved for one and for all, only if we care to recognize the central place of the Guru. Qualities like sinlessness etc., which are said to belong to the Saguna Brahman per se, are acknowledged by Śaṅkara to belong also to Nirguna Brahman, for the sake of glorification (Bra. Śū. 3, 3, 41). As a matter of fact, they must be potentially present even in nirguna Brahman. How else can they be manifested in saguna Brahman? Once accept this Vedantic turn of thinking, and it will appear that theism and mysticism are allies of each other. Devotional love is the sap of both theism and mysticism. It may be first directed towards the deity which is supposed to be different from the soul which worships it. But when the devotion is planted and nourished by the Guru, and when it becomes intense, prolonged, continuous, constant, and a regular feature of life, then that which appears to be outside and different is first felt or visualized as being inside, and then seen as non-different from the worshipper. The bahiryāmin becomes the antaryāmin, and vice versa. ‘I am thou’ is experienced as ‘Thou art I’. This is and ought to be the end of theistic upāsanā. This is the type of identification of the jiva and Brahman which is the hallmark of the Vedantic mysticism, as we understand it to be in the philosophy of Śaṅkara.

5. Meditation and morality ensure spiritual life.

Before concluding the chapter, it would be worth while to deal in brief with what Śaṅkara has to say regarding the path of realizing the Brahman, and the way in which a man who has realized the Brahman behaves in this world. First of all, there must be the desire to realize God. This is generally put negatively
seed of spiritual illumination. It is sown esoterically, as if, in a particular favourable soil; it grows in a suprasensible manner, and is capable of appearing in various forms beginning with ‘snow, smoke, sun, wind, fire, lightning, crystal, and moon’, as mentioned in Śvetāśvatarpaṇīsad (2, 11), and ending with Sva-rūpa, as accepted by Śaṅkara in various places. In a way, it indicates the coming down of the divine power of the Guru (śaktipāta) in the disciple; or to put it differently, the disciple, possessing, as he does, the divine power that has come down in him, can be called a potential avatāra of God.

The next step is to put to service the resolute will for the act of meditation, on the one hand, and for the cultivation of moral virtues, on the other. The first is the direct and the positive means of attaining Brahmajñāna; the second is both positive and negative, because it connotes exclusion of vices, and is both the support and the result of meditation. Just as the full-fledged vairāgya, (Cha. V), is the result of spiritual illumination, even so a fully developed moral life is possible only after Ātma-jñāna is attained, though the latter is not possible without an initial moral life. Like Bradley, at no stage would Śaṅkara think that we can break away from the moral life. It is the condition and support of spiritual life. Nothing will, therefore, be more absurd than to say that for an advaitin, the life of a person who has gone beyond the three guṇas, or beyond pāpa and punya, is a life which is wayward and has no direction. The spiritual life, we may repeat, is śūddha-sāttvika and of alaukika punya; though it goes beyond the three guṇas it is nearer to sattva than to rajas and tamas, and nearer to puṇya than to pāpa. A spiritual life without morality is inconceivable to Śaṅkara, because the Ātma-kāma has no other desire except the Ātman. Moral life and meditation go hand in hand. Both are necessary for the emergence of Ātma-jñāna and the sustenance of it in man. Morality without meditation may be sufficient for social solidarity,
but cannot be a substitute for spiritual illumination. Meditation without morality will often be a pretence of spiritual life, and is likely to be an instrument of doing disservice to mankind.

Now the essence of meditation, consists in the repetition of Om or the Name of God. In the beginning the repetition will involve the movement of the tongue. But Brahma being the subtlest of all things, we should meditate on its symbol, viz., the Om, or the Name, mentally, so that, as Sankara says, we shall thereby be able to ‘strike on’ the Brahma mentally, that is, to rivet our mind on it with such concentrated attention that it will be one with Brahma (Mt. 2, 2, 2). Or, as he tells us along with the Upanishad (Mt. 2, 3, 4), ‘Fixing the arrow of the soul on the bow of Om, we shall so penetrate the target of Brahma that the arrow may become one with it’. Or again, ‘just as by the process of pounding, we separate the grain from the husk’ (Sū. 4, 1, 1), or just as we extract the delicate fibre out of the munja-grass, even so with courage, skill, and constant meditation, we should separate from the body and bring out of it the lustrous, immortal Being. The Atman, is hidden like a razor in the razor-case, within the sheath of our body upto the very nails and hair (Ka. 2, 3, 17), as also within the other four sheaths of vital air, mind, intellect and bliss; but when it is meditated upon, it forthwith assumes the form of our body and appears before us in a column of light. And further, Sankara tells us his own story: ‘Combining the sound (of the Name) with the wind (of the breath), let my mind be merged on the foot of Viṣṇu’ (Yogatārāvali 2, 11). Now the sound may be construed as the mystic unstruck sound which one is said to hear during meditation; but till this does not arise, it may be the inarticulate sound which is mentally felt to be heard, as soon as there emerges an idea or vṛtti after one utters the word Om mentally. Now this mentally heard sound or the idea of Om can be combined with either the breath alone, or with the
breath and the unstruck additional sound which the mystic may hear. Further, as according to Yoga, the nature of pavana or wind (breath) and that of mind being the same, the idea 'Om' will continue to be uttered mentally and heard mentally with or without the additional unstruck sound which is nothing but the audible manifestation of the Ātman. In short, the meditation of an advaitin will bring about the fusion of the mind, the breath, the Om, and the suprasensibly audible sound, as also the visible forms of the Ātman. Bhakti or upāsanā will thus culminate in the jñāna, i.e., the vision of the Ātman, and yet be continuous with it.

Though meditation thus culminates in the vision of the meditated Ātman, so long as there is life there ought to be no end to meditation; for there will be no end to the manifestation of the Ātman in all its glorious forms, whether it is by day or by night. Now, excepting in the case of very highly advanced mystics who may meditate at any place, at any time, and in any posture, with an equally, unfailing concentration of mind, meditation should be done in a sitting posture and in some undisturbed solitary place, in order to achieve physical fitness, peace and purity of mind, and freedom from sloth, sleep, and other worries and distractions of the mind. The Ātman should be first seen in solitude before it can be seen in the hubbub of a city life and in the midst of crowds, and in the fields of battle. It is to be seen when the body is in perfect health before it can be seen when the body is on rack, so that, finally, one should be able to say with the Bhagavadgītā that the mind of the yogin, as it is lodged in Brahman, is not disturbed even by the greatest of miseries, just as the flame remains undisturbed in a place where there is no wind (B. G. 6).

6. The mystic lives for the sake of humanity.

As the meditator derives the qualities of that on which he meditates (Chā. 1, 1, 7), and as Om is the symbol for the saguṇa as well as the nirguṇa Brahman,
it is but natural that the Brahma-yogin is at once the receptacle of qualities like sinlessness, omniscience, power, glory, etc., as also of pure consciousness and bliss. Like Yajnavalkya, he becomes a sovereign both ways, i.e., from the viewpoints of mundane prosperity and spiritual knowledge. Whatever desire he may cherish, it is immediately fulfilled; and yet he has no desire except that of the Atman. Even the ordinary *desires of having food and water* Sankara tells us, *are satisfied in the case of gods, not by actual eating and drinking, but by the mere sight of the Vision. All the organs get their nourishment by experiencing the Atman* (Ch. 3, 6, 1-2). As the Light of the vision before him never sets, he can be said to be always awake, and yet not awake in the ordinary sense. He combines in him the simplicity and innocence of a child and the mature wisdom of a sage, and yet prefers silence to talkativeness (Bra. Su. 3, 4, 47-50), because with all his unchallenged philosophical knowledge, he knows that Brahmanubhava is a matter of silent enjoyment. Unfortunately, an outsider who looks at him only externally considers such a mystic as stupid or unintelligent; and the irony is that Sankara appears to have lent support to this misunderstanding by advocating that *the wise should secretly observe his duty; unknown should he pass his life and move on this earth, as if he were blind, stupid, and deaf, and leave behind him no trace of his name* (Bra. Su. 3, 4, 50). *Let him be in the midst of *upâdhis*, says he in another place, *the muni should be, like the sky, unaffected by their qualities; knowing all he should behave as if he is a fool; unattached to anything, he should move like wind* (Atmabodha, 52).

And if one poses the question, *why should he move at all?* the proper answer would not be that he moves because he has a body, and that therefore *he must wait till it falls*; for one who is lodged in Brahman (Jivanmukta) need not think that the videhamukti is to come after death. He is already enjoying the latter even while he is living; for he is, truly speaking,
unaffected by what happens to the body. His prārabdha karma may have its destruction at any time. He moves in the world because he is the most kind-hearted of all (Paramakāruṇika'), and like wind in the natural world, distributes freely and selflessly the harvest of the spiritual realm to the humanity at large. Only the latter should care to approach him and have it.